Principles  of  Strategy 

WITH  HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 


BY 

COLONEL  WILLIAM  K.  NAYLOR 

GENERAL  STAFF 

DIRECTOR  OF  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  SCHOOL 
THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 
FORT  LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS 

1920-1921 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS  PRESS 
FORT  LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS 


1921 


u 


7n  time  of  war,  when  danger  dread  is  nigh, 
'God  and  the  soldier'  is  the  people's  cry; 
But  peace  restored,  the  country  safely  righted, 
God  is  forgotten,  and  the  soldier  slighted." 


COPYRIGHT  APPLIED  FOR 

In  name  of 
W.   K.   Naylor 


PREFACE 

On  the  reopening  of  The  General  Service  Schools  in 
September,  1919,  and  my  return  to  my  former  position  as 
Instructor  in  Strategy  and  Military  History,  I  found  that  a 
desire  had  developed  among  American  officers  for  American 
text-books. 

To  meet  this  expressed  desire  and  to  write  a  text-book 
that  could  be  available  during  the  course,  I  merely  had  an 
opportunity  to  assemble  the  notes  I  had  used  in  the  past, 
supplementing  them  with  such  reference  to  The  World  War 
as  the  time  would  permit. 

Many  of  the  illustrations  used  have  been  taken  from 
our  own  Civil  War.  In  some  cases,  illustrations  from  other 
text-book  writers  have  been  adopted.  These  illustrations 
have  been  verified  and  in  many  cases  amplified. 

In  general,  the  form  of  von  der  Goltz's  Conduct  of 
War,  which  had  been  used  in  these  schools  as  a  text-book, 
has  been  followed.  The  introduction,  and  Chapter  V,  in  so 
far  as  it  deals  with  the  German  and  French  mobilizations  ' 
of  1866-1870,  have  been  taken  largely  from  Derrecagaix's 
Modern  War.  The  chapter  on  Finance  follows  closely 
Cordonnier's  The  Japanese  in  Manchuria. 

To  these  writers  I  desire  to  give  full  credit ;  also  to  the 
following  persons  whose  writings  I  have  studied,  making 
extracts,  notations,  and  getting  ideas  therefrom : 

War  of  Today — von  Bernhardi. 

Organization — Foster. 

The  Principles  of  Strategy — Foch. 

Operations  of  War — Hamley. 

Military  Operations  and  Maritime  Preponderance — Callwell. 

On  War — von  Clausewitz. 

Germany  in  Defeat — de  Souza. 

Dardanelles  Campaign — Nevinson.*    • 

Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate — Alexander. 

The  Nation  in  Arms — von  der  Goltz. 

La  Conduite  de  la  Guerre — Foch. 

American  Campaigns — Steele. 

Organization  and  Tactics — Wagner. 

Art  of  War — Jomini. 

Letters  on  Strategy — Hohenlohe  Ingelfingen. 

Napoleon  as  a  General — Count  York  von  Wartenburg. 

Campaign  in  Thrace — Howell. 

Germany  in  the  Next  War — Bernhardi. 


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PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY 


• 


CHAPTER  I 


The  Study  of  Military  History  and 
Strategy 


INTRODUCTION 

A  KNOWLEDGE  of  the  art  of  war  is  indispensable  to 
-**•  the  officer.  It  was  by  placing  himself  in  this  frame 
of  mind  that  Marshal  Gouvion  St.  Cyr  was  able  to  char- 
acterize it  as  follows :  "The  art  of  war  is  an  art  for  the 
general,  a  science  for  the  officer  and  a  trade  for  the  sol- 
dier." The  study  of  this  art,  then,  should  prepare  the  of- 
ficer to  come  to  a  rapid  decision  in  the  difficult  situations 
arising  in  the  field,  less  perhaps  by  the  precepts  and  ex- 
amples with  which  it  acquaints  him,  than  by  the  method 
of  reasoning,  the  force  of  will,  the  energy  which  it  teaches 
him  to  develop,  and  the  ability  and  willingness  it  incul- 
cates in  him  to  make  positive  and  clear  cut  decisions 
promptly.  An  eminent  authority  has  defined  the  art  of  war 
as  "The  art  of  making  use  of  the  given  means  of  fighting." 
In  its  broadest  sense  it  includes  all  the  activities  that  have 
their  existence  on  account  of  war,  such  as  the  calling  forth 
of  troops  and  the  mobilizing,  equipping,  training,  concen- 
trating and  actual  fighting  of  them.  In  principle,  the  art  of 
war  should  be  enunciated  in  the  form  of  maxims,  such  as 
those  of  Napoleon,  and  doctrines,  such  as  those  of  von 
Bernhardi,  and  should  constitute  an  ensemble  capable  of  in- 
forming with  precision  the  mind  of  the  student  upon  the 
various  questions  it  embraces;  so  that  having  the  formula 
the  student  merely  applies  it  and  gets  the  result  prescribed. 
In  practice  this  is  quite  impossible  and  altogether  absurd. 
We  might  at  this  point  create  a  maxim  as  follows :  It  is  not  so 
much  to  know  the  rules  of  warfare  as  it  is  to  know  how  to 
apply  them.  The  circumstances  under  which  military  opera- 
tions are  executed  are  so  manifold  that  two  situations  ex- 


2  STRATEGY 

actly  alike  will  hardly  ever  be  discovered.  Yet  we  do  find 
campaigns  where  almost  identical  conditions  and  situations 
have  existed  and  the  outcome  of  and  the  general  results  at- 
tained by  the  application  of  the  same  strategical  and  tactical 
principles  have  been  diametrically  the  opposite.  Why  is 
this?  The  answer  must  be  given  that  there  are  other  con- 
ditions and  circumstances  that  influence  the  conduct  of 
battles  and  campaigns  than  mere  principles. 

Some  of  these  conditions  and  circumstances  are  those 
of  morale  and  the  training  of  troops,  difference  in  leader- 
ship, difference  in  the  support  afforded  by  the  people  of  the 
country,  and  so  on.  In  other  words,  psychology.  If  there 
is  any  one  thing  that  the  Prussian  system  of  training  did 
not  teach  it  was  that.  The  art  of  war  is  not  an  exact 
science,  but  the  Germans  apparently  thought  it  was.  By 
all  rules  of  the  game,  Belgium  should  not  have  been  fool- 
ish enough  to  have  resisted;  South  Africa  should  have 
thrown  off  the  British  yoke ;  the  Indian  princes  should  have 
taken  up  arms  in  revolt;  and  the  United  States,  having  no 
definite  military  policy,  should  not  have  been  able  to  raise 
an  army.  The  estimating  of  these  conditions  and  circum- 
stances is  the  true  test  of  ability  in  the  application  of  the 
principles  and  precepts  of  war.  The  use  of  the  retreating 
defensive  by  the  French,  culminating  in  the  battle  of  the 
Marne  in  the  recent  war,  was  only  possible  for  the  reason 
that  the  French  people  were  with  the  government,  body  and 
soul,  and  had  a  heart  in  the  war.  The  advance  of  the  al- 
lies toward  France  in  1815  was  along  the  same  line,  yet  Na- 
poleon was  not  able,  nor  did  he  dare  to  take  up  the  de- 
fensive for  the  reason  that  the  French  people,  as  a  na- 
tion, were  tired  of  war  and  would  not  have  submitted  vol- 
untarily to  another  invasion.  So  we  see  from  this  illus- 
tration, more  or  less  fresh  in  our  minds,  that  we  may  have 
two  cases  almost  exactly  alike  and  yet,  for  rea- 
sons other  than  strictly  military,  requiring  the  application 
of  different  principles.  The  difference  in  the  capacity  of 
commanders  also  exerts  a  great  influence  in  the  applica- 
tion of  principles.  An  audacious  general  will  take  the  of- 
fensive, although  not  without  due  preparation,  while  a 
weak  and  vacillating  man  will  fall  back  on  the  defensive 
or,  if  he  takes  the  offensive,  do  it  without  proper  prepara- 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  3 

tion.  The  plan  of  operations  contemplated  by  Napoleon  III 
for  the  invasion  of  Prussia  in  1870  was  almost  exactly  the 
same  that  his  illustrious  uncle  carried  out  in  1806  against 
the  same  foe.  The  plan  in  1806  succeeded  because  a  mas- 
ter was  in  command,  but  so  much  cannot  be  said  for  the 
plan  and  the  commander  in  1870.  When  Sherman,  before 
Atlanta,  heard  that  Hood  had  succeeded  Johnston,  he  got 
ready  for  an  attack  and  was  not  disappointed.  He  be- 
came familiar  with  Hood's  sanguine  and  impetuous  tempera- 
ment while  with  him  in  the  Corps  at  the  United  States 
Military  Academy. 

Napoleon's  first  and  last  campaigns  offered  exactly  the 
same  opportunity  in  the  application  of  strategical  princi- 
ples, yet  he  lost  his  last  campaign  for  the  reason  that  he 
did  not  have  as  competent  subordinates  as  he  did  in  his 
first.  In  his  first  campaign  in  1796,  he  effected  strategical 
penetration,  driving  the  Austrians  and  Piedmontese  asun- 
der and,  as  a  result,  Beaulieu  retired  toward  Milan,  away  . 
from  his  ally,  and  that  ally,  Colli,  retired  toward  Turin  so 
that  Napoleon  was  able  to  defeat  each  in  detail.  However, 
in  1815,  in  the  Waterloo  campaign  where  conditions  were 
identical,  the  same  thing  occurred.  Blucher  retired 
toward  his  ally,  and  not  toward  Cologne  and  the  Rhine 
frontier,  as  Napoleon  expected,  and  swung  around  across 
the  Dyle,  uniting  with  Wellington,  and  consummated  the 
overthrow  of  Bonaparte.  Napoleon  failed  to  select  a  proper 
man  for  independent  command,  for  had  he  a  Lannes  or 
a  Desaix  instead  of  the  incompetent  Grouchy,  the  outcome 
of  Waterloo  would  doubtless  have  been  different,  and  that 
name  would  not  forever  afterwards  have  been  a  synonym 
for  complete  overthrow  and  disaster.  In  defense  of  Na- 
poleon we  will  have  to  admit  that  the  field  of  selection  at 
that  stage  of  his  career  was  rather  limited.  He  himself  has 
remarked  that  he  was  not  as  well  served  as  he  had  reason 
to  expect.  While  it  may  seem  presumptuous  to  criticise  the 
master,  yet  everyone  will  have  to  admit  that  Napoleon  in 
1815  was  a  victim  of  his  own  system,  the  "one  man."  Such 
a  system  does  not  build  up  subordinates  who  can  and  will 
act  on  their  own  initiative  when  thrown  on  their  own  re- 
sources. When  the  "one  man"  is  not  physically  up  to  the 
requirements  of  the  system,  and  Napoleon  in  1815  was  not 


4  STRATEGY 

physically  the  Napoleon  of  1796,  the  subordinates  grope 
around  in  the  dark,  not  knowing  whether  to  go  east  or 
west,  north  or  south.  Count  D'Erlon  on  June  16th  vacil- 
lated between  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras  when,  had  he  gone 
to  either  place  and  participated  in  the  action,  a  decisive 
victory  would  have  been  gained. 

From  this  discussion  we  see  that  "a  mere  knowledge  of 
strategy  may  be  of  doubtful  value."  The  blind  application 
of  maxims  with  the  expectation  that  good  results  will  nec- 
essarily follow  and  that  we  already  have  the  answer  the 
moment  we  launch  forward,  has  never  developed  a  general  of 
any  consequence.  In  the  valor  of  our  ignorance  we  are  too 
apt  to  place  too  high  a  value  on  the  knowledge  of  the  art 
of  war  and,  just  because  we  have  generals  who  have  delved 
into  the  theory,  to  think  that  we  have  Napoleons  in  practice. 
We  have  many  generals  who  have  risen  to  highest  rank  as 
commanders  who  possessed  little  or  no  academic  military 
education.  Why  is  this  ?  It  is  because  the  knowledge  of  the 
art  of  war  is  very  simple  but  not,  at  the  same  time,  easy 
to  master.  To  be  a  competent  commander  it  is  not  "neces- 
sary to  be  a  learned  explorer  of  history  or  a  publicist,  but 
it  is  necessary  to  be  well  versed  in  the  higher  affairs  of 
state."  The  general  must  be  able  to  judge  correctly  tradi- 
tional tendencies,  interests  at  stake,  the  immediate  ques- 
tions at  issue,  the  character  of  leading  persons;  he  need 
not  know  minutely  all  the  details  of  the  various  arms  of 
the  service,  but  he  must  know  their  powers  and  limitations. 
He  need  not  be  familiar  with  von  der  Goltz's  Conduct  of 
War,  or  Napoleon's  War  Maxims,  the  works  of  Hamley,  von 
Bernhardi,  Foch,  et  al.,  but  unless  he  understands  how  to 
use  the  rules  therein  in  practice,  either  consciously  or  sub- 
consciously, he  will  never  rise  above  hopeless  mediocrity. 
A  natural  born  leader  is  developed  and  improved  by  the 
study  of  military  art,  but  never  is  made  thereby.  We  hear 
so  often  the  statement,  "He  is  a  practical  soldier,  not  a 
theorist."  Too  often  he  is  neither.  For  one  cannot  be 
practical  without  knowing  the  theory,  although  that  theory 
may  not  have  been  learned  in  an  academy.  And  right  here 
we  have  .the  dividing  line  between  military  study  as  a 
science  and  military  study  as  an  art.  There  is  a  time  when 
all  the  fruits  of  this  study  pass  from  the  objective  stage 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND   STRATEGY  5 

into  that  of  the  mind.  In  all  professions  the  active  agent 
learns  his  theory  from  books,  some  of  them  long  since  dis- 
carded and  relegated  to  the  musty  back  shelves  of  the  li- 
brary ;  afterwards  he  applies  the  principles  to  concrete  cases 
and  thereby  makes  his  science  an  art. 

THE  STUDY  OF  MILITARY  HISTORY  AS  A  SUBSTITUTE 

The  study  of  precedents  has  been  carried  so  far  in  some 
schools  that  they  eschew  the  study  of  the  art  of  war  as  a 
science  but  leave  the  student  to  get  his  ideas  from  the  read- 
ing of  history,  careful  observation  of  extensive  exercises 
with  troops  and  by  reflection.  For  their  authority  they  cite 
Napoleon's  78th  War  Maxim:  "Read  and  re-read  the  cam- 
paigns of  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar,  Gustavus  Adolphus, 
Turenne,  Eugene  and  Frederick;  take  them  for  your  model; 
that  is  the  only  way  of  becoming  a  great  captain,  to  ob- 
tain the  secrets  of  the  art  of  war."  But  the  student  must 
not  pursue  his  task  from  the  point  of  the  historian  but  from 
that  of  the  soldier,  only  being  a  historian  long  enough  to 
become  informed  as  to  what  occurred  and  then  as  a  sol- 
dier applying  the  lessons  to  concrete  cases.  The  general 
character  of  this  study  should  consist  in  the  adoption  of 
a  practical  method;  that  is,  the  application  of  the  theoreti- 
cal knowledge  to  all  military  questions  that  can  present 
themselves  in  practice.  In  order  to  give  to  this  method  its 
greatest  efficacy  it  is  essential  to  utilize  the  productive  ca- 
pacity of  the  officers,  so  that  practice  may  be  benefited  by 
scientific  instructions,  and  that  the  developing  facilities 
may  be  judiciously  recognized.  In  time  of  war,  deeds  play 
a  more  important  part  than  words;  action  surpasses 
thought;  practice  dominates  theory.  It  is  not  sufficient 
then  merely  to  grasp  principles :  it  is.  necessary  to  meditate 
upon  them  and  to  examine  them  thoroughly  in  their  appli- 
cations. 

•  There  is  a  considerable  interval  between  knowledge  of 
principles  and  the  faculty  of  making  them  of  service  in  com- 
ing to  a  decision.  The  method  of  study  pursued  should  tend 
to  abridge  this  interval.  It  is  by  so  doing  that  an  officer 
succeeds  in  acquiring  the  energy  and  force  of  will  so  im- 
portant in  actual  service.  Men  imbued  with  only  ordinary 


6  STRATEGY 

strength  of  character  can  form  a  clear  and  energetic  de- 
cision and  put  it  into  execution,  if  they  have  ac- 
quired the  faculty  of  guiding  their  course  with  requisite 
circumspection  and  dispatch  under  difficult  circumstances. 
The  possession  of  this  faculty  is  one  of  the  results  of 
study.  Lacking  it,  irresolute  persons,  when  thrown  upon 
their  own  resources,  display  an  entire  collapse  of  the  moral 
elements.  The  practical  method  should  aim  at  exciting 
mental  spontaneity  in  an  officer.  To  sum  it  up,  the  principal 
aim  of  the  study  of  military  art  is  to  improve  the  intelli- 
gence and  judgment  of  the  officer  in  combining  instructions 
with  the  widest  exercise  of  his  moral  faculties  in  practice. 
This  end  is  gained  by  utilizing  the  lessons  taught  by  exper- 
ience. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  hear  what  Napoleon  had  to 
say  on  the  subject.  He  wrote  from  Finkelstein,  April 
19,  1807,  in  about  this  mind:  "A  proper  understanding  of 
military  art  would  necessitate  a  knowledge  of  the  various 
plans  of  campaign  adopted  in  the  different  periods  of  his- 
tory, whether  for  invasion  or  defense;  the  origin  of  suc- 
cesses, the  causes  of  defeats,  the  commanders  themselves, 
the  memoirs  in  which  may  be  found  the  details  of  the  facts 
and  the  evidences  of  the  results.  This  part  of  history,  in- 
teresting for  everyone,  has  a  peculiar  importance  for  mili- 
tary men.  In  the  special  school  of  the  engineer  may  be 
learned  the  art  of  attacking  and  defending  fortified  places; 
but  the  art  of  war  in  its  larger  aspects  cannot  be  taught 
because  it  has  not  been  created  if  indeed  it  ever  can  be; 
nevertheless,  a  study  of  history  that  would  make  known  to 
us  how  our  frontiers  have  been  defended  in  different  wars 
by  celebrated  captains  would  be  productive  of  great  benefit. 
I  have  studied  history  a  great  deal,  and  often  for  want  of 
a  guide,  have  been  forced  to  lose  considerable  time  in  use- 
less reading.  Without  this  study,  soldiers  during  many 
years  of  their  career  will  lack  the  means  of  profiting  by  the 
mistakes  which  have  occasioned  reverses  and  of  appreciating 
the  dispositions  that  would  have  prevented  them.  The  en- 
tire war  of  the  Revolution  is  fertile  in  useful  lessons;  but 
to  gather  them,  long  application  and  extended  research  are 
requisite.  This  does  not  arise  from  the  lack  of  a  detailed 
record  of  the  facts,  for  they  have  been  written  about  every- 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND   STRATEGY  7 

where  and  in  every  style;  but  because  no  one  has  applied 
himself  to  the  task  of  making  research  easy  and  of  point- 
ing out  the  way  to  make  it  with  discrimination."  From  the 
study  of  military  history  we  deduce  our  principles  and  then 
from  the  study  of  that  same  military  history  we  see  our 
principles  tried  out.  It  is  true,  as  has  been  already  stated, 
that  one  finds  some  campaigns  won  by  reckless  violation 
of  the  known  and  accepted  principles  and  yet  commanded 
by  men  who  in  event  of  disaster  could  not  have  plead  ignor- 
ance. Had  General  R.  E.  Lee  been  defeated  in  the  second 
Manassas  campaign  he  would  not  have  had  any  justifica- 
tion in  preparing  a  defense  for  his  movements.  He  violated 
nearly  every  known  rule  of  strategy — he  divided  his  army 
in  the  presence  of  a  superior  enemy;  he  surrendered  the 
advantages  of  interior  lines  to  Pope  and  rushed  Jackson 
to  Manassas  Junction  with  18,000  men,  while  he,  with  Long- 
street,  was  west  of  Thoroughfare  Gap  with  about  25,000 
and  Pope  was  at  Gainesville,  between  these  two  points,  with 
a  force  double  of  either.  When  asked  why  he  took  these 
chances  General  Lee  said:  "The  disparity  of  numbers  jus- 
tified any  risk."  Had  General  Lee  waited  and  been  less 
active  he  would  have  had  McClellan  and  Pope  both  on  his 
hands  at  the  same  time  and  their  total  strength  would  have 
been  about  130,000  as  against  his  approximately  58,000 
men.  In  this  instance  Lee  showed  that  rare  trait  in  a  gen- 
eral of  being  able  to  judge  capacity  in  a  subordinate.  He 
knew,  that  with  Jackson,  all  that  was  necessary  was  merely 
to  indicate  a  desire  and  the  impetuous  Stonewall  would 
instantly  put  it  into  execution.  If  care  is  taken  to  look  the 
matter  up,  it  will  be  found  that  after  the  death  of  Stonewall 
Jackson  at  Chancellorsville,  Lee  never  tried  any  more  of 
his  complicated  movements  nor  attempted  to  turn  the  enemy 
«ut  of  position  by  wide  detours. 

Authorities  agree  that  acquaintance  with  military  his- 
tory is  one  of  the  most  effectual  means  of  learning  the 
science  and  art  of  war  in  time  of  peace,  and  the  most  solid 
basis  of  assimilating  its  great  principles.  It  should  take 
into  account  the  larger  questions  in  the  operations  of  war 
and  the  management  of  armies.  It  should  bring  the  student 
in  touch  with  the  military  art  of  the  present  time  so  that 
he  will  become  familiar  with  active  armies  in  the  field.  It 


8  STRATEGY 

should  bring  before  him  continually  the  relation  between 
time  and  distance  on  the  ground.  It  will  prepare  him  to 
keep  a  clear  head  and  a  warm  heart  in  danger,  and  finally, 
by  studying  military  art  in  connection  with  the  military  his- 
tory of  one's  own  country,  it  will  exalt  continually  the  senti- 
ments of  patriotism. 

From  all  this  it  may  be  accepted  that  the  study 
of  military  art  and  science  and  that  of  military  history 
are  inseparable. 

It  may  appear  odd  that  most  of  the  illustrations  herein 
have  been  taken  from  past  wars,  particularly  those  of  Napo- 
leon, with  The  World  War  so  fresh  before  us.  General 
Savoff,  chief  of  staff  of  the  Bulgarian  army  in  its  recent  war 
with  Turkey,  says  the  following  which  justifies  the  selection : 
"As  for  the  methods  of  war  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
art  of  war  has  unchangeable  principles.  For  that  one  must 
always  go  back  to  Napoleon  I  for  the  essential  bases  of 
the  subject.  The  strategical  principles  of  Napoleon  I  are 
unchangeable."  The  principles  of  military  art  are  continu- 
ing, but  tactics  have  changed,  so  in  applying  principles,  one 
must  always  keep  in  mind  the  changes  in  tactics  caused 
by  state  of  development  of  weapons,  the  mediums  of  in- 
formation and  communication,  and  the  scientific  improve- 
ment of  all  the  war  agencies.  Another  reason  why  we  do 
not  get  all  of  our  illustrations  from  The  World  War  is 
that  it  is  too  soon  after  the  events  to  know,  with  sufficient 
accuracy,  exactly  what  happened  everywhere,  so  it  is  not 
safe  yet  to  apply  our  principles. 

In  the  study  of  military  art  it  often  becomes  necessary 
for  the  novice  to  delve  into  the  voluminous  works  on  the 
subject,  such  as  Derrecagaix,  Hamley,  Bernhardi,  von  der 
Goltz,  Foch  and  others,  either  to  learn  from  the  outset  or 
to  refresh  the  memory.  Often  these  books  are  written  in 
a  language  with  which  he  is  not  familiar,  or  if  translated, 
a  copy  of  the  translation  is  not  available.  The  result  gen- 
erally is  that  the  novice  becomes  discouraged  with  the  appar- 
ently endless  task  before  him  and  either  grows  indifferent  or 
gives  up  completely  in  despair.  It  is  to  overcome  this  dif- 
ficulty that  the  subject  is  presented  in  the  form  the  ensu- 
ing course  will  take.  It  is  but  a  short  and  concise  presen- 


MILITARY   HISTORY   AND    STRATEGY  9 

tation  which  indicates  the  way  and  points  out  the  route  that 
may  be  followed  in  further  research. 

In  a  great  many  of  the  books  on  this  subject  we  find 
matters  of  logistics,  mobilization  and  concentration  dis- 
cussed in  detail  and  which  can  only  be  understood  by  a 
careful  study  of  a  great  many  subjects  foreign  to  the  art 
of  war.  Such  matters  will  only  be  touched  on  in  so  far  as 
is  necessary  to  bring  out  the  subjects  to  be  discussed.  Bear 
in  mind  that,  as  already  intimated,  military  science  is  not 
an  exact  science.  One  must  always  figure  on  a  large  factor 
of  safety,  for  plans  do  not  always  work  out  exactly  as  in- 
tended. Take  the  middle  of  the  road  between  extreme 
caution  and  audacity.  The  Germans  in  the  recent  struggle 
lost  because  their  continued  military  study  had  made  them 
think  that  their  deductions  and  calculations  were  infallible. 
A  little  country  like  Belgium  should  not  have  had  the  audac- 
ity to  stand  against  collosal  Germany ;  but  if  it  did  have  the 
audacity,  it  should  not  have  been  strong  enough  to  have 
made  any  impression.  Modern  fortifications  should  not  have 
been  strong  enough  to  have  delayed  the  advance  of  an  army 
supported  by  modern  artillery.  But  the  Belgians  did  have 
the  audacity,  they  were  strong  enough  to  delay  the  Germans, 
and  their  fortifications  at  Liege  were  strong  enough  to  hold 
up  the  advance  for  several  days,  with  the  result  that  the  Ger- 
mans arrived  on  the  Sambre  to  find  the  French  and  British 
Expeditionary  Forces  waiting  for  them.  Take  all  the  neces- 
sary precautions,  take  a  liberal  factor  of  safety,  and  then 
go  ahead.  Captain  Mahan,  in  referring  to  the  allegation 
that  Nelson  and  Farragut  were  foolhardy,  denied  it  and 
stated  "the  average  man  wants  to  be  too  much  too  sure 
of  success  before  he  will  start."  George  B.  McClellan  was 
a  good  illustration  of  a  man  who  wanted  to  be  perfectly 
sure  of  success.  In  modern  war  our  curbstone  strate- 
gist and  vinegar  barrel  tactician  has  all  the  necessary  con- 
fidence in  himself,  but  no  one  else  has.  He  can  always  fight 
the  war  better  than  the  general  in  command  and  does  not 
hesitate  to  say  so,  meanwhile  keeping  well  away  from  the 
recruiting  office.  A  famous  orator,  probably  known  to  you, 
once  announced  in  stentorian  tones  that  e'er  the  sun  sinks 
over  the  horizon  on  the  day  the  President  issues  a  call,  a 
million  men  will  spring  to  arms.  He  lulled  many  of  his 


10  STRATEGY 

hearers  to  sleep  by  his  rhapsody  and  they  awoke  to  find  out 
that  it  was  over  a  year  after  we  had  gotten  into  The  World 
War  before  we  had  a  million  men  in  France. 

A  Roman  general  gave  the  following  as  his  opinion  of 
"military  critics." 

"Lucius  Aemilius,  a  Roman  consul,  who  had  been  se- 
lected to  conduct  the  war  with  the  Macedonians,  B.  C.  168, 
went  out  from  the  Senate  House  into  the  assembly  of  the 
people  and  addressed  them  as  follows: 

"  'In  every  circle,  and  truly,  at  every  table,  there  are 
people  who  lead  armies  into  Macedonia;  who  know  where 
the  army  ought  to  be  placed;  what  posts  ought  to  be  oc- 
cupied by  troops;  when  and  through  what  pass  Macedonia 
should  be  entered ;  where  magazines  should  be  formed ;  how 
provisions  should  be  conveyed  by  land  and  sea;  and  when 
it  is  proper  to  engage  the  enemy,  when  to  lie  quiet.  And 
they  not  only  determine  what  is  best  to  be  done,  but  if  any- 
thing is  done  in  any  other  manner  than  what  they  have 
pointed  out,  they  arraign  the  consul,  as  if  he  were  on  trial. 
These  are  great  impediments  to  those  who  have  the  man- 
agement of  affairs;  for  everyone  cannot  encounter  injur- 
ious reports  with  the  same  constancy  and  firmness  of  mind 
as  Fabius  did,  who  chose  to  let  his  own  authority  be  di- 
minished through  the  folly  of  the  people  rather  than  to 
mismanage  the  public  business  with  a  high  reputation.  I 
am  not  one  of  those  who  think  that  commanders  ought 
never  to  receive  advice ;  on  the  contrary,  I  should  deem  that 
man  more  proud  than  wise  who  did  everything  of  his  own 
single  judgment.  What  then  is  my  opinion?  That  com- 
manders should  be  counselled,  chiefly,  by  persons  of  known 
talent;  by  those,  especially,  who  are  skilled  in  the  art  of 
war,  and  who  have  been  taught  by  experience;  and,  next, 
by  those  who  are  present  at  the  scene  of  action,  who  see 
the  country,  who  see  the  enemy;  who  see  the  advantages 
that  occasions  offer,  and  w^ho,  embarked,  as  it  were,  in 
the  same  ship,  are  sharers  of  the  danger.  If,  therefore, 
any  one  thinks  himself  qualified  to  give  advice  respecting 
the  war  which  I  am  to  conduct,  which  may  prove  advan- 
tageous to  the  public,  let  him  not  refuse  his  assistance  to 
the  state,  but  let  him  come  with  me  into  Macedonia.  He 
shall  be  furnished  by  me  with  a  ship,  a  horse,  a  tent;  and 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  11 

even  with  his  traveling  charges.  But  if  he  thinks  this  too 
much  trouble,  and  prefers  the  repose  of  a  city  life  to  the 
toils  of  war,  let  him  not,  on  land,  assume  the  office  of  a 
pilot.  The  city,  in  itself,  furnishes  abundance  of  topics  for 
conversation ;  let  it  confine  its  passion  for  talking,  and  rest 
assured,  that  we  shall  be  content  with  such  councils  as 
shall  be  framed  within  our  camp.' '  (Livy,  Book  XLIV, 
Chapter  22.) 

The  most  logical  way  to  introduce  clearness  into  the 
treatment  of  this  subject  is  to  pursue  the  order  approach- 
ing nearest  the  reality  of  facts  in  war;  that  is  to  say,  to 
follow  an  army  in  the  principal  events  of  its  career,  conse- 
quently to  study  its  organization,  its  preparation  for  war, 
its  mobilization,  its  transport  service,  its  deployment  upon 
the  frontier,  its  strategic  marches,  and  finally,  its  offensive 
and  defensive  operations. 

The  study  of  military  art  begins  with  a  study  of  mili- 
tary history  and  then  goes  naturally  into  that  of  strategy 
and  tactics,  or  grand  tactics,  as  it  is  sometimes  called.  The 
history  serves  especially  to  illustrate  the  principles  of 
strategy  and  tactics.  In  this  form  the  facts  disclosed 
strike  the  student  more  forcibly.  Clausewitz  says  that 
historical  illustrations  may  be  of  value  if  used  first — merely 
to  explain  an  idea.  In  every  abstract  consideration  it 
is  very  easy  to  be  misunderstood  or  not  intelligible  at  all. 
When  a  speaker  or  author  is  afraid  of  this,  an  exemplifica- 
tion from  military  history  ensures  that  speaker  or  author 
of  being  understood ;  second — the  propounder  may  be  enun- 
ciating certain  theoretical  principles  and  to  show  their  ap- 
plication he  cites  a  campaign  or  battle  and  then  shows  how 
his  principles  are  illustrated;  third — in  another  case  the 
propounder  may  be  making  a  statement,  the  correctness  of 
the  application  of  which  may  be  doubted,  so  he  shows  by 
an  historical  illustration  that  it  can  and  did  happen ;  fourth 
—then  again  a  propounder  may  cite  several  historical  cases 
all  along  the  same  line  from  which  to  deduce  a  principle 
or  establish  a  doctrine. 

The  division  between  tactics  and  strategy  is  generally 
known  and  everyone  knows  fairly  well  under  which  head 
to  place  any  single  act,  without  knowing  very  distinctly  the 
grounds  on  which  the  classification  is  founded.  The  sub- 


12  STRATEGY 

jects  under  discussion  naturally  form  the  two  grand  branches 
of  the  science  and  rest  upon  principles  whose  elucidation, 
to  insure  clearness,  require  determinate  order.  These  prin- 
ciples present  two  series  of  distinct  ideas,  the  one  relating 
to  operations  and  the  other  to  battles.  The  first,  which  are 
ordinarily  the  prelude  to  the  conflict,  belongs  generally  to  the 
domain  of  strategy ;  the  second  relates  to  tactics.  To  under- 
stand more  fully  the  application  of  the  principles  of  strat- 
egy and  tactics  one  should  be  familiar  with  the  organi- 
zation of  the  armies  at  that  time.  This,  however,  can 
hardly  be  taken  up  in  a  study  of  a  subject  so  limited  as  to 
time  as  this  one,  and  yet  it  is  particularly  necessary  to  be 
familiar  with  organization  in  the  study  of  tactics  in  bat- 
tle, for  we  all  know  that  the  tactics  of  'the  various  arms 
have  been  influenced  and  changed  by  the  introduction  of 
high  power  weapons  and  advanced  by  improvements  in  the 
munitions  of  war. 

It  is  hardly  necessary,  in  passing,  to  more  than  touch 
on  the  different  kinds  of  war,  for  in  modern  times  we  will 
have  seen  one  kind  worth  while,  and  that  one  will  be  a 
rising  of  the  nation  in  arms. 

When  we  come  to  it,  we  will  take  up  the  question  of  a 
correct  definition  of  strategy,  but  at  the  outset  of  the  study 
it  is  only  necessary  to  adopt  a  logical  definition,  and  to  in- 
dicate plainly  the  ideas  forming  the  starting  point.  Dur- 
ing the  past  years,  principally  since  the  Franco-Prussian 
War,  authors  have  been  trying  to  frame  numerous  defini- 
tions of  strategy  and  tactics.  Some,  desirous  of  finding  in 
new  arguments  a  remedy  for  past  mistakes,  have  sought  new 
theories  on  the  art  of  war.  Some  deny  that  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  strategy  and  attribute  all  success  in  war  to 
numbers  and  to  tactics.  Others  have  considered  the 
strategy  as  the  conception  and  tactics  as  the  execution  of 
an  idea.  Some  have  called  strategy  the  science  of  opera- 
tions and  tactics  that  of  battles.  The  Germans  call  strategy 
the  "art  of  the  general-in-chief."  The  term  "strategy"  is 
derived  from  the  Greek  strategos,  meaning  a  general,  hence 
the  German  definition. 

According  to  M.  Thiers  "strategy  should  conceive  the 
plan  of  campaign,  take  in  with  a  single  sweep  the  whole 
of  the  probable  theater  of  war,  mark  out  the  line  of  opera- 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  13 

tions,  and  direct  the  masses  upon  the  decisive  points.  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  tactician  to  regulate  the  order  of  marches, 
to  place  the  forces  for  battle  at  the  various  points  indicated 
by  the  strategist,  to  enter  upon  the  action,  sustain  it,  and 
maneuver  so  as  to  attain  the  end  proposed."  For  the  pur- 
poses of  this  study,  the  definition  of  Jomini  seems  to 
be  sufficient.  He  says  "strategy  is  the  art  of  ma- 
neuvering armies  in  the  theater  of  operations;  tactics,  the 
art  of  disposing  them  upon  the  battlefield."  It  will  be  un- 
derstood that  this  is  an  incomplete  definition  but  serves  the 
purpose  until  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  subject  is 
taken  in  its  proper  place.  As  has  already  been  stated,  one 
should  be  well  informed  as  to  the  strength  of  various  ar- 
mies and  their  subdivisions.  One  should  continually  carry 
in  the  mind  the  changes  that  have  taken  place,  and  con- 
sider whether  or  not  such  changes  will  permit  of  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  same  strategy  and  tactics  that  were  used  a 
hundred  years  ago.  Do  you  think  that  Napoleon  could  re- 
peat his  campaign  of  February,  1814,  where  he  took  advan- 
tage of  interior  lines  and  defeated  the  superior  forces  of 
Blucher  on  four  successive  days  at  Champaubert,  Montmir- 
ial,  Chateau  Thierry  and  Etoges  ?  Would  not  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  airplane  and  radio  made  the  quick  movements 
and  sudden  surprises  impossible?  Again,  to  under- 
stand the  real  value  of  an  army,  we  must  take  into  ac- 
count its  moral  strength,  the  means  of  creating  and  de- 
veloping this  quality,  and  the  importance  which  it  acquires 
amidst  the  actual  tests  of  war.  We  must  take  up  the  prac- 
tical reasons  that  have  made  the  modern  organization 
preferable  to  those  of  the  past. 

In  the  study  of  a  possible  war  between  one  country  and 
another,  one  of  the  first  things,  if  not  the  first,  is  to  make 
a  careful  study  of  the  probable  theater  of  war,  the  re- 
sources of  the  enemy,  and  the  adoption  of  a  possible  pro- 
ject of  operations.  From  these  considerations,  together  with 
a  study  of  the  hostile  military  organization,  one  will  be  able 
to  decide  whether  the  general  plan  will  be  the  strategical 
offensive  or  defensive.  A  careful  study  of  the  relative  merits 
of  the  strategic  offensive  and  defensive  would  logically  fol- 
low. Some  authors  will  tell  us  that  the  strategical  offensive 
is  preferable  while  others  will  tell  us  that  the  defensive 


14  STRATEGY 

strategically  is  preferable.  This  can  only  be  decided  after  a 
careful  study  of  the  other  conditions,  such  as  the  temper  of 
the  people,  popularity  of  the  war,  and  numbers  of  troops 
available  at  the  outset. 

STUDY  OF  THE  THEATER  OF  OPERATIONS 

The  study  of  the  theater  of  operations  requires  special 
attention.  It  is  upon  this  study,  and  the  more  or  less  fav- 
orable conditions  which  it  presents,  that  the  choice  of  the 
lines  of  operations  and  the  combinations  of  the  campaign 
depends.  The  many  changes  that  the  territory  has  under- 
gone during  the  successive  years  must  be  carefully  con- 
sidered. To  give  some  idea  of  the  direction  in  which  one 
must  look  for  changes  it  is  but  necessary  to  call  attention 
to  the  improvement  in  the  means  of  transmitting  intelli- 
gence at  the  present  time  as  compared  with  what  it  was 
twenty-five  years  ago.  Again,  we  must  take  into  considera- 
tion the  marvelous  improvement  in  fire  arms  and  munitions 
of  war  of  all  kinds,  and  the  new  forms  of  fortifications  that 
the  engineering  profession  has  developed.  The  introduction 
of  the  motor  truck  makes  it  practicable  to  concentrate  at 
points  where  a  few  years  ago  it  would  not  have  been 
deemed  possible  owing  to  their  supposed  isolation.  Frontier 
fortresses  that  would  have  made  it  impossible  to  advance 
by  a  certain  route  during  the  days  of  Napoleon  might  have 
no  more  effect  on  the  modern  advance  than  so  many  un- 
protected field  works.  During  the  years  prior  to  the  Franco- 
German  War  of  1870,  the  Germans  had  made  a  careful 
study  of  the  probable  theater  of  operations  in  France,  and 
as  it  turned  out  had  better  maps  of  France  than  the  French 
had  themselves,  not  neglecting,  however,  maps  of  their  own 
country.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French  had  most  detailed 
maps  of  Germany  but  very  incomplete  maps  of  their  own 
country. 

They  unquestionably  studied  the  possible  theater  of  op- 
erations but  not  the  probable  theater. 

The  study  of  the  theater  of  operations  naturally  leads 
up  to  the  study  of  the  resources  of  the  enemy.  This  of 
course  applies  most  particularly  to  that  part  of  the  enemy's 
territory,  or  the  territory  of  a  neutral  or  ally,  that  is  to  be 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  15 

the  scene  of  the  war.  It  should  be  known  what  the  aver- 
age annual  output  of  foodstuffs  of  all  kinds,  clothing  and 
other  material  is.  It  is  too  apparent  to  require  discussion 
that  a  highly  productive  section  will  maintain  an  invader 
and  make  it  possible  for  him  to  exploit  the  country  and 
lengthen  the  duration  of  the  war,  if  successful  on  the  bat- 
tlefield, for  a  longer  period  than  he  could  in  an  unproduc- 
tive section.  It  will  be  of  interest  to  know  that  both  Grant 
in  '63,  before  the  Vicksburg  campaign,  and  Sherman  in  '64 
before  his  so-called  "March  to  the  Sea,"  had  careful  statis- 
tical reports  made  of  the  perspective  theaters  of  operations, 
and  their,  movements  were  greatly  influenced  by  them.  The 
French  army  in  '59,  during  the  Wars  of  the  Italian  Unifi- 
cation, advanced  into  what  was  supposed  to  be  a  very  pro- 
ductive wheat  section  of  northern  Italy.  Relying  on  this 
condition  the  French  army  made  no  provision  regarding 
flour,  thinking  to  get  it  from  mills  in  the  country.  Upon 
arrival  it  was  discovered  that,  notwithstanding  the  country 
grew  a  great  deal  of  wheat,  most  of  it  was  shipped  abroad 
since,  due  to  the  peculiar  tastes  of  the  people,  very  little 
was  used  at  home. 

Transportation  peculiarities  and  conditions  of  general 
living  are  evidence  of  the  resources  of  the  enemy  or  of  the 
theater  of  operations.  Quite  naturally  a  great  many  railroads 
indicate  great  commercial  activity,  while  their  absence  in- 
dicates either  the  opposite  or  lack  of  progressiveness. 

It  is  quite  necessary  to  know  the  gauge  of  railroads, 
for  if  history  is  correctly  written,  when  the  Japanese  secured 
possession  of  the  East  Chinese  Railroad,  they  found  that 
the  rolling  stock  they  had  brought  over  to  use  in  event  of 
the  capture  of  the  railroad  was  of  different  gauge,  and  the 
entire  line  had  to  be  reduced  in  gauge  before  Japanese 
transportation  could  be  used. 

Before  passing  to  a  discussion  of  a  plan  of  operation 
and  campaign,  the  question  whether  or  not  the  war  is 
to  be  offensive  or  defensive  must  be  taken  up.  This 
is  viewed  from  a  strategical  standpoint.  What  are  the 
relative  merits  of  each  that  will  influence  the  selec- 
tion? Von  Clausewitz  favors  the  defensive.  He  gives  as 
a  reason  that  its  adoption  tends  to  conserve  the  energies,  and 
that  one  gradually  grows  stronger;  while  the  offensive,  be- 


16  STRATEGY 

ing  a  matter  of  conquest,  spends  the  maximum  force  at  the 
outset,  and  one  gradually  grows  weaker.  Willensen,  as  well 
as  the  majority  of  writers,  favors  the  offensive.  No  rule 
can  be  laid  down  that  will  govern  in  a  selection.  In 
the  present  European  War,  the  Germans  from  a  purely 
military  standpoint  were  more  than  justified  in  assuming 
strategic  offensive  and  taking  advantage  of  their  superior 
readiness,  for  of  what  use  was  their  large  standing  army 
if  the  diplomats  were  to  be  allowed  to  carry  on  their  pro- 
crastinating policies,  thereby  giving  the  unprepared  a  chance 
to  get  ready  and  lessen  this  disparaging  inequality?  Na- 
poleon Bonaparte  claimed  that  all  his  wars  after  the  Empire 
were  defensive,  but  that  instead  of  waiting  for  the  enemy 
to  get  the  advantage  he  struck  while  the  iron  was  hot.  Mar- 
shal Foch  says  that  he  has  always  believed  that  to  wage 
war  is  to  take  the  offensive.  There  are  several  points  to  be 
taken  up  in  considering  the  relative  merits  between  the 
strategic  offensive  and  defensive. 

First :  Terrain  and  position.  Second :  Surprise.  Third : 
Advance  from  several  directions.  Fourth:  Assistance  ren- 
dered by  the  theater  of  war.  Fifth :  Support  of  the  people 
(inhabitants).  Sixth:  Morale. 

Unquestionably  the  defensive  has  the  advantage  of  ter- 
rain, but  the  offensive  has  that  of  surprise,  for  it  selects 
its  own  line  of  direction.  The  value  of  this  element  of  sur- 
prise is  doubtless  less  today  than  it  was  in  the  past, 
due  to  the  introduction  of  the  airplane  and  radiograph. 
The  surprise  will  npt  be  as  complete  but  will  be  more  dif- 
ficult to  meet  due  to  the  increased  size  of  the  armies  of  to- 
day. A  movement  that  one  hundred  years  ago  could  be 
thwarted  on  twenty-four  hours'  notice,  when  armies  were 
numbered  by  thousands,  will  be  difficult  to  prevent  on  a 
week's  notice  with  the  modern  armies  numbered  by  the  hun- 
dreds of  thousands. 

The  surprise  element  in  the  modern  war  will  evidence 
itself  in  the  form  of  a  strategic  movement  adopted.  The  de- 
fender will  be  looking  for  an  advance  against  a  certain  part 
of  the  frontier  and  it  will  come  from  another,  causing 
much  loss  of  time  shifting  troops  to  meet  it.  There  seems 
to  be  little  doubt  that  in  August,  1914,  the  French  were 


MILITARY   HISTORY   AND    STRATEGY  17 

taken  somewhat  by  surprise  in  the  direction  adopted  by  the 
Germans  in  their  advance  across  Belgium. 

As  to  the  advance  in  many  columns,  the  assailant  un- 
questionably has  a  decided  advantage,  yet  the  defender,  if 
he  is  active,  and  will  take  advantage  of  his  opportunities, 
may  concentrate  in  mass  against  any  one  of  these  columns 
and  defeat  it  in  detail.  The  assistance  of  the  theater  of 
war  is  of  value  to  both.  For  the  offensive  it  carries  the 
war  away  from  home  and  makes  someone  else  bear  its  bur- 
dens, and  for  the  defensive  it  carries  the  unquestioned 
sentimental  advantage  of  fighting  for  home  and  fireside. 
As  to  the  value  of  the  support  of  the  people,  one  has  but  to 
look  at  Napoleon's  Peninsula  campaign.  The  people  of 
Spain  rising  against  the  invader  probably  had  more  to 
do  with  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  than  any  other  thing. 
The  action  of  the  Spaniards  showed  the  inhabitants  of 
overrun  countries  wherein  lay  their  strength.  It  is  said 
that  one  of  the  reasons  why  Napoleon  failed  to  put  in  the 
Imperial  Guard  at  Borodino  was,  because  just  before  the 
psychological  moment,  he  received  a  message  telling  of  the 
defeat  of  Marmont  by  Wellington  at  Salamanca.  The  good 
moral  effect  of  an  offensive  war  is  higher  than  that  of  a 
defensive.  Napoleon  in  1815  was  unable  to  carry  on  a 
strategic  defensive  for  the  reason  of  the  moral  effect  upon 
the  French  people.  They  would  support  a  foreign  war  but 
they  were  sick  of  invasions. 

One  of  the  fatal  differences  between  the  defensive  and 
the  offensive  is  that  the  former,  in  order  to  win  success, 
must  triumph  at  all  points  while  the  assailant  will  generally 
win  if  successful  at  one  point. 

The  offensive  always  possesses  the  most  powerful 
means  of  bringing  the  intellectual  and  moral  forces  of  its 
army  into  play.  This  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  in  a  ma- 
jority of  cases  the  side  on  the  offensive  has  won  out  in  the 
war.  The  defensive  lacks  impulsion.  It  brings  its  forces 
together  but  does  not  push  them  forward. 

The  defensive  creates  an  impression  in  the  minds  of  the 
soldiers  that  their  general  is  incompetent  and  his  officers  are 
afraid.  The  constant  vigilance  looking  for  the  leads  of  the 
enemy  and  moving  to  meet  them,  wears  down  the  command, 


18  STRATEGY 

with  the  result  that  when  the  time  comes  for  the  counter- 
attack, enthusiasm  is  gone.  Notwithstanding  von  Clause- 
witz,  we  will  have  to  join  with  William  II,  the  grandson  of 
von  Clausewitz's  pupil,  Kaiser  William  I,  and  decide  that  the 
offensive  is  preferable  if  preparation  has  been  wisely  and 
timely  made. 

Derrecagaix  says  "Everything  considered,  the  offensive 
outranks  the  defensive."  Von  der  Goltz  says:  "To  make 
war  is  to  attack,"  and  Jomini  sums  it  up  by  saying  that  "the 
offensive  at  the  beginning  of  operations  offers  most  favor- 
able means  for  making  a  combined  movement  upon  a  de- 
cisive point  with  overwhelming  forces."  This  means,  says 
he,  "to  take  the  initiative  in  the  movements."  The  general 
who  succeeds  in  winning  this  advantage  to  his  side,  is  free 
to  move  his  forces  wherever  expediency  dictates. 

Having  considered  the  theater  of  operations  and  the  re- 
sources of  the  enemy;  and  having  come  to  a  decision  be- 
tween the  strategic  offensive  and  defensive,  we  will  pass 
to  a  consideration  of  the  project  of  operations. 

PROJECT  OR  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS 

We  see  the  project,  or  plan  of  operations,  referred  to 
by  some  writers  as  the  plan  of  campaign,  and  that  was 
the  ancient  name  generally  given  it.  In  military  affairs 
there  will  be  certain  groups  of  actions,  in  the  same  theater 
of  war,  consisting  of  concentrations,  marches,  occupations 
of  positions,  and  combats  that  follow  each  other  in  logi- 
cal order,  each  successive  one  inseparably  growing  out  of 
the  preceding  one.  This  group  then  would  be  called  an  op- 
eration and  the  plan  would  be  called  the  plan  of  operations. 

To  illustrate  with  the  present  war :  Germany,  before  the 
United  States  entered  the  war,  had  combats  on  two  distinct 
fronts — on  the  west  against  England  and  France  and  on 
the  east  against  Russia.  Austria  had  Italy  on  the  west, 
and  Russia  and  Serbia  on  the  east. 

Their  armies  were  in  distinct  fields  of  operations  and 
the  plan  of  each  was  different  in  many  respects.  Each  plan 
would  constitute  a  separate  operation  and  have  a  separate 
project  while  the  whole  thing  combined  would  constitute  the 
campaign,  and  the  combined  projects  would  be  the  plan 


MILITARY   HISTORY   AND    STRATEGY  19 

of  campaign.  Nor  is  a  plan  of  campaign  or  project  of 
operations  limited  to  any  period  of  time.  Some  writers 
have  defined  a  campaign  as  any  military  events  that  take 
place  in  a  calendar  year,  and,  even  as  late  as  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War,  we  have  campaigns  referred  to  as  winter  and 
summer  campaigns.  Such  fine  distinctions  are  no  longer 
drawn.  We  cannot  draw  a  very  definite  distinction  between 
an  operation  and  a  campaign  other  than  to  say  that  when 
the  events  within  a  theater  or  theaters  of  war  form  a 
certain  combination  unbroken  as  it  progresses,  it  is  usually 
properly  called  a  campaign.  And,  when,  as  a  result  of 
some  more  or  less  great  change  or  catastrophe,  new  com- 
binations begin  to  develop,  or  are  developed,  we  have  a 
break  in  that  campaign  and  another  begins. 

For  example,  the  operations  of  Rosecrans  against 
Bragg,  beginning  with  the  former's  advance  from  Murfrees- 
boro  in  August  of  1863  to  and  including  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  should  be  called  one  campaign,  yet  we  find 
the  first  maneuvers  referred  to  as  the  Tullahoma  campaign, 
when  they  should  properly  be  called  the  operations  in 
East  Tennessee,  or  Rosecrans'  operations  against  Bragg. 
The  battle  of  Chickamauga,  a  logical  result  of  the  opera- 
tions in  East  Tennessee,  should  constitute  a  part  of  them, 
and  the  designation  Chickamauga  campaign,  as  some  au- 
thors give  it,  be  declared  wrong.  The  whole  affair  from 
the  advance  from  Murfreesboro  until  Rosecrans  was 
shut  up  in  Chattanooga  constitutes  one  set  of  progressive 
events  and  should  be  called  the  campaign  in  East  Tennessee 
and  Georgia,  between  Rosecrans  and  Bragg.  Some  of  the 
Southern  writers  do  so  call  it. 

BASE  OF  OPERATIONS 

When  an  army  sets  out  upon  any  expedition,  whether  it 
be  to  attack  the  enemy  and  his  theater  of  war,  or  to  take 
post  on  its  own  frontier,  it  continues  in  a  state  of  neces- 
sary dependence  on  the  sources  from  which  it  draws  its 
subsistence  and  reinforcements,  and  must  maintain  its  com- 
munications with  them,  as  they  are  the  conditions  of  its 
existence  and  preservation. 


20  STRATEGY 

This  dependence  increases  in  intensity  and  extent  in 
proportion  to  the  size  of  the  army.  It  is  not  necessary 
nor  possible  for  an  army  to  keep  in  touch  with  all  of  its 
own  country ;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  is  in  touch  with  that  part 
of  the  country  in  its  immediate  rear  and  which  is  covered 
by  its  deployment.  This  part  is  referred  to  as  its  base  of 
operations,  or  immediate  base.  In  this  strip  of  country  are 
located  the  supply  depots  and  magazines  in  which  the  stores 
of  various  classes  are  kept.  This,  however,  does  not  neces- 
sarily make  the  territory  the  base  or  source  of  supply,  not 
unless  the  supplies  are  actually  extracted  from  that  terri- 
tory, for  if  the  supplies  come  from  elsewhere  and  are 
shipped  in,  that  elsewhere  becomes  the  base  source  of  sup- 
ply or  ultimate  base  and  the  territory  under  discussion  the 
advance  base.  Likewise  a  strip  of  the  enemy's  country  may 
become  the  base  of  operations  or  of  supply,  or  both,  if 
occupied  and  held.  Formerly  the  designation  "base  of 
operations,"  was  understood  to  apply  to  a  definitely  fixed 
geographical  line,  the  possession  of  which  was  secured 
through  special  provisions,  such  as  the  construction  of  for- 
tifications, bridgeheads,  intrenched  camps,  etc.  Often  the 
operations  of  a  whole  campaign  aimed  only  at  gaining  a 
base  for  the  next  one.  Nations  contented  themselves  with 
the  capture  of  a  few  fortifications  from  which,  perhaps 
not  until  the  following  year,  the  enemy's  territory  was  to 
be  invaded.  Along  the  base,  protected  by  fortifications, 
commissary  storehouses  were  established,  supplies  of  cloth- 
ing and  footgear  accumulated ;  and  the  ammunition  for  the 
whole  campaign  brought  together.  At  the  present  time  the 
conception  of  a  base  of  operations  is  the  zone  from  which 
the  army  gets  its  supplies,  while  the  home  country  is  the 
base  of  supply  or  ultimate  base. 

In  the  opinion  of  a  great  many  military  men,  bases 
no  longer  exist,  railroads  having  supplanted  them.  This 
view  is  incorrect.  The  true  state  of  the  case  is  that  the 
changes  that  have  taken  place  in  recent  times  regarding 
transportation  have  modified,  but  not  abolished,  the  idea  of 
bases.  Today,  as  formerly,  before  commencing  active  oper- 
ations, an  army  is  obliged  to  collect  supplies  at  points  in  its 
immediate  rear,  and  from  these  the  troops  are  to  be  fed 
during  the  first  marches,  and  to  these  points  will  be  sent 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  21 

back  the  disabled  men  and  unserviceable  material.  These 
points  will  necessarily  be  chosen  upon  the  lines  of  communi- 
cations, consequently  at  stations  upon  the  important  rail- 
ways ;  and  they  will  form  a  line  of  centers  regulating  the 
movement  of  armies. 

In  1870,  aside  from  the  available  resources  of  the 
various  corps  regions,  the  German  army  had,  at  the  end 
of  July,  six  weeks'  provision  collected  in  the  principal 
places  along  the  Rhine.  This  river  was  then,  at  least  in 
appearance,  its  base  of  operations.  But,  in  reality,  these 
centers  of  supply  had  no  influence  upon  its  operations,  ex- 
cept as  intermediate  magazines  between  the  corps  and 
their  home  regions.  They  did  not  constitute  the  base  of 
operations  but  the  ho  ae  region  did. 

It  is  interesting  in  this  connection  to  read  Moltke's 
memoir  for  the  base  of  operations  of  the  German  armies  in 
1870. 

Several  combinations  were  contemplated.  First,  if  the 
French  took  the  offensive  and  advanced  along  the  line  of 
the  Meuse  and  debouched  on  Cologne,  the  Germans  were 
to  concentrate  along  the  Moselle  to  the  south  and  threaten 
the  line  of  communications  of  the  French.  Accordingly 
Moltke  had  designated  the  Rhenish  provinces  and  the  Mo- 
selle as  the  bases  of  operations  in  that  contingency.  Sec- 
ond, if  the  French  violated  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland  and 
advanced  from  the  Metz-Strassburg  line  into  the  South  Ger- 
man states  for  the  purpose  of  separating  them  from  North 
Germany  and  making  an  arrangement  with  them  for  an  ad- 
vance on  Prussia  as  Napoleon  did  in  1806,  the  Germans 
were  to  use  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine  as  a  base  and  the 
country  north  of  the  Main  River.  But  when  the  French 
showed  unmistakable  signs  of  making  this  latter  advance, 
the  Germans  found  it  more  advantageous  to  threaten  their 
left  flank  and  communications  from  the  north  so  they 
concentrated  in  the  Bavarian  Palatinate,  which  extends 
southeast  of  the  lower  Moselle,  and  with  the  region  comprised 
between  Treves  and  Landau  as  the  base  of  operations  ad- 
vanced against  the  Saar  River  line.  This  entire  subject 
will  be  taken  up  in  detail  in  the  proper  place  later,  so  we 
will  pass  on,  only  delaying  long  enough  to  give  a  few  rules 
as  to  selection  of  bases  that  seem  to  clear  up  the  matter. 


22  STRATEGY 

They  are,  first,  bear  in  mind  that  bases  of  operations  have 
been  transformed  by  the  establishment  of  railroads ;  second, 
that  the  supplies  formerly  assembled  upon  bases  will  hence- 
forth be  distributed  along  the  railroads  charged  with  army 
transport  service ;  third,  that  bases  of  operations  are  gener- 
ally frontier  zones  which  connect  the  armies  with  their 
country,  and  upon  which  they  concentrate  before  the  com- 
mencement of  operations;  fourth,  that  the  direction  of  the 
base  of  operations  with  regard  to  the  enemy's  lines  of  oper- 
ations, increases  in  importance  in  the  proportion  as  the 
masses  become  more  numerous  and  the  first  conflicts  more 
imminent;  fifth,  that  an  angular  base  of  operations  is 
always  the  most  advantageous  (Napoleon  adopted  such  a 
one  in  1805  and  again  in  1806)  and  it  will  be  noticed  that 
the  German  western  frontier  in  the  recent  war  and  their 
western  frontier  as  it  was  in  1870,  is  angular;  sixth,  there 
should  be  a  sufficient  number  of  railroads  running  from  the 
interior  of  the  country  to  the  base  of  operations  to  assure 
the  prompt  concentration  of  the  army;  seventh,  that  the 
base  of  supply,  source  of  supply  or  ultimate  base  of  an  army 
really  is  the  country  which  furnishes  its  supplies,  and  the 
distributing  zone  is  merely  an  advanced  base;  eighth,  that 
the  most  advantageous  bases  of  operations  will  be  those 
which,  while  covering  an  army's  communications,  threaten 
most  directly  those  of  the  adversary;  that  is  to  say,  the 
right-angular  base  is  the  best  and  the  straight  line  base 
probably  the  worst. 

Turning  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War  for  an  illustra- 
tion. Japan's  base  of  supply  was  the  whole  of  Japan,  that 
of  Russia,  European  Russia.  The  bases  of  operations  were 
the  concentration  zones  in  the  theater  of  operations.  The 
line  of  communication  from  Japan  to  the  armies  was  partly 
by  sea,  partly  by  rail,  and  partly  by  road.  At  each  point 
where  one  method  of  transport  was  exchanged  for  another, 
supplies  were  accumulated.  The  accumulations  at  Dalny 
and  Antung  were  very  large,  owing  to  the  danger  to  the 
sea  transport,  which  could  not  work  on  schedule  time  in 
bad  weather.  Similarly,  on  the  Russian  side,  great  accu- 
mulations were  formed  at  Liao  Yang,  Mukden,  and  Harbin, 
because  of  the  small  capacity  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Rail- 
way. 


MILITARY  HISTORY  AND  STRATEGY  23 

MOBILIZATION 

A  decision  having  been  made  regarding  the  project 
of  operations,  and  assuming  it  to  contemplate  a  strategic 
offensive,  let  us  take  up  the  next  logical  step,  and  that  is 
mobilization.  Now  just  what  is  mobilization?  It  is  the 
transition  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing,  preparations  being 
made  beforehand  to  include  the  smallest  details. 

It  may  be  accepted  in  a  word  that  the  mobilization  is 
merely  the  passing  from  the  peace  to  the  war  footing,  and 
the  best  organizations  are  those  which  admit  of  this  ex- 
pansion with  the  least  confusion  and  least  delay.  Prior 
to  the  Franco-Prussian  War  mobilization  was  generally 
referred  to  as  a  "passing  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing," 
and  concentration  "the  formation  of  the  army." 

A  careful  study  of  the  mobilization  of  the  German 
army  in  1870  and  a  comparison  of  it  with  the  French  mobil- 
ization at  the  same  time  will  probably  as  clearly  show  the 
difference  between  a  good  mobilization  and  a  poor  one,  as 
any  illustration.  The  mobilization  having  been  effected,  the 
transportation  of  the  army  to  the  frontier  begins,  and  this 
is  the  concentration  as  distinguished  from  the  mobilization. 
But  if  the  first  is  not  completed  before  the  second  starts 
both  will  be  confused  and  the  whole  thing  will  be  a  chaotic 
mess.  In  France  in  1870,  we  have  a  case  illustrating  this 
point  of  premature  concentration.  In  our  own  country  we 
have  never  had  anything  else,  for  as  Upton  says,  when  the 
others  begin  to  concentrate  we  begin  to  legislate.  A  careful 
study  ought  to  be  made  of  the  conditions  in  other  countries, 
systems  of  other  armies,  the  principles  guiding  them,  the 
improvements  attempted,  and  the  results  attained. 

The  results  are  of  the  greatest  possible  importance  to  us 
when  they  concern  the  condition  of  the  enemy's  army.  Be- 
fore the  war  of  1866  the  Prussian  general  staff  knew  un- 
questionably the  bankrupt  condition  of  the  Austrian  finance 
and,  in  1870,  Moltke  must  have  known  of  the  so-called 
inefficiency  within  the  French  army  and  that  most  of  its 
strength  was  on  paper. 

Once  the  transportation  to  the  frontier  is  effected,  the 
concentration  begins.  It  is  necessary  to  execute  an  opera- 
tion which  formerly  did  not  exist,  but  which  railroads  have 


24  STRATEGY 

created,  and  for  which  the  Germans  have  invented  a  new 
term,  Aufmarsch.  This  is  the  strategical  deployment. 

The  troops  having  reached  the  termini  of  the  railroad, 
or  landing  place  in  case  of  oversea  travel,  it  is  necessary 
of  course  to  get  them  away  from  the  point  of  detrainment 
or  disembarkment.  In  doing  this,  care  must  be  taken  to  see 
that  the  various  subdivisions  can  support  themselves.  This 
means  several  marches,  generally  short,  the  effect  of  which 
will  be  to  locate  each  division  in  the  place  it  is  to  occupy 
provisionally.  These  movements,  however  limited,  constitute 
the  strategic  deployment.  It  is  designed  to  put  the  army 
in  immediate  condition  for  service.  And  as  von  der  Goltz 
says,  it  is  essential  that  the  troops  be  so  disposed  that  all 
of  them  may  be  available  and  easily  united  when  the  neces- 
sity arises  for  striking  heavy  blows.  It  was  by  violating  this 
precept,  afterwards  laid  down  by  von  der  Goltz,  that  von 
Benedek  encompassed  his  own  defeat  in  1866.  The  strate- 
gic deployment  is  preceded  by  the  movement  of  the  air 
service  and  independent  cavalry  divisions  to  the  frontier 
either  by  rail,  boat  or  road  or  a  combination  of  two  or  three. 
How  efficiently  the  cavalry  of  the  Germans  covered  their 
recent  strategic  deployment  in  Europe  is  not  well  known, 
but  it  apparently  covered  very  efficiently  the  early  stages 
of  the  invasion.  When  the  army  has  accomplished  its  stra- 
tegic deployment,  nothing  remains  for  it  but  to  move  for- 
ward. To  do  this  it  must  undertake  its  first  marches  in 
proximity  to  the  enemy  and  his  frontier  at  a  time  when 
his  projects  and  intentions  have  not  yet  been  divined,  and 
when  the  field  of  hypothesis  is  frequently  unlimited. 

The  only  thing  that  is  known  positively  is  that 
hostilities  have  broken  out.  As  to  the  form  of  the  advance, 
it  cannot  be  laid  down  in  a  rule  that  will  fit  any  and  all 
cases.  The  advance  may  be  parallel,  such  as  that  of  the 
German  armies  from  the  frontier  to  the  French  Nied  in 
August,  1870,  or  it  may  be  convergent,  such  as  was  adopted 
by  tho  Japanese  in  the  recent  Russo-Japanese  War,  or 
again  it  may  be  divergent,  such  as  the  advance  of  the  al- 
lies against  Napoleon  in  1814. 

Prudence  will,  however,  dictate  some  of  the  following 
measures,  such  as  rapid  marches,  screening  by  cavalry,  flank 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  25 

columns  echeloned,  suitable  distribution  in  front  and  depth, 
dependent  on  circumstances. 

One  has  but  to  look  at  the  advance  of  the  Germans 
through  Belgium  and  compare  it  with  their  advance  in  1866 
and  1870  to  see  how  well  they  have  profited  by  past  exper- 
ience. In  1866  their  cavalry  might  as  well  have  been  home 
for  all  the  information  it  obtained.  It  is  true  that  some  tac- 
tical information  was  gleaned,  but  in  its  strategic  use  the 
cavalry  of  1866  was  a  failure.  And  in  1870  the  lesson  was 
not  entirely  learned,  for  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  com- 
pletely lost  touch  with  MacMahon's  army  for  several  days 
after  Woerth. 

CROSSING  THE  FRONTIER 

With  the  arrival  on  the  actual  frontier  we  may  look 
for  combats,  if  we  have  stolen  a  march  on  the  enemy,  and 
we  doubtless  have  or  we  would  not  be  on  the  offensive. 
Today,  as  all  nations,  except  our  own,  have  a  general  method 
of  mobilization  and  concentration  worked  out,  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  concentrations  and  deployments  upon  the 
frontier  will  be  effected  at  the  same  time  by  the  opposing 
armies.  *  In  any  case  the  difference  will  only  be  a  few  days, 
but  it  will  probably  be  enough  to  reduce  one  or  the  other  to 
the  defensive.  Witness  the  assumption  of  the  defensive  by 
the  French  during  the  German  advance  through  Belgium. 

After  the  passage  of  the  frontier  the  combats  will 
begin.  After  driving  back  the  first  hostile  groups,  the 
advance  will  continue  with  little  interruption  until  the 
main  covering  detachments  of  the  enemy  are  encountered. 
The  enemy  will  probably  make  new  dispositions  after  the 
first  brushes  and,  if  unsuccessful,  will  gradually  fall  back 
either  by  a  retreating  defensive  or  a  step  by  step  defensive 
to  his  main  line  of  defense.  The  scales  will  gradually  fall 
from  the  invader's  eyes  and  the  line  of  operations  of  the 
invaded  become  apparent.  The  assailant  will  then  under- 
take the  marches  conducting  him  to  his  principal  objec- 
tive, and  probably  to  his  first  great  battle.  Marches  made 
under  these  conditions  are  essentially  strategic  marches,  and 
they  are  always  of  the  highest  importance.  It  is  now 
that  the  genius  of  the  commander  comes  forward.  It  will 
demonstrate  itself  in  the  manner  in  which  he  estimates 


26  STRATEGY 

the  situation  and  selects  the  strategic  movements.  And 
right  here  we  have  the  subjects  that  arouse  the  most  in- 
terest in  the  study  of  the  art  of  war.  The  strategical  frontal 
attack,  penetration,  attack  of  the  wing,  envelopment  (wit- 
ness the  attempts  at  strategic  envelopment  by  General  von 
Kluck's  army),  the  turning  movement  and  attacks  in  rear 
and  flank.  The  direction  of  these  strategic  marches  and 
the  object  to  be  accomplished  lies  with  the  commander,  and 
he  must  decide  on  the  merits  of  the  case  before  him  as  he 
probably  will  not  be  able  to  find  an  exact  precedent.  With 
the  exception  of  the  present  European  War,  with  which  we 
are  slightly  familiar,  the  most  interesting  strategic  marches 
of  recent  years  are  those  which  led  up  to  the  battles  of 
Koniggratz,  Rezonville,  Saint  Privat,  and  more  recently 
those  that  resulted  in  the  seven  days'  fighting  at  Liao  Yang. 
When  the  strategic  marches  have  conducted  us  to  the  vi- 
cinity of  the  hostile  masses,  engagements  are  imminent  and 
we  are  about  to  enter  the  domain  of  tactics. 

Tactical  superiority  is  the  precondition  for  success.  It 
is  a  general  principle  of  all  combat  to  be  stronger  at  the 
critical  point  than  the  enemy.  Napoleon  said  that  he 
noticed  that  the  Lord  was  generally  on  the  side*  of  the 
heaviest  battalions,  and  a  commander  that  attacks  today 
when  he  knows  that  he  will  be  stronger  tomorrow  errs  un- 
less he  is  fearful  that  the  enemy  will  slip  away  from  him. 
Now  there  are  a  number  of  forms  of  tactical  offensive  and 
defensive  that  have  been  isolated  from  the  mass  and  have 
been  given  a  definite  name.  We  have  the  tactical  frontal  at- 
tack and  breaking  of  the  enemy's  lines,  tactical  envelop- 
ment, tactical  turning  movement,  tactical  attacks  in  rear 
and  on  the  flanks.  The  tactical  frontal  attacks  with  at- 
tempt to  break  the  enemy's  line  will  be  resorted  to  in  mod- 
ern warfare  more  than  in  the  past  for  the  reason  that  with 
large  bodies  of  troops  it  will  be  difficult  to  envelop  or 
turn  without  the  defender  learning  of  the  movement  and 
shifting  his  troops  to  meet  it.  This  applies  to  turning 
movements  and  attacks  in  rear  and  on  the  flanks.  However, 
we  may  have  cases  of  turnings  and  envelopments  in  moun- 
tainous country  where  the  topography  conceals  the  turning 
column  and  makes  it  difficult  to  check  it  after  discovery. 
Kuroki's  army  in  its  advance  from  Hamatan  repeatedly 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND   STRATEGY  27 

turned  the  Russians,  on  the  east  front,  out  of  position  by 
the  use  of  passes  through  the  mountains. 

The  tactical  offensive  is  the  fitting  culmination  to  the 
strategic  offensive  advance,  and  is  generally  the  only  way 
that  decisive  results  can  be  obtained.  However,  we  will 
come  to  two  cases  where  the  strategical  offensive  and  tac- 
tical defensive  are  the  proper  combinations.  In  a  word 
they  are  only  possible  when  the  defender  is  forced  to  attack. 

We  have  taken  up  the  strategical  defensive  in  previous 
pages  so  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  more  than  refer  to  it 
now.  It  may  be  of  the  positive  or  negative  kind,  or  the 
active  or  passive,  but  a  true  defensive  is  the  one  that  con- 
templates a  return  to  the  offensive  some  time.  As  von  der 
Goltz  said,  the  defender,  gradually  falling  back  on  his  rein- 
forcements, becomes  stronger  while  the  assailant  grows 
weaker  by  reason  of  detachments  to  guard  his  line  of  com- 
munications. There  finally  comes  a  time  when  the  dis- 
parity of  numbers  is  greatly  reduced  and  then  is  the  time 
for  the  defensive  to  make  the  counter.  We  have  no  better 
illustrations  than  the  Atlanta  campaign  or  Kuropatkin's 
operations  in  Manchuria.  Both  failed,  however,  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  the  Confederates  and  Russians  had  gotten 
into  the  habit  of  falling  back  and  either  would  not  or  could 
not  give  the  proper  counter.  We  will  take  up  the  various 
kinds  of  strategic  defenses;  for  example,  flank  positions, 
such  as  those  of  Jackson  at  Groveton;  interior  lines,  such 
as  those  of  Napoleon  in  1814,  and  the  combined  movements 
where  the  defender  is  at  the  same  time  on  the  defensive 
and  offensive.  This  latter  is  illustrated  by  the  movements 
of  the  allies  and  Germans  in  Europe  in  The  World  War. 
The  tactical  defensive  consists  of  entrenching  a  position 
and  waiting  for  the  enemy's  play. 

CONCLUSION 

In  this  introduction,  an  outline  has  been  given  of  the 
subject  which  will  be  taken  up  in  detail  in  the  following 
lectures  and  conferences.  When  the  United  States  entered 
The  World  War  some  persons  thought  that  we  were  taking 
up  a  brand  new  subject  and  that  everything  that  had  been 
studied  before  was  more  of  a  hindrance  than  an  advantage. 


28  STRATEGY 

The  close  resemblance  of  the  application  in  France  of 
the  principles  that  had  been  studied  for  years  past  was 
amazing.  We  will  doubtless  learn  many  tactical  lessons 
from  the  war  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  various  new 
weapons,  but  it  is  believed  that  the  rules  of  strategy  will 
emerge  clothed  in  their  own  skin  and  easily  recognizable. 
But  there  is  one  lesson  we  can  certainly  learn  and  that  is: 
"When  a  nation  has  no  staff  of  officers,  and  no  principle  of 
military  organization,  it  will  be  difficult  for  it  to  form  an 
army." — Napoleon's  War  Maxims,  LXII.  There  is  one 
thing  certain  and  that  is  the  country  that  is  prepared  for 
war  has  the  unprepared  at  a  great  disadvantage.  It  is 
only  by  taking  advantage  of  our  opportunities  that  we  beat 
the  other  man.  And  just  because  we  are  prepared,  does  it 
make  war  any  more  likely?  As  President  Cleveland  once 
said,  there  are  some  things  more  to  be  abhorred  than  war. 

The  French  learned  their  lesson,  and  the  mobilization 
of  1914  bore  no  resemblance  to  that  of  1870.  The  War  of 
1870  demonstrated  that  no  riches,  no  resources,  no  patriot- 
ism are  worth  much  when  arrayed  against  preparation. 

President  Roosevelt,  in  his  message  to  Congress,  very 
ably  expressed  it:  "It  must  ever  be  kept  in  mind  that  war 
is  not  merely  justifiable,  but  imperative  upon  honorable 
men  and  upon  an  honorable  nation  when  peace  is  only  to 
be  obtained  by  the  sacrifice  of  conscientious  conviction  or 
of  national  welfare.  A  just  war  is  in  the  long  run  far  bet- 
ter for  a  nation's  soul  than  the  most  preposterous  peace  ob- 
tained by  an  acquiescence  in  wrong  or  injustice.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  even  to  be  defeated  in  war  may  be  bet- 
ter than  not  to  have  fought  at  all." 

That  strategy  is  an  art  can  no  longer  be  doubted. 
Napoleon,  in  writing  from  St.  Helena  of  the  greatest 
captains  of  the  past,  stated  that  they  fought  according  to 
rule  and  the  natural  principles  of  the  art  of  war.  "They 
have  never  ceased  to  make  war  a  true  science,"  he  wrote, 
"and  therefore  models,  which  we  should  imitate  in  this  re- 
spect. They  have  ascribed  my  greatest  deeds  to  good  for- 
tune, and  they  will  not  be  slow  in  ascribing  my  misfortunes 
to  my  mistakes.  But  when  I  shall  describe  my  campaigns, 
they  will  be  astonished  to  see  that  in  both  instances  my  in- 


MILITARY   HISTORY  AND    STRATEGY  29 

telligence  and  abilities  were  invariably  in  harmony  with  the 
principle." 

In  closing,  the  homely  definition  of  strategy  is  again 
repeated.  It  is  the  application  of  common  sense  to  war. 
The  difficulty  lies  in  its  execution,  for  we  are  dependent 
on  an  infinite  number  of  factors  such  as  weather,  condition 
of  roads,  health  of  troops  and  so  on.  The  great  difficulty 
of  execution  is  in  deciding.  When  in  doubt  it  is  a  good 
rule  to  go  forward,  as  has  already  been  stated.  Marshal 
Foch  has  said  that  he  has  always  believed  that  to  wage 
war  is  to  attack.  Napoleon  has  stated  that  it  is  a  mistake 
to  underestimate  an  opponent.  "Always  consider  the  en- 
emy at  least  your  equal  in  prowess,  but  consider  yourself 
enough  better  to  take  the  offensive."  There  are  three  de- 
cisions to  be  made — the  right  one,  which  is  the  best,  the 
wrong  one,  which  is  next  best,  and  no  decision,  which  is  the 
worst  of  all. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Positive  Nature  of  War 


A  DEFINITION  of  war  has  rarely  been  correctly  given. 
*•*  In  his  work  on  Modern  Strategy,  Colonel  James  defines 
it  as  "the  endeavor  to  gain  by  violence  an  object  which  can 
not  be  attained  by  other  means."  This  definition  would 
apply  equally  to  robbery  or  burglary.  The  true  definition 
is  a  question  for  the  international  lawyer  to  decide. 

General  Orders  No.  100,  1863,  Art.  20,  defines  war  as 
follows:  "Public  war  is  a  state  of  armed  hostility  between 
sovereign  nations  or  governments."  It  is  a  law  and  a  requi- 
site of  civilized  existence  that  men  live  in  political,  con- 
tinuous societies,  forming  organized  units  called  states  or 
nations,  whose  constituents  hear,  enjoy,  and  suffer,  advance 
and  retrograde  together  in  peace  and  in  war. 

The  object  of  war  is  to  bring  about  the  complete  sub- 
mission of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  possible  by  means  of  reg- 
ulated violence.  Military  necessity  justifies  a  resort  to  all 
the  measures  which  are  indispensable  for  securing  this 
object  and  which  are  not  forbidden  by  the  modern  laws 
and  customs  of  war. 

Bernhardi  states  that  "War  is  the  father  of  all  things. 
A  biological  necessity  of  the  first  importance,  a  regulative 
element  in  the  life  of  mankind  which  cannot  be  dispensed 
with,  since,  without  it  an  unhealthy  development  would 
follow,  which  excludes  every  advancement  of  the  race,  and 
therefore  all  real  civilization."  The  German  conception 
seems  to  have  been  that  war  should  be  principally  charac- 
terized by  its  ruthlessness.  "Necessity  knows  no  law,"  as 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg  stated  as  a  justification  for  the 
violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality.  A  solemn  written  cov- 
enant became  "a  scrap  of  paper."  Too  often  war  conforms 
to  the  following  definition:  "It  is  the  means  by  which  a 
sovereign  state  enforces  an  unjust  claim  against  another." 

30 


POSITIVE  NATURE  OF  WAR  31 

War  has  but  one  means  of  action — "force."  No  other  exists ; 
but  its  exercise  should  be  manifested  only  by  wounds, 
death  and  legalized  destruction.  Moral  force  serves  only 
to  render  the  employment  of  physical  force  more  efficacious. 
"The  use  of  force  in  war  is  absolute/' 

War,  however,  has  but  one  aim — to  overthrow  the  en- 
emy and  render  him  incapable  of  continuing  resistance. 

"During  peace,  nations  try  to  attain  their  ends  by  nego- 
tiations through  their  ordinary  diplomatic  representatives 
or  by  means  of  special  missions;  in  war,  they  seek  to  do 
so  by  armed  forces." 

These  special  missions  are  largely  engaged  in  smooth- 
ing out  the  difficulties  that  arise  between  the  countries  they 
represent. 

However,  it  will  never  be  practicable  to  avoid  entirely 
those  questions  in  which  each  of  the  contesting  parties  be- 
lieves that  it  is  impossible  to  give  way  without  dealing  him- 
self a  fatal  blow. 

Peace  conferences  have  encouraged  the  world  to  believe 
that  in  them  was  to  be  found  the  panacea  for  all  international 
ailments  and  the  means  of  avoiding  war.  Many  hold  to  this 
idea  with  pathetic  determination.  Minor  differences  which 
do  not  affect  the  honor  or  existence  of  a  state  may  be  set- 
tled in  this  way,  but  when  it  is  a  question  vitally  affecting 
the  natural  growth  of  the  state,  politically  or  commercially, 
the  struggle  seems  inevitable. 

"War  is  the  outcome  of  the  policy  pursued  in  peace. 
It  is  a  continuation  of  politics;  only  the  means  for  the  at- 
tainment of  the  object  have  changed." 

In  the  past  the  reason  most  often  arising,  which  has 
brought  about  war,  is  the  attempt  of  governments  to  form 
homogenous  and  independent  states  that  could  not  be 
created  without  violating  previous  possession  and  oblit- 
erating racial  customs,  language,  and  lines.  The  seething 
cauldron  of  the  Balkans  has  been  the  result  of  dividing  up 
people  along  geographical  and  not  natural  lines.  The  far- 
sighted  Bismarck,  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  was  in  favor 
of  such  a  division,  for  he,  in  his  sagacity,  knew  that  per- 
petual strife  would  result;  and  he,  too,  may  have  dreamed 
of  a  Mittel  Europa  arising  from  the  ashes  of  these  nations. 
The  great  strength  of  the  British  Empire  and  the  reason  for 


32  STRATEGY 

the  satisfaction  of  her  colonies  is  that  she  sedulously  en- 
deavors to  preserve  all  that  is  good  of  native  customs,  and 
the  integrity  of  local  boundaries. 

Questions  of  power  and  influence,  even  more  than  na- 
tional jealousy  and  rivalry,  may  acquire  such  an  importance 
that  political  wisdom  and  diplomatic  skill  seek  in  vain  a 
peaceful  adjustment.  A  violent  solution  through  war  be- 
comes unavoidable. 

"The  idea  of  making  war  impossible  through  courts 
of  arbitration  has  led  to  no  practical  result  because  the 
power  which  could  enforce  unconditional  and  universal 
respect  for  the  decisions  of  such  courts  is  lacking."  Ex- 
perience has  shown  that  even  in  civil  law,  a  statute  without 
a  penalty  clause  is  not  worth  the  paper  it  is  written  upon ; 
and  this  defect  applies  equally  well  to  disputes  between 
nations.  Few  people  or  nations  do  right  solely  for  right's 
sake. 

"The  best  means,  then,  to  preserve  peace  is  to  be  found 
in  a  thorough  military  organization,  for  the  strong  are  not 
so  readily  attacked  as  the  weak."  With  the  size  and  power 
of  modern  armies  the  damage  resulting  from  the  encounter 
increases,  the  responsibility  for  deciding  on  war  becomes 
more  serious,  and,  consequently,  this  decision  is  not  lightly 
made. 

Weak  states,  surrounded  by  powerful  neighbors,  are 
in  perpetual  peril  of  annihilation  and  absorption.  They 
consequently  should  not  take  up  an  attitude  likely  to  invite 
aggression  from  stronger  powers,  nor  should  they  seek  by 
arms  to  do  that  for  which  their  armament  is  inadequate. 

The  Boers,  in  1899,  threw  down  the  gauntlet  to  the 
Briton  when  they  themselves  could  not  muster  more  than 
80,000  fighting  men.  It  is  true  that  President  Kruger 
expected  intervention,  a  condition  that  generally  follows 
military  success  on  a  no  uncertain  scale.  Feeble  Denmark, 
in  1864,  did  not  escape  despoliation  by  Prussia,  even  though 
she  was  passive,  and  the  provinces  of  Schleswig  and  Hoi- 
stein  were  taken  from  her  only  to  be  returned  when  her 
despoilers  were  in  turn  overcome.  Many  wars  have  been 
waged  in  the  past  solely  for  the  aggrandizement  of  the 
aggressor.  Frederick  the  Great  wanted  Silesia,  so  he  began 
the  first  Silesian  War.  Cavour  sent  the  Italians  to  fight 


POSITIVE  NATURE  OF  WAR  33 

in  Crimea,  not  that  his  country  had  any  cause  of  offense 
against  Russia,  but  because  he  aimed  at  raising  its  position 
among  nations,  and  hoped  for  future  aid  in  working  out 
his  scheme  for  the  unification  of  Italy  under  the  House  of 
Savoy. 

Napoleon  III  desired  the  Westphalian  coal  fields; 
Frenchmen  wished  for  the  frontier  of  the  Rhine  and  had 
their  over-weening  military  vanity  offended  by  the  Prus- 
sian victories  over  Austria  in  1866.  Bismarck  was  not 
adverse  to  a  war  with  France,  and  rendered  it  inevitable 
by  deliberately  altering  a  telegram,  because  he  believed 
that  the  conflict  would  consolidate  Germany  and  aggrandise 
Prussia.  Germany,  in  the  recent  war,  looking  for  her 
"place  in  the  sun,"  could  only  be  seeking  it  politically,  for 
commercially,  by  legitimate  means,  she  was  crowding  out 
her  greatest  competitor,  Great  Britain. 

States  which  through  neglect  or  indifference  allow  their 
military  organization  and  means  of  defense  to  decline,  con- 
jure up  a  danger  through  their  own  fault  and  from  which 
they  will  some  day  reap  inevitable  ruin  and  destruction. 

In  democratic  nations  the  people  are  supposed  to  be  the 
arbiters  of  their  own  destinies,  and  are,  as  history  shows, 
often  carried  away  by  a  sudden  wave  of  sentiment  which 
forces  them  into  a  position  where  war  is  inevitable.  We 
have  as  illustrations  the  war  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  in  1898,  and  the  Siam  and  Fashoda  incidents, 
which  in  recent  years  nearly  embroiled  Great  Britain  and 
France. 

In  countries  where  public  opinion  has  such  a  great 
power,  preparation  is  more  necessary. 

"The  best  military  organization  is  that  which  makes 
all  the  intellectual  and  material  resources  of  the  nation 
available  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  a  war  to  a  successful 
issue." 

The  day  of  the  mercenary  is  over,  for  in  modern  war 
the  very  strength  of  nations  is  at  a  test  and  it  would  not 
be  justifiable  nor  wise  to  attempt  a*  defense  of  the  whole 
with  a  part. 

The  form  of  the  organization  in  each  state  largely 
depends  on  the  internal  conditions  of  the  country  as  well 
as  upon  international  rivalry.  These  conditions  change  with 


34  STRATEGY 

the  gradual  evolution  of  the  national  character  and  desire. 

In  the  United  States  a  compulsory  system  of  service 
such  as  Germany  had  would  not  be  tolerated.  Yet  in 
France,  where  grim  necessity  forced  her  to  have  at  all 
times  an  army  able  to  cope  with  her  common  enemy,  she 
had  a  similar  form  of  service,  even  though  a  democratic 
nation. 

In  1863,  the  enforcement  of  the  Federal  draft  laws  in 
our  own  country,  even  after  the  victory  at  Gettysburg,  was 
met  with  riots  in  our  metropolis;  yet  in  1917,  the  draft 
laws  were  enacted  almost  unanimously  and  enforced  with 
little  or  no  opposition.  Times  had  changed  and  the  internal 
conditions  of  the  country  made  it  possible. 

The  form  under  which  most  of  the  military  organiza- 
tions of  the  present  day  appear  is  that  of  a  skeleton  army. 
A  certain  number  of  men  able  to  bear  arms  are  retained 
in  the  permanent  organizations  which  functions  as  a  police 
force  to  care  for  obstreperous  boundaries,  foreign  posses- 
sions such  as  colonies,  and  to  serve  as  instructors  in  the 
various  schools  and  camps,  where  the  citizen  is  trained  in 
his  duty  as  a  soldier.  At  the  same  time  this  army  furnishes 
a  framework  or  nucleus  around  which  the  citizen  soldiers 
assemble  to  expand  units  from  peace  to  war  strength.  Few 
states  rely  solely  or  in  part  on  a  militia  system,  for  such 
systems  can  only  be  justifiable  when  a  country  is  so  located 
as  to  render  attacks  by  an  army  ready  for  battle  impos- 
sible; and  few  states,  if  any,  are  so  located.  A  recruiting 
system  by  voluntary  enlistments  is  obsolescent,  and  few 
countries  employ  it. 

Compulsory  service  is  the  rule  in  Europe.  Both  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States  had  to  resort  to  it  to  raise  the 
required  number  of  men  in  The  World  War.  Universal 
training  has  been  adopted  by  Switzerland  and  Argentine, 
and  works  effectively.  It  is  the  true  service  for  a  de- 
mocracy, and  will  be  effective  in  this  country  if  exceptions 
other  than  physical  are  not  made.  It  brings  the  son  or 
relative  of  the  law  maker,  and  the  son  or  relative  of  the 
law  obeyer  in  close  touch ;  likewise  the  sons  of  the  rich  and 
the  poor*  the  learned  and  the  ignorant.  A  war  fought  by 
troops  so  selected  cannot  be  called  "a  rich  man's  war,  but 
a  poor  man's  fight,"  and  the  Congress  that  declares  war, 


POSITIVE  NATURE  OF  WAR  35 

•  , 

and  the  rich  man  whose  wealth  increases  thereby,  will  have 
the  blood  of  their  own  kind  on  their  heads  if  they  force  a 
war  unnecessarily. 

We  now  pass  to  the  subject  of  the  special  nature  of 
modern  wars.  In  times  past  we  have  had  wars  known  as 
religious,  of  conquest,  and  wars  caused  by  ruptures  in 
reigning  houses.  Even  in  modern  times  we  have  wars  for 
humanity,  such  as  the  Spanish- American,  and  wars  in  which 
only  a  section  of  a  country  is  concerned,  such  as  the  local 
upheavals  in  China. 

But  in  this  age,  a  "war  appears  generally  under  its 
natural  form — that  is,  as  a  bloody  conflict  between  nations, 
in  which  each  side  strives  for  the  complete  overthrow  or, 
if  possible,  the  annihilation  of  the  opponent." 

To  attempt  to  frighten  an  enemy  merely  by  massing 
troops  on  his  frontier,  or  by  a  show  of  invasion,  or  as  one 
well  known  writer  says,  "To  gain  victory  without  battle, 
through  the  mere  power  of  maneuver"  will  no.  longer  ac- 
complish its  purpose. 

"The  experience  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  has  taught 
us  that  actions  of  the  above  nature  immediately  lose  their 
effect  as  soon  as  the  opponent  resolves  to  make  war  in 
earnest  and  to  strike  with  a  sharp  sword." 

The  case  often  arises,  however,  where  it  is  better  judg- 
ment not  to  join  battle,  particularly  if  the  enemy  is  doing 
exactly  what  you  want. 

General  Meade  was  unquestionably  correct  in  not  at- 
tacking Lee  when  the  latter  was  in  position  along  the  An- 
tietam  after  Gettysburg.  Lee  was  showing  every  symptom 
of  returning  to  Virginia,  a  thing  vital  to  the  Federal  cause. 

It  would  have  been  folly  to  have  caused  any  diversion 
by  a  battle  that  offered  equal  opportunities  to  each  side, 
for  Lee's  army  after  Gettysburg  was  far  from  being  anni- 
hilated. 

Dumouriez  has  frequently  been  blamed  for  having 
merely  followed  up  the  Prussians  after  Valmy,  instead  of 
bringing  them  again  to  battle.  France  had  fixed  as  the  object 
of  the  war  against  Prussia  the  liberation  of  French  soil, 
and  when,  therefore,  the  day  after  Valmy,  the  Prussian 
army  began  to  retreat  toward  the  Rhine,  Dumouriez  could 


36  STRATEGY 

• 

see  that  his  plan  of  campaign  was  successful.  In  these 
conditions,  to  have  delivered  battle  would  have  been,  in 
case  of  victory,  a  pure  waste  of  men;  in  case  of  defeat,  a 
gratuitous  blunder  that  would  have  compromised  a  fav- 
orable situation  and  perhaps  have  incited  the  Prussians  to 
resume  their  march  on  Paris. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

A  recent  report  of  Admiral  von  Scheer  states  that  Sir 
John  Jellicoe  had  a  golden  opportunity  to  destroy  the  Ger- 
man fleet  at  the  battle  of  Jutland,  but  failed  to  take  advan- 
tage of  his  opportunity  by  permitting  the  German  fleet  to 
return  to  its  base.  In  this  report,  comes  the  intimation  that 
the  British  failed.  Before  we  subscribe  to  this  statement 
and  condemn  Jellicoe,  let  us  analyse.  First:  what  was  the 
grand  strategic  object  of  the  allied  fleet?  It  was  to  deny 
the  use  of  the  sea  to  Germany.  This  could  be  accomplished 
in  a  number  of  ways.  It  so  happened  that  the  way  pre- 
senting itself  in  the  North  Sea  was  to  "bottle  up  the  German 
Grand  Fleet  and  keep  it  bottled  up."  The  sortie  made  by 
the  German  Grand  Fleet  that  led  to  the  battle  of  Jutland 
may  have  been  made  for  any  of  a  dozen  reasons,  which  one 
is  neither  here  nor  there.  The  task  of  the  British  fleet  was 
to  maintain  control  of  the  sea  and  could  best  be  done  by 
driving  the  German  fleet  back  into  port.  If  the  latter  could 
be  cut  off  and  sunk,  so  much  the  better;  but  in  default  of 
that,  the  mission  was  fulfilled  as  soon  as  the  German  fleet 
returned.  To  have  attempted  to  destroy  the  German  fleet, 
regardless  of  risk,  could  not  have  had  a  very  great  bearing 
on  the  outcome  of  the  war  in  event  of  success.  But  in  the 
event  of  failure  and  the  loss  of  such  a  number  of  British 
capital  ships  as  would  have  thrown  the  balance  of  power  on 
the  side  of  Germany,  it  would  have  been  a  gratuitous  blun- 
der which  would  have  accomplished  nothing  and  might  have 
lost  the  war  for  the  allies.  It  is  never  fair  to  condemn  any 
commander  for  an  apparent  failure  until  the  matter  has 
been  studied  from  the  viewpoint  of  other  events. 

"The  idea  that  in  modern  times  two  nations  will  enter 
a  conflict  without  putting  forth  their  full  strength  and 
without  contemplating  the  overthrow  of  the  opponent,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  may  employ  only  a  portion  of  their  forces 


POSITIVE  NATURE  OF  WAR  37 

in  order  to  advance  to  a  certain  point,  the  possession  of 
which  is  the  only  matter  of  interest  to  them — is  as  improb- 
able as  armed  conflicts  without  a  decisive  battle." 

We  do  have  cases  in  which  a  weak  state  has  violated 
the  rights  of  a  powerful  neighbor  and  declines  to  make 
amends  or  to  repudiate  the  acts  of  their  offending  citizens  if 
such  are  the  offenders.  We  then  see  the  stronger  neighbor 
invading  the  weaker  country  and  seizing  the  capital  or  an 
important  seaport  to  await  compliance  with  the  proffered 
demands.  Such  an  expedition  was  sent  against  Pekin  in 
1900  and  by  the  United  States  against  Vera  Cruz  in  1914. 
The  foregoing  practice  is  found  more  often  in  colonial  wars. 

Wars  at  present  are  not  waged  for  trifling  causes,  yet 
should  a  government  for  selfish  reasons  jeopardize  a  portion 
of  the  armed  forces  or  a  section  'of  the  country,  the  balance 
of  the  people,  although  not  desiring  war,  will  not  blandly 
see  their  brethren  injured,  but  will  rush  to  their  support. 
During  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  while  many  of 
the  Southern  States  were  not  in  sympathy  with  the  atti- 
tude of  South  Carolina,  yet,  when  force  was  used  by  the 
Federal  government,  they  at  once  sprung  to  the  assistance 
of  their  sister  state. 

The  desire  of  every  nation  at  war  in  modern  times  is 
to  bring  the  war  to  a  victorious  conclusion  as  quickly  as 
possible,  for  the  demands  of  modern  civilization  are  so  great 
that  war  soon  approaches  a  cost  that  leaves  both  contest- 
ants impoverished  and  worse  off  than  they  would  have 
been  had  there  been  no  war. 

War  is  generally  ended  either  by  complete  overthrow  or 
destruction,  or  by  the  moral  effect  of  a  disaster  to  a  por- 
tion of  the  forces. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
the  recent  war  probably  had  as  much  of  an  influence  as  any 
other  feature. 

"When,  therefore,  we  refer  to  the  overthrow  of  the 
opponent  we  mean  that  through  defeat  of  a  portion  of  his 
forces  we  induce  him  to  give  up  all  chances  of  a  later  favor- 
able turn  in  the  campaign ;  and  by  destruction  we  mean  the 
act  of  producing  such  a  physical  and  moral  condition  that 
he,  for  the  present,  feels  himself  unable  to  continue  the 
struggle." 


38  STRATEGY 

As  long  as  we  have  the  principle  of  nationality  as  the 
dominant  one  in  modern  nations,  and  national,  territorial 
and  commercial  integrity  are  to  be  maintained,  we  will  have, 
in  event  of  trouble,  the  nation  in  arms  and  the  war  will 
retain  its  absolute  character. 


CHAPTER  III 

Methods  of  Waging  War 


"The  art  of  war  is  divided  into  two  parts,  namely,  strategy  and  tactics. 

"Strategy  deals  with  the  military  considerations  which  determine  the  choice  of 
the  offensive  and  defensive,  the  selection  of  the  country  in  which  to  fight,  and  the 
objects  against  which  armies  should  be  directed. 

"The  object  of  strategy  is  to  bring  the  troops  into  action  in  the  decisive 
direction  and  in  the  greatest  possible  strength. 

"The  sole  aim  of  strategy  is  'to  bring  about  the  combat  under  as  favorable 
conditions  as  possible.'  " 

AS  PREVIOUSLY  STATED,  the  word  "strategy"  is  de- 
rived from  the  Greek  word  strategos,  meaning  a 
general.  Some  writers,  principally  German,  therefore  de- 
fine strategy  as  the  art  of  generalship.  This  definition  is 
unsatisfactory,  for  many  of  the  most  brilliant  exhibitions 
of  generalship  have  occurred  on  the  field  of  battle  and 
clearly  in  the  domain  of  tactics.  Recall  Napoleon  at  Aus- 
terlitz,  Wellington  at  Salamanca,  or  Marshal  Foch  at  the 
first  battle  of  the  Marne. 

Strategy  has  been  defined  as  the  art  of  moving  armies 
in  the  theater  of  operations ;  but  this  definition  is  open  to  the 
objection  that  troops  actually  engaged  in  battle  are  in  the 
theater  of  operations,  so  that  in  this  definition  tactics  is 
swallowed  up  by  strategy.  Another  definition  of  strategy 
is  that  it  is  the  art  of  moving  troops  not  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy.  This  answer  is  not  satisfactory,  for  the  cul- 
minating point  of  nearly  all  strategy  is  the  field  of  battle 
where  you  are  unquestionably  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 
Strategy  has  been  defined  also  as  the  art  of  taking  an  enemy 
at  a  disadvantage.  This  is  not  satisfactory,  for  no  one  can 
say  that  the  use  of  gas  for  the  first  time  at  Ypres  did 
not  take  the  British  and  French  at  a  disadvantage;  yet 
there  was  no  strategy  about  it.  Again,  it  has  been  defined  as 
"the  art  of  assembling  and  moving  armies  and  fleets 
for  the  purpose  of  furthering  the  interests  of  one's  own 
government  in  a  political  strife  with  another."  One  writer 
defines  strategy  as  "the  art  of  assembling  and  moving 

39 


40  STRATEGY 

armies  and  fleets  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the  war."  Ham- 
ley  says  that  "the  theater  of  war  is  the  province  of  strategy 
— the  field  of  battle  is  the  province  of  tactics."  A  definition 
given  by  Helmuth  von  Moltke  is  that  "Strategy  is  the  ap- 
plication of  common  sense  to  war."  This  is  an  admirable 
definition,  but  should  not  be  restricted  in  its  use  to  strategy 
alone.  The  definition  of  Wagner  is  quite  a  good  one,  as  it 
covers  both  strategy  and  tactics:  "Strategy  is  the  art  of 
moving  an  army  in  the  theater  of  operations,  with  a  view 
of  placing  it  in  such  a  position,  relative  to  the  enemy,  as 
to  increase  the  probability  of  victory,  increase  the  conse- 
quence of  victory  and  lessen  the  consequences  of  defeat." 

Strategy  may  be  called  the  art  of  directing  armies; 
tactics,  the  science  of  troop  leading. 

The  difference  between  strategy  and  tactics  has  been 
discussed  at  length  here  for  the  reason  that  these  terms  ap- 
pear in  all  text-books  and  an  exact  knowledge  facilitates 
a  general  survey  of  the  art  of  war. 

Thus  we  speak  of  the  strategical  and  tactical  offensive, 
and  of  the  strategical  and  the  tactical  defensive. 

From  these  terms  we  derive  our  various  combinations 
which  become  the  subject  for  special  consideration. 

OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE 

"There  are  two  principal  ways  of  waging  war,  namely, 
offensively  and  defensively.  That  one  of  the  combatants 
who  resolves  to  advance,  seek  out  the  enemy  and  defeat 
him  and  thus  compel  him  to  yield,  we  call  the  assailant. 
The  one  who  wards  off  the  enterprises  directed  against  him 
we  call  the  defender." 

He  who  thinks  solely  of  parrying  can  at  the  best  merely 
avert  defeat.  However,  we  often  have  had  cases  in  the  past 
of  the  defender  winning  a  war,  but  in  those  cases  other 
elements  have  entered,  such  as  famine,  disease,  weather, 
and  guerrilla  warfare. 

The  invasion  of  Europe  by  the  Turks  in  about  1683 
was  brought  to  an  end  by  the  Poles,  under  John  Sobieski, 
with  the  assistance  of  their  ally,  famine,  After  Valmy,  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick's  army  withdrew  from  France  more 
on  account  of  the  dysentery  that  had  broken  out  among 


METHODS  OF  WAGING  WAR  41 

the  troops  than  on  account  of  the  activity  of  the  Repub- 
lican army.  The  invasion  of  Russia  in  1812,  and  the  oc- 
cupation of  Spain  by  Napoleon's  armies  failed  respectively 
on  account  of  weather  and  the  rising  of  the  people  "en 
masse." 

In  all  these  cases  the  invader  was  forced  to  withdraw, 
notwithstanding  he  suffered  no  check  from  an  offensive 
stroke  of  the  defender's  army. 

There  are  two  general  types  of  defensives,  namely, 
the  active,  or  the  true  defensive,  and  the  passive. 

The  true  defensive  contemplates  a  counter-stroke,  some- 
times called  "the  decisive  counter-attack,  or  the  offensive- 
defensive."  Such  was  the  case  of  the  British  at  Waterloo. 

The  passive  defensive  consists  in  complete  inertia, 
merely  checking  the  enemy  while  depending  for  relief  on 
the  assistance  or  intervention  of  allies,  or  a  favorable  dis- 
pensation of  providence  in  the  form  of  severe  weather  or  an 
epidemic  of  disease.  We  have  the  best  illustration  of  a  merely 
passive  defensive  in  the  battle  of  New  Orleans.  This 
method  was  adopted  by  Jackson,  not  from  choice,  but  from 
force  of  circumstances,  for  he  had,  a  few  days  before,  tried 
an  offensive  on  a  small  scale  and  had  learned  that  his  men 
would  only  fight  successfully  behind  a  parapet. 

On  this  subject  Jomini  says:  "The  principa1  advan- 
tage of  the  defensive  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  able  to  select 
its  own  theater  of  war.  But  it  cannot  draw  all  possible 
advantages  from  the  situation  by  a  simple  passive  defense." 
"For  this  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  an  active  defense,  now 
holding  the  army  in  waiting,  now  seizing  a  favorable  junc- 
ture, to  make  an  attack.  The  best  results  are  thus  obtained. 
In  choosing  this  character  of  defense,  the  advantage  of 
having  a  theater  of  war  prepared  in  advance  is  united  with 
the  initiative  of  the  movements." 

"Do  not  adopt  the  defensive,"  said  Napoleon  in  his  cor- 
respondence, "if  it  is  possible  for  you  to  do  otherwise.  If 
you  are  reduced  to  this  extremity  let  it  be  to  gain  time, 
to  await  reinforcements,  to  form  your  soldiers,  to  seek 
alliances,  to  lead  the  enemy  to  a  distance  from  his  base  of 
operations;  but  have  an  eventual  offensive  as  the  constant 
aim  of  your  movements."  He  said  in  another  place 
"the  whole  art  of  war  consists,  on  the  one  hand,  in  a  well 


42  STRATEGY 

planned  and  extremely  prudent  defense;  on  the  other,  in 
a  bold  and  rapid  initiative." 

It  often  happens  that  a  country,  being  fully  convinced 
of  the  righteousness  of  its  cause,  may  prefer  to  assume 
the  defensive  until  the  hostile  acts  clearly  show  the  enemy's 
intentions  before  assuming  the  offensive. 

The  Prussians,  in  1806,  assumed  voluntarily  the  de- 
fensive, taking  up  a  position  to  cover  their  somewhat  luke- 
warm ally,  Saxony,  in  advance  of  the  Elbe,  the  natural  line 
of  defense  of  the  old  Prussian  dominion  against  a  French 
invasion.  In  1866,  at  the  outset,  they  also  stood  volun- 
tarily on  the  defensive  and  waited  for  the  situation  to  de- 
velop. 

The  true  way  to  wage  war  is  to  take  the  offensive,  and 
if  forced  to  assume  the  defensive,  it  must  only  be  temporary. 

Marshal  Foch  has  said  that  he  has  always  believed  that 
to  wage  war  is  to  take  the  offensive. 

The  offensive  possesses  the  most  powerful  means  of 
bringing  the  intellectual  and  moral  forces  of  the  army  into 
play.  This  is  proven  by  the  number  of  victories  put  down 
to  its  account.  The  assailant  presses  forward,  confident 
in  his  plans  and  in  his  ability  to  carry  them  out.  He  selects 
his  mark,  and  all  his  efforts  thus  take  a  settled  direction. 
At  the  same  time  his  designs,  in  the  progress  of  events, 
become  productive.  The  very  fact  that  the  offensive  has 
more  activity  than  the  defensive  is  much  in  its  favor,  for 
between  two  adversaries  equal  at  the  outset,  the  more  active 
will  prevail. 

The  following  are  a  few  of  the  advantages  the  defender 
has  over  the  assailant: 

1.  He  can  select  the  locality  in  which  to  fight. 

2.  He  can  manage  his  fire  so  as  to  cover  all  approaches  while 

utilizing  cover. 

3.  He  presents  a  smaller  and  less  conspicuous  target. 

4.  He  can  bring  a  heavier  and  more  accurate  fire  to  bear. 

5.  He  is  not  near  the  danger  of  exhausting  his  ammunition  supply. 

6.  Increased  range  of  modern  weapons   forces  the  assailant  to 

deploy  sooner. 

7.  The  roads  in  rear  are  better,  which  facilitates  supply. 

8.  Supports  and  reinforcements  can  more  easily  be  sent  forward. 

9.  Derives  the  greatest  benefit  from  mechanical  devices. 

The  great  advantage  to  the  assailant  is  his  free  choice 
in  the  selection  of  the  direction  of  his  attack.  He  can 
distribute  his  forces  in  the  best  way  to  suit  a  definite  case. 


METHODS  OF  WAGING  WAR  43 

The  defender  must  hold  his  troops  in  a  semi-position  of 
readiness,  which  taxes  their  indurance.  The  assailant  can 
prepare  his  enterprise  with  a  distinct  end  in  view,  and 
employ  his  whole  force  in  compliance  with  a  uniform  plan ; 
he  can,  as  regards  time,  space  and  tactics,  make  use  of 
the  time  the  defender  needs  for  reconnoitering,  making  up 
his  mind  and  initiating  his  counter-measures  to  perfect  his 
own  arrangements.  By  the  choice  of  the  direction  of  attack, 
the  further  advantage  is  gained  of  being  able  to  concen- 
trate and  use  effectively  a  great  numerical  superiority  in  the 
decisive  direction  before  the  enemy  can  arrange  his  de- 
fense in  sufficient  strength.  The  assailant  can  further  con- 
duct his  attack  so  as  to  prevent  the  special  advantages  of 
the  defense  from  asserting  themselves. 

Jomini  states  that  a  general  as  his  first  principle  must 
"seize  the  offensive  and  permanently  retain  the  initiative, 
forcing  the  enemy  thereby  to  conform  to  his  actions.  Anni- 
hilation of  the  hostile  army  in  battle  and  pursuit  is  the  only 
guiding  star  for  all  military  thinking,  and  he  directs  his 
observations  above  all  to  the  mode  in  which  those  forces 
must  be  employed  and  moved  in  order  to  gain  this  object 
in  as  complete  a  manner  as  possible." 

INITIATIVE 

Napoleon  has  claimed  that  all  his  wars  after  1803  were 
defensive,  but  that  instead  of  remaining  on  the  defensive, 
he  at  once  took  the  initiative  in  order  to  forestall  the  enemy. 

In  the  summer  of  1899,  the  British  failed  to  make 
adequate  preparations  to  meet  the  military  situation  in 
South  Africa,  although  it  was  patent  to  all  that  the  Boers 
were  arming  for  offensive  purposes.  The  Japanese,  on  the 
other  hand,  took  the  initiative  in  1904  because  they  perfectly 
well  understood  that  the  Russian  negotiations  had  no  fur- 
ther aim  than  to  gain  time. 

The  Boers  in  1899  by  promptly  taking  the  initiative 
completely  upset  the  British  plan  of  campaign,  which  was 
based  on  holding  Natal  defensively  while  the  main  army 
invaded  the  Free  State.  As  a  result,  Sir  George  White 
was  surrounded  at  Ladysmith,  and  a  large  force  had  to  be 
employed  simply  to  release  him. 

We  may  accept  it  as  a  maxim  that  one  must  never  vol- 
untarily surrender  the  initiative. 


44 


STRATEGY 


A  practical  tactician  once  said  "an  ounce  of  bulge  is 
better  than  a  pound  of  tactics,"  and  this  very  inelegant  ex- 
pression must  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

COMBINATIONS 

Of  course,  it  will  be  understood  that  by  the  offensive 
and  defensive  we  do  not  mean  that  one  side  does  nothing  but 
attack  and  the  other  nothing  but  parry.  It  generally  is 
the  case  that  at  various  places  in  an  extended  battle  each 
side  will  be  on  the  offensive  and  defensive  at  the  same  time 
on  different  parts  of  the  battlefield,  yet  the  general  atti- 
tude of  one  will  be  offensive  and  of  the  other,  defensive. 

The  strategical  and  the  tactical  offensive  may  be  com- 
bined by  an  advance  of  the  army  into  the  theater  of  war, 
and  after  finding  the  enemy,  proceeding  to  an  attack  on 
the  field  of  battle.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  might  permit 
the  strategical  offensive  to  be  followed  by  the  tactical  de- 
fensive, by  allowing  the  enemy  to  become  the  aggressor 
on  the  battlefield  after  having  advanced  to  meet  him.  In 
this  case  the  enemy  is  said  to  be  on  the  strategical  defensive 
and  tactical  offensive. 

A  combination  of  strategic  and  tactical  defensive  means 
complete  passivity. 

We  cannot  reduce  the  principles  of  the  conduct  of  war 
to  an  exact  science,  but  there  are  certain  combinations  of 
movements  that  bring  about  a  certain  result  more  often 
than  not.  Willisen,  a  contemporary  of  Clausewitz,  has 
tabulated  them  as  follows: 


Vital 
Phases 


Strategic 
defensive 
and  tactical 
defensive 


Strategic 
defensive 
and  tactical 
offensive 


Strategic 
offensive 
and  tactical 
defensive 


Strategic 
offensive 
and  tactical 
offensive 


In  Event  of 
Victory 


Complete 
draw 


Victory  on 

Favorable 

Annihila- 

the battle- 

general situ- 

tion of  the 

field  without 

ation  for  a 

enemy  and 

result  for 

victory, 

conquest  of 

the  whole 

which,  how- 

his country 

campaign 

ever,  will  be 

or  war 

without  re- 

sult because 

the  enemy's 

capacity  to 

fight  re- 

mains intact 

In  Event  of 
Defeat 

Own  anni- 
hilation and 
loss  of 
territory 

Retreat  in 
order  to  re- 
sume   again 
the  tactical 
offensive 

Warding  off 
the  conse- 
quences by  a 
favorable 
strategic 
position 

Temporary 
abandonment 
of  what  has 
been  begun 

METHODS  OF  WAGING  WAR  45 

ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  THE  VARIOUS  COMBINATIONS 

STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  AND  TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE 

In  Event  of  Victory 

Osman  Pasha  at  Plevna  was  on  the  strategic  and  tac- 
tical defensive,  and  yet,  after  having  driven  back  the  Rus- 
sians in  the  three  separate  attacks  on  the  city,  the  outcome 
was  a  draw. 

In  Event  of  Defeat 

At  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Confederates  were  on  the 
strategic  and  tactical  defensive,  but  after  their  defeat  at 
Donelson,  they  not  only  lost  their  army  by  capture,  but  also 
western  Kentucky  and  part  of  Tennessee. 

STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  AND  TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE 
In  Event  of  Victory 

Lee,  at  Chancellorsville,  was  on  the  strategical  defen- 
sive and  tactical  offensive.  He  drove  back  the  forces  of 
Hooker.  However,  the  Confederates  were  not  much  better 
off  when  Hooker  got  back  into  his  lines  than  they  were  be- 
fore the  attack. 

In  Event  of  Defeat 

Bragg,  at  Stones  River,  was  on  the  strategic  defensive 
and  tactical  offensive,  yet  after  his  defeat  was  forced  to 
fall  back  across  the  Tennessee  River  and  later  at  Chick- 
amauga  again  assumed  the  tactical  offensive. 

The  Confederate  army  during  the  Atlanta  campaign 
was  on  the  strategic  defensive,  but  at  Peach  Tree,  with  the 
change  in  commanders,  the  Confederates  took  the  tactical 
offensive,  and,  even  though  defeated,  were  able  to  send 
Hood's  army  on  the  final  invasion  of  the  North. 

STRATEGICAL  OFFENSIVE  AND  TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE 
In  Event  of  Victory 

While  we  cannot  say  that  Lee  after  Antietam  was  in 
a  favorable  strategic  position  with  a  river  at  his  back,  yet 
he  doubtless  warded  off  the  consequence  of  his  defeat  by 


46  STRATEGY 

the  strength  his  tactical  position  gave  to  his  strategic  sit- 
uation. 

In  Event  of  Defeat 

As  a  result  of  an  unwarranted  assumption  of  this 
combination,  Hooker  was  defeated  at  Chancellorsville  and 
was  forced  to  retreat  across  the  Rappahannock  River.  The 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  prevented  from  again  resuming 
the  tactical  offensive  by  Lee's  unsuccessful  invasion  of  the 
North. 

The  Serbs  in  The  World  War  assumed  the  stragetical 
offensive  after  their  successes  on  the  Shabatz  and  Jadar 
Rivers  and  invaded  hostile  territory  when  they  were  forced 
back  on  the  tactical  defensive,  but  moving  to  their  main 
positions  resumed  the  tactical  offensive  at  the  engagement 
known  as  the  "Battle  of  the  Serbian  Ridges." 

STRATEGICAL  OFFENSIVE  AND  TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE 
In  Event  of  Victory 

This  is  the  combination  productive  of  the  greatest  re- 
sults. We  have  many  illustrations.  At  Paardeburg,  in  the 
Boer  War,  Lord  Roberts  was  on  the  strategic  and  tactical 
offensive  and  not  only  captured  Cronje's  army,  but  overran 
that  section  of  the  Orange  Free  State  in  which  his  army  was 
operating. 

Grant,  at  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  the  Central  Powers 
in  case  of  Russia,  Roumania,  and  Serbia,  were  on  the  stra- 
tegical and  tactical  offensive  and  not  only  destroyed  hostile 
opposition  but  took  over  the  military  control  of  the  territory. 

In  Event  of  Defeat 

The  temporary  abandonment  of  the  enterprise.  Such 
was  the  British  situation  in  Arabia,  and,  on  repeated  occa- 
sions at  other  places,  during  the  recent  war;  the  party  at- 
tacking, when  it  failed,  merely  got  ready  for  another  effort. 

There  is  a  general  impression  given  out  by  certain 
text-book  writers  that  the  general  or  the  general  staff  is 
absolutely  a  free  agent  in  selecting  the  line  of  action.  We 
must  never  forget  that  politics  still  play  a  part,  and  it  is 
not  what  the  general  wants — it  is  what  the  political  au- 
thority demands  and  what  the  people  will  stand  for. 


METHODS  OF  WAGING  WAR  47 

As  already  stated,  Napoleon  would  have  liked  to  have 
stood  on  the  defensive  in  1815,  until  his  veterans  arrived 
from  Spain,  yet  such  an  action  would  have  involved  an  invas- 
ion of  a  part  of  France,  a  thing  the  people  would  not  tolerate. 
Politics,  in  the  American  Civil  War,  demanded  that  a  Fed- 
eral army  be  continually  kept  actually  between  the  Con- 
federates and  Washington. 

Grant's  movement  down  the  west  bank  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River  during  the  Vicksburg  campaign  was  forced  upon 
him,  for  the  political  situation  in  the  North,  with  an  election 
not  far  off,  would  permit  of  nothing  that  looked  like  a 
retrograde  movement.  Grant  wanted  to  go  north  after  he 
learned  of  the  condition  of  the  country  across  the  river  from 
Vicksburg,  and  make  a  trial  on  the  east  bank,  but  this 
would  have  looked  like  a  retreat. 

Vigorously  ambitious  nations  and  states  do  not  lack 
positive  purposes  in  which  they  are  politically  aggressive; 
and  in  their  desire  for  new  territory,  for  the  extension  of 
their  political  institutions  on  behalf  of  a  union  with  people 
of  their  own  blood  held  under  foreign  domination,  or  to 
open  up  trade  routes  and  intercourse  closed  up  by  a  neigh- 
boring state,  will  invariably  assume  the  strategical  and  tac- 
tical offensive.  Such  was  the  case  with  Germany  in  The 
World  War.  Being  ambitious  she  desired  the  extension  of 
her  political  institutions,  and  promptly  took  the  initiative 
to  accomplish  it. 

A  nation,  which  in  its  historical  development  has  ar- 
rived at  a  point  of  rest,  will  invariably  be  on  the  strategic 
and  tactical  defensive.  It  will  merely  await  the  action  of 
the  more  aggressive  nation,  surrendering  to  it  all  of  the 
"trumps,"  so  to  speak,  and  inevitably  meeting  defeat.  We 
have  examples  in  the  case  of  Greece,  Persia  and  China  in 
the  past. 

The  nation  on  the  strategic  offensive  should  follow 
with  a  tactical  offensive;  otherwise  the  slowing  up  may, 
metaphorically  speaking,  result  in  the  breaking  off  of  the 
sharp  point  already  imbedded. 

EXCEPTIONS 

There  are  two  exceptions,  however,  where  the  party  on 
the  strategical  offensive  is  justified  in  combining  with  it 
the  tactical  defensive. 


48  STRATEGY 

First  Case. — When  the  line  of  strategical  advance  en- 
ables the  assailant  to  place  himself  on  the  main  artery  of 
communications  of  the  enemy  and  thereby  to  deprive  the 
latter  of  his  means  of  subsistence  and  compel  him  to  fight 
to  live,  we  may  say  that  a  tactical  defensive  may  be  com- 
bined with  the  strategical  offensive. 

In  the  Marengo  campaign  of  1800,  Napoleon,  by  his 
debouchment  through  the  Alps,  was  able  to  place  his  army 
astride  Melas'  communications.  Melas  had  the  choice  of 
attacking  or  starving.  He  chose  the  former,  but  being 
unsuccessful,  was  forced  to  sue  for  peace. 

Second  Case. — When,  due  to  a  peculiar  political  and 
international  situation,  it  is  imperative  that  the  assailant 
be  ejected  from  invaded  territory,  he  is  justified  in  combin- 
ing the  strategical  offensive  with  the  tactical  defensive.  A 
great  many  writers  claim  that  General  Lee,  during  the 
Gettysburg  campaign,  should  have  fallen  back  on  the  tac- 
tical defensive  and  made  Meade  attack  him.  The  Federal 
government  had  no  too  strong  a  hold  on  the  people,  and  the 
enforcement  of  the  draft  law,  together  with  the  feeling,  in 
some  sections,  that  the  war  was  unjust,  was  making  the  war 
unpopular.  Also,  it  was  generaly  understood  that  all  the 
Confederates  needed  to  secure  foreign  recognition  was  a 
victory  on  Northern  soil.  Such  being  the  case,  it  was  im- 
perative that  Lee  be  driven  back  across  the  Potomac  River. 
Lee  would  have  had  a  better  chance  of  defeating  Meade  by 
dropping  back  on  the  tactical  defensive,  and,  after  Meade 
had  shattered  his  army  by  an  unsuccessful  attack,  to  have 
fallen  on  him  with  a  vigorous  counter-stroke. 

The  organizations  of  armies  plays  an  important  part 
in  the  matter.  The  side  that  mobilizes  first  will  doubtlessly 
wish  to  make  a  rapid  advance ;  the  other  side  will  be  forced 
to  take  the  defensive,  even  if  only  for  the  moment.  Each 
side  will  therefore  find  its  role  by  circumstances  over  which 
it  has  no  control  and  be  obliged  to  accept  the  situation. 

However,  it  does  no  harm  to  become  familiar  with  the 
salient  features  of  each  form  of  strategy  and  tactics,  so 
that,  if  forced  to  assume  either  one  involuntarily,  one  may 
know  what  can  be  expected  from  the  various  combinations. 


CHAPTER  IV 


The  Leading  Principles  of  Strategy 

BEGIN  with,  we  must  assume  that  the  enemy,  "whose 
motives  are  similar  to  our  own,  will  assemble  his 
troops  into  one  vast  army  in  order  to  deliver,  with  united 
forces,  blows  which  shall  be  as  decisive  as  possible."  Na- 
poleon's XLIV  War  Maxim  states  that  "Nothing  is  more  im- 
portant in  war  than  unity  in  the  command ;  thus  when  there 
is  war  against  one  power  there  should  be  but  one  army, 
acting  on  one  line,  and  lead  by  one  chief." 

"In  case  the  great  size  of  the  entire  land  forces  of  a 
state  necessitates  the  formation  of  several  groups,  because 
in  one  mass  the  whole  might  be  too  unwieldy,  several  of 
these  bodies  will  receive  instructions  looking  to  mutual 
action." 

We  will  be  able  to  recognize  the  body  that  is  intended 
for  decisive  action.  This  may  be  learned  from  various 
circumstances ;  for  example,  from  the  strength  of  the  force ; 
from  the  decisive  direction  of  its  advance;  from  the  im- 
portance of  its  commander;  from  the  superiority  in 
quality  of  the  troops  making  up  the  force.  With  a  force 
such  as  Germany  had,  one  may  expect  to  find  the  Guard 
and  Imperial  Crown  Prince  with  the  main  army.  The 
first,  on  account  of  its  dependability,  and  the  second  from 
the  desire  the  Hohenzollerns  had  to  have  the  next  ruler 
in  the  military  "limelight"  as  much  as  possible.  It  is 
obvious  that  with  the  failure  or  overthrow  of  this  main 
force  all  others  must  suffer  accordingly.  It  is  possible 
that  they,  hearing  of  the  defeat  of  the  main  army,  may  give 
up  without  resistance.  Such  was  the  case  in  1866  after  the 
defeat  of  Von  Benedek  at  Sadowa.  From  this  we  derive 
our  first  principle  of  strategy — "Make  the  hostile  main 
army  the  objective."  This  of  course  does  not  prevent  a 
series  of  preliminary  engagements  leading  up  to  the  main 

49 


50  STRATEGY 

encounter.  There  may  be  a  number  of  fortresses  blocking 
the  way  to  the  main  army,  such  as  those  at  Liege,  Namur, 
Maubeuge,  Verdun  and  other  places.  These  must  be  re- 
duced or  isolated.  Each  force  may  try  to  interrupt  the 
other's  concentration  by  sending  put  strategic  cavalry,  but 
these  engagements  are  only  preliminary.  We  have  no  bet- 
ter illustration  of  the  dire  results  from  the  violation  of  this 
principle  than  in  the  action  of  Burnside  in  not  attacking 
Lee's  army  camped  around  Culpepper  Court  House  in  the 
fall  of  1862,  but  attempting  to  move  quickly  via  Fredericks- 
burg  on  Richmond.  The  fall  of  Richmond  would  probably 
have  meant  nothing  to  the  Confederacy  at  that  time  with 
Lee's  army  still  in  the  field,  and  might  have  resulted  in  the 
"bottling  up"  of  the  victorious  troops. 

In  the  selection  of  an  objective,  as  between  a  geograph- 
ical point  and  a  mobile  army,  the  choice  generally  goes  to 
the  latter,  although  there  have  been  cases  when  the  cap- 
ture of  the  geographical  point,  for  political  reasons,  meant 
the  end  of  the  struggle.  The  seizure  of  the  capital  generally 
is  followed  by  a  revolution  and  a  change  of  government. 
There  have  been  many  cases,  however,  where  the  capture  of 
the  capital  has  not  brought  about  peace.  The  capture  of 
Washington  in  the  War  of  1812  made  scarcely  any  im- 
pression upon  the  American  forces,  yet  had  the  same  city 
been  captured  after  First  Bull  Run,  the  Southern  indepen- 
dence might  have  been  recognized.  In  1757,  an  Austrian 
general  of  Hussars  entered  Berlin  and  levied  a  contribu- 
tion on  the  city,  but  being  forced  to  abandon  it  on  the 
approach  of  the  Prussian  King,  the  incident  produced  no 
result.  The  capture  of  the  Belgian  capital,  while  sub- 
jecting the  inhabitants  to  much  discomfiture,  did  not  cause 
the  Belgians  to  sue  for  peace.  Napoleon  held  Madrid  for 
four  years  and  the  Austrians  held  Belgrade  for  a  similar 
period  in  The  World  War,  yet  those  acts  did  not  bring  the 
war  to  a  successful  conclusion.  It  often  happens  that, 
even  after  the  fall  of  the  capital,  a  subsequent  victory  in 
the  field  is  necessary  to  bring  the  enemy  to  terms.  After 
the  capture  of  Vienna  by  Napoleon  in  1805  and  1809,  it 
required  Austerlitz  and  Wagram,  respectively,  to  force  the 
Austrians  to  sue  for  peace. 


THE  LEADING  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY  51 

It  is  a  mooted  question  in  The  World  War  whether 
Paris  or  Marshal  Joffre's  main  army  should  have  been  the 
objective  of  the  Germans.  In  no  country  does  the  capital 
mean  more  to  the  people  than  in  France,  and  it  will  never 
be  known  what  the  outcome  would  have  been  had  the  Ger- 
mans captured  Paris.  A  glance  at  the  railroad  map  of 
France  will  show  that,  in  addition  to  its  sentimental  value, 
Paris  is  of  a  decided  commercial  importance,  as  it  is  the  hub 
of  the  entire  railroad  system  of  the  country.  The  capture 
of  the  capital  would  have  paralyzed  railway  traffic. 

AN  ILLUSTRATION  OF  THE  VIOLATION  OF  THE  LEADING  PRIN- 
CIPLE OF  STRATEGY  THAT  WAS  NOT  JUSTIFIED 

The  Russians,  in  1877,  thought  proper  to  violate  this 
principle.  Urged  by  political  considerations,  they  decided, 
after  the  passage  of  the  Danube,  to  neglect  a  Turkish  army 
of  100,000  men  on  their  left  at  Rasgrad,  and  a  force  of 
about  40,000  men  holding  the  Valley  of  the  Vid  on  their 
right,  but  to  make  Adrianople  their  first  objective,  march- 
ing straight  upon  it.  The  resistance  organized  by  Osman 
Pasha  upon  the  flank  of  their  line  of  operations  arrested 
their  progress,  subjected  them  to  numerous  checks,  and 
forced  them  into  several  unanticipated  engagements.  Plevna, 
which  was  almost  devoid  of  strategic  significance  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign,  soon,  through  the  energy  dis- 
played by  the  Turkish  general,  acquired  signal  importance, 
and  thus  became  the  decisive  object. 

ILLUSTRATION  THAT  WAS  JUSTIFIED 

In  1814,  the  allied  armies  of  Bohemia  and  Silesia  had 
taken  Paris  for  their  objective.  At  the  moment  when  Na- 
poleon, abandoning  the  direct  defense  of  his  capital,  turned 
upon  their  communications,  they  contented  themselves  with 
placing  an  army  corps  in  his  front,  and  continued  their 
march.  The  allied  generals  chose  to  neglect  the  enemy's  main 
force,  taking  for  their  objective  the  principle  strategic 
point  in  the  theater  of  operations.  In  this  case  their  de- 
termination was  not  an  error.  They  knew  that  their  adver- 
sary's forces  were  very  weak;  moreover,  an  intercepted 
letter  had  apprised  them  of  the  fact  that  Napoleon  himself 


52  STRATEGY 

doubted  the  success  of  his  own  operations ;  and,  finally  they 
were  quite  certain  that  once  the  capital  fell  into  their  hands, 
they  could  bring  about  Napoleon's  dethronement.  The  march 
upon  Paris  assured  the  allied  armies  a  result  more  in  con- 
formity with  the  aim  of  the  war,  more  prompt  and  more 
decisive  than  could  be  obtained  by  a  continuance  of  the 
struggle  with  Napoleon  in  the  field ;  for,  in  taking  away  his 
crown,  they  deprived  him  of  his  last  resources. 

ANOTHER  ILLUSTRATION  THAT  WAS  JUSTIFIED 

In  1849,  Hungary,  engaged  in  insurrection,  appointed 
Gorgei,  formerly  a  captain,  to  the  position  of  commander- 
in-chief.  After  three  months'  campaign,  he  succeeded  in 
driving  the  Austrian  army  commanded  by  Prince  Windsch- 
graetz  from  the  Theiss  to  the  Danube.  The  Imperial  forces, 
wishing  to  oppose  the  passage  of  the  river,  took  position  on 
the  5th  of  April  beyond  Pesth.  Leaving  a  containing  force 
to  make  demonstrations  in  the  Imperial  front,  Gorgei 
marched  upon  Komorn  by  the  left  bank  of  the  river  for  the 
purpose  of  debouching  on  the  Austrians'  rear.  On  the  10th 
of  the  month,  he  took  Waitzen,  north  of  Budapest;  on  the 
18th,  Leva,  forcing  the  passage  of  the  Grau  River  at  Nagy- 
Sarlo,  and  succeeded  in  raising  the  siege  of  Komorn  on 
the  22d.  The  Austrians,  seeing  their  line  of  retreat  threat- 
ened, fell  back  to  Pressburg.  At  the  same  time  their  armies 
in  the  west  were  driven  into  the  quadrilateral.  Their  con- 
tinuous reverses  decided  them  to  accept  the  assistance  of 
the  Russians,  who  entered  Hungary  June  17th  by  way  of 
Dulka  Pass.  General  Hainau,  who  had  superseded  Wind- 
schgraetz,  was  obliged  to  choose,  first  of  all,  an  objective 
favoring  co-operation  with  his  allies.  If  he  should  form 
a  junction  with  the  Russians,  he  would  uncover  Vienna. 
This  city  was  at  the  point  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  Gorgei. 
Hainau  therefore  decided  to  make  Budapest  his  first  objec- 
tive and  capture  it  instead  of  using  Gorgei's  main  army  as 
his  first  objective.  Budapest,  at  this  time,  was  the  seat  of 
the  provisional  government  of  the  Hungarians  and  the  center 
of  the  revolutionary  intrigue.  All  communications  of  the 
country  centered  here  and  it  was  the  most  important  cross- 
ing of  the  Danube.  In  marching  on  Budapest,  the  Austrians 
would  have  control  of  the  country  comprised  between  the 


THE  LEADING  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY  53 

Danube,  the  frontier  of  Syria,  the  Drave  River  and  the  Muhr. 
They  could  also  form  a  junction  with  the  Russians  by  way  of 
Foldwar.  They  had  two  lines  of  operations;  one  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Danube,  which  could  be  blocked  by  the 
Hungarians  at  Komorn,  and  the  other  on  the  south  bank  with 
left  resting  on  the  river.  Hainau  decided  to  move  by  the 
south  bank,  for  he  could  leave  a  garrison  at  Pressburg  and 
along  the  Waag,  and  the  enemy  would  have  to  attack  this 
line  before  he  could  threaten  Vienna.  This  movement  suf- 
ficed to  make  the  Hungarians  fall  back  and  caught  them 
between  the  Russians  and  the  Austrians.  This  is  but  another 
example  illustrating  the  fact  that  sometimes  it  is  better 
to  make  a  geographical  point  the  objective  rather  than  the 
hostile  main  army. 

"The  surest  means  of  vanquishing  the  hostile  main 
army  lies  in  the  concentration  of  a  superior  force;  for  no- 
body can,  with  certainty,  claim  in  advance  that  he  will  have 
the  better  general  at  the  head  of  his  army,  or  that  his 
troops  will  be  braver  than  the  enemy."  Some  writers  claim 
that  it  is  unscientific  to  figure  that  the  enemy  is  not  your 
equal  in  prowess  unless  you  know  the  fact  to  be  true.  It 
is  an  old  war  maxim  handed  down  by  Shonshi,  a  Chinese 
general,  who  lived  552  B.  C.,  "to  study  well  your  opponent 
and  know  his  limitations."  Unless  you  know  that  the  gen- 
eral commanding  the  enemy's  forces  is  of  inferior  quality, 
you  have  no  right  to  assume  it.  There  is  no  question  but 
von  Moltke  played  upon  the  weakness  of  von  Benedek  in 
1866,  for  the  latter  had  admitted  to  his  sovereign  that  he 
was  no  strategist  in  the  following  words:  "Sire,  I  am  no 
strategist."  Napoleon's  opponents  were  of  the  opinion  that 
his  arrival  upon  the  battlefield  was  equivalent  to  rein- 
forcements of  a  corps. 

The  XXIX  War  Maxim  of  Napoleon  reads  as  follows: 
"When  about  to  deliver  battle,  it  is  the  general  rule  to  con- 
centrate all  your  forces,  and  to  neglect  none;  one  battalion 
often  decides  the  day." 

From  this  we  derive  our  second  principle  of  strategy, 
namely:  "To  have,  if  possible,  all  the  forces  assembled 
at  the  hour  of  decisive  action.  A  single  battalion  may  turn 
the  scale  in  battle." 


54  STRATEGY 

RULE  FOR  DETACHMENTS  OR  DOCTRINE  OF  ECONOMY 

"It  would  appear  that  every  separation,  and  every  de- 
tachment from  the  main  force  is  faulty.  Such,  however,  is 
not  the  case.  All  great  successes  carry  the  smaller  ones 
with  them.  Yet  we  cannot  ignore  secondary  objectives,  for 
we  cannot  be  sure  as  to  the  exact  point  where  the  issue  is 
to  be  decided.  The  surrender  of  some  point  of  minor  sig- 
nificance may  result  in  its  surprise  by  the  enemy,  thereby 
enabling  him  to  carry  out  his  main  mission  more  effec- 
tively." In  South  Africa,  the  Boers  committed  the  error 
of  detaching  too  many  small  groups  from  their  main  armies, 
with  the  result  that  these  detachments  could  not  be  recalled 
in  time  to  exert  any  influence  on  the  main  battles. '  The 
British  detachments  were  justified  as  they  contributed  to 
the  main  operations  by  holding  out  superior  numbers,  al- 
though these  detachments  were  not  primarily  made  for 
that  purpose. 

We  must  assume  that  detachments  are  unavoidable  and 
it  is  only  a  question  of  justifying  them.  So  we  may  state 
the  rule  as  follows : 

"Detachments  are  justifiable  when  they  contribute  to 
the  main  issue  by  holding  out  superior  numbers  from  the 
decisive  action  or  when  they  can  be  withdrawn  in  time  to 
participate  in  that  action."  The  detachment  under  Johnston, 
in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  is  an  apt  illustration,  for 
Johnston  not  only  held  out  Patterson,  but  was  able  to  with- 
draw in  time  to  participate  in  the  first  battle  of  Manassas. 
The  opposite  was  Patterson's  case. 

Napoleon  came  very  near  losing  the  battle  of  Marengo 
by  detaching  Desaix  who  returned  only  just  in  time.  This 
may  have  been  what  inspired  his  XXVIII  War  Maxim: 
"A  detachment  must  not  be  made  on  the  eve  of  battle,  for 
in  the  night  the  situation  may  change — either  by  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  towards  retreat,  or  by  the  arrival  of 
large  reinforcements  which  will  allow  it  even  to  take  the 
offensive — and  render  the  premature  disposition  made, 
futile." 

DISADVANTAGES  OF  LARGE  CONCENTRATIONS 

The  concentration  of  large  masses  subjects  the  troops 
to  many  hardships,  such  as  inadequate  shelter  and  camp- 


THE  LEADING  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY  55 

ing  facilities  with  the  probability  of  epidemic  diseases 
breaking  out.  In  1914-15  the  Serbs  lost  about  200,000  men 
from  typhoid  fever. 

The  questions  of  supply  are  simplified  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, yet  the  scarcity  of  suitable  roads  in  sufficient  quan- 
tities may  complicate  the  concentration. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  large  masses  are  moved 
only  with  extreme  'difficulty,  and,  in  a  war  of  movement,  the 
same  difficulties  repeat  themselves  at  every  halt  for  the  night 
and  every  time  camp  is  broken. 

It  is  a  rule  that  columns  marching  on  the  same  road 
should  not  be  so  long  that  the  head  can  be  defeated  before 
the  rear  can  be  brought  to  its  assistance.  European  writers 
claim  that  a  column  marching  on  the  same  road  should  not 
exceed  30,000  or  40,000  men.  This  means  that  an  army 
cannot  march  on  a  single  road,  but  must  advance  in  parallel 
columns,  camping  separately,  but  in  such  a  way  that  they 
may  be  united  at  the  decisive  moment,  or  at  least  be  brought 
into  active  co-operation. 

A  good  rule  to  follow  is:  "Separate  to  camp  and  con- 
centrate to  fight." 

Napoleon's  advice  to  his  brother  Joseph,  when  he  was 
about  to  enter  Italy  to  get  possession  of  Naples  was:  "I 
say  to  you  again,  do  not  divide  your  forces.  Let  your  en- 
tire army  cross  the  Apennines,  and  let  your  three  corps  be 
directed  upon  Naples,  and  so  disposed  as  to  be  able  to  unite 
upon  the  same  field  of  battle  in  a  single  day." 

"The  conduct  of  modern  war,  therefore,  appears  under 
the  form  of  continual  separating  and  assembling  masses  of 
troops." 

Von  der  Goltz  states  "that  the  triumph  of  the  art  of 
separation  and  concentration  is  to  have  all  the  available 
forces  concentrated  on  the  day  of  decisive  battle,  without 
causing  them  to  suffer  beforehand  through  continuous  over- 
crowding." 

UNINTERRUPTED  FLOW  OF  EVENTS 

Owing  to  the  sensitiveness  of  our  highly  developed  com- 
mercial life,  warfare  must  move  forward  with  an  uninter- 
rupted flow  of  events.  When  an  army  after  a  repulse  is 
unable  to  respond  with  a  counter-stroke,  you  may  look  for 


56  STRATEGY 

a  dissolution  of  the  forces  and  peace.  When  the  Germans 
were  unable  to  assume  an  offensive  somewhere  after  their 
repulse  on  the  Marne  in  the  summer  of  1918,  their  ultimate 
defeat  was  only  a  question  of  time.  The  expense  of  modern 
war  is  so  great  that  uninterrupted  employment  of  the 
forces  is  imperative.  The  long  pauses,  for  example,  ces- 
sation during  the  winter,  that  characterized  ancient  wars, 
will  no  longer  obtain  except  in  rare  cases,  as  when  condi- 
tions of  climate  prevent  action;  such  was  the  case  in  Flan- 
ders in  The  World  War. 

In  the  Russo-Turkish  war  of  1878,  after  the  second 
attack  on  Plevna,  its  fall  was  delayed  for  four  months. 

Turkey,  after  repelling  the  attackers,  was  too  weak  for 
the  counter-stroke.  She  should  never  have  committed  her- 
self to  an  appeal  to  arms  unless  certain  of  help  from 
allies.  This  original  error,  therefore,  in  deciding  upon  war, 
brought  about  the  exception. 

The  same  thing  happened  in  South  Africa,  but  here 
again  we  notice  special  conditions.  On  account  of  the 
character  of  their  troops,  the  Boers  were  not  able  to  take 
by  force  the  fortified  places  into  which  they  drove  the 
English  divisions  in  the  first  attacks. 

The  British  stuck  stubbornly  to  their  positions.  The 
activity  of  the  offensive  thus  came  to  a  standstill.  For  the 
first  four  months  the  British  attempts  at  succor  came  to 
naught,  due  to  the  incompetence  of  her  leaders  and  the 
steadfast  bravery  of  the  Boers.  Reinforcements,  with  Rob- 
erts and  Kitchener,  arrived  before  the  decisive  blow  was 
struck. 

These  conditions  will  hardly  happen  in  a  war  between 
two  great  powers,  yet  in  Manchuria  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  there  was  a  complete  cessation  of  hostilities  for  the 
month  of  July  and  a  few  days  in  August,  while  the  Japanese 
reinforced  their  1st,  2d  and  4th  Armies. 

ENDURANCE 

The  party  with  the  greatest  endurance  in  war  enjays.. 
a  decisive  advantage. 

As  an  illustration  take  the  case  of  the  enemy's  princi- 
pal army  defeated,  a  greater  part  of  his  territory  overrun, 
and  yet  the  victor  forced  to  grant  a  comparatively  favor- 


THE  LEADING  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY 

able   peace   to  the  defeated   enemy.     The   Russo-Japanese 
War  is  an  example.     Japan  was  the  unquestioned  victor 
on  nearly  every  battlefield,  but  due  to  the  lack  of  financial 
resources  was  forced  to  sign  a  peace  and  forego  any  indem- 
nity.  JLLJias  -been  said  that  Japan  was  gaining  Manchuria 
and  losing  her  own  country,  for  foreign  loans  had  absorbed 
all  her  revenues  and  she  could  not  float  an  internal  loan. 
In  a  country  of  such  a  vast  extent  as  Russia,  and  with 
j5uch  a  scattered  population,  depending  so  little  on  the  out- 
_side  sources  of  supply,  it  is  possible  to  defeat  several  of  her 
armies  and  not  bring  her  people  to  their  knees.     Napoleon 
at  Borodino^, 


""Rnf  wimn-a^^nimtry  is  highly  cfmrmpTvifll,    after  t>]fi 

defeat  of  its  main  armies,  and  the  great*  cities  and  centers 
__ha_Y_e_b£en  seized,  the  people  are  apt  to  demand  peace  at  any 
price  rather  than  suffer  from  the  interruption  of  their  or- 
dinary course  of  affairs.  The  case  of  Belgium  in  the  recent 
war  appears  as  an  exception.  You  are  doubtless  familiar 
with  our  own  Hartford  convention  that  met  near  the  close 
of  the  War  of  1812  to  protest  against  the  embargo  that 
cut  off  the  oversea  intercourse  of  those  concerned.  The 
convention  was  in  favor  of  seceding  and  suing  for  a  sep- 
arate peace  in  preference  to  this  interruption  of  their  com- 
mercial life." 

After  two  years  of  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States, 
there  was  an  element,  principally  in  the  east,  who,  feeling 
the  pressure  of  the  war,  clamored  loudly  for  peace  through 
the  Chicago  Tribune  and  New  York  World. 

So  we  see  that  social,  commercial,  and  political  condi- 

—  4tons-play  .an  important  part.    "It  is  only  when  two  states 

are  of  approximately  the  same  nature  that  the  defeat  of  the 

hostile  main  army  carries  with  it  the  attainment  of  the 

further  purpose,  the  immediate  exaction  of  peace." 

The  most  remarkable  case  was  the  defeat  of  Austria 
in  the  Six  Weeks*  War. 

It  took  Prussia  three  months  to  bring  the  French  peo- 
ple to  their  knees  in  1870  after  the  defeat  of  the  French 
armies.  Neither  Napoleon  in  1812  in  his  war  with  Russia, 
nor  the  Confederates  in  the  United  States  in  the  sixties 
were  able  to  bring  the  war  home  to  the  enemy's  people 
after  the  defeat  of  the  main  armies. 


58  STRATEGY 

We  should  always  consider  what  steps  are  necessary 
after  the  defeat  of  the  hostile  main  army  to  coerce  the  peo- 
ple into  a  peace.  These  depend  upon  circumstances,  such 
as  the  nature  of  the  country  and  people.  It  may  be  the 
threatening  of  the  capital,  as  was  the  case  in  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War  of  1878.  It  may  be  the  seizure  of  certain  har- 
-Jx>rs,  commercial  centers,  important  lines  of  traffic,  forti- 
fications and  arsenals,  or  anything  important  to  the  exis- 
tence of  the  people.  It  may  be  by  blockade,  the  method 
adopted  by  the  Federal  government  with  great  effect  against 
the  Southern  States  from  1861  to  1865,  or  it  may  be  by 
the  occupying  of  certain  sections  of  the  enemy's  country,  as 
is  now  being  done  along  the  Rhine. 

The  distinguishing  characteristics  of  modern  war  are 
then: 

1.  "Calling  forth  the  military  resources  of  a  country  to  such 
an  extent  that,  after  victory,  an  advantageous  peace  may  also  be 
forced  from  the  enemy,  and  that  as  quickly  as  possible. 

2.  "Preparation  of  all  the  forces  immediately  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war. 

3.  "Unceasing  progress,  without  delay,  until  the  organized 
resistance  of  the  opponent  is  broken  in  decisive  battles;  and  only 
after  that,  until  the  conclusion  of  peace,  a  calmer  course,  with  less 
injury  to  the  instrument  of  war." 

Politics,  which  caused  the  war,  will  now  have  a  de- 
cided influence  upon  the  treaty  of  peace. 


CHAPTER  V 

Preparation  for  War 


MOBILIZATION  AND  CONCENTRATION 

NO  ARMY  can  take  the  field  from  a  peace  footing  with- 
out additional  preparation.    This  results  from  the  fact 
that  nations,  in  time  of  peace,  keep  together  only  a  nucleus 
of  the  troops  to  be  used  in  time  of  war.    Many  of  the  units 
do  not  exist  at  all,  and  entirely  new  bodies  must  be  formed. 

Reserves  must  be  called  to  the  colors,  drafts  of  men  and 
animals  made,  the  means  of  transport  increased  and  a  vast 
amount  of  stores  procured.  To  do  this,  often  a  draft  law 
must  be  created  and  passed,  or  other  means  of  raising  men 
devised;  factories  must  be  built,  and  others  manufacturing 
products  utilized  in  peace  converted  to  war  materiel  pro- 
ducers. All  this  takes  time  and  the  country  that  has 
anticipated  the  least  must  take  a  maximum  of  time  with 
a  maximum  of  effort  when  the  emergency  arises. 

Up  to  the  latter  part  of  the  18th  century,  armies  were 
a  mere  aggregation  of  battalions  and  regiments;  but  as 
they  grew  in  size,  this  cumbersome  arrangement  was  modi- 
fied. Prior  to  the  16th  century,  it  was  not  customary  to 
raise  forces  larger  than  a  company.  The  "lance"  — 
that  is,  the  fully  armored  knight  with  his  retinue  of  a 
squire,  a  page  and  three  or  four  mounted  men  —  formed  the 
principal  elements  of  every  military  force.  Thejrnodern-jor  — 
_j£anizatLoji  is-the  -outgrowth.  of  the  16th  century  when  war 
became  the  pastime  of  monarchs  and  bore  no  semblance 
-  ™f  q  Cation  a  1  jjiara^y-  4§  a  result,  war  became  a  busi- 

Inasmuch  as  the  process 


originated  in  Italy,  we  find  most  of  our  terms  derived  from 
the  Italian.  Companies  and  troops  were  organized.  A 
company  in  a  military  sense  meant  a  gathering  of  feudal 
retainers  or  mercenaries,  who  followed  their  lord  to  the 
wars,  and  meant  a  band  commanded  by  a  captain  (caput, 

59 


60  STRATEGY 

head) .  From  among  these  mercenaries  the  idea  of  armies 
sprang.  The  word  "company"  is  derived  from  the  old 
French  word  compaignie ;  the  Latin  word  companionem 
(companion)  from  cum-panis  (with  bread),  implying  an 
intimate  association  of  men  in  one  mass.  The  word  "troop" 
is  of  uncertain  origin  and  probably  comes  from  the  word 
turbo,  (a  crowd),  or  the  Teutonic  word  treiben  (drive) 
or  a  drove.  The  company  consisted  of  several  hundred  men, 
but  this  number  was  reduced  to  about  100,  as  it  was  not 
thought  that  a  larger  number  could  be  controlled  by  one 
man. 

The  captain  was  generally  a  man  of  poor  pedagogic 
ability,  so  some  one  had  to  be  selected  to  take  his  place,  who 
had  greater  aoility  as  an  instructor  and  less  influence. 
This  man  was  called  a  servient,  or  one  who  serves,  and 
from  this  term  we  derive  the  name  sergeant,  our  first  staff 
officer. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  companies  and  troops 
would  have  to  be  moulded  into  some  larger  force  in  order 
to  co-ordinate  their  efforts,  so  a  regiment  was  formed,  the 
word  being  a  derivation  from  regimen,  meaning  "to  rule." 

The  regiment  was  ruled  by  an  officer  called  in  Italian 
colonnello  (little  column),  which  referred  to  the  little  com- 
pany of  the  colonel  which  rode  at  the  head  of  the  organiza- 
tion. This  colonel,  having  little  or  no  education,  was  a 
poor  administrator,  so  must  needs  have  some  one  to  repre- 
sent him,  so  a  lieutenant  (locum  tenens),  being  known 
as  a  lieutenant  colonel,  was  appointed;  and  the  captain, 
being  as  ignorant  of  his  duties  as  the  colonel,  also  had  an 
assistant  (locum  tenens)  and  known  as  lieutenant. 

The  term  battalion  came  into  use  later  and  was  de- 
rived from  the  Italian  battaglia,  meaning  a  battle  array. 
It  originally  meant  a  unit  consisting  of  several  regiments, 
but  later  on,  as  it  became  customary  to  fight  by  battalions, 
that  unit  was  reduced  and  the  two  terms,  regiment  and 
battalion,  changed  places.  The  term  brigade  was  first  used 
by  Maurice  of  Nassau,  who  drew  up  his  army  in  the  Swiss 
fashion  in  three  lines,  styled  "van,"  "battle,"  and  "rear." 
The  word  "brigade"  is  a  corruption  of  the  Italian  briga,  and 
French  brigue  (a  quarrel),  and  means  "a  band  of  oppos- 
JngLcombatants ." 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  61 

The  sergeants  drilling  and  instructing  their  companies 
required  a  staff  officer  to  supervise  their  efforts,  so  another 
officer  was  added,  namely,  sergeant  major.  He  regulated 
the  march  of  the  regiment,  its  maneuvers  in  battle,  and  the 
issuance  of  orders.  When  organizations  fought  in  larger 
numbers  it  became  necessary  to  have  some  one  of  experience 
to  draw  up  the  army  in  line  of  battle,  a  difficult  task  in  the 
days  before  maneuvering  became  known.  This  officer  was 
called  the  sergeant  major  general. 

As  the  time  went  on,  the  term  sergeant  was  dropped 
from  two  titles,  sergeant  major  and  sergeant  major 
general,  leaving  as  we  have  today,  a  major  and  a  major 
general,  which  officers  in  an  European  army  command, 
respectively,  battalions  and  brigades. 

The  staff  work  of  the  army  in  the  16th  century  was 
performed  by  an  officer  called  in  France  the  major  general 
des  logis,  or  the  major  general  of  quarters,  since,  among 
other  duties,  he  allotted  quarters.  This  title  was  later  short- 
ened to  major  general,  by  which  name  the  chief  staff  officer 
of  the  army  has  since  been  known.  In  German,  the  term  was 
translated  quartier  meister-general,  or  quartermaster  gen- 
eral in  English. 

The  wide  scattering  of  troops  over  a  large  frontage 
made  it  impossible  for  the  general  to  exercise  supervision, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  supplies;  so  at  the  close  of  the 
18th  century,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  army  had  to  be  di- 
vided into  portions  for  administrative  purposes,  a  new  or- 
ganization came  into  being,  called  a  division. 

The  power  of  independent  actions  thus  conferred  on 
these  divisions,  which  were  in  fact  miniature  armies,  led 
to  a  want  of  concert  in  their  movements  and  of  co-ordina- 
tion in  their  action;  while  at  the  same  time,  as  armies  in- 
creased in  size,  the  number  of  divisions  became  too  great 
for  the  commander-in-chief  to  control  properly.  So  the 
corps  d'armee  was  introduced  by  Napoleon  as  a  permanent 
organization.  In  Japan  and  the  United  States,  the  division 
is  the  administrative  unit,  but  with  the  continental  army 
it  is  the  corps. 

The  most  mooted  question  in  these  organizations  is 
the  strength  of  the  company  and  the  number  of  regiments 
to  the  brigade,  and  brigades  to  the  division.  With  the  com- 


62  STRATEGY 

pany,  the  strength  should  be  governed  by  the  amount  of 
training,  being  smaller  where  the  troops  are  ill  trained  and 
hard  to  handle,  and  larger  when  the  reverse  conditions 
exist. 

Regarding  the  number  of  larger  subordinate  units  in 
the  brigade  and  division,  authorities  differ.  Those  favoring 
the  three-unit  formation  base  their  choice  on  the  proposition 
that  it  gives  the  commander  of  the  whole  due  importance 
over  his  subordinate  commanders,  and  insures  his  retaining 
an  adequate  command  whenever  he  wishes  to  detach  one  of 
his  units.  This  would  not  be  the  case  were  there  only  two 
units  in  the  whole,  for,  if  one  were  detached,  the  commander 
of  the  whole  would  be  left  exercising  command  over  the 
other  unit,  already  adequately  commanded.  With  the  two- 
regiment  brigade  and  the  two-brigade  division,  the  question 
of  command  is  simplified  by  one-third. 

Most  continental  countries  favor  the  two-regiment 
brigade  and  the  two-brigade  division.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  were  a  third  regiment  assigned  to  the  brigade  and 
a  third  brigade  to  the  division,  without  a  reduction  in  the 
size  of  these  organizations,  it  would  be  somewhat  awkward 
for  them  to  fulfill  the  conditions  of  ready  concentration  in 
battle.  Consensus  of  opinion  seems  to  be  that  where  the 
regiments  and  brigades  are  large  the  two  subdivisions  idea 
is  better  and  where  they  are  small  the  three-subdivision 
idea. 

There  is  another  reason  of  a  tactical  nature  that  rec- 
ommends the  two-subdivision  idea  in  the  brigade  and  divi- 
sion. In  modern  warfare  such  as  was  fought  in  Europe, 
a  division  will  generally  operate  as  a  part  of  a  corps.  Such 
being  the  case,  it  will  have,  in  event  of  attack,  the  duty  of 
tactical  penetration.  Inasmuch  as  this  will  be  a  blow 
straight  ahead,  there  will  be  a  minimum  of  maneuvering, 
so  what  is  needed  is  one  force  to  strike  and  one  for  relief. 
There  would  be  a  maximum  distribution  in  depth,  which  is 
necessary. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  prime  function  of  the 
division  in  France  was  to  penetrate,  of  the  corps  or  separ- 
ate division  was  to  envelop,  while  the  army  both  enveloped 
and  turned.  Where  there  is  to  be  maneuvering,  there  should 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  63 

be  a  third  unit;  where  there  is  no  maneuvering,  it  would 
be  idle  and  in  the  way. 

Modern  opinion  favors  a  division  of  from  12,000  to 
16,000  infantry.  The  following  table  shows  the  approx- 
imate infantry  strength  of  the  divisions  in  the  larger  coun- 
tries at  the  beginning  of  The  World  War: 

United    States    . 14,500 

France   12,000  to   18,000 

Italy 12,000 

Japan    12,000 

Germany 12,000 

Russia   14,000 

Austria-Hungary    _^ 16,000 

England    12,000 

The  organization  should  be  determined  by  each 
country  in  time  of  peace,  and  after  mature  consideration 
of  the  characteristics  of  the  citizens  who  will  form  this 
organization,  amount  of  training  they  will  probaby  have, 
kind  of  officers  who  will  command,  etc. 

Any  country  in  deciding  upon  a  military  organization 
should  first  consider  its  military  policy.  Taking  the  United 
States  as  an  illustration :  Our  general  policy  is  one  of  non- 
aggression;  such  being  the  case,  in  event  of  war  with  an 
oversea  nation,  our  general  strategical  plan,  at  least  at  the 
outset,  would  be  of  a  defensive  nature  in  so  far  as  leaving 
this  continent  is  concerned.  We  then  should  make  our 
organization  such  as  will  work  most  effectively  in  the  ter- 
rain peculiar  to  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Inasmuch  as 
the  war  would  unquestionably  be  one  of  movement,  generally 
known  as  open  warfare,  our  organization  should  be  such  as 
would  facilitate  the  maximum  of  maneuvering.  Unques- 
tionably the  three  units  formation  is  the  best  for  that 
purpose.  The  whole  organization  of  the  smaller  units 
should  be  on  the  basis  of  responsibility  regulating  control; 
that  is,  a  commander  who  is  responsible  for  the  success  of  a 
unit  should  have  sole  command  of  the  various  branches  of 
the  service  in  the  unit  he  commands.  With  the  untrained 
officers  and  soldiers  that  we  would  have,  large  size  units 
would  be  difficult  to  handle,  so  our  units  should  perforce  be 
small.  In  the  question  of  transportation,  we  should  give 
more  consideration  to  animal-drawn  than  to  motor,  for  the 
reason  that  motor  transport  pre-supposes  good  roads  in  suffi- 


64  STRATEGY 

cient  numbers.  Our  experience  in  France  should  not  cause 
us  to  think  that  motor  transport  would  be  the  rule  over 
here,  for  our  roads  in  no  way  compare  to  those  of  France. 
We  should  remember  that  in  this  country  cavalry  can  be 
usepl  with  a  division,  so  just  because  it  was  not  used  in 
France  should  not  be  taken  as  a  criterion.  Light  artillery 
is  more  suited  than  heavy  artillery,  on  account  of  the  ex- 
treme difficulty  in  moving  heavy  guns. 

The  amount  of  preparation  is  an  open  secret  in  nearly 
every  country.  No  country  need  think  that  other  states 
are  ignorant  of  its  military  condition  and  establishment. 

This  preparation  is  stimulated  by  the  rivalry  existing 
in  time  of  peace  and  by  fear  of  the  consequences  of  ne- 
glect in  event  of  war. 

MOBILIZATION 

Mobilization  is  the  first  step  in  the  assembling  of  the 
army.  It  may  be  defined  as  the  transition  from  peace  to 
a  war  footing  prepared  beforehand  to  include  the  smallest 
details. 

The  practice  should  be  to  keep  in  store  all  the  neces- 
sary supplies  which,  when  the  army  must  be  transferred  to 
a  war  footing,  can  no  longer  be  procured,  or  the  acquisition 
of  which  would  require  so  much  time  that  the  completion  of 
the  preparation  of  the  whole  force  would  be  delayed  there- 
by. "The  ideal  of  perfection  in  this  regard  is  that  the  army 
should  be  ready  to  march  as  soon  as  the  last  soldier  called 
out  has  taken  his  place  under  the  colors." 

The  great  advantage  of  a  prompt  mobilization  is  that 
it  enables  a  country  to  surprise  an  enemy  and  does  not 
betray  the  purpose  until  it  is  too  late  for  the  enemy  to  over- 
come the  advantages  gained.  A  prospective  enemy  does 
not  become  certain  that  we  have  decided  upon  war  before 
its  outbreak. 

A  recital  of  the  methods  of  a  few  of  the  nations  that 
have  given  the  subject  the  most  study  will  be  of  benefit, 
particularly  to  a  country  that  has  no  policy  at  all.  As  al- 
ready stated,  when  other  nations  concentrate  we  begin  to 
legislate.  "When  a  nation  has  no  staff  of  officers  and  no 
principle  of  military  organization,  it  will  be  difficult  for  it 
to  form  an  army." 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  65 

This  war  maxim  is  as  true  today  as  when  written  and 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  has  never  been  on  the  losing 
side  in  any  war  cannot  be  credited  to  the  superiority  of  her 
military  policy.  In  all  our  wars  our  mobilization  has  been 
a  matter  of  extemporizing  to  offset  lack  of  preparation. 
In  none  of  our  wars  have  all  our  troops  been  thoroughly 
equipped  before  going  into  combat.  In  the  Mexican  War, 
we  even  sent  unequipped  troops  to  General  Scott  at  Jalapa, 
when  we  should  have  known  that  no  equipment  or  clothing 
was  available  at  that  place.  In  the  Spanish-American 
War,  some  of  our  units  never  were  mobilized  in  a  strict 
sense.  Orders  providing  for  certain  company  organiza- 
tion and  equipment  were  not  issued  until  after  the  protocol 
was  signed.  In  the  recent  war,  our  shortcomings  are  too 
well  known  to  require  elucidation  and  we  only  await  govern- 
mental license  before  referring  to  them  with  freedom. 

We  know  most  about  French  mobilization.  From  it 
we  can  learn  many  lessons,  it  was  the  only  allied  mobiliza- 
tion that  even  approached  symmetry. 

A  brief  glance  at  the  attempt  at  mobilization  in  1870 
will  show  us  some  of  the  errors  the  French  avoided  in  1914. 
Needless  to  say,  in  the  recent  war,  they  did  not  combine 
mobilization  and  concentration. 

In  France,  before  1866,  it  was  customary  to  effect  the 
calling  out  of  reserves  and  the  formation  of  the  armies 
simultaneously.  At  the  same  time  that  one  order  returned 
the  men  of  the  reserve  and  of  the  second  portion  to  the 
colors,  another  directed  various  permanent  bodies  to  the 
frontier,  and  grouped  them  according  to  a  table  prepared 
in  advance.  This  system,  which  had  its  advantages  when 
it  was  a  question  of  assembling  an  army  of  only  100,000 
men,  exposed  the  country  to  serious  complications  when 
it  was  necessary  to  put  the  whole  national  forces  upon  a 
war  footing  within  three  or  four  weeks.  These  defects, 
taken  in  connection  with  the  feebleness  of  the  effectives, 
placed  the  French  in  the  presence  of  the  Germans  in  a  very 
precarious  condition  as  to  inferiority. 

Subsequent  to  1866,  due  to  the  feeling  aroused  by  the 
German  success,  instructions  regarding  mobilization  had 
been  changed  and  improved. 


66  STRATEGY 

MOBILIZATION  OF  1868 

On  September  9,  1868,  Marshal  Niel,  then  Minister 
of  War,  addressed  to  the  military  authorities  new  instruc- 
tions for  their  guidance.  They  radically  changed  existing 
regulations  and  suppressed  the  intervention  of  sub-intend- 
ants  and  prefects  in  the  work  of  sending  out  notices  of  the 
time  and  place  of  assembly  to  the  reservists. 

Before  this,  the  commandant  of  the  recruiting  bureau 
sent  the  list  of  reservists  to  the  sub-intendants,  who  pre- 
pared the  orders  and  sent  them  to  the  prefects.  The  latter 
classified  these  orders  by  parishes  and  dispatched  them  by 
post  to  the  mayors  of  each  cantonment.  The  mayors  for- 
warded them  to  those  interested.  It  is  apparent  that  this 
was  a  very  long  procedure,  especially  in  a  populous  com- 
munity. At  Lille,  for  example,  the  sub-intendant  was  com- 
pelled to  make  out  5,000  such  orders.  Another  thing, 
the  mayors  and  prefects  were  far  from  offering  the  same 
guarantees  as  the  military  authorities  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  work. 

Beginning  with  1868,  the  recruiting  bureau  replaced  the 
sub-intendancy,  and  the  gendarmerie  supplied  the  places  of 
the  civil  authorities.  The  suppression  of  the  three  interme- 
diaries, while  simplifying  the  operation,  abridged,  by  six  or 
eight  days,  the  time  elapsing  between  the  dispatch  of  the 
summons  and  the  arrival  of  the  reservists. 

Thenceforth  the  passage  from  peace  to  war  footing 
was  carried  out  in  the  following  order: 

ENROLLMENT  IN  THE  RESERVES 

Upon  completion  of  the  soldier's  service  with  the  colors, 
his  corps  commander  forwarded  his  certificate  of  enroll- 
ment to  the  commandant  of  the  recruiting  bureau,  who 
placed  his  name  upon  muster  rolls  and  prepared  his  order 
of  individual  summons,  in  anticipation  of  the  calling  out 
of  reserves.  These  summons  were  kept  ready,  and  required 
only  to  be  dated  and  sent  out. 

CALLING  OUT  THE  RESERVES 

Immediately  upon  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  Cham- 
bers, two  general  movements  took  place,  extending  over  the 
entire  country — one  for  the  calling  out  of  the  reserves,  the 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  67 

other  for  the  formation  of  the  army.  The  first  movement 
embraced  three  stages:  first,  from  the  man's  home  to  the 
departure  rendezvous;  second,  from  the  rendezvous  to  the 
corps  depot;  third,  from  the  corps  depot  to  the  regiments. 
The  second  movement,  or  that  relating  to  the  for- 
mation of  the  army,  included  only  the  transportation  of  the 
troops  from  the  garrison  places  to  the  frontier. 

OPERATION  ATTENDING  THE  CALLING  IN 
OF  RESERVES 

The  order  calling  the  reserves  to  active  service  was 
sent  by  telegraph  direct  from  the  War  Ministry  to  the  mili- 
tary authorities  and  to  the  commandants  of  recruiting  bu- 
reaus. 

Then  followed  the  dispatch  of  summons  to  the  members 
of  the  reserves.  (The  individual  muster  orders  prepared  in 
advance,  and  arranged  by  classes  and  categories,  were  dated 
and  signed  by  the  commandant  of  the  bureau,  then  trans- 
mitted to  the  commander  of  the  gendarmerie,  who  arranging 
them  according  to  cantons  and  parishes,  placed  them  in  the 
hands  of  the  gendarmerie  charged  with  their  speedy  dis- 
tribution to  the  individual  reserve  men.) 

FORMATION  AND  FORWARDING  OF  DETACHMENTS 

This  order  (summons)  indicated  to  the  soldier  of  the 
reserve  the  day  on  which  he  was  to  report  to  the  depart- 
ment rendezvous  (recruiting  station) .  The  dates  were  so 
calculated  as  to  avoid  all  delay. 

The  reserve  men,  once  assembled  at  the  rendezvous 
(recruiting  station),  were  formed  into  detachments,  under 
direction  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  sent  from 
the  regiments  to  receive  them,  reviewed,  and  forwarded 
by  rail  to  the  corps  depots. 

Upon  reaching  the  depots,  these  men  were  incorporated, 
clothed,  equipped,  armed,  and  sent  as  rapidly  as  possible  to 
their  regiments,  under  conduct  of  the  noncommissioned  offi- 
cers of  their  respective  groups.  These  operations,  very 
simple  as  far  as  the  military  authorities  were  concerned, 
in  execution  produced  many  complications,  caused  by  the 
dispersion  over  the  entire  territory  of  the  active  forces,  the 
reserves,  and  the  magazines. 


68  STRATEGY 

CORPS  DEPOT 

In  the  depots  the  reservists  found,  as  a  rule,  clothing, 
shoes,  and  arms  in  sufficient  quantities.  But  the  equipage 
was  not  always  adequate  to  supply  the  wants.  Camp 
equipage  in  particular  was  wanting.  In  addition  the  author- 
ities were  swamped  with  the  paper  work  of  filling  up  the 
active  battalions  and  organizing  fourth  battalions  as  depot 
organizations. 

The  regiments  were  not  kept  in  their  depot  districts, 
so  that  even  though  it  was  a  good  thing  to  have  a  man 
serve  in  an  organization  in  which  he  had  friends,  it  did  not 
add  to  mobilization  to  have  the  depot  at  one  end  of  the 
Empire,  while  the  regiment  was  at  the  other. 

Likewise,  the  mobilization  contemplated  the  organiza- 
tion of  corps  and  divisions  after  the  said  mobilization  had 
started.  This  caused  added  confusion.  It  is  a  fact  that  in 
France  the  largest  bodies  that  had  ever  been  together  for 
some  time  had  been  regiments. 

This,  of  course,  excepts  the  Chalons  Corps  that  was 
kept  continually  mobilized  in  the  entrenched  camp  at  that 
"place.  The  following  will  illustrate  some  of  the  results 
of  this  system: 

The  23d  Regiment  at  Chalons  had  its  depot  at  Ajaccio. 

The  98th  at  Dunkirk  had  its  depot  at  Lyons. 

The  86th  at  Lyons  had  its  depot  at  Saint  Malo. 

It  was  estimated  that  it  would  take  15  days  to  get 
the  men  equipped  and  to  the  regiments.  This  proved  in- 
sufficient time  in  almost  every  case. 

There  was  great  confusion  in  getting  the  reservists 
from  the  depot  to  the  regiment.  To  cite  one  case :  The  re- 
serve men  of  the  2d  Regiment  of  Zouaves,  living  in  the 
north,  were  obliged  to  proceed  to  Marseilles,  and  from  there 
to  Oran,  then  back  again  to  Marseilles,  and  finally  to  rejoin 
their  regiment  in  the  east,  thus  travelling  1,200  miles  by 
rail,  and  making  two  sea  voyages  of  three  days  each,  before 
reaching  their  destination. 

Another  instance  was  that  of  the  53d  Regiment  at 
Belfort. 

A  detachment  of  recruits  was  sent  to  it  on  July  18th 
from  Lille.  The  detachment  arrived  at  Gap  on  the  28th, 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  69 

having  still  five  days  to  make  on  foot.  Here  it  remained 
until  August  30th.  It  was  stopped  at  Lyons  because  the 
location  of  its  regiment  by  this  time  was  unknown.  On 
October  1st,  it  was  sent  to  Orleans  to  assist  in  forming  the 
27th  "Regiment  de  Marche,"  arrived  there  on  the  llth, 
and  was  forced  into  battle.  So  you  see,,  setting  out  on  the 
18th  of  July,  this  detachment  did  not  get  into  action  until 
three  months  thereafter  and  in  the  meantime  the  regiment 
for  which  it  was  intended  had  passed  out  of  existence  and 
disappeared  in  the  storm. 

MOBILIZATION  OF  1914 

The  French  army  of  1914  had  been  the  subject  of  many 
experiments  since  1870  and  every  effort  had  been  made  to 
correct  faults.  The  law  governing  it  was  passed  in  its  pres- 
ent form  in  1913  and  was  framed  to  reduce  the  disparity 
of  France  as  against  the  rapidly  increasing  man-power  of 
Germany.  Unlike  Germany  she  called  practically  her  whole 
able-bodied  male  population  to  arms.  A  Frenchman  found 
fit  for  service  joined  the  colors  at  the  age  of  20,  spent 
3  years  in  the  regular  army,  11  in  the  regular  reserve,  7 
in  the  territorial  army,  7  in  the  territorial  reserve,  and  did 
not  become  free  from  service  until  he  had  attained  the  age 
of  48. 

The  mobilization  of  the  regular  force,  which  had  a 
peace  strength  of  673,000,  was  done  practically  by  the  in- 
corporation of  the  men  from  the  regular  reserve.  The 
remaining  reservists  were  organized  into  reserve  units, 
similar  to  the  regulars,  and  the  others  kept,  as  a  last 
reserve,  at  the  depots.  Roughly  speaking,  the  system  gave 
France,  a  month  or  so  after  the  beginning  of  war,  4,000,000 
trained  men  of  whom  700,000  were  regulars,  700,000  formed 
the  reserves  required  to  put  the  regulars  on  a  war  footing, 
700,000  were  embodied  in  the  territorial  army,  700,000  in 
the  territorial  depot  reserve  and  700,000  in  the  territorial 
surplus.  Thus  the  first  line  consisted  of  1,500,000,  the 
second  line  500,000  and  the  reserve  2,000,000.  There  were 
21  army  corps  areas,  20  of  which  were  in  France  and  1  in 
Algeria.  Apart  from  the  corps,  there  were  8  independent 
cavalry  divisions  and  a  number  of  separate  colonial  organi- 
zations. The  French  army  was  thoroughly  democratic, 


70  STRATEGY 

there  being  no  select  class  from  which  officers  were  drawn, 
as  in  1870.  While  the  discipline  seemed  lax  and  there  was 
a  great  deal  of  camaraderie  between  the  officers  and  men, 
the  realization  of  the  seriousness  of  the  task  made  everyone 
do  his  best  to  prevent  delays  in  mobilization. 

When  the  telegram  for  mobilization  was  received  by 
the  respective  mayors,  they  at  once  proceeded  to  the  "Mairie" 
and  got  out  their  bulletins,  already  prepared,  broke  the  seals, 
filled  in  the  date  of  the  first  day  of  mobilization,  and  then 
had  them  posted  at  conspicuous  places  in  and  about  their 
towns.  Every  reservist  glanced  at  his  identification  book  to 
see  on  what  day  he  was  to  report  and  where,  although  the 
latter  he  already  knew.  As  an  illustration  of  the  machine- 
like  precision  with  which  the  mobilization  was  effected  we 
will  take  as  an  illustration  one  of  the  line  regiments :  In 
the  barracks  yards  were  located  a  number  of  posts,  one 
for  each  company.  As  the  men  came  in,  those  belonging  to 
the  same  company  grouped  themselves  around  their  com- 
pany posts  until  a  sufficient  number  had  arrived  when,  con- 
ducted by  their  corporals,  they  went  to  draw  clothing  and 
equipments.  A  large  schedule  was  posted  at  a  central  point 
in  each  organization  showing  by  hour  exactly  what  was  to 
be  done.  The  same  orderly  system  was  followed  in  assem- 
bling animals,  motor  transport,  and  other  agencies.  Just  as 
soon  as  the  smaller  units  were  actually  mobilized  they  were 
sent  to  the  next  higher  unit.  The  railroads  had  their  sche- 
dules prepared  in  advance  so  that  there  was  no  confusion. 
An  official  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  who  was  in  one  of 
the  principal  cities  of  France,  said  that  the  railroads  were 
operated  so  systematically  and  with  so  little  confusion  that 
had  it  not  been  for  the  presence  of  soldiers  no  one  would  have 
known  that  a  mobilization  was  being  carried  out. 

MOBILIZATION  OF  THE  GERMAN  ARMY 

Experience  gained  in  the  campaigns  of  1864  and  1866 
demonstrated  that  with  the  masses  composing  modern  ar- 
mies, speed  in  mobilization  was  one  of  the  first  conditions  of 
success.  Therefore,  since  the  war  in  Bohemia,  mobiliza- 
tion had  become  a  subject  of  constant  study  by  the  Prus- 
sian general  staff.  The  work  undertaken  seemed  to  have  had 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  71 

a  double  aim:  the  separation  of  the  field  forces  from  the 
landwehr;  the  reduction  of  the  time  necessary  to  assemble 
the  reserves.  Moreover,  since  the  earlier  days,  Prussia 
adapted  the  organization  of  her  armies  to  the  requirement 
of  mobilization. 

Thus  grew  up  the  Prussian  system,  and  the  first  conse- 
quence of  the  system  was  the  elaboration,  in  time  of  peace, 
of  all  details  of  mobilization,  and  especially  of  the  role  of 
each  unit,  each  group,  each  service,  each  individual;  the 
various  duties  had  been  rigorously  marked  out,  and  for  a 
long  time,  every  measure  of  military  legislation  brought 
about  improvement.  Thus  the  mobilization  of  1866  was 
effected  after  the  plans  established  in  consequence  of  the 
reorganization  in  1860.  The  plans  of  1870  were  drawn  up 
and  carried  out  conformable  to  projects  drawn  up  after  the 
Bohemian  campaign.  Those  of  the  present  day  were  drawn 
up  from  and  influenced  by  the  experience  of  1870. 

Independent  of  the  plan  of  mobilization,  the  Prussian 
general  staff  renewed  from  year  to  year,  for  the  military 
authorities  interested,  an  order  of  mobilization  which  re- 
mained in  force  from  April  1st  to  the  31st  of  March  of  the 
year  following  and  which  indicated  to  each  one  his  duty  from 
day  to  day  for  this  important  operation. 

Tables  relating  to  time  and  manner  of  moving  the  bod- 
ies of  troops,  and  to  transport  trains,  were  part  of  the  plan. 
The  mobilization  rested  upon  the  fruitful  principles  of  the 
division  of  labor  and  decentralization.  Each  army  corps, 
each  organized  troop,  each  unit,  each  service,  was  mobilized 
as  a  whole,  dependent  wholly  upon  itself.  The  responsi- 
bility was  thus  divided  among  the  different  elements  of 
the  hierarchy,  and  these  concurred  in  obtaining  the  greatest 
precision,  even  in  the  smallest  detail. 

MOBILIZATION  PLAN  OF  1870  IN  DETAIL 

The  German  plan  for  mobilization  commenced  by  in- 
dicating the  way  in  which  the  effectives  were  to  be  organ- 
ized upon  a  war  footing,  and  the  measures  to  be  taken  to 
reach  the  regulation  figures. 

On  these  data  were  based  the  tables  prescribing  the 
distribution  of  the  field  forces,  and  the  depot  and  garrison 
troops. 


72  STRATEGY 

These  tables  went  into  effect  only  upon  the  approval 
of  the  War  Minister. 

The  designation  of  points  of  mobilization  came  next. 

As  a  rule  each  group  or  service  was  mobilized  in  its 
own  region. 

The  headquarters  of  the  landwehr  battalion  districts 
played  a  promiment  part  in  these  combinations. 

Directions  concerning  horses  and  material,  and  reg- 
ulations governing  the  replacement  of  the  military  author- 
ities completed  these  plans,  which  were  accompanied  by  de- 
tailed tables  and  instructions. 

The  operation  of  the  mobilization  comprised  five  suc- 
cessive periods: 

1.  The  call  for  men  and  the  requisition  for  the  proper  comple- 

ment of  remounts. 

2.  The  movement  of  men  and  remounts  toward  the  centers  of 

mobilization. 

3.  The  formation  of  the  field  troops. 

4.  The  formation  of  the  depot  troops. 

5.  The  formation  of  the  garrison  troops. 

The  call  for  men  and  horses  resulted  from  the  order 
for  mobilization. 

Notice  of  mobilization  was  at  once  telegraphed  by  the 
War  Ministry  to  the  commanders  of  the  landwehr  battalion 
districts,  who  were  directed  to  summon  the  reserves.  These 
commanders,  with  the  aid  of  the  civil  authorities,  sent  out 
written  summons,  which  were  always  kept  ready,  notifying 
each  reservist  and  landwehr  man  when  and  where  to  join.  A 
delay  of  tiventy-four  hours  was  granted  them  and  by  the 
fifth  day  the  greater  part  of  the  reservists  had  reached  the 
designated  points.  Then  they  were  formed  into  detach- 
ments and  forwarded  under  noncommissioned  officers  to 
their  regiments. 

On  the  fourth  day,  the  commissions  for  the  purchase 
of  remounts  assembled  at  the  points  indicated.  On  the  fol- 
lowing day,  the  owners  of  horses  presented  themselves  with 
their  animals,  which  were  inspected,  paid  for,  and  delivered 
to  the  officers  sent  to  receive  them.  The  men  and  horses 
were  in  general  directed  upon  the  main  bodies  on  the  day 
after  their  arrival  at  local  headquarters,  that  is,  on  the 
sixth  or  seventh  day. 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  73 

In  the  meantime,  the  regiments  emptied  their  maga- 
zines, prepared  arms,  clothing,  munitions,  provisions,  etc., 
and  organized  the  depot  cadres. 

These  operations  were  carried  on  with  methodical  ac- 
tivity, and  when  the  reservists  arrived,  they  were  immed- 
iately clothed,  equipped,  armed  and  incorporated.  Twenty- 
four  hours  later  they  were  prepared  to  take  the  field,  or,  as 
a  rule,  on  the  seventh  day  of  mobilization.  This  was  also 
the  time  when  the  remounts  of  the  new  complement  were 
received  at  the  points  of  assembly.  And  on  the  eighth  day, 
as  a  rule,  the  artillery  and  train  teams  were  nearly  com- 
pleted. 

A  fundamental  principle  served  to  regulate  the  organ- 
ization of  the  war  effectives ;  the  reservists  must  enter  not 
only  the  regiments  in  which  they  received  instruction  and 
were  trained,  but  the  same  battalion  and  the  same  company. 
The  affection  developed  for  the  flag  under  which  the  recruit 
had  been  instructed  in  the  calling  of  the  soldier  and  for 
the  group  of  comrades  of  his  early  service,  was  kept  alive, 
and  gave  added  cohesion  to  a  regiment  at  the  outset  of  the 
campaign. 

The  Guard  alone  did  not  conform  to  the  system  of 
regional  mobilization,  but  drew  its  effectives  from  all  parts 
of  the  kingdom. 

The  special  arms  and  various  services  received  their 
complement  of  men  from  the  whole  of  the  corps  region  in 
which  they  were  located. 

In  this  system,  the  calling  together  of  the  reservists  to 
the  headquarters  of  the  battalion  districts,  and  their  dis- 
patch to  their  respective  regiments,  required  but  a  short 
space  of  time ;  and  as  the  materiel  was  already  at  the  mobil- 
ization centers,  there  was  a  certainty  that  they  would  meet 
neither  obstacles  nor  embarrassments  of  any  kind  while  en 
route. 

The  assemblage  thus  took  place  without  friction,  with- 
out loss  of  time,  without  difficulty  of  any  kind. 

While  the  reservists  were  rejoining  their  regiments,  it 
was  necessary  to  proceed  to  the  formation  of  the  supplemen- 
tary units.  In  this  respect  the  infantry  and  cavary  had 
only  to  organize  their  depot  troops,  but  the  task  of  the 
special  arms  was  more  burdensome. 


74  STRATEGY 

The  artillery  was  obliged  to  prepare  its  munition  col- 
umns, its  parks,  and  its  depots  of  reserve  munitions;  the 
engineers  their  bridge  equippage,  their  implement  columns, 
their  companies  of  pontoniers  and  sappers,  their  railroad  and 
telegraph  sections. 

The  train  had  its  supply  columns,  its  sanitary  detach- 
ments, its  horse  depots,  ambulances,  etc. 

The  cadres  of  these  new  units  were  in  existence  in  time 
of  peace,  and  came  into  active  operation  at  the  very  com- 
mencement of  the  mobilization,  aiding  in  the  preparation 
of  their  respective  groups. 

When  the  various  commands  had  reached  their  full 
effectives,  formed  their  depots,  and  organized  their  sup- 
plementary services,  their  mobilization  was  complete.  The 
time  required  varied  according  to  the  arms  of  the  service. 
In  1866,  the  infantry  regiments  of  the  line  took  from  9 
to  14  days  to  reach  a  war  footing;  those  of  the  Guard 
from  14  to  15  days ;  those  of  the  cavalry  from  15  to  17  days ; 
and  the  artillery  regiments  of  the  Guard,  20  days. 

Notwithstanding  the  rapidity  of  these  movements,  the 
improvement  brought  about  after  1866*  still  further  dimin- 
ished this  time  and  the  infantry  regiments,  in  1870,  took 
7  to  9  days,  cavalry  from  9  to  11  days,  and  the  other  services 
15  days  to  mobilize. 

After  the  formation  of  the  field  forces  came  that  of 
garrison  troops.  A  part  of  the  latter,  called  the  first  aug- 
mentation, were  designed  to  act  as  territorial  guard ;  of  the 
remainder,  called  the  second  augmentation,  some  were  to 
take  the  field  with  the  active  army,  others  to  maintain  the 
communications,  while  others  still  were  assigned  to  the  de- 
fense of  the  fortified  places,  and  were  called  landwehr  men. 
These  were  summoned  to  report  at  their  district  head- 
quarters while  the  last  detachments  of  the  reservists  were 
being  dispatched  to  their  regiments.  They  were  immedi- 
ately formed  into  battalions  and,  on  the  day  following  their 
arrival,  put  in  motion  to  the  places  to  be  garrisoned  or  the 
designated  points  of  concentration. 

They  thus  passed  under  the  authority  of  the  com- 
manders of  army  corps  or  the  governor-general,  remaining 
in  the  territory,  as  the  case  might  be. 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  75 

The  foregoing  brief  description  was  the  plan  of  the 
German  mobilization  of  1870,  and  probably  the  one  for  the 
present  war  did  not  differ  greatly  from  it.  During  the  War 
of  1870,  South  Germany  mobilized  along  the  same  lines. 

Germany  was  organized  into  25  army  corps  which, 
except  the  Guard  Corps,  were  recruited  on  the  territorial 
basis. 

A  soldier  began  his  service  at  20  and  spent  2  years  with 
dismounted  and  3  years  with  mounted  troops.  He  then 
passed  to  the  regular  reserve  for  5  or  4  years,  according  to 
arm.  This  period  of  7  years  being  completed,  the  soldier 
went  into  the  landwehr  first  levy  for  5  years,  thence  to  the 
landwehr  second  levy  until  he  was  39  years  old.  He  then 
passed  to  the  first  levy  landstrum,  where  he  remained  until 
45.  The  landstrum  second  levy  consisted  of  untrained  men 
of  all  ages.  The  ersatz  reserve  consisted  of  all  men  not 
selected  for  military  training.  This  system  gave  Germany 
a  force  of  7,000,000  men,  4,000,000  of  whom  had  actually 
served  with  the  colors. 

FAILURE  TO  COMPLETE  MOBILIZATION  IN 
RECENT  WAR 

In  The  World  War,  Germany,  in  her  mad  rush  to  run 
over  the  Belgian  forces  and  get  across  Belgium,  sent 
von  Emmich  forward  with  three  divisions,  one  from  each 
corps,  before  mobilization  was  complete.  They  lacked  ade- 
quate equipment,  transport  and  siege  artillery.  On  the  3d 
of  August,  they  were  in  Belgian  territory,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  evening  of  the  13th  that  the  last  fort  at  Liege 
fell  and  then  not  until  siege  artillery  had  been  brought  up 
from  the  rear.  Likewise  a  half  mobilized  force  was  sent 
into  upper  Alsace  at  about  the  same  time.  It  was  also 
driven  back  by  the  advancing  French,  who  were  not  driven 
back  themselves  until  strong  German  forces  had .  been  sent 
against  them. 

THE  CONCENTRATION 

The  time  gained  by  a  rapid  mobilization  might  be  again 
lost  if  the  assemblage  of  troops  proceeded  too  slowly.  This 
assemblage  or  concentration  must  therefore  be  prepared  in 
all  its  details.  Inexperienced  people  may  think  that  it  is 


76  STRATEGY 

impossible  to  foresee  just  where  the  concentration  should 
take  place.  The  plan  of  operations  prepared  by  the  general 
staff  in  times  of  peace  fixes  the  point  of  assemblage  to  be 
taken  up  in  event  of  a  war  against  any  one  enemy  or  a 
combination  of  enemies.  In  the  selection  of  this  point  the 
railroads,  dirt  roads  and  water  routes  will  exert  a  decided 
influence.  By  careful  study,  a  combination  of  marches  and 
conveyance  by  motor,  rail  and  water  may  be  worked  out,  in 
consequence  of  which  all  the  troops  will  be  able  to  arrive  at 
their  destinations  without  loss  of  time.  The  rapidity  of 
the  concentration  is  regulated  solely  by  the  capacity  of  the 
railroads.  In  the  recent  war  the  Central  Powers  had  a 
great  advantage  in  that  all  the  railroad  lines  of  Germany, 
while  being  sited  in  a  measure  for  commercial  reasons,  the 
probable  future  military  situation  always  governed  in  each 
selection.  The  superiority  of  railroads  was  particularly 
marked  on  the  east  front  where  Russia  was  so  unprepared. 

The  whole  railroad  net  in  Germany  was  divided  into 
26  lines  or  administration  districts  comprising  in  addition  to 
the  trunk  lines,  the  adjoining  branch  lines.  There  were  six 
lines  connecting  North  and  South  Germany  and  rocade  lines 
along  both  the  east  front  and  the  Rhine. 

The  necessary  articles  for  fitting  out  all  fourth-class 
carriages  and  suitable  vans  for  the  transportation  of  masses 
of  men  and  horses  were  kept  in  time  of  peace.  The  per- 
fection of  the  German  railroad  system  enabled  Germany  to 
concentrate  at  any  point  on  either  front  in  half  the  time  it 
took  the  allies,  and  her  interior  position  enabled  her  to  shift 
troops  from  one  front  to  another. 

When  all  the  railroads  in  the  zone  of  assembly  are  trans- 
porting daily  all  the  troops  that  can  be  carried,  it  can  be 
said  that  the  concentration  has  been  well  arranged. 

The  all  important  feature  of  the  preparation  is  to  have 
suitable  quartering  facilities  at  mobilization  points,  and 
these  mobilization  points  so  located  as  to  favor  to  the 
utmost  embarkation  and  transportation  to  the  frontier  or 
seaboard.  The  desire  to  distribute  evenly  these  camps  over 
the  entire  country  should  never  be  catered  to  at  the  expense 
of  proper  concentration.  A  political  distribution  is  ab  initio 
bad.  Ample  equipment  of  all  railroad  lines  with  rolling  stock 
is  important  so  that  the  greatest  number  of  trains  that 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  77 

the  nature  of  the  road  permits  may  be  run.  A  complete 
network  of  railroads  in  accordance  with  military  considera- 
tions is  imperative,  but  can  hardly  be  constructed  in  time 
to  be  of  use  at  the  first  mobilization  unless  built  before 
war.  The  capacity  of  two  or  more  railroads  should  be  used 
to  their  fullest  extent,  even  if  the  roads  converge  for  some 
distance  in  a  single  track.  The  railroad  net  in  South  Africa 
was  what  enabled  the  British  to  overcome  finally  the  Boers, 
for  without  it,  they  could  not  have  followed  up  their  suc- 
cesses— getting  forward  troops  and  supplies.  The  rivalry  be- 
tween neighboring  states  has  caused  the  construction  of 
purely  strategical  railroads.  Strategical  railroads  are  a 
special  feature  of  modern  times. 

The  Trans-Siberian  Railroad  was  one  of  the  latest 
and  most  important  strategic  lines  constructed,  and,  while 
it  had  great  commercial  value,  its  principal  importance 
was  that  it  brought  the  east  and  west  closer  together  in  a 
military  sense. 

In  many  European  countries  the  time  required  to  con- 
centrate in  the  past  has  been  reckoned  almost  in  hours.  In 
the  United  States  if  we  use  as  our  unit  of  time  measure- 
ment the  week,  we  will  arrive  at  a  more  accurate  figure. 

In  The  World  War,  if  France  had  been  able  to  complete 
her  concentration  three  days  sooner  than  Germany,  she 
could  have  invested  Metz  and  Thionville,  separated  Strass- 
burg  from  its  communications  and  crossed  the  river  Saar 
before  Germany  was  ready.  The  result  would  have  been 
that  the  Germans  would  have  had  to  start  their  concen- 
tration back  about  where  they  started  it  in  1870.  Aside 
from  the  material  advantage  to  France,  think  of  the  moral 
effect  upon  emotional  people  like  the  French. 

Apparently  Germany's  concentration  was  effected  in 
advance  of  the  French,  and  the  Germans  were  en  route  to 
Paris,  and  very  nearly  got  there,  before  they  could  be 
stopped. 

The  advantage  of  completing  the  strategical  concen- 
tration first  is  that  it  affords  an  opportunity  to  break  up  the 
hostile  concentration  by  force.  This  is  comparatively  easy 
where  a  portion  of  the  forces  are  moved  by  sea.  Even  with- 
out a  superior  fleet,  ships  under  prompt  and  bold  leaders 


78  STRATEGY 

can  create  great  havoc  and  subject  the  enemy  to  severe 
losses,  which  have  a  greater  effect  because  they  occur  before 
the  actual  fighting  has  begun. 

Recognizing  this  danger,  Turkey,  in  the  war  with 
Greece,  gave  up  entirely  the  use  of  the  sea,  which  had  been 
her  greatest  assistance  in  1877-78. 

The  most  recent  illustration  is  the  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare  which  gave  such  a  great  promise,  but  which  so  com- 
pletely failed. 

CAVALRY 

On  land  the  interruption  of  the  enemy's  concentration 
constitutes  a  wide  field  of  activity  for  large  bodies  of  cav- 
alry. This  requires  that  in  time  of  peace  the  cavalry  must 
garrison  the  places  near  the  frontier  so  that  it  can  get  a 
good  start  the  moment  war  is  declared. 

Some  states,  on  account  of  the  shape  of  their  territory, 
are  limited  to  one  or  two  railroads  in  their  concentration 
march  on  the  frontier. 

Consequently,  it  is  necessary  to  make  arrangements  to 
protect  these  roads  in  advance.  Troops  are  placed  along 
them  at  the  outset. 

Also,  plans  should  be  made  to  protect  the  principal 
engineering  works,  river  and  valley  crossings,  tunnels  and 
important  stations  from  raid  by  cavalry  or  aircraft  of  any 
kind. 

In  event  of  war  on  our  Pacific  coast  one  of  our  first 
duties  should  be  to  place  guards  over  the  tunnels  through 
which  the  railroads  make  their  entrance  into  the  Puget 
Sound  district. 

SELECTIVE  SERVICE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

It  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  give  a  complete  out- 
line of  the  selective  service  law  in  the  United  States,  and  its 
operation,  without  making  this  lecture  so  long  that  one 
might  forget  its  purpose  and  think  that  it  was  devoted  to 
selective  service  alone. 

The  willingness  of  the  American  people  to  accept  this 
measure,  apparently  so  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  dem- 
ocracy, is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  features  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  United  States  in  preparation  for  war.  And, 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  79 

moreover,  the  government  did  not  wait  until  the  war  had 
progressed  for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  until  a  large 
class  of  volunteers  had  been  developed,  or  until  it  had 
been  demonstrated  that  no  recruits  could  be  obtained  in  any 
other  way,  before  passing  the  law.  The  law  was  put  through 
at  once,  before  any  distinction  could  grow  up.  A  few  months 
after  the  law  went  into  operation  there  was  scarcely  any 
difference  between  the  two  classes  of  service. 

The  record  of -desertions  for  the  war  shows  a  smaller 
percentage  among  the  selected  men. 

The  first  law,  passed  May  18,  1917,  required  all  men 
who  had  attained  the  age  of  21  and  had  not  attained  the 
age  of  31  to  register.  This  registration  took  place  on  June 
5,  1917. 

It  was  effected  about  as  follows :  The  registration, 
selection  and  induction  were  in  charge  of  the  provost  mar- 
shal general,  appointed  mainly  for  that  purpose. 

Local  boards  were  appointed  in  every  county,  or  sim- 
ilar subdivision  of  the  various  states,  for  approximately 
each  30,000  of  the  population  in  every  city  of  30,000  or  over, 
according  to  the  last  census.  District  boards  were  appointed 
for  every  Federal  judicial  district  and  territory  and  the 
District  of  Columbia.  These  bqards  had  appellate  and 
original  jurisdiction,  the  latter  in  certain  specified  cases 
pertaining  to  claims  for  deferred  classification. 

Upon  registration  done  either  in  person  or  by  mail, 
the  registrant  was  furnished  a  registration  certificate  and 
a  questionnaire,  the  latter  to  be  returned  in  a  specific  time. 
All  citizens  or  persons  who  had  declared  their  intention 
of  becoming  citizens  were  required  to  register.  With  those 
residing  abroad  it  was  optional.  Each  registration  card 
was  given  a  serial  number  and  these  numbers  were  checked 
against  a  master  list  of  numbers  from  1  to  10,500,  drawn 
by  lot  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War",  to  de- 
termine the  order  number.  Upon  registration,  the  regis- 
trant's name  was  entered  upon  a  classification  list.  Upon 
return  of  the  questionnaire,  all  registrants  were  classified 
in  one  of  five  classes  and  notified  as  to  the  classification. 

On  a  date  fixed  by  the  provost  marshal,  Class  I  regis- 
trants appeared  for  physical  examination  by  the  physician 


80  STRATEGY 

of  the  local  board.  Classes  II,  III,  and  IV  were  only  to  be 
examined  when  specially  ordered. 

Appeals  were  allowed  within  a  certain  time  to  the  dis- 
trict board  which  determined  upon  a  final  classification. 

Appeal  from  the  local  board  could  be  made  in  certain 
cases  to  a  medical  advisory  board,  or  even  to  the  district 
board.  Upon  final  completion  of  the  examination,  the  re*g- 
istrant  was  notified  as  to  its  result. 

MOBILIZATION 

The  provost  marshal  general  notified  the  various  state 
adjutants  general  of  their  quotas,  they  in  turn  notified  the 
local  boards,  and  the  latter  summoned  the  men  by  the 
order  of  induction  mailed  which  gave  the  place  of  reporting 
and  the  hour.  The  men  reported,  were  organized  into 
parties,  and  sent  by  rail  to  a  designated  mobilization  camp 
or  cantonment.  The  local  board  wired  the  mobilization 
camp  or  cantonment  of  the  departure  and  sent  duplicate 
mobilization  papers  by  registered  mail. 

The  second  registration  took  place  one  year  after  the 
first  and  included  all  men  who  had  attained  the  age  of  21 
years  in  the  12  months  intervening. 

10,679,814  registered  on  both  these  dates  with  a  result 
that  2,666,867  were  inducted. 

The  third  registration  on  September  12,  1918,  extended 
the  age  up  to  45  and  down  to  18. 

This  registration  produced  13,228,762  of  whom  only 
120,157  were  inducted. 

Alaska,  Hawaii  and  Porto  Rico  inducted  23,272. 

The  entire  military  force  for  the  war  was  approxi- 
mately 4,000,000  or  4,800,000,  counting  the  Navy  and  Mar- 
ine Corps. 

527,000,  or  13  per  cent  were  regular;  382,000,  or  10 
per  cent,  were  National  Guard  and  3,091,000,  or  77  per  cent, 
were  National  Army. 

The  service  law  of  France  differs  from  that  of  the 
United  States  in  that  she  inducts  all  males  up  to  middle 
age,  assigning  those  needed  for  combat  duty  and  the  re- 
mainder to  service  in  munition  plants,  on  farms,  etc.,  but 
all  are  soldiers. 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR  81 

Under  our  law,  men  needed  as  workers  in  the  munition 
factories,  on  farms,  on  railroads,  in  ship  building,  etc.,  were 
either  exempted  at  the  outset  or,  if  enrolled  and  needed 
later  for  industrial  work,  were  furloughed. 

This  resulted  in  the  man  who  remained  behind  getting 
a  vastly  larger  wage  than  the  man  who  went  to  the  front 
and  risked  his  life. 

Which  is  the  fairei*  of  the  two  systems,  namely,  the  one 
which  makes  them  all  soldiers  or  the  one  which  makes  only 
those  who  risk  their  lives? 

At  mobilization  camps,  the  recruits  were  again  exam- 
ined and  those  physically  not  up  to  the  standard  were  re- 
jected. 

The  great  delay  in  the  mobilization  was  in  the  securing 
of  equipment,  principally  ordnance,  aircraft  and  motor 
vehicles ;  notwithstanding  the  United  States  had  over  1,000- 
000  men  in  France  in  about  a  year  after  entering  the  war, 
and  over  2,000,000  by  the  llth  of  November,  1918,  of  whom 
1,390,000  saw  service  in  the  front  line. 

From  70  to  80  per  cent  of  the  men  from  the  agricul- 
tural states,  namely,  those  in  the  middle  west  or  one-fourth 
of  the  Union,  passed  both  physical  examinations,  which  was 
the  largest  percentage,  showing  that  the  best  material  comes 
from  the  farming  communities. 

The  states  given  over  principally  to  industries  had  a 
lower  percentage  due  to  the  alien  born  population  who 
were  not  physically  up  to  the  standard  of  the  native  born. 
Country  boys  were  better  physically  than  city  boys,  and 
whites  than  blacks. 

TRAINING 

The  average  American  soldier  who  fought  in  France 
had  six  months'  training  in  the  United  States,  two  months' 
overseas  before  entering  the  line  and  one  month  in  a  quiet 
sector  before  going  into  battle.  Forty-two  divisions  in  all 
were  sent  to  France. 

EQUIPMENT 

In  a  country  so  poorly  prepared  for  war  as  the  United 
States  was  upon  her  entry,  it  was  not  so  much  a  question 
of  getting  together  the  men,  as  the  clothing,  arms,  equip- 
ment, etc. 


82  STRATEGY 

Notwithstanding  the  regardless  expenditure  of  money, 
the  United  States  would  have  suffered  materially  had  it 
not  been  for  the  assistance  afforded  her  by  her  allies,  par- 
ticularly in  the  furnishing  of  machine  guns,  aircraft,  auto- 
matic rifles,  and  artillery.  Over  $14,000,000,000  were  spent 
on  the  army  proper — 44  per  cent  on  quartermaster  property 
and  stores;  29  per  cent  by  the  ordnance  department;  6  per 
cent  by  the  air  service;  4  per  cent  by  the  engineers;  2  per 
cent  by  the  medical  corps;  2  per  cent  by  the  signal  corps 
and  miscellaneous ;  13  per  cent  for  pay. 

By  the  middle  of  July,  1918,  there  were  enough  ma- 
chine guns  for  the  entire  army  and  there  were  more  than 
enough  automatics. 

Of  missile  weapons  in  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive,  the 
principal  shortage  was  in  pistols  and  revolvers. 

In  August  of  1918,  there  were  enough  light  and  heavy 
guns  for  the  combat  units  in  France,  namely,  3,500  guns, 
of  which  2,417  were  used  in  the  Meuse-Argonne.  It  is 
true,  however,  that  of  these  guns  only  477  were  of  American 
manufacture. 

There  was  a  shortage  of  motor  truck  tonnage,  there 
being  but  about  50  per  cent  available. 

2698  airplanes  were  sent  to  the  zone  of  the  advance  of 
which  667  were  of  American  manufacture. 

On  November  11,  1918,  the  United  States  had  574  bal- 
loons which  was  283  more  than  the  total  number  of  Ger- 
man, French,  English  and  Belgian  balloons. 

While  no  one  would  have  the  audacity  to  belittle  what 
the  United  States  did  in  The  World  War,  when  she  finally 
got  started,  at  which  time  she  was  in  a  fair  way  to  eclipse 
all  other  nations,  yet  we  cannot  escape  the  fact  that,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  assistance  that  our  allies  rendered  us  in 
holding  off  the  Germans  while  we  were  getting  ready,  the 
story  might  have  been  different. 

Modern  war  has  proven  that  it  is  easier  to  induct  man 
power  than  to  obtain  the  material  which  makes  soldiers; 
but  once  you  get  the  material  it  is  a  cold  question  of  man 
power,  pure  and  simple. 


CHAPTER  VI 

War  and  Finance 


THERE  are  two  things  that  go  together  in  the  life  of 
nations  as  closely  connected  and  linked  as  the  famous 
Siamese  twins.  They  are  war  and  money. 

Money,  being  the  root  of  all  evil,  is  the  direct  or  in- 
direct cause  of  war.  War  without  money  cannot  long  survive. 
It  is  a  beautiful  thought  that  one  is  fighting  for  a  prin- 
ciple, but  just  the  same,  any  war  has  itself  linked  up  with 
the  hope  of  financial  gain  or  fear  of  financial  loss. 

To  make  war  three  things  are  necessary,  as  Monte- 
cuculi,  even  in  his  generation  would  say:  First,  money, 
second,  money;  third,  money.  The  World  War  is  no  ex- 
ception to  the  rule.  In  the  war  in  Manchuria  finance 
fought  as  many  battles  as  the  soldiers.  The  Peace  of  Ports- 
mouth, though  it  did  not  satisfy  the  Japanese,  was  accepted 
by  them  because  their  finances,  not  their  army,  were  ex- 
hausted. 

Formerly  the  cost  of  wars  to  the  state  which  engaged 
in  them  was  relatively  small,  but  the  money  question  was 
nevertheless  of  primary  importance. 

"Frederick  William  I,  by  leaving  his  son  Frederick  II  a 
war  treasure  of  1,350,000  pounds,  enabled  him  to  carry  on 
the  Silesian  War,  or  at  least  to  hold  out  until  Louis  XV 
sent  subsidies." 

"The  Seven  Years'  War  was  prepared  by  Maria  Theresa 
on  the  basis  of  subsidies  that  she  obtained  from  the  King 
of  France  through  the  agency  of  her  bonne  amie,  Mme.  de 
Pompadour,  and  Elizabeth  of  Russia  only  joined  the  coali- 
tion after  Maria  Theresa  had  passed  on  to  her  a  little  of 
this  financial  manna." 

Without  the  English  subsidies  Frederick  II  would  not 
have  been  able  to  have  made  headway  against  the  coalition. 

"In  the  17th  century,  though  war  was  costly,  peace  as 
a  rule  was  not.  In  peace,  armies  were  disbanded,  while 

83 


84  STRATEGY 

new  ones  were  levied  for  new  wars."  Frederick  William 
I  was  the  first  to  make  peace  more  costly  by  keeping  his 
army  practically  at  full  strength. 

Today  a  condition  of  armed  peace  impoverishes  the 
states  that  maintain  it,  while  the  others  run  the  risk  of 
being  ruined  and  of  disappearing  altogether.  In  propor- 
tion as  war  becomes  more  scientific  it  comes  less  within 
the  province  of  impoverished  soldiers.  Armies  are  no 
longer  levied  but  appear  in  the  form  of  cadres  and  soldiers 
to  which  other  cadres  and  properly  trained  sodiers  are  sent. 

"Armies  no  longer  are  hired  as  in  the  days  of  the  con- 
dottieri.  They  are  composed  of  men  serving  from  a  sense 
of  duty;  they  contain  the  purest  blood  of  the  nation;  their 
military  value  depends  upon  instruction  and  training,  and 
that  implies  expense."  We  nowadays  may  rewrite  Monte- 
cuculi's  phrase  thus:  "To  preserve  peace  three  things  are 
necessary:  First,  money;  second,  money;  third,  money." 

In  1905-6,  England  spent  22  per  cent  of  her  income 
for  military  purposes,  France  28  per  cent  and  the  German 
Empire  14£  per  cent.  Germany  has  always  kept  a  war 
chest.  In  1870  it  contained  4,500,000  pounds.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  this  war  she  had  an  available  reserve  of  6,000,000 
pounds.  Other  nations  have  followed  Germany's  example. 
Gold  was  heaped  in  the  vault  of  the  Bank  of  France,  but 
bank-notes  were  issued  to  circulate  and  draw  interest  secured 
by  this  gold.  The  German  funds,  however,  were  hoarded 
in  vaults  and  taken  out  of  circulation.  Had  the  6,000,000 
pounds  in  the  citadel  of  Spandau  been  used  as  a  basis  of  note 
issue  since  1871,  they  would  have  become  20,000,000  pounds 
by  the  time  the  war  began  in  1914. 

It  would  be  quite  impossible  to  hoard  up  enough  money 
to  pay  for  all  expenses  in  war,  so  the  holding  out  of  a  lesser 
sum  might  lull  a  nation  into  a  false  sense  of  financial  secur- 
ity, the  average  man  not  knowing  how  much  a  war  will 
cost. 

"The  day  before  the  Franco-German  War  began,  Prus- 
sia had  4,500,000  pounds  in  her  war  chest.  Other  sources 
yielded  2,750,000  pounds  more.  This  sum  was  so  far  below 
the  cost  that  other  sources  of  revenue  had  to  be  sought.  Bis- 
marck appealed  to  German  patriotism  and  received  as  a 


WAR  AND  FINANCE  85 

result  of  voluntary  subscription  about  300  dollars.  All 
Europe  laughed." 

Bismarck  opened  a  5  per  cent  loan  of  18,000,000  pounds 
issued  at  88  and  redeemable  in  18  years.  Little  over  half 
was  taken,  so  Bismarck  had  to  go  to  London  for  help,  where 
he  negotiated  a  loan  of  50,000,000  pounds. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  that  the  Germans,  so  loath  to 
lend  money  to  their  own  government,  showed  themselves 
very  eager  to  loan  it  to  France. 

When  the  delegation  of  Tours,  on  October  27-29,  1870, 
contracted  the  Morgan  loan,  which  enabled  it  to  form  the 
Army  of  the  "Defense  Nationale,"  German  money  flowed 
freely  into  French  coffers.  Bismarck  was  very  wroth ;  "he 
directed  the  prosecution  of  several  Frankfurt  bankers  whom 
he  accused  of  having  facilitated  the  loan,  which,  to  quote 
the  words  of  the  charge,  had  enabled  France  to  constitute 
the  Army  of  the  Loire,  and  maintain  the  war  longer  and 
with  greater  energy." 

WATCHING  FINANCE  TO  DISCOVER  INDICATIONS  OF 
APPROACHING  WAR 

A  close  observation  of  the  fluctuations  of  foreign  na- 
tions' finances  nowadays  is  of  the  highest  importance.  It 
is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  modern  war. 

"Take  Japan  after  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  when, 
after  revision  by  the  European  powers,  she  found  herself 
euchred  out  of  Port  Arthur  and  receiving  instead  Formosa 
and  37,700,000  pounds. 

Japan  had  to  accept,  but,  notwithstanding,  she  at  once 
pooled  out  her  indemnity  to  England  and  with  the  money 
obtained  began  to  augment  her  war  power. 

Along  with  this  came  new  taxes — tobacco  tax,  income 
tax  and  stamp  tax.  Her  "speeding  up"  went  on  at  such 
a  rate  that  her  revenues  were  increased  7,800,000  pounds. 
Tax  payers  protested  and  upset  four  ministries  in  three 
years.  What  was  the  meaning?  It  was  not  for  a  defen- 
sive war  that  Japan  was  subjecting  herself  to  such  sacri- 
fices, for  no  one  was  threatening  her.  It  was  therefore  in 
order  to  attack.  To  attack  whom?  If  Russia  had  asked  her 
the  question  she  might  have  seen  that  she  herself  was  the 
enemy  aimed  at. 


86  STRATEGY 

The  World  War,  however,  was  not  preceded  very  long 
in  advance  by  any  unusual  activity  other  than  Germany's 
naval  expenditures  and  the  increase  in  her  army  of  1913. 
The  "Morocco  scare"  of  1911  nearly  precipitated  things, 
but  this  finally  blew  over.  In  1912,  when  the  Balkan 
War  began,  distinct  signs  of  financial  apprehension  were 
renewed.  Parisian  bankers  had  been  loaning  money  heaY=__ 
ily  to  Germany.  In  the  autumn  they  began  to  recall  these 
loans  and  the  French  people  began  to  hoard  gold  in  their 
old  stockings  and  chimney-pieces.  This,  to  a  Frenchman 
is  historic  evidence  of  the  inevitable  approach  of  war.  It 
is  estimated  that  not  less  than  $350,000,000  gold  was  hid- 
den away  by  the  people  of  Germany,  France  and  Austria. 
During  1913,  money  rates,  were  abnormally  high  on  the 
Continent.  In  January,  1914,  money  rates  were  reduced 
at  the  great  state  banks  of  England,  Germany,  France, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Switzerland  to 
the  lowest  figure  touched  since  the  Balkan  War  began  in 
October,  1912. 

An  almost  certain  sign  of  war  is  the  selling  of  out-— 
standing  government  bonds  and  a  rapid  fall  in  prices.  Yet, 
during  the  opening  weeks  of  1914,  prices  for  the  govern- 
ment bonds  of  Germany,  France,  England  and  Russia  ad- 
vanced from  2  to  6  per  cent.  Two  weeks  before  the 
murder  of  the  Archduke  and  two  weeks  before  the  ulti- 
matum to  Russia,  money  rates  were  growing  easier  in  Paris 
and  London.  There  was  nothing  prior  to  the  last  days  of 
July  that  indicated,  from  a  financial  point,  that  an  outbreak 
of  any  kind  was  imminent.  There  were  closing  of  stock 
exchanges  and  a  run  on  the  Bank  of  England  in  the  few 
days  before  the  war,  but  that  did  not  necessarily  mean  war. 

"Financial  conditions  had  been  unsettled  for  some  time 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  in  fact  since  the  disturb- 
ance brought  on  by  the  Balkan  War,  as  already  stated.  In 
addition  there  had  been  considerable  industrial  unsettle- 
ment  which  by  1914  became  more  or  less  acute.  The  first 
six  months  of  the  year  1914  was  marked  by  industrial  de- 
pression and  some  paralysis,  both  in  the  United  States  and 
Europe.  During  this  time  the  security  markets  had  been 
continuously  weak  and  a  great  drop  in  prices  occurred  in 


WAR  AND  FINANCE  87 

the  last  few  days  of  July,  when  securities  from  all  over  the 
world  seemed  to  be  thrown  into  American  markets  for  sale." 

This  latter  happening  is  the  only  really  ominous, 

As  to  financing  the  war,  Germany  figured  on  a  short 
war,  which  she  could  maintain,  and,  counting  on  it  being 
successful,  she  expected  to  pay  the  costs  out  of  the  indem- 
nity imposed. 

Now,  turning  our  attention  to  Japan,  we  will  see  by  her 
situation  an  illustration  of  how  the  shortage  of  money 
played  an  important  part  in  bringing  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  to  a  close. 

"After  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  January,  1902, 
Russia  sensed  a  possible  rupture  and  began  talking  about 
evacuating  Manchuria  by  three  stages. 

In  February,  1904,  the  national  debt  of  Japan  was 
57,400,000  pounds;  in  March,  1906,  it  had  grown  to  230,- 
700,000  pounds. 

The  Japanese  Annual  for  1906  gave  the  total  expenses 
of  the  war  as  202,500,000  pounds.  Russia  spent  nearly 
278,000,000  pounds. 

The  Japanese  finance  minister,  in  the  budget  statement 
of  1906-7,  estimated  that  in  addition  it  would  take  52,300,- 
000  pounds  to  pay  for  repairs  to  the  fleet  and  material  gen- 
erally for  awards,  pensions,  etc. 

The  Japanese  millions  spent  on  the  war  came  from 
three  sources  : 

1.  The  budgets  of  1904-05. 

2.  Internal  loans. 

JL  External  loans,  taken  up  principally  in  England  and  the 


Interior  loans  against  which  treasury  bonds  were  given 
are  shown  below  : 


, 

1 

1 

M 

O 

v  & 
.2  § 

11 

u  P. 

c 
.2 
| 

53 

55 

0 

* 

£ 

£ 

A<>3 

p*j! 

1 

1 

Feb.  1904 

100,000,000 

10,240,000 

5 

95 

5.25 

5   years. 

2 

May,  1904 

100,000,000 

10,240,000 

5 

92 

5.43 

7  years. 

3 

Nov.  1904 

80,000,000 

8,192,000 

5 

92 

5.43 

No    limit. 

4 

Mar.  1905 

100,000,000 

10,240,000 

6 

90 

6.66 

No   limit. 

5 

Apr.   1905 

100,000,000 

10,240,000 

6 

90 

6.66 

No  limit. 

These  loans,  issued  upon  more  and  more  unfavorable 
terms,  showed  that  it  was  becoming  dangerous  to  make  in- 
cessant demands  on  the  public. 


88 


STRATEGY 


External  loans  were  resorted  to  covered  by  security. 
The  following  is  the  list,  the  last  one  being  contracted 
for  after  the  peace  treaty  had  been  signed: 


1 

1 

£ 

£ 

Security 

it 

01 

Pd 

0)   ft) 
.«  3 

P,   03 

If 

Extinction 

London, 

Customs 

1 

May, 

1904 

New  York 

10,000,000 

dues 

6 

93.1 

6.44 

7  yrs 

Customs 

2 

Nov. 

1904 

New  York 

12,000,000 

dues 

6 

90.1 

6.65 

9  yrs 

Tobacco 

3 

Mar. 

1905 

New   York 

30,000,000 

Monopoly 

4.5 

90 

5 

20  yrs 

{London 

4 

July 

1905 

Berlin 

30,000.000 

Tobacco 

New   York 

Monopoly 

4.5 

90 

5 

20  yrs 

London 

5 

Nov. 

1905 

Paris 

25,000,000 

None 

New   York 

4 

90 

4.4 

25  yrs 

Now  let  us  analyze  the  above  tables. 

"We  see  from  them  that,  unlike  the  internal  loans, 
the  external  loans  became  less  burdensome  as  the  war 
progressed. 

"In  May,  1904,  the  interest  on  the  capital  was  5.43 
per  cent  for  internal  loans  and  6.44  per  cent  for  external 
loans. 

"In  March,  1905,  the  interest  on  the  capital  in  case  of 
interior  loans  had  risen  to  6.66  per  cent  while  on  external 
loans  it  was  5  per  cent. 

"The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  internal  loan  is  indi- 
cation of  the  credit  of  the  country  and  the  external  merely 
the  valuation  of  security." 

"In  November,  1904,  Japan,  with  the  victories  of  Liao 
Yang  and  the  Sha-Ho  to  her  credit,  was  certainly  better 
off  than  in  the  previous  May,  and  yet  the  interest  on  the 
capital  of  the  second  loan  was  more  onerous  than  that  of 
the  first  (6.65  per  cent  as  against  6.44  per  cent).  This 
apparent  anomaly  explains  itself  when  we  observe  that 
the  security  of  the  second  loan  was  already  ear-marked  for— 
the  first.  Had  the  third  loan  to  be  secured,  like  the  others, 
on  the  customs  receipts,  very  likely  Japan  would  not  have 
found  many  lenders."  So  her  third  and  fourth  loans  had 
to  be  secured  by  the  state  monopoly  on  tobacco. 

Had  not  the  Peace  of  Portsmouth  been  signed,  Japan 
would  have  needed  more  funds,  as  the  war  was  costing 


WAR  AND  FINANCE 


11,000,000  pounds  a  month.     Her  fifth  internal  loan  at  6.66 
per  cent  was  only  covered  with  difficulty  and  she  had  no 
more  security  for  an  external  loan.    Japan's  budget-^or- 
..1902-3  amounted  only  to  22,500,000  pounds,  so^you  see  the 
jwar_wa.s  costing  half  of  the  yearly  income  a  month.   Jajjan^y 
jKa&Jinding-  herself  gaining  Manchuria  militarily  and  los- 
^ng^apaji_financially.     She  was  obliged  to  allow  Russia  to 
bargain,    and    foregoing    her    indemnity    virtually    accept 
Russia's  terms.     This  is  a  vivid  illustration  of  Montecu- 
culi's  phrase. 

^Jyj[n_j7Tflttf>r   ^nw   qn^pggfnl    your   soldiers   mav   be   in 
modern  war,  without  money  to  buy  the  sinews  you  cannot 
it 


The  following  tables  show  how  the  recent  war  has  af- 
fected the  finances  and  wealth  of  the  principal  belligerents : 

Debt  and  interest  charge  compared  with  estimated  wealth 
and  income  of  the  principal  belligerents  in  the  recent  war 

Approximate  Status  April  1st,  1919 


5 

M 

§ 

5        l| 

1 

1 

85 

? 

0) 

P 

1       || 

c 

| 

V  ~ 

United   States 

22 

300           75 

.917 

60.0 

1.53% 

Great  Britian 

38 

120         31§ 

1.664 

15.5 

10.73% 

France 

26 

90         20 

1.300 

12.0 

10.83% 

Italy 

12.6 

40         31i 

.548 

7.5 

7.30% 

Germany 

39 

80         481 

1.950 

10.0 

19.50% 

Total  expenditures,  ten  principal  countries,  $186,000,000,000 
Per   Capita   Basis 


Population 
in  millions 

"S 
fe 

1 

Wealth  per 
Capita 

Interest  per 
Capita 

Income  per 
Capita 

107 
43 
40 
36 
65 

United   States 
Great  Britain 
France 
Italy 
Germany 

$206 
885 
650 
350 
600 

$2803 
2279 
2260 
1111 
1231 

$8.57 
38.69 
32.50 
15.22 
30.00 

$560 
360 
300 
208 
154 

wst 

$,00- 


*Debt,   wealth,  interest  and  income  in  billions. 


90  STRATEGY 

COST  OF  FORMER  WARS  SINCE  1776 

United  States  Dollars 

American  Revolution 76,781,953  per  capita  $18.88 

War  of  1812 127,041,341  per  capita  14.64 

Mexican   War 68,304,796  per  capita  2.84 

Civil  War 2,844,649,616  per  capita  81.58 

England  Pounds 

American  Revolution 121,000,000 

Campaigns    against    Napoleon    831,446,449 

Crimean  War 74,000,000 

Boer  War __211,256,000 

France  Pounds 

Jena  Campaign (Gain)   20,680,000 

Spanish  Campaign 28,000,000 

1805  to  1810  (less  Jena) 24,840,000 

Crimea 66,000,000 

Italian  War 15,000,000 

War  of  1870 169,000,000 

Counting  indemnity,  loss  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  695,000,000 

Russia  Pounds 

Turkey    in    1828    27,200,000 

Crimea   53,300,000 

Turkey  in  1878 '_ 102,000,000 

Japanese    278,000,000 

Germany  Pounds 

Jena    56,450,000 

Austro-Prussian 18,450,000 

War  of  1870 65,000,000 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  most  recent  wars  cost  the  most. 

Money  in  general  is  necessary  for  waging  war,  but  its 
necessity  is  greatly  reduced  if  the  people  will  make  sacri- 
jfice_s.  Money,  therefore,  plays  the  most  important  part  before 
and  after  the  war. 

If  the  figures  are  correct,  for  the  amount  the  United 
States  spent  directly  on  the  recent  war,  she  could  have  con- 
tinued her  next  most  expensive  war,  namely,  the  Civil  V£ar^ 
38  years. 

England  could  have  kept  fighting  Napoleon  about  750 
years  and  the  American  Colonies  could  have  kept  up  the 
fight  against  England  about  1,200  years. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  the  pre-war  anti-prepared- 
ness faction  to  know,  that,  for  the  amount  actually  expended 
on  the  army,  during  the  two  years  of  the  war,  an  army  of 
the  size  asked  for  by  the  preparedness  faction  could  have 
been  maintained  for  at  least  75  years. 


WAR  AND  FINANCE 

The  war  cost  the  JUnited  States  considerably  more  than 
.$1,000,000  an  hour  for  two  years. 

During  the  first  three  months  our  war  expenditures 
were  at  the  rate  of  $2,000,000  an  hour. 

During  the  final  ten  months  ending  April,  1919,  the 
daily  average  was  over  $44,000,000. 


The  direct  cost  of  the  war  was.  nearly  enough  to  have 
paid  the  g"t^  ™«t  oJLxunning  the  United  States  govern- 
jn£njLfrom-1791  up  to  .the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and_is  more 
ef  thegoM-produced  in  the  whole  world  from 


the  discovery  of  America  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Offensive 

STRATEGICAL 

"Offensive  strategy  must  be  prepared  for  in  time  of  peace  by  perfecting  the 
military  machinery.  This  cannot  be  done  during  hostilities,  nor  can  the  nation  which 
has  neglected  to  do  so  hope  to  wage  war  successfully." 

"The  strategical  offensive,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  consequence  of  political  striving 
after  some  definite  object,  the  feeling  of  power  to  attain  this  object,  and  a  distinct 
consciousness  of  superiority  over  the  enemy." 

T  N  the  case  of  the  Japanese,  after  the  Chino-Japanese  War 
A  of  1894,  they  coveted  Korea,  which  they  had  once  con- 
quered, and  Port  Arthur,  taken  from  them  by  the  Treaty 
of  Shimonoseki,  as  a  result  of  Russian  and  German  influ- 
ence. Japan,  in  1904  and  1905,  felt  her  own  superiority 
over  Russia,  so  took  the  offensive  forthwith,  never  sur- 
rendering the  initiative. 

A  commander  will  endeavor  to  take  advantage  of  the 
favorable  considerations  which  caused  his  country  to  de- 
clare war  before  there  can  be  an  unfavorable  turn.  This 
is  what  the  German  staff  endeavored  to  do  in  1914.  After 
the  Confederate  success  at  first  Bull  Run,  both  Joseph  E. 
Johnston  and  Stonewall  Jackson  wanted  to  carry  the  war 
into  the  North  and  invade,  taking  advantage  of  their  tem- 
porary success  and  the  Federal  confusion.  Jefferson  Davis, 
the  Confederate  President,  was  averse  to  this  project,  so 
nothing  was  done  with  the  result  that  the  Federal  forces 
and  politicians  regained  their  equilibrium. 

We  may  express  the  qualities  of  the  offensive  in  three 
words — rapidity — activity — surprise. 

As  we  have  already  learned,  the  first  objective  should 
normally  be  the  hostile  main  army.  In  an  aggressive  war, 
then,  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  mobilize,  and  that  being 
completed,  to  concentrate  for  the  purpose  of  invading  the 
theater  of  war,  occupied  by  the  enemy,  with  a  view  of 
finding  his  main  army  and  forcing  it  to  battle  under  condi- 
tions as  favorable  to  us  as  possible. 

92 


THE    OFFENSIVE 

The  general  who  leads  off  with  a  feeling  that  a  for- 
ward movement  is  the  natural  and  necessary  thing,  is  stim- 
ulated much  more  to  mental  activity,  bold  plans  and  prompt 
action,  than  the  general  who  waits.  The  general  who  moves 
his  army  forward  inspires  a  confidence  in  the  troops  that 
increases  their  fighting  prowess  far  over  and  above  what 
it  would  have  been  with  an  irresolute  general.  Napoleon's 
LXXXIV  War  Maxim  gives  his  ideas  on  this  subject  as  fol- 
lows:  "An  irresolute  general  who  acts  without  principles  or 
plan,  although  at  the  head  of  an  army  superior  in  numbers  to 
_JjiajL_Qf,  the  foe,  of  ten-  proves  inferior  on  the  battlefield. 
Shuffling,  half-measures  lose  everything  in  war."  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  shortly  after  General  R.  E.  Lee  took 
command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  the  news- 
papers of  the  South  subjected  him  to  a  great  amount  of 
ridicule,  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  having  Richmond  for- 
tified, apparently  leaving  the  enemy  all  the  time  he  needed 
to  concentrate  superior  numbers.  This,  however,  was  un- 
just, as  Lee  was  merely  trying  to  organize  his  army  prop- 
erly. General  Lee  was  the  soul  of  audacity. 

MORALE 

Another  strong  feature  that  recommends  the  offensive 
is  that  it  stimulates  the  interest  and  enthusiasm  of  the 
people  as  well  as  the  army.  The  continued  retreat  of  the 
Confederate  army  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta  disheartened  the 
troops,  for  it  seemed  that  all  they  could  do  was  to  fall 
back.  The  assumption  of  the  offensive  by  Hood,  although 
ill  timed,  showed  clearly  by  its  impetus  that  it  took  solely 
the  offensive  to  reanimate  the  Confederates. 

Frederick  the  Great,  in  writing  to  Louis  XV,  said: 
"It  is  always  better  to  act  6ffensivelyr  even  if  WP  siro.  inferior— _ 
in  numbers.  J?he^  enemy  is  often  bewildered  by  boldness, 
_an_d  allows  advantages  to  be  snatched  from  him."  One 
need  look  no  further  for  an  illustration  of  Frederick's  dic- 
tum than  the  second  Manassas  campaign. 

Lee,  although  inferior  in  numbers,  completely  bewild- 
ered Pope  by  rapid  movements  and  forced  the  latter's  army 
back  to  the  vicinity  of  Washington. 

"Fixed  determination  promotes  discernment,  facilitates 
the  choice  of  judicious  measures,  and  contracts  the  field 


94  STRATEGY 

of  mistakes  and  errors;  for  the  actor  has  in  mind  a 
definite  purpose  and  can  go  wrong  only  in  his  choice  of 
routes." 

Napoleon,  after  his  initial  failure  at  Essling  and  As- 
pern,  did  not  give  up  crossing  the  Danube,  but  took  extra 
precautions  and  finally  got  across.  He  had  the  one  thing 
on  his  mind,  and  that  was  to  defeat  the  Austrians,  so  he 
would  not  entertain  any  thought  of  failure. 

MASSING  OF  TROOPS 

It  is  quite  apparent  that  on  the  offensive  troops  may  be 
massed  more  quickly  and  with  less  chance  of  movement  by 
the  flank  than  on  the  defensive.  We  may  visualize  the  sit- 
uation of  a  division  and  a  corps  moving  in  fan-shape  toward 
the  handle  which  is  the  objective.  There  is  little  chance 
for  confusion,  crossing  of  columns  and  intermingling  of 
supply  units.  Co-operation  is  more  readily  arranged  than 
in  the  case  of  a  stationary  defensive  when  the  objective  is 
not  indicated  until  the  enemy  makes  his  appearance  in  front 
of  the  position. 

We  have  no  better  illustration  of  the  advantages  of 
the  strategic  offensive  in  the  matter  of  massing  troops  and 
converging  columns  than  in  the  various  Japanese  advances 
in  Korea  and  Manchuria  in  1904-1905. 

Before  the  battle  of  the  Yalu,  the  Russians  were  scat- 
tered on  a  front  of  50  to  60  miles,  looking  for  the 
Japanese  main  force  and  trying  to  learn  where  it  would 
strike.  When  they  did  find  out,  it  was  too  late  to  assemble 
troops  to  meet  it. 

Before  Liao  Yang  and  Mukden,  the  Japanese,  by  march- 
ing in  parallel  columns,  were  able  to  conceal  their  main 
point  of  attack  until  too  late  to  be  effectually  stopped. 

A  general,  however,  must  bear  in  mind  that  advancing 
rapidly  in  many  columns  is  liable  to  cause  excessive  elon- 
gation, and  should  the  heads  of  these  columns  strike  the 
enemy  deployed  for  battle,  they  might  be  driven  back  on 
the  tail,  the  columns  telescoped,  and  an  assembly  forced  to 
the  rear. 

This  is  what  happened  to  the  Germans  at  the  first  bat- 
tle of  the  Marne. 


THE  OFFENSIVE  95 

Napoleon  concentrated  several  columns  against  Melas  at 
Marengo,  and  came  very  near  losing  the  battle. 

Later  on  we  will  take  up  the  two  types  of  concentra- 
tions, commonly  known  as  the  von  Moltke  and  Napoleonic, 
types. 

The  parallel  lines  used  in  the  offensive  march  forward 
to  the  concentration  are  known  by  the  Germans  as  the  von 
Schlieffen  parallel  lines,  the  idea  being  to  advance  as  many 
parallel  columns  as  the  roads  permit,  with  the  main  column 
directed  toward  the  center  of  the  hostile  concentration.  The 
flank  columns  march  by,  turn  in,  and  accomplish  a  double 
envelopment  in  a  scissors  fashion.  In  a  way  this  is  what 
von  Hindenburg  did  at  Tannenburg  and  was  successful, 
thereby  acquiring  the  sobriquet  of  "The  Scissors." 

"The  greatest  difference  between  the  offensive  and  de- 
fensive is  that  the  former  will  win  if  successful  at  a  single 
point  while  the  latter's  position,  forming  an  organic  whole, 
will  lose  its  stability  and  cohesion  as  soon  as  a  part  is  de- 
stroyed." 

As  soon  as  the  Italian  army  on  the  Isonzo  was  driven 
back  on  a  brigade  front  in  1917,  the  entire  defensive  posi- 
tion collapsed. 

MOST  SALIENT  POINTS  OF  SUPERIORITY  OF  THE 
OFFENSIVE  OVER  THE  DEFENSIVE 

1.  The  assailant  is  able  to  select  his  own  point  of  attack. 

2.  In  so  doing  he  imposes  the  element  of  surprise. 

3.  Although  the  defender,  by  carefully  weighing  all  the  circum- 

stances, may  often  detect  the  point  of  attack,  yet  the  affair 
will  seldom  pass  off  without  errors  as  to  details. 

4.  The  attacker  therefore  has  a  reasonable  right  to  expect  that 

the  defender  will  be  weaker  at  the  decisive  point. 

5.  Even   though  the   duration  of   greater   strategical  operations 

give  the  defender  a  chance  in  a  way  to  repair  his  errors,  he 
will  have  greater  distances  to  reckon  with  and  his  correction 
will  probably  be  too  late. 

6.  It  will  be  difficult  for  the  defender  to  remedy  his  original  mis- 

takes of  concentration  for  the  reason  that  masses  of  troops 
cannot  be  moved  ad  libitum. 

In  the  selection  of  the  point  of  attack  or  general  ob- 
jective, the  assailant  in  nearly  every  case  has  freedom  of 
choice.  He  will,  however,  select  the  point  from  which  he 
will  derive  the  most  strategic  advantage  if  successful.  For 
units  participating  in  an  attack  one  idea  should  predomi- 
nate, a  tactical  victory.  In  the  study  of  directions  there 


96  STRATEGY 

should  be  no  confusion  between  strategy  and  tactics.  The 
army  is  concerned  with  strategy,  subordinate  units  are 
concerned  with  tactics.  In  sending  Okasaki's  brigade 
against  the  Manju  Yama,  north  of  the  Tai-Tzu-Ho,  in  the 
battle  of  Liao  Yang,  Kuroki  took  a  long  chance,  but  being 
successful,  the  entire  Russian  line  was  threatened. 

The  fatal  weakness  in  the  Russian  offensive  on  the 
Sha-Ho  was  that  the  element  of  surprise  was  missing.  The 
Japanese  knew  all  about  this  contemplated  attack  long 
before  it  was  made.  The  fatal  weakness  in  the  British 
descent  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  was  that  it  lacked  rapid- 
ity, secrecy  and  well  chosen  objectives. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Turks  knew  all  about  the  expe- 
dition, even  to  the  exact  points  of  landing.  Due  to  the 
fact  that  the  transports  were  not  scientifically  loaded  they 
had  to  put  back  to  Alexandria  for  readjustment,  later 
assembling  at  Lemnos.  The  time  of  the  year  for  a  land- 
ing on  the  beach  was  not  selected  with  due  consideration 
for  the  local  storm  conditions;  it  so  happened  that  during 
the  time  of  the  year  selected  for  the  landing,  the  surf  was 
so  high  at  times  as  to  make  debarkation  extremely  difficult. 

The  defeat  of  the  French  around  Metz  was  due  to  the 
surprise  of  their  corps  on  the  14th  of  August.  Likewise 
in  1870,  during  the  march  to  the  battle  of  Sedan,  the  Ger- 
mans completely  surprised  McMahon  going  to  the  aid  of 
Bazaine,  invested  in  Metz.  The  V  French  Corps  was  com- 
pletely surprised  at  Beaumont. 

It  always  will  be  difficult  for  the  defender  to  correct 
strategical  and  tactical  errors  of  distribution.  On  the  16th 
of  August,  as  the  Saxon  12th  Corps  was  turning  the  French 
right  at  Roncourt,  the  French  reserve  was  located  in  rear 
of  the  left.  The  error  could  not  be  corrected  in  time  to 
block  the  envelopment. 

MORAL  EFFECT  OF  INVASION  OF  HOSTILE 
TERRITORY 

The  one  great  advantage  of  the  offensive  is  that  it  leads 
into  the  enemy's  country  and  might  lead  into  a  neutral 
country,  which  has  a  tendency  to  refresh  troops  morally 
and  materially,  and  does  not  subject  the  home  DeoDle  to 


THE    OFFENSIVE  97 

the  discomfitures  that  the  inhabitants  always  experience 
when  their  land  is  the  scene  of  operations. 

In  The  World  War,  the  German  great  general  staff, 
being  of  Frederick  the  Great's  opinion  that  the  worst  place 
to  make  war  is  in  one's  own  country,  the  best  in  the  enemy's 
and  the  second  best  in  that  of  a  neutral,  had  decided  on 
the  violation  of  Belgium,  and  had  made  preparations  long 
before  war  started.  On  all  the  German  frontier  lines, 
elaborate  arrangements  had  been  perfected  for  the  concen- 
tration of  troops.  If  any  doubt  exists  that  the  invasion  of 
Belgium  was  premeditated,  a  reading  of  Bernhardi's  book 
and  a  study  of  the  railway  network  of  Germany  along  her 
western  front  will  remove  it. 

In  the  invasion  of  Maryland  by  the  Confederates  in 
1862,  we  have  an  illustration  of  the  enthusiasm  attendant 
upon  the  entrance  of  an  army  into  new  regions.  As  the 
Confederates  waded  across  the  Potomac,  the  bands  played 
"Maryland,  My  Maryland,"  and  the  troops  advanced  as  a 
relieving  force.  Unfortunately  the  Marylanders  did  not 
show  an  overwhelming  desire  to  be  relieved. 

The  hope  of  rehabilitation  inspired  Napoleon's  army 
of  Italy.  In  an  energetic  proclamation  Napoleon  showed 
that  an  obscure  death  threatened'  his  troops  if  they  re- 
mained on  the  defensive;  that  they  had  nothing  to  expect 
from  France,  but  everything  from  victory.  He  exclaimed : 
"There  is  plenty  in  the  fertile  plains  of  Italy.  Soldiers! 
Will  you  fail  in  courage  and  fortitude?" 

To  picture  to  yourself  the  effect  that  moving  into  new 
country  has  upon  an  army,  just  glance  at  the  accounts  with 
reference  to  the  German  armies  around  Metz,  and  the  Japan- 
ese armies  around  Port  Arthur  and  note  the  improvement  in 
morale  when  they  respectively  started  west  and  north  to 
join  the  field  armies. 

SOME  OF  THE  DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE 

One  of  the  principal  disadvantages  of  the  offensive  is 
that  it  makes  greater  demands  on  the  energies  of  the  troops 
and  that  there  is  a  maximum  of  marching.  Losses  on  the 
march  in  war  generally  are  greater  than  those  in  battle. 

Napoleon,  in  his  LVIII  War  Maxim,  says:  "The  first 
quality  in  a  soldier  is  fortitude  in  enduring  fatigue  and  hard- 


98  STRATEGY 

ship ;  bravery  but  the  second.  Poverty,  hardship,  and  mis- 
ery are  the  school  of  the  soldier." 

Now  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  one  of  the  causes  for 
the  failures  on  the  part  of  both  sides  at  the  battle  of  An- 
tietam. 

It  will  be  brought  before  your  mind  by  reading  an 
extract  from  General  McClellan's  report,  submitted  to  The 
Adjutant  General  on  September  28th.  It  reads: 

"The  stragglers,  too,  are  numerous  in  every  division  of 
the  army;  many  of  them  desert.  The  states  of  the  North 
are  flooded  with  deserters,  absentees,  etc.  One  corps  of  the 
army  has  13,000  and  odd  men  present  and  15,000  and  odd 
absent;  of  the  15,000,  8,000  probably  were  at  work  at  home, 
deserters."  (W.  R.  19,  Part  II,  p.  364.) 

This  apparently  was  the  1st  Corps,  for  when  Meade 
succeeded  Hooker  in  command,  after  the  wounding  of  the 
latter,  he  reported  that  8,000  men,  including  250  officers, 
had  quit  the  ranks  either  before  or  during  the  battle  of 
Antietam.  And  the  Confederates  were  no  better,  for  D.  H. 
Hill,  in  his  report,  gives  as  one  of  the  three  reasons  for 
the  loss  of  the  battle,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  the 
straggling.  On  the  22d  of  September,  five  days  after  the 
battle,  the  strength  reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia shows  41,520  men,  while  on  the  30th  it  shows  62,713, 
and  yet  no  conscripts  had  been  received.  Query:  Where 
were  these  men  during  the  battle?  Henderson  states  that 
there  were  at  least  10,000  living  off  the  citizens  of  Leesburg, 
Virginia.  Jackson  took  into  action  on  the  17th,  1,600  men, 
and  lost  700,  and  yet  had  3,900  for  duty  on  the  30th.  Law- 
ton's  division,  formerly  commanded  by  Ewell,  rose  from 
2,500  to  4,450  in  the  same  time. 

In  spite  of  their  excellent  discipline,  the  Prussian  Guard 
Corps  lost  between  5,000  and  6,000  men  on  the  marches 
between  St.  Privat  and  Sedan. 

HOSTILE  INHABITANTS  IN  REAR 

The  country  traversed  by  the  assailants  must  be  as  a 
rule  considered  hostile.  The  necessary  precautions  should 
therefore  be  taken  against  the  inhabitants.  We  have  a  re- 
cent illustration  of  the  German  method  of  dealing  with  the 


THE    OFFENSIVE        .  99 

inhabitants  in  the  cases  of  Belgium,  Roumania  and  Serbia. 
The  invader  will  have  to  adopt  drastic  measures  in  handling 
the  inhabitants,  but  he  must  be  careful  to  see  that  they  con- 
form to  the  customs  of  war,  for  if  they  do  not,  and  ap- 
pear to  neutrals  as  unwarranted,  these  measures,  by  their 
very  severity,  may  arouse  such  an  indignation  as  to  bring 
about  intervention. 

The  Spanish  and  Portuguese  inhabitants,  by  their  guer- 
illa warfare,  did  what  their  armies  could  not  do  and  that 
was,  evict  the  invader.  Napoleon,  during  his  early  wars, 
had  the  inhabitants,  even  of  the  enemy's  country,  with  him, 
for  he  brought  the  liberty  which  their  own  governments 
denied  them.  He  always  came  as  a  deliverer,  but  in  going 
to  Spain  and  Portugal,  he  came  as  a  conqueror. 

GUARDING  THE  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION 

The  lines  of  communication  along  which  all  the  neces- 
saries of  life  and  all  the  reinforcements  are  brought  to  an 
army  will  generally  require  more  special  means  of  protec- 
tion on  the  offensive  than  on  the  defensive. 

The  grouping  into  armies  is  imperative  with  the  pres- 
ent size  of  combatant  forces.  This  involves  the  detaching 
of  troops  to  guard  communications  and  advance  depots. 
Consequently,  it  may  take  a  vast  number  of  troops  to  guard 
communications.  General  Grant  said  that  more  than 
two-thirds  of  the  troops  in  the  West  were  detached  from  the 
main  army  to  guard  communications  against  raids  by  par- 
tisan bands.  Part  of  the  Bavarian  troops  were  left  to  in- 
vest Strassburg  and  Nancy  in  1870,  and,  in  the  German 
onrush  across  Belgium  in  1914,  the  Germans  were  forced  to 
make  detachments. 

Maubeuge,  while  eventually  falling  before  the  forces 
of  von  Bulow,  held  out  long  enough  to  give  Joffre  time  to 
complete  his  concentration.  The  fortress  guarded  a  rail- 
way and  had  to  be  captured  before  communications  could 
be  opened  up. 

There  is  a  saying  that  it  takes  six  men  behind  the  line 
to  keep  one  on  it,  and  if  such  is  the  case,  the  longer  the 
communications  the  more  men  behind  the  line.  At  the 
end  of  July,  1870,  the  //  German  Army  had  198,000  com- 


100  STRATEGY 

batants.  Some  days  later  it  was  increased  by  a  new  corps, 
and  reached  228,000  men,  divided  into  seven  army  corps 
and  two  divisions  of  cavalry. 

"The  I  Army,  which  served  as  a  right  wing  in  the  first 
operations,  numbered,  counting  from  the  6th  of  August, 
96,000  combatants.  At  the  same  time  the  III  Army  was 
167,000  strong.  To  guard  the  communications  of  this  force 
about  166,000  men  were  required;  Approximately  one- 
third." 

The  attackers  are  usually  moving  from  their  sources 
of  supply  at  home.  Although  this  fact  loses  much  of  its 
significance  in  civilized  countries  possessing  modern  means 
of  communications,  it  is  still  of  considerable  importance 
as  a  factor  in  weakening  the  offensive. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  farthest  that  any  army  that 
relied  upon  the  railroad  could  get  from  its  base  was  145 
miles. 

One  is  hardly  ever  able  to  utilize  the  railroads  of  the 
occupied  country  with  the  facility  that  the  roads  at  home 
can  be  used.  The  gauge  may  be  different  or  it  may  be  im- 
possible to  get  rolling  stock. 

WAR  INDIFFERENCE 

There  is  a  condition  that  often  arises  as  a  result  of 
repeated  success — that  is,  weariness  about  the  war  and  even 
indifference  to  it.  While  success  is  a  fine  thing  for  the  troops, 
it  is  apt  to  develop  in  them  a  feeling  of  optimism  that  does 
not  cause  extra  effort  on  their  part.  In  South  Africa,  after 
the  victories  on  the  Tugela  and  Modder  Rivers,  and 
shortly  before  Cronje's  catastrophe  at  Paardeburg,  10,000 
men  of  the  small  Boer  army  were  f  urloughed  to  their  homes. 

ARMED  INTERVENTION 

No  nation  likes  to  see  too  much  success  on  the  part  of 
another.  As  a  result,  the  attackers  may  bring  down  upon 
themselves  the  envy,  jealousy,  or  anxiety  of  other  powers. 
These  sentiments  call  forth  politics  unfavorable  to  the  at- 
tackers which  may  grow  to  an  adverse  element  or  even  to  an 
armed  intervention. 

England  prevented  the  seizure  of  Constantinople  by  the 
Russians  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  but 


THE    OFFENSIVE  101 

not  until  after  Russia,  by  her  successful  advance  through 
the  Balkan  Mountains,  had  made  such  a  seizure  possible. 
The  Japanese  lost  Port  Arthur,  one  of  the  prizes  of  the 
Chino-Japanese  War,  due  to  the  intervention  of  Russia  and 
Germany,  prompted  by  jealousy  of  the  success  of  Japan. 

ALLIES 

The  assailant  often  is  in  danger  of  losing  his  allies,  who 
will  support  him  up  to  a  certain  point,  but  do  not  care  to 
see  him  get  stronger  at  their  expense. 

Both  Prussia  and  Austria,  during  the  Crimean  War, 
while  not  actively  participating  with  the  allies,  had  declared 
with  solemnity  that  the  war  was  just,  but  having  gained 
their  object,  namely,  the  Austrian  control  over  the  lower 
Danube,  became  lukewarm  toward  the  allies  on  account  of 
the  latter's  uniform  success,  and  opened  up  negotiations  with 
the  Russians  on  their  own  account. 

GENERAL  COSTLINESS  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  MEN 

"Attacking  armies  melt  away  like  fresh  snow  in  spring- 
time." 

The  army  on  the  offensive  as  a  rule  loses  vastly  more 
men  than  the  army  on  the  defensive  and,  unless  there  is  a 
continual  flow  of  replacements  from  the  rear,  the  assail- 
ants eventually  must  stop.  For  some  reason  unknown 
at  the  time,  the  Japanese  failed  to  pursue  the  Rus- 
sians more  than  5  or  6  miles  after  Liao  Yang.  Some 
thought  it  to  be  a  deep  laid  strategical  scheme,  but 
as  a  matter  of  fact  it  resulted  from  the  general  costliness 
to  the  Japanese  in  men  and  ammunition  during  the  recent 
action.  They  needed  replacements  of  men  and  replenish- 
ment of  ammunition  and  had  to  halt  operations  until  they 
arrived. 

It  is  plain  that  the  offensive  is  only  possible  when  large 
numbers  enable  a  leader  to  overcome  the  difficulty  it  offers, 
and  good  organization  insures  the  rapidity  necessary  for 
carrying  it  out. 

ADVANCE  ON  Moscow 

When  Napoleon  crossed  the  Niemen  on  the  24th  of 
June,  1812,  at  Kovno  and  Grodno,  his  Central  Army 
(Grande  Armee)  with  which  he  advanced  on  Moscow 


102  .  STRATEGY 

numbered  363,000.  His  entire  army,  including  the  troops 
in  Prussia,  was  442,000  men.  He  reached  Vitebsk  with 
229,000,  having  lost  213,000  principally  by  detachments  and 
straggling,  out  of  his  total  strength.  At  Smolensk,  on  the 
15th  of  August,  his  army  numbered  185,000  men.  Bear  in 
mind  that  up  to  that  time  only  two  engagements  had  taken 
place,  one  between  Davoust  and  Bagration,  the  other  be- 
tween Murat  and  Tolstoy-Osterman.  We  may  put  down 
the  French  losses  in  battle  at  about  10,000 ;  consequently  the 
losses  in  sick  and  stragglers  within  52  days,  on  a 
march  of  about  350  miles  direct  to  the  front  amounted  to 
168,000  men  of  his  Central  Army  which  crossed  the  Nieman. 
He  reached  Borodino  with  134,000  men,  and  eight  days 
after  that  at  Moscow  his  army  numbered  95,000  men.  He 
had  covered  550  miles  and  lost  by  battle,  sickness  and  strag- 
gling about  268,000  men.* 

The  total  of  the  Grande  Armee,  counting  detachments, 
some  of  which  did  not  invade  Russia,  was : 

French _  119,000 

Swiss 37,000 

Wurtembergers   39,000 

Italians   45,000 

Poles    36,000 

Bavarians 25,000 

Saxons 27,000 

Westphalians 18,000 

Prussian  Auxiliaries 32,000 

Austrian  Auxiliaries 30,000 

The  losses  of  this  army  in  general  were  at  the  rate  of 
1  in  150  per  day  at  the  commencement;  subsequently,  they 
rose  to  1  in  120  and  at  the  last  period  they  increased  to 
1  in  19. 

The  Moscow  march  lasted  82  days. 

BLUCHER  IN  1813 

"In  Blucher's  campaign  of  1813  in  Silesia  and  Saxony, 
a  campaign  very  remarkable,  not  for  any  long  march,  but 
for  the  amount  of  marching  to  and  fro;  York's  corps,  of 
Blucher's  army,  began  the  campaign  on  the  16th  of  August 
about  40,000  strong  and  was  reduced  to  12,000  at  the  battle 
of  Leicsic,  19th  of  October.  The  principal  combats  in 


*NOTE — Every   writer   gives   different  figures,   but  the  above  are  believed  to   be 
fairly    accurate. 


THE    OFFENSIVE  103 

which  this  corps  fought  were  at  Goldberg,  Lowenberg, 
Wartenburg  and  Mockern  (Leipsic),  and  it  lost,  according 
to  the  best  accounts,  about  12,00ft  men.  Accordingly  the 
losses  from  other  causes  in  the  eight  weeks'  campaign  were 
16,000  men." 

FRENCH  IN  SPAIN 

The  Spanish  campaign  of  1810  furnishes  us  with  a 
still  more  striking  illustration.  In  the  spring  of  that  year 
400,000  Frenchmen  crossed  the  Pyrenees.  They  advanced 
continually  and  gained  numerous  victories.  Yet  Marshal 
Massena  could  only  finally  muster  but  45,000  men  to  oppose 
the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras  near  Lisbon,  where  the  decision 
lay.  This  French  force  was  too  weak  to  deliver  the  last 
decisive  blow,  but  if  Massena  had  attacked  at  once  and  in 
the  manner  suggested  to  him  by  staff  officers,  he  would 
have  been  able  to  have  carried  the  lines.  He  waited  on  ac- 
count of  the  indisposition  of  a  certain  individual  he  had  in 
his  suite,  and  the  decisive  moment  passed.  As  a  result, 
the  French  were  finally  driven  from  the  Iberian  Peninsula. 

DlEBITSCH  IN  THE  BALKANS 

f 

In  the  spring  of  1829,  Russia  sent  160,000  men  to  win 
the  campaign  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Field  Marshal 
Diebitsch  retained  but  20,000  of  this  number  when  he  ar- 
rived before  Adrianople. 

According  to  Moltke's  calculations,  if  Diebitsch  had 
been  forced  to  continue  his  campaign,  he  would  have  arrived 
at  Constantinople  without  more  than  10,000  men.  A  peace 
skillfully  concluded  saved  his  weakness  from  being  evi- 
dent and  his  army  from  the  resultant  ruin. 

Russo-TuRKiSH  WAR 

Out  of  the  great  army  of  460,000  men,  which  the  Rus- 
sians had  gradually  led  across  the  Danube,  a  meager  100,- 
000  men  got  as  far  as  Constantinople.  This  number  in- 
cluded the  sick,  who  are  said  to  have  amounted  to  half. 

Even  the  Germans,  who  were  operating  under  un- 
usually favorable  conditions,  crossed  the  Saar  in  1870  with 
372,000  men;  after  a  six  weeks'  campaign  they  arrived 
before  Paris  with  only  171,000. 


104  STRATEGY 

JAPANESE 

In  the  case  of  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria  it  was  dif- 
ferent. On  August  28th,  the  opening  of  the  battle  of  Liao 
Yang,  Oyama  was  able  to  put  135,000  men  into  action. 
Notwithstanding  losses  at  Liao  Yang,  the  Japanese  com- 
mander had  15,000  more  men  at  the  Sha-Ho  than  he  had 
at  Lia  Yang.  However,  as  before  mentioned,  he  had  to  delay 
temporarily,  awaiting  replacements. 

On  February  28,  1905,  Oyama  set  out  to  his  so-called 
Borodino.  It  was  at  the  head  of  300,000  men  that  he  chal- 
lenged fate  at  Mukden.  March  10th,  the  Japanese  entered 
Mukden,  while  the  Russians  were  making  ready  to  retire 
to  Harbin.  From  that  day  to  September  16th,  the  date 
of  the  armistice,  the  Japanese  force  numbered  450,000  men. 
So  you  see  that  this  condition  was  somewhat  unusual. 

WANING  POWER  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE 

Very  properly,  therefore,  do  we  speak  of  the  waning 
power  of  the  offensive  as  an  unavoidable  fact  which  must 
be  taken  into  account,  and  which  becomes  the  more  pro- 
nounced the  longer  the  attack  advances.  This  circum- 
stance requires  that  the  necessary  provisions  be  made,  both 
in  organization  and  plans  of  campaign,  to  be  able  to 
strengthen  continully  the  fighting  front  of  the  army  by 
means  of  reserves,  of  which  as  Clausewitz  says,  "The  mili- 
tary roads  in  rear  of  the  army  must  never  be  clear." 

Apparently,  one  of  the  reasons  the  various  German 
drives  on  the  west  front  failed  of  complete  success  in  The 
World  War  was  the  inability  of  the  Germans  to  keep  sup- 
plies and  reserves  up  with  the  rapidly  moving  front.  In 
other  words,  the  advance  troops  ran  away  from  their  sup- 
plies and  reserves. 

Do  NOT  START  IN  ON  A  CAMPAIGN  UNLESS  You  HAVE 
TROOPS  ENOUGH  TO  CARRY  IT  OUT 

The  most  important  basis  for  success  in  every  offen- 
sive movement  lies  in  the  proper  appreciation  of  the  con- 
ditions, such  as  the  number  of  troops  and  supplies  neces- 
sary, etc. 


THE    OFFENSIVE  105 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War,  Sherman,  who  was 
in  the  West,  was  heralded  as  crazy  by  some  of  the  news- 
papers and  lost  his  command  because  he  maintained  that  it 
would  take  at  least  200,000  men  to  suppress  the  rebellion 
in  the  West  alone. 

The  finest  and  best  plan  will  fail  unless  we  have 
enough  troops  to  carry  it  out  to  a  finish.  This  has  been 
the  rule  in  the  case  of  all  the  great  commanders,  such  as 
Charles  XII,  Hannibal,  and  Napoleon  in  his  campaign  of 
1812. 

"In  the  Russian  campaign  of  1812,  Bonaparte  tried  to 
extort  peace  from  an  astonished  adversary  by  one  great 
coup.  The  destruction  of  his  army  was  the  danger  he 
exposed  himself  to,  but  like  all  gamblers,  he  was  willing 
to  take  the  chance.  The  destruction  of  his  army  was  not 
so  much  due  to  the  fact  that  he  penetrated  too  far  into 
Russia,  but  due  to  the  fact  that  he  made  his  attempt  too 
late  in  the  year,  and,  after  guarding  his  long  line  of  com- 
munications, had  not  enough  men  to  succeed  in  event  of  the 
Russians  failing  to  come  over  to  his  side  upon  the  fall  of 
Moscow." 

POINT  AT  WHICH  THE  OFFENSIVE  SHOULD 
SUE  FOR  PEACE 

If  we  follow  the  course  of  offensive  operations,  we  shall 
find  that  they  differ  from  defensive  operations  in  another 
respect.  Although  originally  superior  to  the  enemy,  and 
victorious  in  the  past,  troops  may  finally  arrive,  through 
an  inevitable  process  of  weakening,  at  a  point  which  does 
not  assure  any  future  success,  or,  in  other  words,  the  point 
of  culmination. 

A  general,  with  a  correct  estimation  of  the  situation, 
should  immediately  recognize  the  arrival  of  this  culmina- 
tion and  use  it  as  did  Diebitsch  in  the  Balkans,  the  Jap- 
anese in  Manchuria  and  the  Germans  in  1918,  concluding  a 
peace  or  else  changing  over  to  the  defensive,  holding  all 
the  territory  previously  gained  until  the  enemy  submits 
to  terms  of  peace. 

Had  Melas  and  Kray,  in  the  campaign  of  1800,  pushed 
the  French  as  they  should  have  done  up  to  the  point  of  cul- 
mination the  result  would  not  have  been  so  disastrous  for 
them. 


106  STRATEGY 

POINT  OF  CULMINATION  TOO  SOON 

Should  this  point  of  culmination  be  arrived  at  too  soon 
— that  is,  before  the  peace  desired  is  secured — a  disastrous 
reverse  follows,  and  this  is  generally  much  more  severe  in 
its  consequence  than  the  effect  of  a  defeat  on  the  deliberate 
defensive. 

KIND  OF  LEADERS  AND  TROOPS  FOR  AN 
OFFENSIVE 

A  sufficient  number  of  skillful  and  experienced  leaders 
must  be  available,  together  with  organized  and  well  dis- 
ciplined troops,  who,  during  an  adequate  period  of  peace 
service,  have  become  accustomed  to  acting  together  and 
will  be  able  to  withstand  the  destructive  elements  that 
make  themselves  felt  during  the  course  of  the  offensive. 

Prussia  in  1806  attempted  the  offensive  with  green 
troops,  antiquated  generals  and  equipment,  divided  counsels 
and  a  meager  exchequer  as  against  an  experienced  leader, 
tried  soldiers  and  boundless  resources.  It  was  almost  a 
foregone  conclusion  that  she  would  be  defeated. 

WHEN  STRATEGICAL  OFFENSIVE  CAN  BE  CARRIED 
OUT  BY  POOR  TROOPS 

The  strategical  offensive  can  only  be  carried  out  by 
green  troops  and  poorly  instructed  armies  when  the  enemy 
is  of  inferior  quality.  The  Swiss  and  Spanish  have  been 
very  successful  on  the  defensive  with  untrained  troops,  but 
for  offensive  war  with  the  same  kind  of  troops  it  is  to 
be  feared  if  any  country  will  be  more  successful  than  were 
the  Boers  in  South  Africa. 

While  it  is  a  fact  that,  in  general,  the  offensive  requires 
better  troops  than  the  defensive,  yet  experience  in  The  World 
War  has  shown  that  certain  colored  troops,  particularly 
French,  while  very  effective  on  the  offensive,  would  not 
stand  the  strain  of  holding  a  defensive  position  under  shell 
fire  and  gas.  This  is  due  to  the  lower  degree  of  mentality 
for,  from  a  psychological  standpoint,  it  requires  a  higher 
state  of  mental  development  to  take  punishment  without 
replying  than  not.  We  are  all  familiar  with  the  expression 
"shooting  up  one's  pluck"  and  we  know  that  action  increases 


THE    OFFENSIVE  107 

the  morale,  for  inaction  leaves  too  much  time  for  "think- 
ing it  over." 

The  Boer  offensive  never  assumed  proportions  that  in 
any  way  greatly  endangered  the  British  nor  their  territory. 
At  the  outset,  the  Boers  could  have  put  80,000  men  into  one 
army  had  the  troops  been  trained  and  would  have  had  only 
about  12,000  British  against  them  at  that  time.  With  this 
army,  they  could  have  overrun  Cape  Colony  and  have  been 
in  a  position  to  prevent  a  further  British  advance  at  least 
until  Great  Britain  had  sent  an  enormous  force  to  South 
Africa. 

TACTICAL 

The  importance  of  good  troops  in  the  tactical  offen- 
sive is  more  pronounced  than  in  the  strategical,  for  with 
the  terrific  destructive  power  of  modern  weapons,  none 
but  the  best  troops  will  advance.  The  Germans  realized 
this  early  in  The  World  War  and  formed  their  Sturm  troops, 
training  them  specially  for  the  attack.  The  idea  advanced 
by  the  Germans  that  modern  fortifications  cannot  stand  up 
against  modern  artillery  has  been  somewhat  exploded.  They 
found  out  to  their  grief  that  they  could  riot  ignore  them. 
Had  the  Germans  had  the  same' kind  of  troops  in  1918  that 
they  had  in  1914,  the  Americans  would  probably  not  have 
won  over  them  as  easily  as  they  did  in  the  Meuse-Argonne. 

The  1st  and  2d  Regular  Divisions  of  the  American  army 
in  France  gave  repeated  exhibitions  of  what  good  troops  can 
do,  as  did  the  regulars  at  first  and  second  Bull  Run;  and, 
in  fact,  at  every  place  where  they  fought  during  the  Civil 
War.  They  always  held  the  post  of  most  honor — that  of 
most  danger. 

By  good  troops  we  mean  those  that  can  be  depended 
upon. 

A  general  rule  for  attack  is  strength  against  weakness, 
front  against  flank,  superior  against  inferior  force,  masses 
against  the  decisive  point.  The  same  principles  character- 
izes both  the  strategical  and  tactical  offensives. 

Good  troops  in  sufficient  numbers  are  of  first  impor- 
tance. As  has  been  shown,  in  this  country  they  are  the  reg- 
ulars. It  is  worthy  of  note  that  most  regular  organizations 
in  time  of  war  are  composed  at  the  outset  of  about  50  per 
cent  new  troops,  but  there  is  always  a  nucleus  of  old  men, 


108  STRATEGY 

familiar  with -regimental  traditions,  who  inspire  an  "esprit 
de  corps"  that  causes  the  recruits  soon  to  act  like  veterans. 

The  Comte  de  Paris,  in  referring  to  the  withdrawal 
of  Sykes'  Regulars  at  Gaines  Mill,  said  they  seemed  to  be 
more  chagrined  over  falling  back  before  volunteers  than 
they  were  over  their  frightful  losses. 

In  the  tactical  offensive  the  common  objective  is  even 
more  evident  than  in  the  strategical.  In  the  latter  the  ob- 
jective is  surmised  from  the  dispositions,  but  in  the  former 
it  is  actually  seen.  This  lessens  the  danger  of  the  indi- 
vidual units  going  astray  in  the  fight. 

The  tactical  offensive  stimulates  mental  activity  among 
the  leaders  and  encourages  them  to  act  on  their  own  initia- 
tive. It  makes  them  more  original,  and  excites  ambition 
and  a  desire  to  achieve  great  exploits.  It  helps  the  troops 
to  forget  danger  and  strengthens  them  with  a  feeling  of 
superiority  that  the  commander  would  not  have  decided 
on  an  attack  were  he  not  convinced  of  the  existence  of  such 
superiority. 

Owing  to  the  constant  wars  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  the 
Emperor,  at  least  in  the  period  of  1800-12,  had  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  every  piece  of  the  engine  of  war  that  he 
handled.  From  1800  to  1805  and  in  1809  he  had  a  good 
idea  of  the  mediocrity  of  his  opponents,  and  the  initial 
combats  confirmed  these  beliefs. 

In  the  long  days  of  peace  of  the  past  years,  it  has  been 
difficult  to  form  a  correct  estimate  of  the  capabilities  of 
the  prospective  commanders  of  armies. 

Consequently,  the  initial  engagements  will  be  cautious, 
and,  just  as  the  Germans  only  found  their  boldness  after 
the  success  of  Weissenburg,  and  the  Japanese  of  1904  after 
the  Yalu,  all  modern  armies  will  increase  in  their  boldness 
after  success  in  the  first  fighting. 

Being  repeatedly  on  the  defensive  causes  the  leader  to 
grow  cautious  to  such  an  extent  that  he  will  not  take  legit- 
imate risks,  while  the  offensive  doubles  the  gambling  pro- 
pensity or  the  willingness  to  take  chances. 

In  Manchuria,  on  the  26th  of  August,  1904,  the  Jap- 
anese Guard  commander  reported  that  he  was  in  a  critical 
situation  and  that  reinforcements  were  essential.  Without 


THE    OFFENSIVE  109 

hesitation  Kuroki  sent  in  the  29th  Kobi  Regiment,  the  only 
available  troops  that  he  had  left. 

"There  is  no  bottling  up  the  Old  Guard  tendency  about 
Kuroki,"  writes  Sir  Ian  Hamilton.  "Never  will  he  merit 
the  reproach  which  Napoleon  leveled  at  Joseph  after  Tala- 
vera,  when  he  told  him  the  plain  truth,  and  said  that  a 
general  who  retreats  before  he  has  used  all  of  his  reserves 
deserves  to  be  shot  forthwith." 

When  Moltke,  on  the  eve  of  Gravelotte,  issued  orders 
for  the  battle,  he  left  the  4th  Corps  between  Marbach  and 
Toul,  believing  himself  to  be  strong  enough  without  it. 
On  his  return  to  Pont-a-Mousson  the  day  after  it  was  over, 
he  remarked  to  Verdy  du  Vernois,  "I  have  learned  a  lesson 
from  this  day's  work,  which  is  that  one  is  never  strong 
enough  on  the  field  of  battle." 

SURPRISE 

Surprise  is  a  better  ally  of  the  tactical  than  of  the 
strategical  offensive,  for  in  the  tactical  field  the  enemy, 
if  surprised,  has  less  time  to  remedy  the  mistakes  he  has 
already  made  through  lack  of  foresight. 

One  of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  tactical  surprise 
is  Stonewall  Jackson's  attack  at  Chancellorsville  on  the  XI 
Corps. 

In  March,  1918,  the  British  were  not  able  to  check  the 
Germans  after  the  tactical  surprise  on  the  5th  Army,  and 
came  very  near  being  cut  off  from  the  French. 

The  Germans  had  set,  about  six  months  before,  to 
train  troops  for  the  attack  and,  under  cover  of  fog,  attacked 
reentrants  and  not  salients  or  strong  points.  They  were  suc- 
cessful, at  least,  until  the  British  were  driven  back  almost 
to  Amiens,  as  a  result  of  superior  training  and  nothing  else. 

The  assailant  may  attack  simultaneously  at  several 
different  points — frontal  attack  with  envelopment,  simul- 
taneous attack  in  front  and  flank,  etc.  These  special  forms 
of  attack  will  be  discussed  in  a  later  chapter. 

VALUE  OF  CONCENTRIC  FIRE 

There  is  no  question  but  that  the  offensive  has  a  decided 
advantage  in  that  it  brings  a  concentric  fire  to  bear.  In 
modern  battles,  extending  over  a  large  front,  the  advantages 


110  STRATEGY 

and  disadvantages  are  quite  evenly  divided  between  the 
attack  and  defense;  nevertheless  the  offensive  has  this  ad- 
vantage, in  that  it  can  assemble  both  artillery  and  ammuni- 
tion at  a  given  point  or  in  a  given  sector  and  can  converge 
its  fire  upon  the  point  of  attack  before  the  enemy  can  shift 
in  sufficient  strength  to  meet  it. 

The  range  of  guns  today  is  so  great  that  it  is  possible 
for  artillery,  not  really  assigned  to  the  attack,  to  co-oper- 
ate in  the  decisive  action  by  means  of  fire. 

SELECTING  THE  POINT  OF  ATTACK 

This  is  the  great  advantage  the  tactical  offensive  has 
over  the  tactical  defensive.  It  can  select  its  point  for  the 
decisive  blow,  if  secrecy  is  maintained  and  feints  carried 
out,  can  concentrate  its  attacking  force  at  the  selected 
point  and  launch  the  attack  before  the  enemy  can  take 
counter-measures. 

It  is  much  easier  in  modern  war  to  conceal  the  tactical 
point  of  attack  than  the  strategical  one  for  the  reason  that 
battles,  being  conducted  on  such  a  large  scale,  involve 
movements  of  large  bodies  which  will  be  detected  by  air- 
craft. The  tactical  point  may  not  be  known,  but  the  area 
in  which  the  attack  is  to  take  place  can  be  pretty  well  fig- 
ured out.  The  battle  of  the  Somme  in  1916  did  not  come  as  a 
surprise  to  the  Germans,  as  they  knew  from  all  the  prepara- 
tions the  sector  in  which  it  was  to  take  place. 

"A  good  general  by  a  coup  d'oeil  will  detect  the  de- 
cisive point."  He  must,  however,  not  allow  the  question 
of  the  decisive  tactical  direction  to  draw  him  away  from 
the  decisive  strategical  direction.  Ludendorff  avers  that 
the  decisive  strategical  direction  should  always  govern  since 
tactically  nothing  is  impossible  nowadays.  We  can  only  quote 
the  two  axioms,  namely :  "The  commander  must  always  en- 
deavor to  gain  the  victory  which,  under  the  given  conditions, 
is  the  most  decisive"  and  that  "the  chance  of  great  results 
also  justifies  great  risks."  McClellan,  at  Antietam,  at- 
tacked the  Confederate  left  because  it  offered  greater  tac- 
tical advantages,  whereas,  had  he  attacked  the  right,  where 
the  tactical  situation  was  not  so  good,  he  would,  if  he  had 
been  successful,  have  cut  off  Lee's  retreat  and  might  have 


THE    OFFENSIVE  111 

ended  the  war.  "Sure  things"  seldom  produce  great  results 
in  war.  At  Fredericksburg,  the  decisive  direction  was 
against  the  Confederate  right,  yet  the  Federal  main  at- 
tack was  against  the  left. 

DECISIVE,  IF  SUCCESSFUL  AT  ONE  POINT 

A  victory  generally  is  assured  when  a  decisive  advan- 
tage is  obtained  at  some  one  point. 

The  truth  of  this  is  even  more  apparent  than  in  the 
strategical  offensive.  The  tactical  unit  of  the  defenders 
forms  an  organized  whole,  which  is  even  more  distinct  than 
that  formed  by  the  strategical. 

The  stability  of  the  whole  organization  is  somewhat 
disturbed  if  a  certain  portion  of  it  is  destroyed  or  gets  out 
of  hand. 

The  defeat  of  a  wing  by  the  enemy,  or  the  forcing  of 
a  flank,  is  liable  to  decide  the  whole  battle. 

Missionary  Ridge  is  a  good  illustration.  When  Sheri- 
dan and  Wood  pierced  the  center,  the  whole  Confederate 
line  collapsed. 

The  defenders  will  probably  give  way  when  a  mere 
quarter  of  their  line  is  defeated,  but  the  attackers,  who 
have  been  driven  back  along  three-quarters  of  their  line, 
will  still  be  triumphant  if  they  are  victorious  in  the  re- 
maining quarter.  This  also  is  illustrated  by  Missionary 
Ridge  where  Sherman  on  the  left  was  stopped,  Hooker  on 
the  right  was  delayed,  yet  Sheridan  and  Wood  in  the  center 
were  successful. 

LIAO  YANG 

Oyama's  operation  orders  issued  on  the  29th  of  Au- 
gust for  the  attack  on  the  Russian  1st,  3d  and  10th  Siberian 
Corps,  south  of  Liao  Yang,  were  for  a  frontal  attack  by  the 
covering  the  flanks. 

The  enemy  was  in  position  between  Ma-ya-tun  and 
three  armies,  with  two  divisions  in  reserve  and  the  cavalry 
Hsia-pu.  By  the  time  the  movements  ordered  for  the  30th 
were  well  started,  the  Russians  were  in  position  facing  the 
assailant. 


112  STRATEGY 

The  array  of  Japanese  was  by  no  means  of  equal  den- 
sity. Oyama  figured  that  if  he  could  get  possession  of  the 
height  99,  between  the  railroad  and  the  Mandarin  road,  he 
could  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Russians  or  else  cause  them 
to  retire  so  quickly  to  reach  their  bridges  that  great  confu- 
sion and  loss  would  be  entailed.  So  he  massed  the  4th,  6th, 
3d  and  5th  Divisions,  supported  by  the  13th,  14th  and  15th 
Field  Artillery  Regiments  and  the  4th  Foot  Artillery,  with 
a  battery  of  4.2  and  a  battery  of  6-inch  guns  against  Ma- 
yeh-tun  on  a  front  of  3  to  11  men  to  the  yard.  To 
the  east  and  against  the  balance  of  the  Russian  position  on 
a  front  of  11  miles,  he  massed  the  10th,  the  Guard,  the  2d 
and  12th  Divisions.  The  troops  on  the  right  were  merely 
to  grip  the  Russians,  while  the  troops  in  front  of  99  carried 
the  position. 

Oyama  was  carrying  out  the  old  principle  of  the  tac- 
tical offensive.  To  win  a  battle  does  not  necessarily  mean 
to  win  at  every  point.  In  almost  every  case — perhaps  in 
every  case — there  is  one  part  of  the  field  of  battle,  the 
conquest  of  which  brings  about  the  collapse  of  the  whole  line. 
So  it  developed  in  this  case  that  the  capture  of  hill  99  forced 
the  Russians  to  evacuate  their  entire  line. 

ST.  PRIVAT 

The  Germans  were  driven  back  along  three-fourths  of 
their  line,  but  when  the  Saxons  under  Pape  captured  Ron- 
court  and  the  Guards  carried  St.  Privat,  the  whole  French 
defense  of  the  west  front  withdrew.  However,  it  took  two 
attacks  to  carry  St.  Privat,  and  the  second  was  only  suc- 
cessful after  the  fall  of  Roncourt  and  the  Germans  had 
concentrated  26  batteries  and  about  100,000  men  against 
the  town,  which  was  defended  by  about  20,000  French 
troops  under  Canrobert. 

As  a  result  of  observations  in  The  World  War,  we  have 
a  new  expression  to  add  to  the  vocabulary  of  military  art. 
It  is  "action  of  dislocation."  The  line  which  allows  itself 
to  be  broken  in  modern  war  is  generally  defeated.  We  will 
take  up  the  "action  of  dislocation"  later  under  the  name  of 
"tactical  penetration."  The  first  battle  of  the  Marne  be- 
longs to  this  class.  The  action  between  Foch's  7th  French 
Army  and  the  10th  German  Corps,  the  Prussian  Guards  and 


THE    OFFENSIVE  113 

Saxons,  is  illustrative  of  this  class.  Being  unable  to  drive 
back  the  French  left  anchored  at  Mondemont,  the  Germans 
tried  the  right  through  and  around  to  the  east  of  the  St. 
Gond  Marshes.  In  this  they  were  successful  and  were  rush- 
ing madly  toward  Sezanne  and  Pleurs.  Foch,  realizing 
the  natural  strength  of  his  left,  withdrew  the  42d  Division, 
sending  it  across  the  rear  toward  the  east.  The  eastern 
half  of  the  Prussian  Guard,  in  the  impetuosity  of  its  at- 
tack and  advance,  had  left  the  western  portion  of  the  Guard 
north  of  the  swamps.  In  order  to  connect  up,  the  line 
became  attenuated.  Into  this  breach  Foch  threw  the  42d 
Division,  while  all  other  units  attacked  vigorously,  break- 
ing the  German  line  and  making  a  gap  from  the  eastern 
end  of  the  St.  Gond  Marshes  to  La  Fere  Champenoise. 
The  whole  German  line  now  collapsed,  due  to  the  blunder- 
ing of  its  peerless  staff. 

WEAK  POINTS  OF  THE  TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE 
FATIGUE 

The  offensive  entails  the  greatest  amount  of  prelim- 
inary marching  which  fatigues  the  men  and  causes  strag- 
gling. It  is  amazing  how  an  organization  diminishes  in 
strength  in  the  modern  attack. 

INTERRUPTION  OF  FIRE 

The  fact  that  the  assailant  is  moving  forward  inter- 
rupts to  a  certain  extent  his  fire,  particularly  that  of  small 
arms.  After  the  line  has  advanced  to  a  certain  distance  from 
the  enemy's  position,  the  artillery  ranges  must  be  increased. 

The  defender's  artillery  has  the  great  advantage  in  being 
able  to  register  on  points  past  which  the  assailant  must 
pass  in  his  attack.  At  those  points  the  assailant  encounters 
his  heaviest  losses. 

EXPOSURE 

The  fact  that  during  the  forward  movement  the  attack- 
ers must,  to  a  certain  extent,  expose  themselves  and  dis- 
pense with  the  protective  cover  of  the  terrain,  makes  their 


NOTE : — Foch's  Tth  Army  was  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  9th,  in  the  hope  that 
the  Germans  would  be  deceived  and  would  worry  concerning  the  location  of  the  Tth 
and  8th  Armies. 


114  STRATEGY 

losses  out  of  all  proportion  to  those  of  the  defender.  Of 
course,  once  the  position  is  carried,  and  the  defend- 
ers start  their  retreat,  they  are  made  to  feel  the  disadvan- 
tage thereof  with  double  force,  because  the  movement  is 
to  the  rear. 

It  is  said  that  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  Pickett's 
division  suffered  greater  losses  in  its  withdrawal  than  in  its 
advance. 

In  the  recent  war,  the  maximum  losses  were  not  suf- 
fered during  the  attack  itself,  but  when  the  objective  was 
reached  and  consolidation  of  the  position  began.  Then  the 
enemy,  by  use  of  gas  and  shelling,  could  make  the  line 
almost  untenable,  since  he  knew  ranges  exactly  and  his 
artillery  fire  was  like  "driving  tacks,"  to  use  a  simile. 

DARKNESS 

The  question  of  daylight  figures  very  conspicuously 
in  the  modern  battle.  The  intervention  of  darkness  has 
saved  many  a  day  and  reputation. 

The  fall  of  night  in  an  undecided  battle  generally  means 
a  victory  for  the  defenders  and  a  defeat  for  the  attackers 
unless  they  have  made  due  preparation  for  the  next  day. 

Had  the  battle  of  Gravelotte-Sainte  Marie  aux  Chenes- 
St.  Privat  not  been  fought  at  the  time  of  day  it  was  fought, 
but  during  a  winter  month,  instead  of  August,  1870,  in  all 
probability  it  would  have  resulted  favorably  for  the  French. 
Sainte  Marie  aux  Chenes  was  not  captured  until  2 :30  PM, 
the  first  attack  on  St.  Privat  was  not  made  until  5 :30PM  and 
the  second  until  8:30  PM.  Had  this  second  and  decisive 
attack  been  postponed  until  the  following  day,  Bazaine 
could  have  shifted  the  Guard  Corps  from  his  left  to 
his  right  to  meet  and  check  it.  Of  course  the  German? 
still  had  the  X  Corps  to  reinforce  their  line,  but  it  is 
doubtful  whether  even  this  addition  would  have  equalized 
the  French  Guard. 

The  coming  of  night  unquestionably  saved  Smith-Dor- 
rien's  II  Corps  at  Le  Cateau. 


THE  OFFENSIVE  115 

POSSIBILITIES  OF  MAKING  MISTAKES  IN  INITIAL 
MOVEMENT  IN  THE  TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE 

The  fact  that  the  assailant  has  to  begin  tactical  man- 
euvers sooner  than  the  defender  and  is  consequently  more 
liable  to  make  mistakes  has  been  advanced  as  a  disadvantage 
of  the  offensive.  This  is,  however,  more  than  counter-balanced 
by  the  fact  that  the  assailant  can  profit  by  the  defender's 
mistakes  better  than  the  defender  can  by  the  assailant's. 
At  Nanshan  Hill  the  Japanese  launched  a  general  frontal 
attack  and  were  checked,  but  discovering  the  weakness  of 
the  Russian  position  toward  Kinchow  Bay,  they  took  ad- 
vantage of  it,  sending  troops  to  that  point,  and  eventually 
turning  the  Russians  out  of  their  position. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  demands  made  on 
the  attacking  troops  do  not  constitute  a  weakness,  but 
they  do  increase  the  difficulty  of  the  task  to  a  considerable 
degree.  Such  troops  must  possess  mobility  and  must  be 
very  resistant  to  the  moral  effect  of  danger.  All  this  re- 
quires a  very  thorough  and  sufficiently  extended  prepara- 
tion in  time  of  peace.  With  untrained  troops,  even  if  they 
are  superior  in  numbers,  the  tactical  is  still  less  practicable 
than  the  strategical  offensive. 

Clausewitz  says  that  an  army  should  be  possessed  of 
a  true  military  spirit  to  engage  in  offensive  war. 

He  defines  this  military  spirit  as  follows :  "An  army 
which  preserves  its  usual  formations  under  the  heaviest 
fire,  which  is  never  shaken  by  imaginary  fears,  and,  in  the 
face  of  real  danger,  disputes  the  ground  inch  by  inch,  which, 
proud  in  its  feeling  of  its  victories,  never  loses  its  sense 
of  obedience,  its  respect  for  and  confidence  in  its  leaders, 
even  in  the  depressing  effect  of  defeat;  an  army  with  all 
its  physical  powers  inured  to  privations  and  fatigue  by  exer- 
cise, like  the  muscles  of  an  athlete;  an  army  which  looks 
upon  all  its  toils  as  the  means  to  victory,  not  a  curse  which 
hovers  over  its  standards,  and  which  is  always  reminded 
of  its  duties  and  virtues  by  the  short  catechism  of  one  idea, 
namely,  the  honor  of  its  arms — such  an  army  is  imbued 
with  the  true  military  spirit."  We  must  shut  our  eyes  to 
all  historical  proof,  if  we  do  not  see  that  the  success  of 
Alexander  was  due  to  his  Macedonian  Phalanx,  Csesar  to 


116  STRATEGY 

his  Legions,  Alexander  Farnese  to  his  Spanish  infantry, 
Gustavus  Adolphus  and  Charles  XII  to  their  Swedish  gren- 
adiers, Frederick  to  his  Prussian  infantry,  and  Napoleon  to 
the  army  he  had  built  up.  All  great  leaders,  but  without 
their  seasoned  troops  they  could  not  have  lasted  long. 

The  nearest  approach  to  the  true  military  spirit  we 
have  in  the  United  States  is  in  our  regular  troops.  A 
graphical  chart  showing  the  endurance  of  our  troops  in 
The  World  War  will  clearly  demonstrate  the  regular  divi- 
sions as  the  winners.  Why?  Tradition,  and  the  feeling 
that  "I  am  a  regular." 

All  these  conditions  must  be  carefully  weighed  before 
the  offensive  is  decided  upon.  Unless  we  have  at  least  the 
greater  part  of  them  on  our  side,  success  will  hardly  be 
attained. 

"We  should  also  note  that  the  successful  delivery  of 
an  attack  requires  the  leaders  to  be  much  more  severe  to 
the  troops  than  is  necessary  in  the  defense;  for  fighting  on 
the  defensive  appears  to  the  troops  as  an  essential  mili- 
tary duty  prompted  by  a  feeling  of  the  necessity  for  self- 
preservation.  But  the  attack  requires  higher  qualities 
that  none  but  the  strong  can  exact.  The  decision  to  at- 
tack entails  responsibility  for  the  losses  caused  thereby, 
which  are  generally  considerable.  Most  men  avoid  such 
responsibility." 

Imagine  the  responsibility  on  the  shoulders  of  General 
Grant  in  carrying  out  the  Overland  campaign  of  1864  which 
entailed  such  terrific  losses.  Other  plans  might  have  been 
more  brilliant  and  less  costly  yet  more  hazardous,  but  with 
the  administration  feeling  as  it  did,  nothing  but  a  sure 
method  was  wise,  no  matter  how  costly.  It  had  to  be  a  cam- 
paign of  attrition,  and  Grant  knew  he  could  outlast  Lee, 
and  thereby  won. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

"he  Defensive 


STRATEGIC 

WE  SHOULD  never  consider  the  defensive  as  a  mere 
passive  state  in  which  the  army  quietly  awaits  in 
position  until  the  enemy  arrives  and  attacks. 

"The  importance  of  the  operative  element  in  the  strate- 
gic defensive  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  a  pure  defense, 
as  in  tactics,  is  not  possible  in  strategy.  A  strategic  front 
is  seldom  a  continuous  tactical  line  of  defense,  especially 
on  account  of  large  areas  necessarily  required  for  the  con- 
centration of  the  masses  involved  in  modern  war." 

One  will  seldom  have  the  situation  of  every  section  of 
the  line  on  the  passive  defense,  but  one  will  have  drives  at 
certain  points  and  counter-attacks  at  others,  and  yet,  gen- 
erally speaking,  one's  forces  will  be  on  the  strategic  defen- 
sive. 

We,  therefore,  on  the  strategic  defensive,  have  more 
use  for  cavalry  and  aircraft,  for  they  must  continually  be 
striving  to  tear  away  the  veil  back  of  which  the  assailant 
moves.  If  the  Russian  cavalry,  which  was  far  superior  to 
that  of  the  Japanese,  had  reported  the  approach  of  the 
Port  Arthur  army  under  Nogi  at  Mukden  but  a  very  little 
earlier  than  it  actually  did,  Kuropatkin  might  have  been 
able  to  move  troops  to  his  right  to  meet  it.  The  battle  of 
Mukden  was  lost  due  to  poor  reconnaissance,  as  reserves 
could  have  been  shifted  with  comparative  ease. 

The  strategical  defensive,  then,  should  not  exclude 
movements  entirely,  and  by  no  means  should  confine  itself 
to  an  absolute  standstill. 

FOUR  DIFFERENT  METHODS  OF  DEFENSE 

There  are  four  different  methods  of  carrying  out  the 
strategical  defensive : 

117 


118  STRATEGY 

1.  The  position  defensive. 

Going  out  to  meet  the  enemy,  wherever  he  may  come,  with 
a  portion  of  the  force,  thus  holding  him  until  the  remaining 
troops  have  concentrated  in  that  direction  and  are  able  to 
co-operate. 

2.  The  retreating  defensive. 

Retiring  before  the  enemy  into  the  interior  of  the  country 
so  as  to  gain  time,  during  which  those  factors  that  con- 
stantly tend  to  weaken  the  offensive  have  had  time  to  operate. 

In  this  case,  the  defender  merely  remains  in  position, 
forcing  the  assailant  to  deploy,  thereby  tiring  out  his  troops; 
but  withdrawing  in  time  to  escape  from  becoming  too  seriously 
involved,  only  to  occupy  another  position  further  back. 

3.  The  step  by  step  defensive. 

Taking  up  a  position  and  allowing  the  enemy  to  butt  his 
head  against  strong  lines,  thereby  suffering  losses,  the  de- 
fender then  withdrawing  in  time  to  occupy  another  position 
and  repeat  the  performance. 

4.  The  sortie  defensive. 

Waiting  quietly  during  the  preliminary  operations  of  the 
assailant  to  discover  his  mistakes  or  weak  points,  and  then 
making  use  of  them  to  attack  him  with  concentrated  forces. 
This  is  really  the  ideal  defensive. 

THE  POSITION  DEFENSIVE 

In  military  history  we  find  that  this  kind  of  strat- 
egy is  most  frequently  assumed  by  the  weaker  side.  It  is  the 
natural  result  of  being  conscious  of  an  unfavorable  situation 
and  of  the  knowledge  that  enough  troops  are  not  available 
for  the  more  strenuous  attack.  This  is  -the  method  of  de- 
fense that  the  British  should  have  adopted  in  South  Africa 
until  reinforcements  arrived.  The  Russians  attempted  to 
adopt  this  form  of  defensive  in  Manchuria — that  is,  merely 
checking  and  holding  up  the  Japanese  advance,  while  wait- 
ing reinforcements  from  Russia.  They  were  unable  to  stop 
the  Japanese,  so  fell  back  before  them  on  Liao  Yang,  to 
wait  the  final  decision  under  more  favorable  conditions. 

THE  RETREATING  DEFENSIVE 

In  this  case  the  army  retires  into  the  interior  of  its 
country  before  an  assailant,  so  as  to  give  the  natural  condi- 
tions, which  have  a  weakening  influence,  sufficient  time  to 
work  before  the  decisive  blow  is  struck.  By  this  means 


THE  DEFENSIVE  119 

the  defender  may  often  reinforce  his  own  army  by  approach- 
ing his  source  of  supply  and  uniting  with  troops  that  were 
not  available  in  the  beginning,  and  are  not  in  the  first  line. 
It  is  evident  that  such  a  procedure  is  only  advisable  when 
enough  distance  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  defender  to  fur- 
nish the  necessary  amount  of  time  for  the  action  of  the 
disrupting  influences  to  affect  the  attacker.  It  is  also  evi- 
dent that  an  additional  retrograde  movement  should  not 
cause  the  abandonment  of  important  territory  that  should 
have  been  guarded,  and  the  loss  of  which  might  play  a 
decisive  part  in  the  result  of  the  campaign. 

RETREATING  AND  STEP  BY  STEP  DEFENSIVE 
The  Atlanta  campaign  affords  a  good  illustration  of 

the  retreating  step  by  step  defensive. 

Johnston's  campaign  in  Georgia  can  be  divided  into 

two  distinct  phases: 

First. — A  "retreating  defensive." 
Second. — A  "step  by  step  defensive." 

The  first  phase  began  at  Rocky  Ridge,  May  7,  1864, 
and  terminated  with  the  occupation  by  the  Confederates  of 
the  Dallas  line,  May  23d. 

During  18  days,  the  Confederate  army,  while  fighting 
the  actions  of  Buzzard's  Roost,  Dug  Gap,  Resaca,  Adairs- 
ville  and  Cassville  without  any  tactical  advantage,  had 
retreated  72  miles. 

At  the  end  of  this  phase,  the  enemy  was  as  vigorous, 
as  aggressive,  and  apparently  as  strong  as  at  the  begin- 
ning, and  a  new  policy  had  to  be  adopted. 

The  second  phase  began  with  the  battle  of  New  Hope 
Church,  May  25,  1864,  and  terminated  with  the  Confederate 
retreat  into  the  lines  of  Atlanta,  July  20,  1864,  a  period  of 
45  days,  in  which  the  Confederate  army  had  retreated  only 
20  miles. 

During  this  phase  the  battles  of  New  Hope  Church, 
Pickett's  Mills,  Dallas,  Gulp's  Farm,  Kenesaw  Mountain 
and  Smyrna  were  fought,  and  the  ground  gained  by  Sher- 
man's army  was  purchased  at  heavy  losses  and  almost  con- 
tinuous fighting. 


120  STRATEGY 

But  throughout  the  campaign,  General  Johnston  ad- 
hered to  the  passive  defensive,  which  has  the  fundamental 
defect  that  all  that  is  possible  is  to  avoid  defeat;  victory 
is  unattainable. 

The  fundamental  idea  that  guides  the  strategical 
defensive  is  to  remedy  an  unfavorable  situation  by  husband- 
ing our  forces  whilst  those  of  the  enemy  are  more  rapidly 
consumed  in  the  attack.  A  condition  on  which  success  de- 
pends is  that  the  increase  of  strength  expected  during  the 
strategical  defense,  or  the  decrease  on  the  enemy's  side,  shall 
exceed  the  material  and  moral  losses  that  will  invariably 
be  associated  with  a  retreating,  waiting  or  procrastinating 
policy. 

If  at  the  end  of  the  defensive  operation,  we  are  no 
stronger  in  comparison  with  the  enemy  than  at  the  begin- 
ning, nothing  has  been  gained ;  and  it  would  have  been  bet- 
ter to  have  risked  the  tactical  decision  at  the  very  first, 
for  loss  of  confidence  will  always  have  sprung  up  in  the 
meantime  among  the  troops. 

Shirking  a  decision  and  courting  delay  merely  for  fear 
of  an  unfavorable  decision  cannot  be  called  operating,  for 
there  is  an  absence  of  that  purpose  which  must  always  enter 
into  the  operations  of  war.  Such  a  line  of  action  can  only 
prove  useful  when  plenty  of  time  and  space  are  available 
for  seeking  in  the  course  of  events  advantages  and  re- 
sources that  have  been  thought  of  before. 

Judged  according  to  these  principles,  Johnston's  cam- 
paign was  an  utter  failure.  Comparing  the  opposing  armies 
we  find  that  at  Dalton,  Johnston  had  52,992  men. 

Before  Resaca,  he  was  joined  by  two  divisions  from 
Polk,  one  Georgia  brigade  and  conscripts,  amounting  to 
18,245.  Therefore  he  had  at  Resaca  a  total  of  71,237. 

Sherman  began  the  campaign  with  98,787,  and  the  ratio 
at  Resaca  was  about  72  to  97,  or  the  Confederate  num- 
erical strength  73  per  cent  of  the  Federals.  Subsequent 
tc  Resaca,  Johnston  received : 

One  division  (French's)  ;  one  brigade  (Quarles') ;  one  divi- 
sion, cavalry  (Jackson's)  ;  G.  W.  Smith's  Georgia  militia  and  other 
small  factions  amounting  to  15,240,  making  a  total  to  be  accounted 
for  since  the  beginning  of  the  campaign 86.477 


THE  DEFENSIVE  121 

On  July  10th,  seven  days  before  his  relief,  Johnson  reported 

as  effective 50,932 

The  loss  during  the  campaign  was   35,545 

July  1st,  Sherman's  effective  total  was  106,070,  a  gain  since 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign  of 7,283 

In  other  words,  Sherman's  losses  from  all  causes  dur- 
ing the  campaign  had  been  more  than  offset  by  reinforce- 
ments, which  amounted  to  about  50,000.  At  the  end  of  the 
operations,  therefore,  the  ratio  between  the  two  armies  was 
51  to  106,  and  the  Confederate  army  was  only  48  per  cent 
of  the  Federal  army,  as  against  73  per  cent  at  the  be- 
ginning. Nothing  had  been  gained  by  the  defensive  policy 
adopted  and  much  had  been  lost.  Johnston  should  have 
risked  the  decisive  action  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign, 
for  he  was  well  aware  that  the  Confederacy  had  strained 
every  resource  to  afford  him  the  strength  he  had,  and  could 
give  nothing  more.  He  also  knew  that  the  resources  of  his 
opponent  were  practically  unlimited.  It  was  clearly  a 
case  where  the  decision  was  shirked  and  delay  courted, 
mainly  through  fear  of  an  unfavorable  result;  hence  it 
is  excluded  from  the  definition  of  systematic  warfare. 

The  retreating  defensive  of  Napoleon  in  1814  was  a 
most  active  one.  It  consisted  of  the  following: 

1.  Abandonment  to  the  enemy  of  the  frontier  zones  and  the 
line  of  defense  found  there. 

2.  Slow  and  concentric   retreat  of  the  corps  of  observation 
posted  upon  the  frontier. 

3.  Assemblage    of   the   forces    upon   a    central   position   be- 
tween the  frontier  and  the  capital. 

4.  Offensive  maneuvers  upon  an  interior  line  of  operations 
against  any  of  the  enemy's  corps  which  could  be  assailed  to  ad- 
vantage. 

5.  Continual  and  energetic  attacks  upon  the  weakest  points 
presented  by  the  adversary. 

6.  Rousing  the   inhabitants   of   the   country   in   the   enemy's 
rear. 

7.  Attempts  to  cut  communications. 

It  was  essentially  an  active  defense,  and  would  prob- 
ably have  succeeded  had  it  not  been  for  the  great  dispro- 
portion between  the  forces  and  the  premature  surrender 
of  Paris. 

The  retreating  and  step  by  step  defensives  on  the 
part  of  the  British  and  French  in  1914,  culminating  in  the 
battle  of  the  Marne,  is  an  ideal  illustration.  Valuable  ter- 
ritory, however,  was  lost;  yet  the  allies  continued  their 


122  STRATEGY 

retreat  until  strong  enough  to  counter-attack,  when- they  did 
so  with  the  well  known  success.  It  almost  looked  as  if  the 
Germans  had  been  lured  on. 

THE  SORTIE  DEFENSIVE 

This  was  Albert  Sidney  Johnston's  plan  in  the  spring 
campaign  of  1862,  but  he  failed  to  keep  his  troops  together 
in  sufficient  force  to  destroy  the  enemy  should  the  latter 
make  the  needed  blunder.  This  method  for  carrying  on  the 
strategical  defensive  is  generally  considered  the  most  effec- 
tive— in  fact,  the  ideal  one.  But  it  makes  very  high  de- 
mands on  the  quickness  and  decision  of  the  general. 

RATISBON 

At  Ratisbon,  Marshal  Davoust  defended  himself  pas- 
sively awaiting  Austrian  blunders,  while  Napoleon  with 
the  right  wing  attacked  the  5th  and  6th  Austrian  Corps, 
and  completely  defeated  them. 

The  battles  of  Tannenberg  and  the  Masurian  Lakes 
are  of  the  nature  of  sortie  defensives  from  von  Hinden- 
burg's  viewpoint. 

In  carrying  out  the  sortie  defensive,  the  defensive  fea- 
ture is  not  the  real  principle  of  the  operation.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  becomes  subordinate  to  the  offensive  and  merely 
its  auxiliary. 

It  is  here  more  a  question  of  an  attack  waiting  for 
the  auspicious  moment  than  of  defense,  and  we  have  no  un- 
qualified right  to  count  an  operation  of  this  kind  as  de- 
fensive. 

The  fundamental  object  of  every  strategic  defensive 
is  to  neutralize  the  enemy's  primary  superiority  by  sparing 
use  of  our  own  forces,  while  those  of  our  opponents  are 
rapidly  consumed  in  attacking. 

The  defensive  movement  is  favored  by  the  fact  that  the 
question  of  marching,  which  has  in  itself  an  injurious  effect, 
plays  a  less  important  part  than  in  the  offensive.  It  is  much 
safer,  therefore,  with  inferior  troops,  to  venture  upon  the 
strategical  defensive  than  upon  the  strategical  offensive. 


THE  DEFENSIVE  123 

NEGATIVE  PURPOSES 

As  the  defensive  aims  to  accomplish  negative  pur- 
poses— and  these  are  more  easily  attained  than  the  posi- 
tive purposes  for  which  the  offensive  strives — there  is  less 
chance  of  the  defender  making  mistakes  or  bringing  about 
unfavorable  incidents.  General  Lee,  in  the  fall  of  1862,  was 
on  the  defensive  and  inactive,  yet  his  inactivity  was  more 
than  offset  by  the  maneuvers  of  the  ill-starred  pontons 
that  Burnside  tried  to  move  down  from  Berlin,  on  the 
Potomac,  to  Fredericksburg,  with  which  to  effect  a  crossing 
of  the  Rappahannock  at  that  point.  Lee  was  able,  almost 
at  leisure,  to  take  up  a  position  at  Marye's  Heights. 

ERRORS 

If  the  assailant  commits  errors  in  his  measures  and 
his  undertakings  are  wrecked  thereby,  the  defender  may 
consider  himself  victorious  without  much  effort.  Long- 
street's  delays  and  the  poorly  conducted  attacks  by  Mc- 
Laws  before  Knoxville,  left  the  victory  in  Burnside's  hands 
without  so  much  show  of  brilliancy  on  the  latter's  part. 
The  assailant  often  accelerates  the  destruction  of  his  own 
forces,  which  is  the  aim  of  the  defender.  The  poor 
tactics  of  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg  hastened  the  destruc- 
tion of  his  own  troops  without  Lee  having  to  make  an  im- 
portant move. 

DELAYS 

Every  omission  and  delay  on  the  part  of  the  assailant 
inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  defender.  The  advantage  may 
merely  be  on  the  side  of  the  defender,  because  he  has  not 
been  defeated  by  a  certain  time  and  the  postponement 
of  defeat  has  given  time  for  some  powerful  ally  to 
intervene.  Such  was  the  situation  on  the  side  of  the  Turks 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  War.  The  Confederate 
armies  in  the  Civil  War  and  the  Boer  army  in  South  Africa 
prolonged  their  struggle  after  they  had  lost  all  chance  of 
winning  on  the  battlefield,  because  they  expected  interven- 
tion. 

In  the  recent  war,  every  delay  was  much  more  to  the 
benefit  of  the  allies  than  to  the  Germans,  for  it  meant 
better  armies,  more  supplies,  and  intervention  of  allies. 


124  STRATEGY 

TIME 

Time,  as  a  rule,  is  the  defender's  friend;  the  assail- 
ant, even,  if  not  too  weak,  is  often  crippled,  because  final 
success  is  delayed  too  long. 

There  is  no  case  where  time  rewarded  the  defender  so 
greatly  with  benefits  as  in  the  withdrawal  of  the  allies  to 
the  Torres  Vedras  lines  around  Lisbon.  Massena  could  not 
remain  in  Portugal  on  account  of  lack  of  supplies,  and  the 
Portuguese,  gradually  falling  back,  had  been  reinforced  by 
their  allies,  the  British,  and  finally  drove  Massena  out  of 
the  Iberian  Peninsula. 

The  defender's  object  is  to  hold  out,  while  the  attacker's 
object  is  to  win.  The  former  is  the  easier. 

THEATER  OF  WAR 

The  defender  generally  selects  his  own  theater  of  war 
— that  is,  he  determines  that  it  shall  be  his  own  country, 
with  which  he  is  familiar,  or  that  of  an  ally  with  which  he 
is  more  or  less  familiar.  In  the  recent  war,  while  Germany 
decided  her  own  line  of  operations,  it  was  situated  in  a 
country  with  which  the  allies,  in  their  respective  sectors, 
were  familiar. 

During  the  Civil  War,  in  the  campaign  in  the  Southern 
States,  the  Confederates  were  at  a  decided  advantage  in  that 
they  knew  every  inch  of  the  ground.  It  is  said,  meta- 
phorically speaking,  that  General  Lee  had  an  expert  guide 
continually  at  his  bridle  rein.  One  has  but  to  travel  over 
the  strip  of  territory  called  the  Wilderness  of  Virginia,  with- 
out a  guide,  to  find  out  the  great  advantage  the  Confed- 
erates had. 

The  defender  knows  more  nearly  the  effect  of  the  ele- 
ments on  roads,  camps,  etc. 

General  Lee  would  have  known  better  than  to  have 
tried  to  make  the  march  attempted  by  Burnside,  called  the 
"mud  march,"  at  the  time  of  the  year  that  the  experiment 
was  made. 

While  it  is  a  supposition  that  the  defender  knows  the 
theater  of  war  better  than  the  assailant,  it  is  not  an  in- 
fallible one,  for  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  it  is  said 


THE  DEFENSIVE  125 

that  the  Germans  were  more  familiar  with  the  military  and 
natural  features  of  France  than  the  French  were.  At  all 
events  the  Germans  had  better  maps. 

RAILROADS 

In  the  question  of  railroads,  the  defender  has  quite  an 
advantage,  but  not  so  much  as  in  the  past.  During  the 
Boer  War,  the  British  were  greatly  delayed  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  railroads,  and  so  were  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  recent  war,  with  the  modern 
devices  that  the  Germans  had,  the  delay  attendant  upon 
railroad  interruption  was  greatly  reduced  insofar  as  they 
were  concerned.  It  is  a  known  fact  that  the  Russian  gauge 
was  five  feet  while  the  German  gauge  was  standard,  namely, 
four  feet,  eight  inches.  The  Germans  had  a  device  where- 
by they  could  quickly  tear  up  the  tracks  and  adjust  the 
rails  to  their  own  gauge.  .Also,  the  railway  cars  that  they 
held  in  storage  for  use  in  event  of  war  on  the  east  front 
had  adjustable  trucks  so  that  they  could  be  made  to  fit  a 
four-foot,  eight-inch  or  a  five-foot  gauge.  It  is  said  that 
the  Japanese,  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  figuring  on  cap- 
turing sufficient  rolling  stock  from  the  Russians  to  keep 
open  the  Port  Arthur  Railroad,  had  made  no  provision 
against  the  failure.  Upon  seizing  the  road,  the  Japanese 
found  that  the  Russians  had  run  all  the  engines  north.  The 
track  being  a  different  gauge  from  the  Japanese  rolling 
stock,  its  conversion  before  use  was  necessary. 

NATURAL  AND  ARTIFICIAL  FEATURES 

The  defender  is  able  to  make  use  of  the  natural  and 
artificial  sources  of  strength  offered  by  the  terrain,  such  as 
streams,  forests,  swamps,  or  desert,  which  the  enemy  in 
order  to  make  headway  must  overcome;  as  well  as  for- 
tifications and  intrenchments  that  detain  the  enemy  or 
compel  a  division  of  his  forces. 

The  Masurian  Lakes  battle  was  an  exception  as  Hinden- 
burg  made  greater  use  of  the  obstacles  than  Rennenkampf . 

Napoleon,  in  his  campaign  of  Italy  in  1797,  was  on 
the  strategical  and  tactical  defensive,  and  used  Lake  Garda 
to  assist  him  in  defeating  the  Austrians  who,  advancing 
from  two  directions,  were  separated  by  it. 


126  STRATEGY 

Jackson  likewise  utilized  the  south  fork  of  the  Shen- 
andoah  at  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic. 

INHABITANTS  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE 
DEPARTMENTS 

Generally,  the  defender  is  in  his  own  country  and  the 
attacker  in  a  foreign  country,  with  the  result  that  the  de- 
fender has  the  support,  probably,  of  the  inhabitants  and  of 
the  administrative  departments  in  getting  information, 
supplies  and  in  harassing  the  lines  of  communication  of  the 
assailant. 

The  defender,  in  addition,  has  at  his  disposal  the  admin- 
istrative and  police  departments  of  the  local  government 
of  the  theater  of  war  to  assist  him  in  the  maintenance  and 
shelter  of  his  troops,  the  replenishment  of  his  losses,  and  the 
arranging  of  transportation  of  large  forces. 

'.-' 

SUPPORT  OF  ENTIRE  PEOPLE 

"In  a  larger  sense,  the  defender  has  the  support  of  the 
whole  nation  generally,  while  the  assailant  keeps  increas- 
ing his  distance  from  that  help. 

"By  this  we  do  not  mean  a  levee  en  masse  merely,  but 
the  assistance  of  every  kind  that  a  patriotic  people  is  able  to 
render  to  the  defense  of  their  country.  These  inhabitants 
will  impede,  in  every  way  they  can,  movements,  shelter  and 
subsistence  of  the  enemy." 

The  danger  to  their  fatherland  and  their  own  fireside 
spur  the  defenders  on  to  the  renewed  efforts  and  can  de- 
velop passions  that  increase  the  power  of  the  defense  to 
an  extent  otherwise  undreamed  of.  This  occurred  in  Spain 
from  1808  to  1812,  in  Germany  in  1813,  and  in  France  after 
the  defeat  of  Sedan. 

In  the  recent  war,  had  Germany  been  able  to  reconcile 
the  inhabitants  of  Belgium  and  northern  France  to  their 
fate,  or  Austria  the  Serbians,  it  would  have  been  a  long 
step  toward  their  ultimate  victory. 

When  the  English  invaded  the  South  African  States, 
children  14  years  old  and  men  of  75  turned  out 
in  arms  against  them.  The  same  was  the  case  recently 
with  the  Serbs  against  the  Austrians — boys  of  12  years 
and  women  were  fighting  with  the  men. 


THE  DEFENSIVE  127 

This  we  cannot  expect  in  aggressive  warfare  unless 
it  is  the  case  of  a  delivering  army  marching  to  the  over- 
throw of  a  tyrant,  and  even  in  that  case,  the  civil  popula- 
tion may  turn  against  the  aggressor;  for  no  people,  no 
matter  how  much  oppressed,  love  an  invader  overmuch. 

Of  course,  we  assume  here  that  the  public  spirit  is 
active  in  the  defender's  country,  that  the  people  are  self- 
sacrificingly  interested  in  all  the  affairs  of  state,  and  that 
they  are  accustomed  to  contributing  toward  the  army. 
If  this  is  not  the  case,  the  result  may  be  exactly  the  oppo- 
site from  what  we  might  expect.  "A  hostile  army,  untram- 
meled  by  any  restrictions,  may  then  live  better  than  the 
defender  can  in  his  own  country."  "In  the  campaign  of  1806, 
the  Prussian  and  Saxon  troops  nearly  died  of  hunger  in  a 
rich  country  because  they  did  not  dare  to  touch  its  supplies, 
while  the  enemy  made  use  of  them  freely.  In  the  winter 
campaign  of  1870-71,  the  French  troops  bivouacked  in  the 
streets  of  the  towns  in  the  bitter  cold,  as  it  was  not  con- 
sidered advisable  to  quarter  them  in  the  houses  of  the  rich 
citizens.  But  the  Germans,  who  followed,  made  themselves 
comfortable  at  the  hearths  and  tables  of  the  same  citizens." 

INDIFFERENCE 

A  situation  often  arises  in  which  the  country  of  the 
assailant  becomes  indifferent  to  the  war,  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  repeated  reports  of  victory  lead  the  inhabitants  to  believe 
that  the  war  is  already  won. 

They  do  not  see  the  dangers  and  difficulties  against 
which  the  armies  are  struggling,  so  are  reluctant  to  grant 
increased  support. 

The  defender,  however,  has  his  army  in  his  own  coun- 
try, and  the  people  are  brought  to  realize  the  situation. 

There  is  no  more  beautiful  illustration  of  loyal  self- 
denying  support  to  an  army  than  that  shown  by  the  non- 
combatant  population  of  the  Southern  States  during  the 
Civil  War. 

Had  part  of  The  World  War  been  fought  in  the  United 
States,  it  is  believed  that  the  attitude  of  some  of  our  citi- 
zens might  have  changed. 

The  condition  of  the  army  of  Italy  in  1796,  when  Na- 
poleon took  command,  shows  the  extremes  to  which  an 


128  STRATEGY 

army  may  be  brought,  due  to  the  indifference  of  the  home 
government. 

The  indifference  of  the  United  States  to  Scott's  army 
in  Mexico  was  almost  criminal. 

Scott  was  even  forced  to  clothe  his  men  in  uniforms 
made  by  Mexicans  from  captured  Mexican  cloth. 

In  all  these  regards  the  defender  has  the  advantage. 

FINAL  BLOW 

On  the  offensive  it  is  also  difficult  to  bring  to  the  at- 
tention of  the  home  government  the  almost  imperceptible 
signs,  recognizable  to  the  trained  eye,  that  a  reversal  in  the 
course  of  the  campaign  is  imminent.  The  defender's  peo- 
ple are  right  there,  can  see  and  possibly  hear. 

Likewise,  the  assailant  may  need  a  little  extra  effort 
to  end  the  war,  but  this  is  either  denied  or  is  postponed 
so  long  as  to  be  of  no  use.  Hannibal  had  such  an  ex- 
perience in  Italy,  as  did  Scott  in  Mexico. 

PERPETRATION  OF  SURPRISES 

The  great  freedom  of  action  enjoyed  by  the  defender 
enables  him  to  prepare  surprises  for  the  assailant. 

While  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  on  the  tactical  of- 
fensive at  Shiloh,  he  also  was  on  the  strategical  defensive. 
It  is  doubtful  if  he  could  have  completely  surprised  the  Fed- 
erals, as  he  unquestionably  did,  had  he  not  been  in  his  own 
country.  Of  course  the  Federals  contributed  to  this  sur- 
prise by  their  carelessness. 

FLANK  POSITIONS 

Since  the  defenders  are  in  their  own  country  they  can 
obtain  subsistence  almost  any  place  and,  as  a  result,  are  able 
to  shift  suddenly  their  position  and  force  the  assailant  to 
change  his  line  of  advance.  This  can  be  done  by  suddenly 
taking  up  a  flanking  position.  Jackson,  by  his  knowledge 
of  the  Valley,  was  able  to  take  up  a  flanking  position  at 
Swift  Run  Gap,  which  the  Federals  under  Banks  were  afraid 
to  pass,  and  move  on  Staunton. 


THE  DEFENSIVE  129 

CHANGES  IN  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION 

The  defender  may,  by  the  direction  of  his  withdrawal, 
force  the  assailant  to  the  trouble  of  changing  his  lines  of 
communication,  which  at  times  is  not  so  easily  done. 

When  Bragg  switched  his  army  from  Tupelo  to  Chat- 
tanooga, he  forced  the  Federals  to  change  front  and  to  use 
the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad  as  a  line  of  communica- 
tions for  Buell's  army.  Buell  experienced  no  end  of  trouble 
as  the  result  of  this  railroad  being  repeatedly  cut.  He  did 
not  breathe  easily  until  he  arrived  near  Huntsville,  where 
he  could  switch  to  the  Nashville  &  Chattanooga  Railroad. 

THE  INVADER  MAY  SEPARATE  His  COLUMNS  THEREBY 

ENABLING  THE  DEFENDER  TO  STRIKE  ANY 

ONE  OF  THEM  IN  DETAIL 

On  account  of  the  forward  movement,  the  assailant 
may  have  trouble  in  getting  subsistence  for  his  troops. 
As  a  result,  he  will  have  to  divide  his  forces  and  advance 
on  a  wider  front.  This  gives  the  defender  a  chance  to  fall, 
with  his  whole  force,  upon  one  of  these  subdivisions  before 
the  others  can  come  to  its  assistance.  If  the  attack  is  suc- 
cessful, it  enables  the  same  troops,  which  have  just  beaten 
one  detachment,  to  advance  against  a  second,  or  even  a 
third,  with  like  success. 

Napoleon's  attack  on  the  Silesian  army  in  1814  shows 
what  can  be  accomplished  along  these  lines. 

Napoleon,  assuring  his  communications  with  the  cap- 
ital, stationed  himself  between  the  two  masses,  the  one  under 
Schwarzenberg  coming  from  the  direction  of  the  Basle,  and 
the  other  under  Blucher  coming  from  the  direction  of 
Cologne. 

He  successfully  destroyed  the  three  corps  of  the  army 
of  Silesia  at  Champaubert  on  the  10th  of  February;  at 
Montmirail  on  the  llth;  at  Chateau  Thierry  on  the  12th, 
and  at  Vauchamps  on  the  14th. 

Retiring  then  in  order  to  unite  his  troops  with  those 
of  Victor  and  Oudinot,  whom  Schwarzenberg  had  thrown 
back  upon  Ypres,  he  resumed  the  offensive  against  the 
Russians  and  Austrians,  and  inflicted  upon  them  a  succes- 


130  STRATEGY 

sion  of  defeats — at  Mormant  on  the  17th  of  February, 
Montereau  on  the  18th,  and  Mery  on  the  21st — which  forced 
them  back  to  Bar-sur-Aube. 

In  the  meantime,  Blucher  had  rallied  his  corps  and 
moved  to  Meaux.  He  was,  with  great  difficulty,  checked 
by  Mortier  and  Marmont,  who  succeeded,  however,  in 
finally  pushing  him  upon  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  then  be- 
yond the  Marne,  and  in  stopping  him  on  the  Ourcq,  after 
two  desperate  combats. 

Napoleon,  at  this  juncture,  left  Troyes  in  order  to  rejoin 
his  two  marshals  at  Ste.  Sezanne  and  La  Ferte-Gaucher,  and 
ordered  the  resumption  of  the  offensive  against  Blucher, 
who  retired  in  disorder  upon  Soissons.  Napoleon  intended 
to  throw  Blucher  back  upon  the  Aisne  and  destroy  his 
army  under  the  walls  of  Soissons;  but  the  place,  poorly 
commanded,  capitulated.  This  act  of  weakness  on  the 
part  of  the  commandant  of  Soissons  decided,  perhaps,  the 
fate  of  the  campaign. 

The  operations  of  Frederick  the  Great  in  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  of  Jackson  in  the  Valley,  and  of  the  Federals 
at  Perry ville,  were  along  these  same  lines. 

THE  ASSAILANT  MUST  FOLLOW  DEFENDER 
WHEREVER  HE  GOES 

"As  long  as  the  defender  has  not  been  decisively  de- 
feated, his  army  acts  as  a  perfectly  natural  attraction  to 
the  assailant,  and,  just  as  a  magnet  attracts  iron,  will  at- 
tract him.  He  seeks  to  defeat  the  defender's  army  and 
thus  to  free  himself  from  the  influence  which  the  existence 
of  the  defender  exerts  upon  all  of  his  plans." 

We  must  assume  that  the  assailant  will  go  wherever 
the  defender  leads  him. 

Had  Johnston  retired  through  Rome,  and  thence  into 
the  heart  of  Alabama,  in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  Sherman 
most  certainly  would  have  had  to  follow  him. 

IGNORING  FLANK  POSITIONS 

Should  the  defenders  occupy  a  flank  position,  and  the 
invaders  wish  to  pass  by  the  position  commanding  the 
theater  of  war,  a  mere  show  of  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
defenders  may  suffice  to  attract  the  invaders  in  their  direc- 


THE  DEFENSIVE  ,  131 

tion.  The  half-hearted  movement  of  Mehemet  All  along 
the  river  Yantra,  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Russian  advance 
in  1878,  and  the  movement  of  Osman  Pasha  to  Plevna  on 
the  right  flank,  were  sufficient  to  check  any  further  advance 
of  the  Russians  through  the  Balkans,  and  turn  the  Russian 
forces  against  these  flanking  positions. 

If  the  invader,  however,  ignores  these  positions,  the 
defender  must  strike  him  vigorously  in  the  flank. 

The  Prussians  at  Jena  and  Auerstadt  had  an  unus- 
ually good  opportunity  to  strike  Napoleon  from  a  flank  posi- 
tion when  he  marched  by  them.  The  Prussians  were  posted 
in  Thuringian  Forest  covering  the  two  great  roads  Erfurt- 
Berlin  and  Hof-Leipsic. 

Napoleon  was  south  of  this  line  with  his  supposed 
communications  by  way  of  Mainz,  and  his  true  line  tem- 
porarily through  Sulzbach  to  Strassburg. 

The  question  as  to  which  road  Napoleon  would  take  was 
uncertain,  but  owing  to  the  mountainous  nature  of  the  Hof 
Road,  it  was  not  deemed  wise  to  intercept  him  on  that  one 
road  if  he  should  take  it. 

The  idea  entertained  by  some  staff  officers  of  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick  was  to  move  over  and,  from  a  flank  posi- 
tion, strike  Napoleon  as  he  went  by.  The  duke,  however, 
did  not  want  to  cross  the  Valley  of  the  Saale,  nor  was 
the  Prince  Hohenlohe  very  keen  for  this  action.  The  duke 
determined  to  await  developments  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Saale. 

Meanwhile,  others  of  his  staff  were  trying  to  get  him 
to  strike  out  for  Napoleon's  supposed  line  of  communi- 
cations with  Mainz. 

There  were  three  things  the  duke  might  have  done, 
namely:  From  his  position  on  the  Saale  he  might  have  at- 
tacked Napoleon  if  the  latter  tried  to  cross  the  river ;  second, 
if  Napoleon  tried  to  march  past,  his  communications  might 
have  been  cut;  third,  he  might  have  been  intercepted  by  a 
rapid  flank  march  in  the  direction  of  Leipsic  if  the  march 
were  started  in  time. 

The  duke  merely  waited  and  allowed  Napoleon  to  march 
past  him,  and  then,  at  the  eleventh  hour,  attempted  to 
carry  out  the  third  action  available,  but  was  struck  in  flank 
on  the  hills  of  Jena  and  defeated,  losing  his  own  life.  Im- 


132  STRATEGY 

mediately  thereafter  Hohenlohe  was  defeated  by  Davoust 
and  Bernadotte  at  Auerstadt  and  would  have  been  anni- 
hilated had  Bernadotte  supported  Davoust  as  he  should 
have  done. 

"The  strategical  defender  can  make  use  of  greater  free- 
dom of  movement  without  anxious  concern,  especially  in 
his  own  country." 

EXPENSES 

A  country,  the  policy  of  which,  in  event  of  war,  is  to 
assume  the  strategical  defensive,  escapes  much  of  the  costs 
of  preparation.  As  we  have  seen  in  our  study  of  the  offen- 
sive, the  country  that,  in  event  of  war,  contemplates  the 
strategic  offensive  must,  in  peace,  systematically  arrange 
for  its  mobilization,  possess  abundant  equipment,  have  great 
means  of  transportation,  and  have  considerable  reserves  in 
money.  Rivalry  in  this  regard  among  the  European  states 
before  the  recent  war  nearly  bankrupted  them.  The  country 
that  is  to  adopt  a  strategical  defensive  at  all  hazards  is  not 
subject  to  nearly  all  this  expense,  but  must  be  able  to  mar- 
shal its  forces  in  time  to  occupy  the  strategical  positions 
it  has  determined  to  hold. 

There  is  a  conservative  limit  in  regard  to  preparation, 
and  the  country  that  banks  too  strongly  on  the  defensive 
and  the  needlessness  of  preparation,  may  find  all  its  ter- 
ritory overrun,  in  event  of  a  war,  and  be  unable  to  get 
ready. 

SUPPORT  OF  ALLIES 

The  nation  on  the  strategical  defensive,  in  a  way  being 
the  under  dog,  may  look  for  assistance  when  the  assailant 
may  not.  It  does  not  always  come,  as  Oom  Paul  Kruger 
and  Jefferson  Davis  could  have  testified.  Countries,  at 
present,  no  longer  lend  a  helping  hand  to  a  weak  nation 
and  with  magnanimity  help  it  out — not  unless  it  is  to  their 
interests  to  do  so. 

There  is  no  desire  to  belittle  the  altruistic  motives  that 
caused  the  world  to  rush  to  the  assistance  of  Belgium,  but 
it  is  not  believed  that  all  nations  were  entirely  unselfish 
in  the  matter. 

The  state  of  equilibrium  that  existed  in  Europe  before 
this  recent  outbreak,  known  as  the  balance  of  power,  and 


THE  DEFENSIVE  133 

which  brought  about  the  two  alliances,  known  respectively 
as  the  Triple  Entente  and  Triple  Alliance,  was  merely  for 
the  purpose  of  checking  any  nation  that  went  too  far  in 
the  exploiting  of  its  peace  advantages. 

In  1866,  the  intervention  amounted  to  no  more  than  a 
mild  appeal  by  Napoleon  III  in  behalf  of  Austria.  In  1871, 
the  Germans  by  their  wise  restraint  in  dealing  with  France, 
stopped  the  appearance  of  any  intervention  at  all.  In  the 
recent  war,  the  intervention  of  at  least  one  country  was  duo, 
so  it  is  stated,  to  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  one  of  the 
weaker  powers. 

Our  own  Christian-like  spirit  in  intervening  in  Cuba 
and  driving  out  Spain  some  people  think  was  somewhat 
sugar-coated. 

There  has  been  a  desire  in  Europe  in  the  past  century 
to  preserve  the  statuo  quo.  This  had  its  origin  in  the 
advanced  age  of  all  the  states,  and  all,  except  Prussia,  have 
been  more  or  less  on  the  strategic  defensive.  In  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  young  Prussia  found  out  how  dangerous  it 
was  to  disturb  conditions  that  had  become  established. 
Kaiser  William  II  doubtless  has  some  regrets  that  he  dis- 
turbed the  peace  of  Europe.  His  regret  probably  is  due  to 
the  feeling  of  chagrin  over  his  failure,  rather  than  to 
true  conscientious  remorse. 

SOME  OF  THE  DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE 
STRATEGIC  DEFENSIVE 

There  are  a  considerable  number  of  drawbacks  to  the 
strategical  defensive,  the  principal  one  being  the  inability 
to  gain  decisive  results  in  other  ways  than  by  intervention 
or  wearing  out  the  opponent. 

The  fact  that  such  a  strategy  has  been  assumed  is  an 
admission  of  weakness,  the  moral  effect  of  which  is  hard 
to  overcome. 

The  utmost  that  can  be  obtained  is  peace.  The  process 
of  exhausting  is  very  slow  and  affects  the  defender  also. 

EXHAUSTION  OF  THE  ENEMY 

Frederick  the  Great  forced  peace  upon  Europe  as  a 
result  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  by  exhausting  the  other 


134  STRATEGY 

contestants.  However,  a  reorganization  of  the  political  sit- 
uation and  mode  of  warfare  of  his  day  helped  the  situation 
materially. 

Nearly  every  deliberate  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
strategic  defense  to  tire  out  the  enemy  has  failed.  The 
Confederacy  prolonged  the  Civil  /War  in  vain.  Ih  the 
Russo<-Turkish  War,  the  strategical  defensive  was  van- 
quished, although  successful  at  the  outset.  The  result  of 
the  South  African  War  was  similar.  The  tiring  out  of 
the  Germans  in  The  World  War  seems  to  be  an  exception. 
But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  strategy  of  the  allies 
was  not  deliberately  assumed. 

It  is  generally  understood  that  Russia,  by  prolonging 
the  war  with  Japan,  really  won  out  as  a  result  of  Japan's 
financial  exhaustion. 

"However,  he  who  is  not  able  to  pass  over  to  the  of- 
fensive at  the  conclusion  cannot  expect  to  reap  much  from 
the  peace." 

Loss  OF  TERRITORY  AT  THE  OUTSET 

At  the  outset,  the  strategical  defensive  will  have  to 
give  up  territory  with  the  loss  of  the  supplies  that  the 
section  produces. 

Johnston,  in  the  west,  in  the  Civil  War,  and  the  allies 
on  the  west  front,  were  hard  hit  by  losing  so  much  valuable 
territory. 

It  is  hard  to  imagine  a  defense  conducted  exactly  on 
the  frontier.  It  was  tried  by  the  Greeks  at  the  beginning 
of  their  war  with  Turkey  on  account  of  Thessaly.  It  led 
to  a  wretched  splitting  up  of  forces,  which  did  not  receive 
their  proper  punishment,  because  the  Turkish  counter- 
attack, which  followed  the  first  hostilities,  was  too  slow. 

The  defender  will  not  come  out  of  the  war  unscathed 
unless  he  can  recover  the  lost  territory,  and  this  may  not  be 
so  easy.  Also,  the  loss  of  territory  and  its  occupation  by 
the  enemy  may  be  a  means  of  weaning  over  the  popula- 
tion to  the  opposition.  There  seems  to  be  no  question  that  if 
the  Confederates  could  have  held  Kentucky  from  the  outset 
in  the  Civil  War  the  state  would  have  become  Confederate ; 
but,  when  Bragg  tried  to  retake  it  in  the  fall  of  1862,  the 


THE  DEFENSIVE  135 

population  was  not  so  sure  it  wanted  to  be  Confederate. 
Likewise,  the  occupation  of  such  a  territory  at  the  beginning 
of  war  may  give  the  victor  a  chance  to  hold  on  to  it. 

INACTIVITY  HAS  A  BAD  EFFECT  UPON  THE 
DEFENDERS 

"The  usual  consequences  resulting  from  consciousness 
of  weakness,  which  is  always  present  in  the  defensive,  and 
enforced  inactivity,  while  waiting  to  see  what  the  enemy 
will  do,  exercise  an  important  influence." 

After  Fredericksburg,  the  Confederates  were  on  the 
defensive,  and  had  to  scatter  out  to  subsist.  The  result 
was  that  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  was  fought  without 
Hood  and  Pickett's  division.  It  was  only  due  to  the  presence 
of  a  Lee,  a  Jackson  and  a  Federal  Hooker  that  the  battle 
was  not  decided  otherwise. 

The  results  of  inactivity  on  the  part  of  the  Federals 
were  even  worse  after  the  Fredericksburg  fiasco.  When 
Hooker  took  command,  he  reported  that  there  were  85,000 
men  absent  without  leave. 

SICKNESS 

The  strategic  defensive  frequently  deprives  its  troops 
of  a  salutary  change  of  scene  for  long  periods.  The  danger 
of  ravaging  disease  increases  thereby,  and  the  spirits  of 
the  soldiers  are  generally  subjected  to  a  depressing  in- 
fluence. But  all  these  failings  are  not  as  important  as  the 
one  fundamental  defect  of  the  strategical  defensive  or  any 
kind  of  defensive — that  it  can  merely  avoid  defeat  and  can 
not  gain  victory. 

The  Turks  in  the  war  with  the  Balkan  allies  (1912-13) 
were  nearly  annihilated  by  an  epidemic  of  cholera. 

Sometimes,  however,  the  assailant  is  in  more  danger 
than  the  defenders  for  the  reason  that  the  country  occupied 
by  him,  surrounding  a  defensive  position,  may  be  most 
unsalubrious. 

Example:    United  States  troops  investing  Santiago. 

ALLIES 

There  is  still  another  point.  We  have  said  that  the 
strategic  offensive  carries  with  it  the  possibility  of  losing 


136  STRATEGY 

allies,  who  do  not  entertain  exactly  the  same  ideas  as  we; 
the  strategical  defensive,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  capable 
of  carrying  uncertain  states  along  with  it  or  frightening 
other  states  from  taking  part  in  the  war  against  it.  Had 
Germany  decided  to  confine  herself  to  the  strategical  de- 
fensive in  1870,  doubtless  both  Denmark  and  Austria  would 
have  allied  themselves  with  France,  not  having  recovered 
from  1864  and  1866.  Likewise,  the  Confederacy  in  the 
United  States  would  have  attracted  allies  had  she  been 
able  to  win  a  decisive  victory  on  Northern  soil,  but  being 
unable  to  do  so,  foreign  powers  were  loth  to  intervene  and 
lose  the  friendship  of  the  United  States  government. 

TACTICAL 

As  has  been  said  before,  this  consciousness  of  weakness 
on  the  part  of  the  defense  and  the  inherent  inactivity  in 
waiting  to  see  what  the  enemy  is  going  to  do,  has  a  very 
severe  moral  effect.  This  applies  equally  to  both  strate- 
gical and  tactical  defensive. 

The  movement  of  the  attacker  awakens  in  him  new 
intellectual  and  moral  forces. 

We  have  already  said  that  the  defensive  can  prepare 
surprises  for  the  assailant  by  watching  his  movements  and 
falling  upon  him  as  soon  as  a  mistake  is  discovered. 

It  is  not  at  all  probable  that  the  assailant  will  confine 
his  movements  to  a  combined  attack  at  one  place.  He  will 
make  feints  at  the  various  points  and  then  launch  his  main 
attack  at  one  certain  place. 

It  will  be  difficult  for  the  defensive  to  know  to  which 
one  of  these  attacks  to  pay  most  attention,  and  he  may 
make  a  mistake  and  concentrate  his  masses  against  one 
attack  and  find  that  another  is  the  really  important  one. 
The  foregoing  apply  with  greater  force  to  the  tactical  de- 
fensive. 

The  following  are  some  of  the  specific  advantages  of  the 
tactical  defensive : 

1.  The   defender   retains   the   advantage   of   continuous   fire 
action  while  the  attacker  must  interrupt  his  by  advancing. 

2.  The  terrain  is  of  more  advantage  to  the  defender  than 
to  the  attacker. 

3.  The  defender  enjoys  the  special  advantage  of  being  able 
to  seek  out  obstacles  which  he  wishes  the  enemy  to  cross  under 
his  fire,  and  often  strengthens  them  by  artificial  means. 


THE  DEFENSIVE  137 

4.  The  defender  also  enjoys  the  special  advantage  of  being 
able  to  keep  his  troops  under  cover,  which  not  only  protects  them 
against  excessive  losses,  but  also  hides  their  disposition  from  the 
enemy. 

5.  On  the  other  hand,  the  attacker  must  advance  in  the  open 
and  is  generally  exposed  to  view. 

The  fights  along  the  Tugela  and  Modder  Rivers  in  South 
Africa  show  how  great  a  difference  there  can  be  between 
the  losses  sustained  by  the  attack  and  those  sustained  by 
the  defense. 

In  the  recent  war,  the  attacker  did  not  suffer  as  heavily 
as  might  be  expected,  when  the  barrage  properly  covered  his 
advance.  Without  the  barrage,  and  the  defender  with  a 
plentiful  supply  of  machine  guns,  the  assailant's  losses  at 
times  were  terrific. 

SURPRISES 

The  advantages  of  the  tactical  defensive  mentioned 
above  would  give  defenders  an  opportunity  for  surprises 
more  frequently  than  is  recorded  in  military  history  if  it 
were  not  so  difficult  to  start  troops,  once  distributed  along 
the  positions,  from  their  permanent  locations  to  places  from 
.which  to  take  advantage  of  the  enemy's  mistakes. 

The  cases  of  the  Highland  Brigade  at  Magersfontein, 
and  Buller  at  Colenso  in  South  Africa  are  exceptions.  The 
Boers  made  very  few  moves  but  merely  lay  in  wait  for 
the  British. 

It  takes  time  to  discover  mistakes,  to  let  a  plan  ripen, 
to  convey  to  the  troops  the  order  to  carry  it  out,  for  the 
troops  to  take  up  the  formation  for  an  advance,  and  for 
them  to  move  off.  All  this  takes  so  long  that  the  enemy, 
who  is  usually  moving,  may  have  time  to  pass  over  the 
critical  period. 

"The  three  principal  dangers  to  the  force  on  the  tac- 
tical defensive  are: 

1.  To  be  attacked  from  several  directions  at  the  same  time. 

2.  To  be  occupied  in  front  and  have  one  or  both  flanks  turned. 

3.  To  be  deprived  of  the  line  of  retreat. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  reply  by  a  counter-attack  on  the 
tactical  than  on  the  strategical  defensive. 

Space  is  so  cramped  and  the  time  too  short  to  be 
able  to  start  counter-attacks  and  develop  them  to  their  full 


138  STRATEGY 

strength.  An  advance  of  the  same  troops  against  one,  and 
then  against  another  part  of  the  enemy's  army  will  hardly 
be  possible,  for  the  distance  between  separated  bodies  of 
the  enemy  is  so  small  that  the  defender  would  be  not  only 
between  two  opponents  but  between  two  fires. 

During  the  battle  of  Liao  Yang,  the  Russians  tried 
shifting  troops  about  on  tactical  interior  lines,  but  met 
with  small  succ.ess  for  the  reasons  given  above.  Prin- 
cipally, because  the  distances  were  too  short. 

SIMPLEST  KIND  OF  COUNTER-ATTACK 

The  simplest  form  of  a  counter-attack  on  the  battle- 
field is  an  advance  straight  to  the  front  after  an  attack 
is  repelled. 

Example:     British  advance  at  Waterloo. 

Any  other  kind  of  a  counter-attack  requires  a  master 
hand  like  that  of  Napoleon. 

At  Austerlitz,  he  gave  an  example  worth  imitating; 
but  such  examples  are  rare. 

One  of  the  best  ways  to  surprise  the  assailant  is  just 
after  he  has  made  his  deployment  for  an  attack  in  a  cer- 
tain direction,  to  appear  suddenly  in  another.  This  ne- 
cessitates a  change  of  front  on  the  assailant's  part  which 
is  impossible. 

The  appearance  of  Bragg's  forces  along  Chickamauga 
Creek,  when  Rosecrans  looked  for  them  in  the  vicinity  of 
LaFayette,  was  enough  of  a  surprise  to  cause  him  con- 
siderable annoyance,  and  had  the  Confederates  played  their 
cards  properly  at  McLemore's  Cove,  Rosecrans  would  have 
been  annihilated. 

"Although  the  lack  of  mobility  of  troops  on  the  defen- 
sive is,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  weak  point,  it  also  possesses 
the  specific  advantage  of  not  making  such  high  demands 
on  their  skill  and  steadiness,  nor  on  the  experience  of 
the  leader,  as  does  the  attack." 

Troops  whose  very  constitution  would  prevent  them 
from  delivering  an  even  fairly  energetic  attack  could  still 
carry  on  a  very  tolerable,  or  even  victorious  defense. 


CHAPTER  IX 


Change  from  the  Offensive  to  the  Defensive 
and  the  Reverse 


"It  is  difficult  to  lay  down  any  definite  rules  for  the  alternation  between  offensive 
and  defensive." 

'T1  HE  SELECTION  of  the  proper  time  to  change  from 
the  offensive  to  the  defensive  strategically  or  tactically 
is  a  matter  that  must  be  decided  in  each  specific  case. 
No  general  rule  can  be  laid  down.  It  must  be  so  selected  as 
to  render  the  greatest  possible  assistance  toward  the  at- 
tainment of  the  chief  end  of  the  war. 

The  commander,  so  to  speak,  must  feel  the  pulse  of 
his  army  to  ascertain  what  he  can  demand  of  it  and  when, 
and  he  should  not  force  his  army  to  the  point  of  exhaustion ; 
but  as  soon  as  he  sees  that  the  potential  energy  of  his 
troops  is  about  to  be  spent,  he  should  assume  the  defensive 
voluntarily. 

It  would  be  an  error  to  continue  the  advance  until 
the  force  of  circumstances  makes  it  imperative  to  adopt 
a  defensive  course. 

At  Waterloo,  Napoleon,  as  soon  as  he  found  that 
Blucher  was  on  the  field  with  his  overwhelming  forces,  should 
have  drawn  off  on  the  defensive  and  should  have  fallen  back 
to  the  river  Somme  or  Aisne,  or  at  least  to  the  fortresses  of 
Mons  or  Valenciennes.  There  he  could  have  taken  up  the 
defensive  until  Grouchy  was  able  to  unite  with  him.  Doubt- 
less the  reason  he  carried  his  attacks  as  far  as  he  did  after 
6 :00  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  of  June  was  that 
he  knew  that  he  did  not  have  the  French  nation  back  of 
him  and  that  his  hold  on  it  was  contingent  upon  success. 

A  great  deal  of  criticism  has  been  passed  upon  Joseph 
E.  Johnston  for  not  having  moved  on  Washington  after 
the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.  Had  he  done  so,  it  is  ques- 
tionable whether  he  would  have  been  successful  or  not. 

139      • 


140  STRATEGY 

Washington  at  the  time  was  well  defended.  Its  works 
were  manned  by  troops  in  good  condition  and  undemoral- 
ized  by  the  defeat  of  the  21st  of  July.  Johnston  would 
have  been  pushing  the  offensive  too  far.  He  would  doubt- 
less have  been  checked,  and  if  so,  would  have  lost  the 
moral  effect  of  a  victory  on  the  battlefield. 

It  would  have  been  better  to  have  moved  to  a  position 
in  Maryland,  threatening  Washington,  and  to  have  taken  up 
a  defensive  position. 

THE  PROPER  MOMENT  FOR  THE  CHANGE 

The  commander  must  himself  select  the  proper  moment 
for  the  change  and  must  possess  sufficient  force  of  character 
to  relinquish  a  continuation  of  the  offensive  voluntarily,  if 
he  desires  to  retain  what  he  has  already  won. 

But  in  deliberating  on  the  situation,  he  should  bear  in 
mind  that  the  losses  which  he  perceives  in  his  own  army 
unwittingly  produce  a  greater  effect  on  him  than  those 
which  his  imagination  assigns  to  the  enemy. 

McClellan  in  the  Peninsula  apparently  seemed  to  think 
that  rain  and  mud  only  affected  Federals  and  that  his  losses 
were  greater  than  those  of  his  enemy. 

"To  delay  passing  over  to  the  defensive  until  the  last 
moment,  and  then  to  change  of  one's  own  accord,  is  the 
highest  achievement  of  the  art." 

We  have  no  more  striking  example  of  changing  to  the 
defensive  from  the  offensive  too  soon  than  Hooker's  ac- 
tion at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville.  He  had  almost 
reached  Tabernacle  Church,  where  he  would  have  been  out 
of  the  Wilderness  and  could  have  made  his  numbers  count, 
when  he  decided  to  fall  back  to  the  Chancellorsville  line  and 
thereby  surrender  all  the  advantage  to  Lee  and  Jackson. 

A  complete  transition  from  the  strategical  offensive 
to  the  defensive  took  place  in  South  Africa.  The  Boers, 
by  a  rapid  advance  and  skillful  union  of  their  forces,  in- 
vested three  British  detachments  in  Ladysmith,  Kimberly, 
and  Mafeking. 

Afterwards  they  confined  themselves  to  the  defensive 
against  the  British  troops  sent  to  the  rescue.  The  change 
here  took  place  too  early,  as  the  Boers  did  not  take  full 
-advantage  of  their  opportunities  and  superior  numbers. 


OFFENSIVE  TO  DEFENSIVE  AND  REVERSE          141 

DISTANCES  AND  EXERTION 

"The  assumption  of  the  defensive,  because  distances 
and  exertion  are  too  great,  is  an  indication  that  there  has 
been  neglect  in  the  preparation  of  the  details." 

"Calculation  in  advance  is  difficult  and  demands  a 
strict  control  of  the  imagination,  which  otherwise  is  easily 
swayed  by  personal  desires  and  produces  illusions." 

In  his  advance  on  Moscow,  Napoleon  has  been  crit- 
icised in  the  retrospect  for  not  having  halted  at  Smolensk, 
when  he  found  that  his  supplies  might  not  be  adequate  for 
his  Grande  Armee.  However,  he  doubtless  had  figured  on 
obtaining  sufficient  supplies  at  Moscow  or,  at  all  events,  in 
forcing  a  peace  on  the  Russians  after  a  decisive  battle  which 
he  hoped,  but  did  not  fight,  with  the  Russian  'army. 
Borodino  was  a  desperate  battle,  but  was  in  no  way  decisive 
as  the  Russians  merely  drew  off  to  the  north,  augmented 
their  forces  and  Napoleon  was  unable  to  follow  them. 

CHANGE  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  TERRAIN 

"A  change  to  the  defensive  merely  to  take  advantage 
of  the  terrain  and  make  strategical  or  tactical  use  of  a 
strong  position  will  seldom  accomplish  its  purpose/' 

The  circumstances  that  have  placed  the  aggressor 
in  a  condition  to  make  the  attack  have  also  forced  the  de- 
fender to  assume  the  defensive. 

It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  a  force  that  has  been  on 
the  defensive  and  is  falling  back,  will  at  once  assume  the 
offensive  the  instant  it  sees  the  pursuer  take  up  a  defensive 
position. 

LOSSES  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE  SOMETIMES  MAKE  THE  CHANGE 

IMPERATIVE 

Heavy  losses  in  the  attack  brought  on  by  the  strategical 
offensive  may  make  a  change  imperative. 

In  the  Marengo  campaign,  Napoleon  was  forced  back 
on  the  defensive  by  his  losses  and  did  not  resume  the  of- 
fensive until  he  had  gotten  Desaix  back.  He  could  have 
remained  on  the  defensive,  and  if  so  Melas  would  have  been 
forced  to  attack  him.  He  chose  the  offensive  because  he 
wanted  to  wind  the  matter  up. 


142  STRATEGY 

After  Liao  Yang,  the  Japanese  only  pursued  a  few 
miles  and  then  took  up  the  defensive.  The  world  wondered. 
Later  it  was  learned  that  their  action  was  prompted  by  losses 
which  necessitated  reinforcements,  and  by  a  shortage  of 
ammunition. 

A  change  to  the  defensive  will  arise  in  some  cases 
when  a  position  is  secured  by  the  assailant  where  he  either 
surrounds  the  defender,  or  at  the  least  threatens  his  line  of 
retreat.  In  such  a  case,  the  latter  is  bound  to  fight  and  in 
so  doing  suffers  heavy  losses  that  may  expedite  the  sur- 
render of  the  forces. 

At  Fort  Donelson,  and  in  fact,  everywhere  that  a  field 
army  has  been  surrounded,  the  assailant  drops  back  on 
the  defensive  and  awaits  the  counter-attack  or  surrender 
of  the  enemy. 

PUSHING  THE  ATTACK  Too  FAR 

Tactically  an  attack  pushed  too  far  generally  leads  to 
a  fatal  repulse,  for  events  move  much  more  rapidly  than 
in  the  domain  of  strategy,  and  the  stemming  of  the  tide, 
once  retirement  has  commenced,  becomes  doubly  difficult. 

At  Cedar  Mountain  we  have  an  example  of  an  attack 
pushed  too  far  by  Banks  and  his  defeat  by  the  arrival  of 
A.  P.  Hill  on  the  field. 

However,  it  is  less  difficult  in  the  tactical  than  in  the 
strategical  domain  to  select  the  right  moment. 

The  diminution  of  the  forces  becomes  more  plainly 
visible  in  tactics  than  in  strategy. 

"The  commander  not  only  has  the  army  under  his  eye, 
but  can  also  overlook  the  stage  on  which  the  whole  action 
must  take  place.  The  limit  to  which  he  should  advance,  and 
which  can  be  attained  without  incurring  the  risk  of  sac- 
rificing what  has  been  won,  becomes  more  clearly  recogniz- 
able. In  general  terms  this  limit 'is  formed  by  the  enemy's 
line  of  defense;  in  detail  it  is  marked  by  localities  in  that 
line,  such  as  villages,  strong  enclosures,  woods  and  ridges." 

At  Shiloh,  after  the  Confederates  had  captured  the  Fed- 
eral camps  and  ridge  along  the  Purdy  Road,  they  should 
have  reorganized  their  forces,  assuming  the  defensive  for 
the  necessary  time  to  do  so,  and  then  moved  forward  in 
regular  formation.  Instead,  they  delayed  here  and  there 


OFFENSIVE  TO  DEFENSIVE  AND  REVERSE  143 

to  loot  the  Federal  camps  while,  at  other  points,  in  a  rather 
disjointed  manner,  followed  up  the  Federals.  Result,  when 
the  Confederates  made  their  final  attack  on  the  Dill  Creek 
position  they  could  not  bring  more  than  a  weak  brigade  or 
two  into  action,  and  consequently  were  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss,  the  battle  was  restored  and  a  retreat  precipitated 
on  the  morrow. 

This  takes  us  into  the  field  of  discussion  of  limited  ob- 
jectives. It  is  believed  to  be  wrong  in  the  modern  battle  to 
limit  the  advance  to  a  certain  point  unless  there  is  a  spe- 
cific reason  for  so  doing.  While  intermediate  and  ultimate 
objectives  should  be  assigned,  together  with  exploitation 
lines,  the  limit  of  advance  should  be  governed  solely  by  the 
opposition  met  with,  co-operation  with  flank  groups,  liaison 
or  communication,  and  artillery  support. 

CHANGE  FROM  DEFENSIVE  TO  OFFENSIVE 

"When  the  various  natural  and  artificial  weakening 
causes  have  acted  upon  the  offensive  long  enough  to  have 
reduced  his  superiority  to  a  point  where  the  defender  may 
hope  for  a  successful  counter,  the  latter  should  assume  the 
offensive." 

It  is  a  question  solely  of  judging  the  time  when  to  do 
this,  if  at  all. 

After  Gettysburg,  had  Meade  made  a  determined  coun- 
ter-attack on  Lee,  he  might  have  been  defeated  and,  if  so, 
he  would  have  forfeited  all  the  advantage  of  a  Confederate 
defeat  on  Northern  soil. 

Lee  doubtless  would  have  resumed  the  offensive. 

At  Fredericksburg,  it  would  have  been  a  mistake  for 
Lee  to  have  made  a  counter-attack. 

In  tactical  operations,  the  transition  from  the  defensive 
to  the  offensive  is  easier  than  in  strategical.  The  weaken- 
ing of  the  tactical  attack  can  scarcely  be  kept  long  from 
the  defender  if  he  is  not  perfectly  passive. 

The  diminished  vigor  calls  for  retaliatory  action,  and 
conditions,  in  general,  will  draw  the  defender  into  an  of- 
fensive. 

Kutusov,  in  1812,  furnishes  an  example  of  how  the  de- 
fensive can  be  drawn  over  to*  the  offensive  by  general  con- 
ditions. 


144  STRATEGY 

Frederick  the  Great's  defeat  at  Kolin  drove  the  irres- 
olute Daun,  almost  against  his  will,  to  an  attack  on  the 
Prussian  theater  of  war. 

Napoleon  considered  the  passing  from  the  defensive 
to  the  offensive  a  very  difficult  operation,  as  shown  by  his 
XIX  War  Maxim  which  reads  as  follows:  "The  passage 
from  defensive  to  offensive  action  is  one  of  the  most  dif- 
ficult operations  in  war." 

We  have  a  very  good  illustration  of  a  timely  transition 
from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive  in  Falkenhayn's 
invasion  of  Roumania.  His  army  was  assembled  on  the 
defensive  in  the  Valley  of  the  Maros  waiting  the  moves  of 
the  Roumanians.  The  latter,  taking  the  offensive,  started 
to  cross  the  Carpathians  into  the  Maros  Valley.  Falken- 
hayn  waited  until  the  hostile  armies  were  extended  into  many 
attenuated  columns  crossing  the  passes,  when  he  quickly 
united  his  forces  and  feinting  at  certain  of  the  passes  broke 
through  at  others  and  doubled  back  the  enemy,  not  stopping 
until  Roumania  had  been  completely  overrun. 

In  modern  war,  we  seldom  will  have  a  situation  of  an 
entire  army  or  strategic  front  on  the  offensive  at  the  same 
time,  not  unless,  as  in  the  final  campaign  of  1918,  we  have 
superior  numbers  all  along  the  line  and  can  attack  every- 
where. The  situation  will  probably  find  the  army  holding 
at  certain  places  while  at  others  it  attacks.  In  the  recent 
war,  repeatedly  when  the  Germans  made  an  attack  at  a  cer- 
tain point,  at  all  other  points  they  stood  on  the  defensive. 

This  holding  force  is  made  weak  for  a  purpose  and  is 
instructed  to  hold  or  gradually  fall  back  and  draw  the  enemy 
on  while  the  main  force,  which  is  made  strong  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  holding  force,  is  held  at  or  moves  in  the  de- 
cisive direction  to  deal  the  telling  blow. 

The  allies  made  very  successful  use  of  the  combination 
in  their  operations  against  Napoleon  in  the  autumn  of  1813. 

Their  plan  was  to  retire  on  divergent  lines  until  pur- 
suit by  Napoleon  was  abandoned  and  then  to  turn  on  the 
respective  columns  and  defeat  them,  arrangements  having 
been  made  for  a  concentration. 

Observation  by  the  northern  army  and  the  army  of 
Silesia  brought  about  the  defeats  of  Victor  and  Marmont 
at  Gross-Beeren,  Dennewitz,  and  Katzbach. 


OFFENSIVE  TO  DEFENSIVE  AND  REVERSE      145 

The  battle  of  Dresden  is  the  only  case  of  violation  of 
this  principle  and  defeat  was  the  result. 

Such  an  action  is  sometimes  referred  to  strategically  as 
the  offensive-defensive. 

In  the  case  just  cited,  the  coalition  had  three  armies, 
one  of  120,000  men  in  Bohemia,  one  of  100,000  in  Silesia, 
and  one  of  70,000  in  the  north,  near  Madgeburg.  The  plan 
of  the  coalition  was  to  operate  in  concert,  and  it  was  agreed 
that  the  army  attacked  by  Napoleon  was  to  retire,  while 
the  other  two  operated  against  the  flanks  and  rear. 

Napoleon,  constrained  to  act  in  the  same  way,  was 
under  the  necessity  of  weakening  himself  at  all  points  at 
the  same  time.  He  placed  65,000  under  Oudinot  near  Wit- 
tenberg and  Torgau  to  watch  the  northern  army;  100,000 
under  Ney  on  the  Bober  to  watch  the  army  of  the  allies 
in  the  east;  96,000  men  divided  into  four  corps  to  watch 
the  passes  through  the  Giant  Mountains  leading  into  Bo- 
hemia; 72,000  in  reserve  at  Bautzen. 

Blucher  showed  himself  a  master  of  this  kind  of 
strategy,  as  he  drew  Napoleon  into  Silesia  twice  without 
offering  him  the  much  longed-for  battle,  and  the  maneuver 
only  failed  because  the  army  of  Bohemia  advanced  too 
soon  against  Napoleon's  right  at  Dresden. 

This  operation  requires  a  master  hand,  and  Napoleon 
showed  his  skill  along  this  line  in  the  campaign  on  the 
Grande  and  Petite  Morin  in  1814. 

The  difficulty  of  seizing  the  right  moment  for  passing 
from  the  defense  to  attack  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  must 
generally  be  ascertained  from  the  condition  of  the  enemy; 
and  for  the  formation  of  this  opinion  we  have  only  uncer- 
tain indications. 

The  case  will  very  seldom  be  so  simple  that  a  great 
increase  of  strength  on  our  side,  or  a  plainly  visible  decline 
on  the  enemy's  side,  practically  forces  the  offensive  upon  us. 

COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1813  IN 
EUROPE  AND  THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  1862  IN 

THE  WEST  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
President  Lincoln's  plan  for  the  operations  of  the  Fed- 
erals in  the  west  in  1862  shows  a  clear  conception  on  his 
part,  quaintly  expressed,  of  the  combined  offensive  and  de- 
fensive. 


146  STRATEGY 

He  wrote  as  follows: 

"I  state  my  general  idea  of  this  war  to  be  that  we 
have  the  greatest  numbers,  and  the  enemy  has  the  greatest 
facility  of  concentrating  forces  upon  points  of  collision; 
that  we  must  fail  unless  we  can  find  some  way  of  making 
our  advantages  an  overmatch  for  his ;  and  that  this  can  only 
be  done  by  menacing  him  with  superior  forces  at  different 
points  at  the  same  time,  so  that  we  can  safely  attack  one 
or  both,  if  he  makes  no  changes;  and  if  he  weakens  one  to 
strengthen  the  other,  forbear  to  attack  the  strengthened 
one,  but  seize  and  hold  the  weakened  one,  gaining  so  much. 
To  illustrate:  Suppose  last  summer,  when  Winchester  ran 
away  to  reinforce  Manassas,  we  had  forborne  to  attack 
Manassas  but  had  seized  and  held  Winchester." 

This  seems  to  embody  the  principle  on  which  the  allies 
worked  in  the  fall  of  1813.  Napoleon  had  interior  lines 
and  could  concentrate  more  easily  than  the  allies.  The 
latter  had  the  advantage  in  numbers  but  were  dispersed. 
When  Napoleon  appeared  with  his  main  army,  the  allies, 
menaced,  straightway  retreated  before  him,  but  the  other 
two  allied  armies  immediately  fell,  with  superior  numbers, 
upon  his  detachments.  The  result  was  the  progressive 
contraction  of  the  area  controlled  by  Napoleon  and  his  ulti- 
mate envelopment  and  decisive  defeat  at  Leipsic. 

There  was  nothing  inherently  bad  in  the  President's 
plan,  and  exception  can  be  better  taken  to  its  applicability 
than  to  its  soundness.  To  carry  out  such  a  plan  success- 
fully, bold,  skillful  and  experienced  generals  who  will  act 
with  the  utmost  decision  and  swiftness,  and  troops  that  have 
good  morale,  a  high  state  of  discipline,  and  extreme  mobility, 
are  essential.  Now  Halleck  had  neither  boldness,  swiftness 
nor  decision.  Buell  was  bold  and  decided,  but  not  swift. 
Grant  had  all  the  necessary  qualities,  but  was  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  dictate  a  policy.  As  for  the  troops,  the  Federals 
were  excellent  raw  material,  but  many  of  them  were  hardly 
soldiers  yet;  their  mobility  was  poor,  and  their  discipline 
was  poorer. 


OFFENSIVE  TO  DEFENSIVE  AND  REVERSE          147 

COMBINED  OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE  OF 
JOFFRE  IN  1914 

We  have  a  very  good  illustration  of  the  combined  of- 
fensive and  defensive  in  the  operations  of  the  French  in 
1914.  The  Germans  we're  mobilizing  on  their  western  fron- 
tier to  the  north  while  the  French  were  mobilizing  to  the 
south  under  cover  of  the  fortress  on  their  eastern  frontier. 
Even  before  the  French  mobilization  was  completed,  the 
Germans  invaded  Belgium  with  the  idea  of  drawing  the 
French  in  that  direction.  Consequently,  Joffre  took  the 
offensive  in  Upper  Alsace  in  order  to  lead  the  Germans  to 
believe  that  it  was  but  a  diversion  to  cover  the  advance  of 
other  French  troops  into  Belgium,  as  the  Germans  wished. 
This  diversion  also  was  made  for  sentimental  reasons 
and  to  satisfy  a  faction  in  Paris  clamoring  for  action. 
Having  completed  his  mobilization,  Joffre  took  the  offensive 
in  Lower  Alsace  and  Lorraine  in  order  to  draw  some  of 
the  German  forces  destined  for  Belgium  in  that  direction, 
while  his  left  wing,  under  Larenzac,  and  the  British,  stood 
on  the  defensive  on  the  Sambre.  Joffre's  right  now  fell 
back  upon  the  Meuse  forts  while  his  left  retired  toward  the 
Marne.  While  the  retirement  to  the  Marne  was  being  car- 
ried out,  the  right  under  Castelnau  was  repelling  the  Ger- 
man attack  on  the  Grande  Couronne.  This  being  success- 
fully completed,  the  left  and  center  then  assumed  the 
offensive  in  the  battle  of  the  Ourcq  and  Fere  Champenoise, 
generally  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 

Like  a  good  business  man  the  commander  should  not  ex- 
pend his  forces  unless  commensurate  results  are  to  be  at- 
tained. 

Neither  should  he  stint  himself  when  promising  gains 
are  in  sight. 

"Judicious  distribution  of  the  forces,  with  reference  to 
time  and  space — and  with  it  success — depends  upon  the 
happy  combination  of  these  principles." 


148  STRATEGY 

To  BE  EQUALLY  STRONG  AND  MAKE  THE  SAME  EFFORTS 
EVERYWHERE  is  THE  SIGN  OF  CLUMSEY  LEADER- 
SHIP UNLESS  THE  PREDOMINANCE  OF  STRENGTH 
is  SUCH  AS  TO  WARRANT  IT 

"Only  he  who  knows  how  to  husband  his  forces  and 
present  only  a  temporary  front  to  the  enemy  at  points  where 
a  disaster  could  not  have  decisive  consequences  will  be  in 
position  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  at  another  place  and 
to  gain  the  superiority  at  that  one  point,  which  should  be 
the  constant  object  of  our  endeavors."  Joffre  in  invading 
Upper  Alsace  at  the  beginning  of  The  World  War,  picked 
out  a  place  that,  when  the  reverse  came,  did  not  prove  dis- 
astrous. 


CHAPTER  X 

Operations 


TN  THE  course  of  all  military  operations  there  will  be 
certain  groups  of  movements,  engagements,  marches, 
etc.,  that  bear  a  closer  relationship  to  each  other  than  to 
any  previous  or  subsequent  occurrences. 

These  events  will  be  carried  out  for  the  purpose  of 
reaching  a  certain  goal,  capturing  a  certain  point  or  de- 
feating a  certain  group  of  the  enemy.  Then  after  the  at- 
tainment of  this  goal  or  object  there  will  follow  a  cessation 
of  movement  until  rest  can  be  had,  reinforcements  brought 
up,  ammunition  resupplied,  etc.,  and  then  there  will  be 
another  dash  for  the  attainment  of  another  object. 

OPERATION 

Each  of  the  following  groups  of  military  events  would 
constitute  an  operation : 

In  the  War  of  1870,  between  Germany  and  France, 
we  have  the  operations  on  the  Saar — then  a  pause;  then 
operations  on  the  Moselle,  and  then  a  pause,  while  the 
army  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  is  being  formed ;  and 
then  the  advance  on  MacMahon  at  Sedan,  called  the  opera- 
tions around  Sedan.  The  whole  series  of  operations  con- 
stitute the  campaign  of  1870. 

Likewise,  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  we  have  the  op- 
erations along  the  Yalu;  operations  around  Port  Arthur; 
operations  against  the  passes  of  the  Fenshui  Mountains; 
operations  around  Liao  Yang ;  operations  along  the  Sha-Ho, 
etc.  The  Russians  refer  to  the  events  around  Liao  Yang, 
as  the  operations  on  the  east  front  and  operations  on  the 
south  front. 

The  whole  affair  is  the  Manchurian  campaign  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War. 

149 


150  STRATEGY 

"It  is  evident  that  the  different  groups  of  events  or 
operations  must  be  connected  by  the  bond  of  some  common, 
fundamental  idea  and  should  not  be  joined  together  in  an 
arbitrary  or  haphazard  manner." 

CAMPAIGN 

A  certain  number  of  operations  generally  bear  a  closer 
relation  to  one  another  than  others.  They  are  fought  under 
similar  conditions,  against  the  same  hostile  army,  or  they 
differ  from  the  others  in  time  and  place,  or  by  a  change 
of  antagonists,  or  by  a  change  in  the  manner  of  carrying 
on  the  war. 

Such  a  group  would  be  called  a  campaign. 

One  hundred  years  ago  campaigns  were  divided  by 
seasons.  For  example,  we  hear  of  a  winter  campaign 
and  a  summer  campaign. 

GEOGRAPHICAL  DESIGNATION 

Later  on,  with  the  increase  in  the  size  of  the  armies 
this  designation  had  application  to  certain  districts,  or,  in 
other  words,  a  geographical  significance. 

The  series  of  operations  on  the  Modder  River,  after 
the  arrival  of  Lords  Roberts  and  Kitchener,  are  known 
as  the  Paardeburg  campaign.  The  first  campaign  of  the 
South  African  War  is  known  as  the  opening  campaign 
of  '99,  the  movements  of  Buller  and  White  in  Natal  are  des- 
ignated as  the  operations  in  Natal,  and  Methuen's  campaign 
along  the  Modder  River  is  known  as  Methuen's  operations 
along  the  Modder  River. 

In  the  War  of  1870  and  1871,  we  have  the  Loire  cam- 
paign, between  von  Manteuffel  and  Bourbaki,  a  campaign 
in  the  north  and  one  in  the  west. 

SINGLE  CAMPAIGN 

It  is  possible  to  end  a  war  in  a  single  campaign,  al- 
though such  a  thing  does  not  often  happen.  The  war  in 
1866,  between  Prussia  and  Austria,  was  ended  in  the  one 
campaign  called  Koniggratz  or  Sadowa. 


OPERATIONS  151 

CONTINUAL  FLOW  OF  EVENTS 

In  modern  warfare,  there  must  be  a  continual  flow  of 
events,  but  this  does  not  mean  without  an  occasional  day 
of  rest  or  waiting.  This  must  not  be  taken  in  a  too  literal 
sense.  A  time  comes  when  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  day 
of  rest  in  order  that  troops  may  not  become  absolutely 
exhausted.  In  operations  this  is  less  apt  to  be  necessary. 
We  must  hold  to  the  requirement  more  rigidly,  for  the 
enemy  may  divine  the  purpose  associated  therewith  and 
make  use  of  a  delay  to  frustrate  us. 

In  the  campaign  of  maneuvers  in  Virginia  in  the  fall 
of  1863,  General  Lee  delayed  one  day  to  issue  rations  and 
thereby  allowed  Meade  to  escape  from  the  trap  he  was  in. 
Bazaine  would  have  escaped  from  Metz  if  the  German  I 
and  II  Armies  had  decided  to  rest  on  the  15th  of  August, 
1870.  On  the  other  hand,  had  Bazaine  used  this  day  in 
marching  toward  Verdun,  he,  in  all  probability,  would  have 
escaped. 

On  the  23d  of  August,  1914,  von  Kluck  allowed  his  2d 
Corps  to  be  delayed  by  the  reported  cavalry  fight  at  Courtrai 
with  the  result  that  Sir  John  French  extricated  his  army 
on  the  Sambre.  Again  at  Le  Cateau,  this  same  corps  was 
diverted  to  the  west  by  d'Amade's  French  territorials,  and 
Smith-Dorrien's  2d  British  Corps  escaped. 

The  pauses,  if  any,  will  come  between  operations.  This 
is  particularly  true,  in  modern  war,  where  such  great 
preparations  must  be  made.  If  an  operation  is  carried 
out  as  it  should  be,  it  will  be  done  rapidly  and  that  of  course 
means  going  too  fast  for  the  most  perfect  supply  system. 

ON  THE  DEFENSE 

On  the  defense,  there  may  be  interruptions  in  the  flow 
of  events  arising  from  the  necessity  of  waiting  for  the 
moves  of  the  enemy.  This  does  not  mean  any  suspension  of 
activity  toward  reaching  the  final  aim,  which  very  fre- 
quently consists  largely  of  delays  and  expedients  to  gain 
time. 


152  STRATEGY 

PREVIOUS  PREPARATION  NECESSARY  IF  THE  OPERATION 
is  NOT  TO  BE  INTERRUPTED 

But,  if  the  action  within  one  and  the  same  operation 
is  to  be  carried  through  continuously,  without  any  inter- 
ruption, everything  that  the  troops  need  must  be  provided 
beforehand.  Their  subsistence,  supply,  and  ammunition 
must  be  carefully  arranged  for  the  whole  period  of  the 
operation. 

DASH 

The  distance  should  not  be  greater  than  can  be  covered 
in  one  spurt. 

In  military  history  we  seldom  come  across  operations 
that  consist  of  more  than  five  or  six  consecutive  marches  in 
the  same  direction  without  any  change  of  plan  or  idea. 
To  stop  in  the  midst  of  an  operation  merely  because  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  men  makes  it  necessary,  is  fatal  to  success. 

The  enemy  will  be  quick  to  notice  if  we  have  under- 
taken more  than  we  can  carry  out. 

DISTANCE  Too  LONG 

If  the  commander  feels  that  the  distance  is  too  long 
to  carry  out  the  movement  in  one  continuous  series,  he 
had  better  divide  up  the  operation,  or  else  try  to  push  his 
troops  forward  unperceived  to  a  point  closer  to  the  enemy, 
before  the  actual  operation  starts.  He  may  thereby  arrive 
at  a  point  from  which  he  can  reach  the  decisive  position  in 
one  bound. 

After  the  capture  of  the  mountain  passes  in  Man- 
churia, the  Japanese  delayed  over  a  month  until  reinforce- 
ments could  be  brought  up  for  the  final  operations  at  Liao 
Yang.  Had  they  attempted  to  continue  on  without  any 
interruption  they  probably  would  have  reached  the  line  of 
the  Sha-Ho  and  Tai-Tzu-Ho  too  exhausted  to  have  taken  the 
offensive. 

HALTING  PLACE  A  NATURAL  OBSTACLE 

This  stopping  point  should  be  on  some  natural  obstacle 
that  lends  itself  to  defense,  such  as  the  Danube,  where 
Napoleon  stopped  after  the  Echmuhl  campaign,  or  the 
Minho,  part  of  the  boundary  between  Spain  and  Portugal, 
where  Soult  stopped. 


OPERATIONS  153 

PREPARATION 

With  the  halting  at  the  obstacle  in  question  comes  the 
making  of  further  preparations,  such  as  advancing  rail- 
heads for  distribution  of  ammunition,  food,  forage  and 
other  supplies,  and  the  preparation  of  the  means  for  cross- 
ing the  river,  if  that  be  the  obstacle  on  which  we  have 
stopped.  Any  inordinate  delay  in  these  preparations  will 
inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  defender. 

In  the  campaign  of  invasion  of  Portugal,  Marshal 
Soult  was  forced  to  make  .a  detour  of  140  miles,  due  to  the 
fact  that  upon  arriving  at  the  Minho  River,  contrary  to 
his  expectation,  he  found  all  the  bridges  down,  the  inhab- 
itants hostile,  and  he  had  made  no  arrangements  for  bridg- 
ing the  river. 

As  an  illustration  of  a  laughable  failure  to  make 
preparations,  we  have  but  to  look  at  the  ill-starred  pontons 
of  Fredericksburg.  It  took  nearly  a  month  to  move  them 
from  the  vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry  to  the  vicinity  of 
Fredericksburg. 

"The  beginning  of  the  operation  should  be  co-incident 
with  the  last  essential  preparatory  step." 

PLAN  OR  PROJECT  OF  OPERATION 

Before  the  adoption  of  the  present  military  systems, 
governments  usually  waited  until  their  political  relations 
became  so  strained  as  to  point  to  hostilities  before  estab- 
lishing a  plan"  of  operations. 

At  such  a  juncture,  questions  relating  to  the  probable 
theater  of  operations  and  the  immediate  plans  and  strength 
of  the  enemy  demanded  immediate  consideration. 

The  second  step  was  to  consider  the  measures  neces- 
sary to  meet  these  conditions. 

A  project  was  thus  formed  and  constituted  the  plan 
of  campaign,  or  project  of  operations,  as  it  is  called  by  the 
French. 

Today  this  will  not  do.  The  opening  of  the  campaign 
so  closely  follows  the  declaration  of  war,  and  the  affairs 
at  the  outset  are  so  multiplex,  that  the  government  would 
have  no  time  to  prepare  a  plan  if  it  waited  until  so  late 
a  day. 


164  STRATEGY 

"It  is  therefore  imperative  that  governments  prepare, 
in  time  of  peace,  these  projects  and,  while  they  cannot 
be  put  into  practice  in  exactly  the  same  form  as  when  de- 
vised, yet  probable  hypotheses  may  be  assumed  so  sweep- 
ing as  to  take  in  all  possible  contingencies. 

These  plans  may  be  defined  as  the  exposition  of  the 
first  combinations  which  are  to  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  armies 
in  their  operations. 

"A  government  declaring  war  must  have  some  idea  as- 
to  what  its  line  of  procedure  will  be  at  the  outset,  for  vague- 
ness of  purpose  produces  vacillation  and  uncertainty  in 
the  commands,  which  in  turn  will  be  followed  by  feeble  and 
incomplete  execution  on  the  part  of  the  troops." 

The  essential  points  in  devising  a  plan  of  operations 
are  to  apprehend  with  judgment  how  far  we  can  go  and 
to  what  extent  we  are  permitted  to  enter  details. 

To  guard  against  letting  arbitrary  and  academic  as- 
sumptions creep  in. 

Not  to  draw  erroneous  inferences  nor  figure  that  our 
preliminary  plans  will  be  carried  out  exactly  as  laid. 

Even  though  we  may  be  superior  to  the  enemy,  it  would 
be  wrong  to  figure  that  we  can  defeat  him,  no  matter  how 
we  play  the  game. 

The  allies,  in  1814,  were  greatly  superior  to  Napoleon 
and  seemed  to  be  operating  with  contempt  for  the  princi- 
ples of  war  as  they  were  known  in  those  days.  The  result 
was  that  Napoleon  protracted  the  final  campaign  and  made 
it  an  affair  of  months,  whereas  it  should  have  been  an  affair 
of  weeks.  Napoleon  could  bring  into  the  field  a  little  over 
200,000  men,  while  the  allies  had  about  1,000,000  men. 

"The  selection  of  the  proper  plan  of  operations  to  be 
followed  in  each  case  will  make  demands  on  the  general 
staff  that  will  tax  its  knowledge  of  existing  conditions,  and 
will  be  an  indication  of  its  true  grasp  of  the  situation  and 
reflect  credit  or  discredit  on  its  intelligence  in  the  same 
ratio  as  its  plans  work  out  or  fail  when  actually  put  to 
the  test." 

Napoleon  Bonaparte  is  supposed  to  have  made  the 
statement  that  he  never  had  a  plan  of  operations. 


OPERATIONS  155 

This  may  be  true,  but  everyone  knows  today  with  what 
care  the  Emperor  bestowed  his  attention  upon  the  prepara- 
tions for  his  first  movements  in  every  campaign. 

On  this  subject  he  wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph  on  the 
6th  of  June,  1806:  "Nothing  is  attained  in  war  except  by 
calculation.  During  a  campagin,  whatever  is  not  pro- 
foundly considered  in  all  its  details  is  without  result.  Every 
enterprise  should  be  conducted  according  to  a  system; 
chance  alone  can  never  bring  success." 

We  can  see  in  all  Napoleon's  undertakings  that,  from 
the  outset,  they  were  directed  toward  some  great  and  per- 
fectly definite  objective  which  we  can  readily  recognize. 

Sometimes  it  was  the  separation  of  the  enemy's  army 
from  its  base,  as,  for  example,  in  the  campaigns  of  1800 
and  1805;  sometimes  it  was  the  threatening  of  a.  capital, 
for  protection  of  which  the  enemy  was  forced  to  give  up 
the  attack,  or  give  battle  at  no  matter  what  costs. 

Such  was  the  case  in  the  campaign  of  1806  in  Germany. 

Before  this  campaign,  it  is  said  that  Jomini  discovered, 
to  the  great  surprise  of  Napoleon,  not  only  the  goal  at 
which  he  was  aiming,  but  also  the  path  he  was  first  going  to 
take.  Both  these  points  were  thus  discernible  to  the  in- 
tellect of  an  attentive  observer. 

The  surprising  changes  which  the  great  master  of  war 
himself  did  not  anticipate  were  brought  about  partly  by 
the  dispositions  of  the  enemy  and  partly  by  his  mistakes, 
which  Napoleon  took  advantage  of. 

The  plan  should  establish  what  we  intend  to  do  and 
what  we  hope  to  be  able  to  attain  with  the  means  at  our 
disposal. 

It  cannot  entirely  regulate  the  individual  movements 
or  undertakings  by  means  of  which  we  wish  to  arrive  at 
our  goal. 

THE  FIRST  ENCOUNTER 

There  is  nothing  that  exerts  a  greater  influence  on  the 
plan  than  the  first  encounter.  In  The  World  War,  Ger- 
many considered  France  as  her  principal  adversary,  hence 
her  rapid  defeat  would  clear  up  the  political  horizon  and 
enable  Germany  to  turn  her  masses  on  Russia.  Likewise, 
the  defeat  of  France  would  have  had  the  moral  effect  of 


156  STRATEGY 

keeping  both  England  and  Italy  out  of  the  war.  The  Ger- 
man general  strategic  plan  was  to  entice  the  French  army 
into  Belgium  and  there  cut  it  off  by  an  advance  from  the 
east ;  failing  in  this,  from  the  Sambre  on  she  then  tried  an 
envelopment  of  the  left. 

Prior  to  Worth  and  Spicheren,  the  plan  of  the  French 
in  1870  was  the  offensive  with  a  crossing  of  the  Rhine  south 
of  Mainz,  and  a  movement  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  Na- 
poleon I  in  the  1806  campaign.  The  first  battles  threw  the 
French  back  on  the  defensive  and  changed  the  German 
line  of  advance,  for  the  time  being,  from  the  east  to  the 
northeast  via  the  lines  of  the  Saar,  and  not  the  upper  Rhine 
between  Gersheim  and  Strassburg  as  was  expected. 

In  this  connection,  Derrecagaix  says :  "It  is  not 
possible  for  the  project  to  go  beyond  the  first  battle,  because 
a  decisive  action  often  changes  the  situation.  New  com- 
binations and  new  projects  will  consequently  be  required." 
"It  would  then,"  as  von  Moltke  has  said,  "be  an  error  to 
expect  to  see  in  the  development  of  a  campaign,  the  com- 
plete execution  of  a  plan  settled  in  advance  in  all  its  details. 
The  leader  of  an  army,  no  doubt,  has  always  before  his 
eyes  the  essential  objects  to  be  pursued,  but  he  can  never 
indicate  precisely  the  ways  in  which  it  may  be  reached." 
"During  the  course  of  operations,"  says  General  Berthaut, 
"there  arise,  even  leaving  battles  out  of  consideration,  many 
unforeseen  events,  such  as  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  or 
a  change  in  the  manner  of  grouping  the  forces,  which  mod- 
ify the  situation,  and  give  rise  to  new  problems,  the  solu- 
tion of  which  cannot  be  determined  in  advance." 

CANNOT  Go  BEYOND  CONCENTRATION 

"In  modern  wars,  operations  begin  with  the  completion 
of  the  strategic  concentration,  and  the  first  battles  ensue 
immediately  thereafter,  so  it  follows  that  the  farthest  range 
of  the  plan  generally  cannot  be  permitted  to  extend  much 
beyond  the  concentration.  After  that,  the  great  general 
purpose  alone  remains  as  the  guiding  star  for  the  com- 
mander in  his  undertakings." 

"A  plan  of  campaign,"  says  Ludendorff,  "can  and 
must  be  planned  a  long  time  ahead.  Battles  in  a  war  of 
positions  demand  similar  treatment,  but  the  rapid  succes- 


OPERATIONS  157 

sion  of  events  in  a  war  of  movement  bring  about  equally 
rapid  changes  in  a  commander's  views  and  impressions. 
He  has  to  be  guided  by  feeling,  intuition.  Thus  the  mili- 
tary science  becomes  an  art  and  the  soldier  a  strategist." 
In  response  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the  battle  of 
Tannenberg  had  been  fought  according  to  a  long  conceived 
and  prepared  plan,  he  answered  "that  it  had  not,"  and 
delivered  himself  of  the  above  sentiment. 

POLITICAL  SITUATION 

It  is  absolutely  necessary  for  a  general  to  grasp  suc- 
cessfully the  main  purpose  of  a  campaign.  He  must  have 
a  correct  understanding  of  the  whole  military  and  political 
situation  combined  with  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  efficiency 
of  his  own  forces  and  those  of  the  enemy. 

In  1870,  the  French  committed  a  fundamental  military 
error  in  not  knowing  the  whole  military  situation.  They 
thought  they  could  assume  the  strategic  offensive  and  sur- 
prise the  Germans  with  an  army  whose  larger  units  were 
not  to  be  formed  until  it  assembled,  whose  reserves  could 
not  arrive  until  the  army  had  started  its  strategic  concen- 
tration, and  whose  administrative  heads  contemplated  strict 
centralization. 

This,  notwithstanding,  they  knew,  or  ought  to  have 
known,  that  their  enemy  had  carefully  prepared  all  the 
details  of  his  mobilization  beforehand.  However,  Napoleon 
III  was  not  entirely  to  blame.  (1)  He  had  been  deceived  as 
to  the  real  condition  of  his  army.  (2)  The  South  German 
States,  through  their  press,  at  the  instigation  of  Bismarck, 
had  been  printing  anti-Prussian  articles  in  their  papers  with 
a  view  of  leading  Napoleon  III  to  think  that  they  would  be 
his  allies  the  instant  he  entered  their  territory.  (3)  Na- 
poleon's hold  on  the  French  people  was  not  such  that  he 
could  chance  a  defensive  war. 

The  project  submitted  by  Marshal  Niel  and  General 
Frossard  in  1868  went  into  all  these  matters  and  recom- 
mended a  defensive.  We  see  that  Napoleon  III  violated  the 
two  precepts  laid  down  by  most  writers.  He  did  not  know 
the  true  political  situation,  nor  the  true  powers  and  lim- 
itations of  his  army. 


158  STRATEGY 

The  Turkish  army  that  acted  on  the  offensive  in  the 
wars  against  Serbia  and  Montenegro  very  wisely  took  up 
the  defensive  when  it  came  to  the  war  with  Russia. 

"The  Turks  knew  that  their  organization  was  not 
such  as  would  admit  of  a  forward  movement,  so  they 
adopted  the  defensive,  but  went  too  far  in  that  they  re- 
sorted to  the  passive  defensive  and  allowed  the  Russians  to 
cross  the  Danube  without  opposition,  and  then  only  held 
the  Balkans  in  a  half-hearted  way.  They,  at  least,  could 
have  destroyed  the  bridges  across  the  Danube  and  made 
greater  use  of  their  navy." 

The  fighting  qualities  of  the  Turks,  as  disclosed  by 
Osman  Pasha's  army  at  Plevna,  leads  one  to  believe  that 
they  would  have  done  quite  well  on  the  offensive. 

Russia,  in  the  War  of  1878,  did  not  fully  understand 
the  military  situation,  for  after  the  first  concentration  and 
her  subsequent  check,  she  had  to  delay  four  months  await- 
ing the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from  the  home  country. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Federal  government 
in  1861  so  little  appreciated  the  situation  that  the  first  call 
for  volunteers  was  for  90  days.  The  politicians  were 
so  positive  of  a  short  war  that,  when  Sherman  at  Cincinnati 
reported  that  it  would  take  about  200,000  men  to  subdue 
opposition  in  the  West  they  regarded  this  statement  as  that 
of  a  crazy  man,  then  transferred  their  opprobrium  to  him 
personally  and  finally  had  him  relieved. 

KIND  OF  TROOPS  FOR  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE 

"To  plan  a  strategic  offensive,  which  requires  prompt- 
ness and  energy,  with  unweildy  levies,  whose  leaders  have 
not  even  had  an  opportunity  to  gain  the  necessary  exper- 
ience in  moving  considerable  bodies  of  troops  in  large 
peace  maneuvers,  is  like  building  a  house  without  a  foun- 
dation/' 

Some  writers  argue  that  the  decision  as  to  whether  or 
not  a  country  shall  take  the  offensive  is  controlled  by  the 
nature  of  the  country  in  which  the  army  is  liable  to  operate. 
This  is  solely  a  question  of  adapting  organizations  and  for- 
mations to  it.  In  South  Africa,  the  British  discovered  that 
their  formations  would  have  to  undergo  a  change,  as  both 
of  the  contending  sides  did  in  The  World  War.  To  meet  pos- 


OPERATIONS  159 

sible  troubles  in  the  Alps,  both  Italy  and  France  have  spe- 
cially trained  Alpine  troops.  The  preponderance  of  any 
particular  arm  is  regulated  sometimes  by  the  nature  of  the 
country  in  which  the  army  is  likely  to  operate.  For  many 
years,  subsequent  to  the  Civil  War,  the  army  of  the  United 
States  was  disproportionately  strong  in  mounted  troops, 
due  to  the  fact  that  most  of  the  service  was  on  the  plains, 
but  when  it  came  to  The  World  War  most  of  the  cavalry  had 
to  be  converted  into  some  other  arm. 

"On  the  other  hand,  to  limit  to  the  defensive  an  army 
which  is  well  disciplined,  possessing  trained  leaders  and 
proper  equipment,  and  which  is  opposed  by  an  inferior 
enemy,  is  to  bury  a  treasure,  unless  the  enemy's  overwhelm- 
ing superiority  in  numbers  forces  this  line  of  action." 

Lee,  during  the  first  part  of  the  Civil  War,  realized 
the  superiority  of  his  army,  at  least  in  leadership,  and 
wisely  took  the  offensive. 

NOBODY  SHOULD  TAKE  THE  DEFENSIVE  DELIBERATELY 

Of  course  nobody  would  knowingly  be  guilty  of  such 
an  error  as  assuming  the  defensive  deliberately,  unless 
conditions  warranted  it.  However,  we  must  beware  of 
jingoes  who  imagine  that  the  army,  just  because  it  belongs 
to  their  country,  is  capable  of  everything.  We  witness 
the  "On  to  Berlin"  element-  of  1870  and  the  "On  to  Rich- 
mond" element  of  1861. 

The  first  requisite  for  a  proper  grasp  of  the  military 
object  of  the  plan  of  operations  is  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  our  own  capabilities  and  resources.  This  not  only 
applies  to  the  capability  of  the  men,  but  more  particu- 
larly to  that  of  the  leaders. 

When  General  Halleck  refused  permission  to  Pope  for 
an  advance  on  Richmond  in  1862,  when  Lee  was  making  his 
movement  around  Pope's  right,  Halleck  clearly  took  into 
consideration  the  incapacity  of  Pope. 

Every  officer  when  placed  in  command  and  given  a 
task  to  perform,  should  weigh  his  own  abilities,  before 
adopting  any  project.  In  the  1800  campaign,  Napoleon  al- 
lowed Moreau  to  adopt  his  own  ideas  in  the  movement 
against  Kray,  fully  realizing  that  the  moves  that  he,  Na- 


160  STRATEGY 

poleon,  would  have  carried  out  required  a  Napoleon  to  be 
present  to  execute  them. 

From  this  we  see  that  often  a  perfectly  good  plan  will 
have  to  be  abandoned  for  want  of  a  suitable  man  to  carry 
it  out. 

OBJECT  REMAINS  THE  SAME 

The  plan  to  be  worked  out  at  the  opening  of  a  cam- 
paign fixes  an  object  for  the  military  operations,  and  this 
remains  the  same  for  the  whole  duration  of  the  hostilities, 
unless,  as  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  requirements 
laid  down  by  policy  themselves  undergo  modification. 

The  object  of  the  War  of  1870  between  France  and 
Germany,  in  so  far  as  it  pertained  to  King  William  I, 
was  the  overthrow  of  the  dynastic  armies  of  Napoleon  III, 
and  when  the  victory  at  Sedan  made  that  certain,  he  favored 
peace  with  France.  Bismarck,  Moltke  and  von  Roon  were 
of  a  different  idea.  The  matter  was  settled,  however,  by 
the  French  people  organizing  the  Army  of  the  Loire  and 
throwing  down  the  gauntlet  to  Germany.  It  then  was  a 
war  between  France  and  Germany. 

The  determination  of  an  object  so  fixed  as  to  be  un- 
affected by  the  vicissitudes  and  fluctuations  of  the  military 
operations  gives  the  war  its  special  character,  its  form, 
its  unity. 

"No  consideration,  military  or  otherwise,  should  enter 
the  commander-in-chief's  mind  that  does  not  tend  to  the 
success  of  the  plan  which  has  been  settled  upon  in  view 
of  the  object  of  the  war." 

Dumouriez  has  frequently  been  blamed  for  having 
merely  followed  up  the  Prussians  after  Valmy,  instead  of 
trying  to  bring  them  to  battle.  France  had  fixed  as  the  ob- 
ject of  the  war  against  the  Prussians,  the  liberation  of 
French  soil,  and  when,  therefore,  the  day  after  Valmy,  the 
Prussian  army  began  to  retreat  toward  the  Rhine,  Du- 
mouriez could  see  that  his  plan  of  campaign  was  successful. 

Under  these  conditions,  to  have  delivered  battle  would 
have  been,  in  case  of  a  defeat,  a  gratuitous  blunder  that 
would  have  compromised  a  favorable  situation,  and  perhaps 
incited  the  Prussians  to  march  again  on  Paris.  Thus,  in  not 
attacking  Brunswick's  retreating  army,  Dumouriez  acted 
in  conformity  with  the  aims  of  policy. 


OPERATIONS  161 

When,  in  1813,  all  Europe  was  leagued  against  Na- 
poleon, the  assigned  object  of  the  war  was  the  suppression 
of  the  Emperor  himself.  To  attain  this  object,  it  was  nec- 
essary not  only  to  destroy  the  Imperial  armies,  but  also 
to  dry  up  the  Imperial  power  at  its  source.  The  war  was 
not,  and  could  not  be  concluded  the  day  after  Leipsic;  it 
had  to  be  pursued  until  Napoleon  was  deprived  of  his 
armies  and  his  throne.  The  Tsar  Alexander,  the  head  of 
the  coalition,  had  consequently  to  lead  his  armies  from 
Moscow  to  Paris. 

OFFENSIVE  OR  DEFENSIVE 

The  first  important  point  in  preparing  the  plan  of 
operations  will  be  to  decide  on  the  general  method  of  con- 
ducting the  war ;  whether  it  is  advisable  to  proceed  to  attack 
the  enemy,  or  to  wait  an  improvement  in  the  situation, 
on  the  defensive.  If  we  have  several  opponents,  we  must 
decide  against  which  one  we  had  better  direct  our  main 
efforts,  and  which  one  we  can  treat  as  being  of  minor 
importance. 

In  The  World  War  it  looks  very  much  as  if  Germany 
had  decided  upon  the  extermination  of  France  first;  cer- 
tainly she  should  have  stuck  to  her  plan  and  not  have  allowed 
the  approach  of  SamsonofFs  army  to  divert  any  troops. 
Tannenberg  was  a  glorious  victory  locally,  but  the  same 
troops  that  were  diverted  from  the  west  to  the  east  front 
to  accomplish  that  victory*  if  allowed  to  remain  with  the 
armies  in  France,  might  have  sealed  the  fate  of  France 
and  won  the  war. 

ALWAYS  FIGURE  THAT  THE  ENEMY  WILL  DO  THE 
RIGHT  THING 

We  should  always  ask  ourselves:  "What  is  the  enemy 
most  likely  to  do?"  The  art  of  war  does  not  entirely  forbid 
us  from  assuming  that  the  enemy  will  make  mistakes,  when 
we  have  special  reasons  for  thinking  that  we  can  expect 
them  with  certainty.  Yet  it  is  generally  wiser  to  assume 
that  he  will  do  what  is  correct — i.e.,  that  which  will  hurt 
us  the  most. 


162  STRATEGY 

Archduke  Albert  of  Austria,  in  the  campaign  of  1866 
against  Italy,  waited  until  his  greatly  superior  enemy  had 
done  the  incorrect  thing  and  then  took  advantage  of  it. 
The  archduke  had  about  75,000  men  while  the  Italians 
had  about  300,000  men.  The  Austrians  were  better  pre- 
pared, and  mobilized  almost  before  war  was  declared.  The 
Italians  wanted  to  turn  the  quadrilateral  nud  so  stationed 
one  army  behind  the  Oglio  and  the  other  upon  the  right 
bank  of  the  lower  Po,  separating  their  forces  greatly. 
The  archduke,  seeing  the  error,  at  once  concentrated  at 
Verona,  and  having  the  advantage  of  interior  lines,  defeated 
the  Italians  in  the  Custozza  campaign.  He  was  first  at- 
tacked by  the  King  of  Lombardy  but  defeated  him  and  then 
turned  on  General  Cialdini. 

CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  ENEMY 

"When  we  have  arrived  at  a  definite  assumption  as  to 
the  action  of  the  enemy,  we  must  then  picture  in  our  minds 
the  concentration  march  of  his  forces  which  will  be  gov- 
erned by  the  same  fundamental  principles  as  our  own.  The 
purpose  which  we  ascribe  to  him  for  engaging  in  hostil- 
ities will  indicate  to  us  the  area  of  his  concentration.  The 
peace  dispositions  of  his  troops,  which  should  not  be  unknown 
to  us,  as  well  as  the  position  and  extent  of  his  districts 
of  military  administration,  give  us  the  starting  points  from 
which  his  troops  move.  The  location  of  his  railroad,  dirt 
roads  and  water  routes  will  indicate  to  us  the  concentration 
area."  As  the  majority  of  the  German  railroads  cross  the 
line  north  of  Luxemburg,  it  was  not  hard  to  figure  the 
area  of  German  concentration  in  the  recent  war.  The 
Metz-Stenay-Sedan  route  was  too  far  south. 

OUR  OWN  STRATEGIC  PLANS  OF  CONCENTRATION 

If  we  decide  upon  the  offensive,  we  must  make  all  our 
arrangements  favor  co-operation  toward  the  front.  If  we 
decide  upon  the  defensive,  the  concentration  of  our  forces 
on  the  probable  line  of  advance  of  the  principal  bodies  of 
the  enemy's  forces  should  be  the  main  object.  In  the  latter 
case,  it  is  well  to  have  the  point  of  assembly  as  near  the 
enemy  as  the  security  of  the  concentration  will  permit,  for 
every  step  backward  sacrifices  territory  and  time. 


OPERATIONS  163 

After  this,  the  plan  for  the  offensive  can  cover 
the  roads  which  the  various  parts  of  the  army  are  to 
take.  It  can  go  still  farther  and  designate  the  place  of 
union  of  the  columns  before  battle,  as  well  as  the  special 
objective  to  be  attacked,  such  as  a  wing,  a  flank,  or  the 
center  of  the  enemy's  army. 

Only  the  most  general  plans  can  be  drawn  for  further 
operations  and  these  will  usually  state  what  the  mission  is, 
for  example,  cutting  of  the  enemy's  most  important  com- 
munication, without  which  his  very  existence  is  threatened. 
According  to  Napoleon,  the  easiest  way  to  defeat  an  enemy 
is  to  threaten  his  communications,  while  holding  our  own 
secure. 

VALUE  OF  ADVANCE  BASES 

It  will  hardly  be  possible  to  force  the  surrender  of  an 
army  in  modern  war  by  cutting  one  line  of  communications. 
All  that  is  necessary  for  it  to  do  is  merely  to  switch  to 
another  line  and  open  up  a  new  advance  base. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  fate  of  most  of  the  western 
armies  depended  upon  the  railroad  communications.  Rose- 
crans  refused  to  advance  until  either  the  railroad's  safety 
was  insured  or  until  he  had  accumulated  sufficient  supplies 
at  his  advance  base  in  Nashville. 

Without  the  Georgia  Central  Railroad,  Sherman  could 
not  have  gone  far  into  the  heart  of  Georgia,  and  every 
time  it  was  cut,  nis  operations  were  delayed  the  length 
of  time  necessary  to  repair  it. 

The  only  way  it  will  be  possible  at  present  to  decide 
the  fate  of  an  army  will  be  either  to  surround  it,  as  was 
done  at  Richmond  in  1865,  and  at  Metz  and  Sedan  in  1870, 
or  to  drive  the  hostile  army  back  upon  neutral  territory, 
as  was  done  by  Manteuffel  in  his  operations  against  Bour- 
baki's  communications  in  southeast  France,  which  resulted 
in  the  latter  being  forced  into  and  interned  by  Switzerland. 
Still  another  way  will  be  to  throw  the  army  back  upon  or 
against  the  shore  of  a  sea  that  it  does  not  control  or  to  in- 
tercept its  main  line  of  communications. 

This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  Germany  was  so  anxious 
to  secure  Ostend,  Dunkirk  and  Calais.  With  her  right 
resting  on  the  Straits  of  Dover  and  the  North  Sea,  she 


164  STRATEGY 

could  then  attempt  to  get  control  of  that  sea.  If  she  did 
not  succeed  and  her  center  was  pierced,  her  right  wing  would 
have  been  driven  back  upon  Holland  and  the  North  Sea, 
which  would  have  meant  her  end. 

Whether  the  piercing  of  the  Metz-Montmedy-Sedan 
railroad  line  was  fatal  to  Germany  in  the  recent  war  we 
do  not  know,  but  it  certainly  was  a  staggering  blow.  From 
reports  received  at  the  time,  it  is  believed  that  there  was 
lots  of  fight  still  left  in  the  German  army. 

MANNER  IN  WHICH  THE  ENEMY  WILL  BE  FORCED  TO 
ACCEPT  PEACE 

We  must  always  keep  in  mind  the  decisive  strokes  that 
will  most  readily  force  the  enemy  to  sue  for  peace. 

DEFENSIVE  PLAN 

The  defensive  plan  must  state,  among  other  things,  the 
strategical  position  from  which  the  first  resistance  is  to 
be  made,  or  in  case  this  is  only  to  be  temporary,  the  prob- 
able location  of  the  final  stand. 

In  a  good  consistent  plan  the  locality  at  which  the  de- 
cisive stand  is  to  be  made  will  be  the  locality  where  a  gen- 
eral change  for  the  better  is  to  be  expected. 

The  plan  then  should  show  from  what  source 
reinforcements  are  to  be  looked  for  so  that  the  withdrawal 
of  the  army  may  be  in  that  direction — not  away  from  it. 

It  is  quite  apparent  that  the  enemy  will  be  greatly 
weakened  if  our  line  of  retreat  will  lead  him  away  from 
his  objective,  for  his  own  communications  will  probably 
then  be  threatened  and  he  will  not  be  able  to  pass  us ;  if  he 
attacks  us,  he  will  have  to  form  front  to  flank. 

Dumouriez  in  1796,  retired  toward  Vitry  and  took  up 
a  position  facing  north  when  the  line  of  advance  of  the 
Brunswickers  had  been  west.  The  authorities  in  Paris 
wanted  him  to  retire  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cover  that 
city.  He  chose  this  flank  position,  forced  the  enemy  to 
attack  him,  and  in  the  battle  of  Valmy  defeated  the  in- 
vader so  that  he  withdrew  from  French  soil. 

The  plan  should  conclude  with  a  detailed  statement  of 
how  and  when  we  think  we  can  bring  about  the  desired  re- 
sult. 


OPERATIONS  165 

SENSIBLE  MODERATION  IN  PLAN 

"Sensible  moderation  is  the  quality  which  is  more  likely 
than  any  other  to  give  value  to  a  plan  of  operation.  If 
it  considers  too  much  time  and  space,  and  goes  too  far 
into  details,  which  depend  upon  chance  ariyhow,  it  will 
soon  be  contradicted  by  the  course  of  events." 

SHOULD  DESCRIBE  WHAT  THE  OTHER  FORCES  ARE  TO  DO 

The  plan  should  describe  what  all  the  armies  are  to  do. 
General  Grant's  plan  for  the  operations  of  all  the  Federal 
armies  in  the  theater  of  war  in  1864  was  the  first  plan 
arranging  for  the  co-operation  of  all  armies  to  be  effec- 
tively carried  out  in  the  Civil  War.  It  told  what  each  army 
was  to  do  and  when.  It  was  so  arranged  that  the  failure 
of  any  one  army  would  not  cause  the  failure  of  another, 
no  matter  how  much  it  might  jeopardize  the  latter's  success. 

Fortifications  exert  an  influence  on  the  strategic  con- 
centration, so  it  must  be  determined  beforehand  how  they 
are  to  be  handled.  We  must  make  suitable  assignments 
of  siege  material  in  advance  and  determine  what  places 
are  to  be  carried  by  assault  and  what  by  siege,  if  any.  We 
must  also  decide  where  we  will  pierce  the  frontier  and  the 
co-operation  between  the  army  and  navy.  Apparently  the 
Germans  forgot  to  make  suitable  assignment  of  siege  ar- 
tillery to  von  Emmich's  force  at  Liege  or  possibly  they  did 
not  expect  opposition;  at  all  events  they  had  to  send  back 
for  Austrian  Skoda  howitzers. 

PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS — CONSTITUENT  PARTS 

The  plan  of  operations  should  consist  of  a  record 
which  begins : 

1.  With   a  general   consideration  of  the  political   and  mili- 
tary situation. 

2.  Comparison  of  the  opposing  forces  with  one's  own  army. 

3.  The   general   plan   to   be   followed,   whether   offensive   or 
defensive. 

4.  Statement  of  probable  plans  of  the  enemy  and  probable 
points  of  his  concentration. 

5.  Point  of  concentration  of  our  own  forces  and  how  com- 
bined efforts  will  be  made. 

6.  The   direction   to   be   taken   in   the   first   movements,    the 
purpose   of   which   being  to   fight   a   decisive  battle   against  the 
enemy's  main  army  under  the  most  favorable  conditions. 


166  STRATEGY 

7.  Division  into  the  offensive  and  defensive  with   plans  for 
each,  together  with  combinations.    Under  the  heading  "Offensive" 
is  taken  up  the  method  to  be  pursued  which,  though  general, 
includes   events   leading   to   the   exaction   of   peace.      Under   the 
heading  "Defensive"  is  taken  up  the  action  in  event  of  an  invol- 
untary defensive  from  the  outset  and  the  action  in  event  of  a 
change  to  the  offensive  during  the  course  of  the  war. 

8.  A  general  discussion  of  lateral  issues. 

PRUSSIAN  PLAN  IN  1870 

"(1)  The  idea  of  invading  France  had  been  firmly 
rooted  in  the  German  mind  since  1815.  It  was  the  secret 
hope  of  all  the  patriots.  (2)  After  discussing  the  political 
condition  in  France,  von  Moltke  closely  considered  the 
respective  forces  of  France  and  Germany.  In  the  project, 
he  then  discussed  the  combinations  by  which  his  superior- 
ity, known  to  him,  could  be  increased.  Among  these  com- 
binations were  to  be  counted  those  likely  to  divide  the 
French  forces;  for  example,  an  isolated  attempt  by  France 
upon  the  South  German  States.  (3)  Then  came  a  study  of 
probable  French  operations.  Under  this  head  was  con- 
sidered: First,  a  French  advance  into  South  Germany. 
Second,  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Von  Moltke 
then  discussed  the  plan  for  blocking  the  advance  into  South 
Germany,  which  was  a  concentration  on  the  middle  Rhine 
with  a  threat  at  the  French  left  flank;  then  the  plan  for 
blocking  the  second  combination,  which  was  a  concentra- 
tion on  the  Moselle,  in  order  to  strike  the  French  right 
flank.  (4)  The  mobilization  of  the  two  antagonists  and  the 
probability  of  France  mobilizing  first.  The  decision  being 
that  Germany  could  mobilize  first,  the  plan  then  took  up: 
(5)  Selection  of  the  Palatinate  as  the  zone  of  concentration, 
and  grouped  the  forces  into  armies." 

LINES  AND  OBJECTS  OF  OPERATIONS 

"Lines  of  operations  are  the  routes  by  which  an  army 
moves  from  its  base  toward  its  object." 

"An  army  ought  to  have  but  one  line  of  operation,  which 
should  be  carefully  preserved,  and  abandoned  only  as  the 
result  of  weightier  and  overbearing  considerations." — Na- 
poleon's XII  War  Maxim. 

The  general  rule  is  that  the  most  advantageous  direc- 
tion of  the  lines  of  operations  is  that  which  permits  an 


OPERATIONS  167 

army  to  threaten  the  communications  of  the  enemy  without 
compromising  its  own. 

On  this  subject,  Jomini  states  the  following: 

First. — "The  direction  to  be  given  to  the  line  of  oper- 
ations depends  upon  the  geographical  configuration  of  the 
theater  of  operations,  and  the  position  of  the  enemy's 
forces." 

Second. — "Only  a  general  direction  of  march  can  be 
adopted,  which  will  be  either  upon  the  enemy's  center  or 
one  of  his  wings,  preferably  the  wing  which  is  nearer  his 
line  of  communications." 

Third. — "The  movement  may  be  made  upon  the  front 
and  both  wings  of  the  enemy  with  greatly  superior  force; 
but  to  make  a  practice  of  doing  this  is  to  court  disaster." 

Fourth. — "The  configuration  of  the  frontiers  generally 
exercises  a  great  influence  upon  the  direction  of  the  lines 
of  operations,  and  upon  the  advantages  attending  these 
lines." 

Single  combined  lines  of  operations  leading  toward  the 
enemy  are  best. 

In  1878,  the  Turks  had  three  distinct  lines  of  operations 
and  tried  to  use  them  all.  The  Russians  had  one  leading 
direct  to  Adrianople  with  the  result  that  the  Turks,  having 
no  cohesion  in  their  efforts,  were  driven  back. 

It  is  simply  a  question  of  communications,  the  means 
of  which  of  course  at  the  present  time  are  better  than  in 
the  past. 

With  the  enormous  land  forces  of  modern  great  powers 
we  shall  seldom  have  a  single  line  of  operations  to  deal 
with.  We  shall  have  several  that  lead  in  the  same  direc- 
tion toward  the  objective.  With  due  regard  to  the  necessary 
freedom  of  motion,  each  army  will  be  assigned  its  own 
line  of  operations.  But  the  co-operation  of  all  will  be 
necessary. 

In  Manchuria,  the  1st,  2d,  and  4th  Armies  had  sep- 
arate lines  of  operations,  yet  all  were  so  arranged  as  to 
co-operate,  and  no  advances  were  made  until  such  a  co-oper- 
ation was  insured. 

Lines  of  operations  separated  by  an  impassable  ob- 
stacle are  bad,  particularly  if  the  enemy  can  throw  his 
force  against  one  column  while  it  is  separated  from  the 


168  STRATEGY 

other  columns  by  this  obstacle.  This  is  what  Napoleon  did  in 
1797,  when  Quasdanovich,  west  of  Lake  Garda,  was  ad- 
vancing on  Brescia,  and  Wurmser,  east  of  the  lake,  was 
advancing  on  Verona.  While  holding  off  the  latter  he  de- 
feated the  former  and  then  turned  on  the  latter. 

The  route  over  which  the  army  marches  is  generally 
dirt  road,  so  we  may  say  that  the  line  of  operations  are 
generally  dirt  roads,  yet  now  and  then  we  find  other  means. 

The  line  of  operations  of  the  Federal  army  at  Fort 
Henry  was  most  all  by  water,  as  Grant's  forces  went  by 
boat. 

During  the  Magenta  and  Solferino  campaigns  in  Italy 
in  1859,  the  French  turning  movement  against  the  Aus- 
trians  by  way  of  Vercelli  was  by  railroad. 

CHOICE 

The  importance  of  the  right  choice  of  lines  of  opera- 
tion is  evident.  It  embraces  the  proper  recognition  of  the 
goal  and  the  selection  of  the  best  way  to  reach  it.  Thh 
is  not  always  the  shortest,  but  the  most  expedient,  when 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  have  been  taken  into 
consideration. 

Jomini  says :  "The  art  of  arranging  the  lines  of  op- 
eration in  the  most  advantageous  way  is  one  of  the  es- 
sentials of  the  science  of  war." 

The  whole  field  of  strategy  lies  in  the  theory  of  lines 
of  operations  and  the  proper  selection.  As  one  author  has 
expressed  it,  strategy  consists  in  the  selection  of  a  line  of 
operations. 

Napoleon  always  selected  for  his  line  of  operations  the 
one  that  would  bring  about  the  greatest  results — that  is, 
decisive  defeat  or  capture  of  the  enemy's  army. 

He  wished  Moreau,  in  the  campaign  of  1800,  to  advance 
south  of  the  Rhine  in  Switzerland  and  then  to  strike  north 
toward  the  Danube,  cutting  off  Kray  from  Vienna,  and 
thereby  forcing  its  surrender.  Moreau  was  not  capable 
enough  to  carry  out  this  move,  but  instead  demonstrated 
in  Kray's  front  while  attempting  to  turn  him.  The  result 
was  that  Kray  was  defeated,  but  none  the  less  was  able 
to  retire  toward  Ratisbon. 

A  further  discussion  of  this  subject  will  appear  under 
the  heading  "Lines  of  Communication." 


OPERATIONS  169 

THE  OBJECT  OF  OPERATIONS 

The  objept  to  which  a  movement  relates  is  called  the 
object  of  operations. 

"As  all  important  undertakings  in  war  require  co-op- 
eration of  the  forces  the  lines  of  march  leading  to  the  ob- 
ject will  in  the  nature  of  things  be  convergent."  However, 
we  must  not  consider  the  object  as  stationary,  but  movable. 
The  choice  of  objectives  depends  on  conditions  either  polit- 
ical or  military.  We  may  deduce  the  following  general 
rules  for  the  choice  of  objectives : 

First. — The  hostile  main  army. 

Second. — Important  strategical  points  in  the  theater 
of  operations  as  indicated  by  the  position  of  the  hostile 
armies.  These  points  may  be  either  of  material  or  moral 
advantage. 

Third. — Large  railway  centers,  fortified  places,  points 
of  junction  in  lines  of  communication  and  finally  the  cap- 
ital. 

Sebastopol  is  an  illustration  of  a  strategical  point  cap- 
tured on  account  of  its  material  importance. 

The  material  and  moral  effect  of  the  capture  of  Port 
Arthur  by  the  Japanese  was  great.  In  a  material  way,  it 
ended  the  Russian  fleet  and  released  Nogi's  army,  and  in 
a  moral  way  it  virtually  marked  the  ending  of  the  war. 

The  railroad  centers  of  Roulers  in  Belgium  and  Cam- 
brai  in  France  were  the  repeated  objects  of  the  allies. 
They  were  junction  points  on  the  German  lines  of  com- 
munications. 

Hannibal  was  deprived  of  the  fruits  of  his  victory  in 
Italy,  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  unable  to  capture  Rome. 

During  the  days  of  Napoleon  neither  the  capture  of 
the  Spanish  nor  of  the  Russian  capital  decided  the  war;  nor 
did  the  capture  of  Washington  in  the  American  War  of 
1812. 

The  general  rule  has  been  that  with  a  government  that 
is  popular  with  the  people,  the  fall  of  the  capital  has  had 
little  deciding  effect;  but,  where  the  government  is  tyran- 
nical and  despotic,  the  fall  of  the  capital  has  meant  over- 
throw of  the  government  and  generally  the  loss  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XI 

Base  of  Operations 


\7  ARIOUS  meanings  have  been  attached  to  the  expres- 
sion "base  of  operations."  At  one  time  the  term 
meant  a  point  at  which  magazines  were  constructed  for 
housing  supplies,  and  campaigning  meant  nothing  more 
than  an  advance  from  one  base  to  another.  Often  the  op- 
eration of  a  whole  campaign  only  aimed  at  gaining  a  base 
for  another.  The  inconvenience  of  assembling  supplies 
at  one  point  led  to  the  selection  of  several  points  con- 
nected by  some  suitable  mediums  of  communication,  such 
as  rivers,  dirt  roads,  and  later  railroads. 

Former  German  writers  on  military  subjects,  in  their 
desire  to  reduce  as  many  military  propositions  to  an  exact 
science  as  possible,  adopted  the  idea  of  a  triangular  base 
and  attempted  to  say  how  high  the  altitude  of  the  triangle 
should  be  consistent  with  safety.  The  term  base  to  them 
meant  a  line  joining  certain  magazines  from  which  the 
army  drew  its  supplies. 

The  lines  leading  from  both  ends  of  this  base  to  the 
objective  formed,  together  with  the  base  itself,  a  triangle, 
which  represented  the  theater  of  war  within  which  the  army 

It  goes  without  saying  that  in  the  triangle  with  the 
was  able  to  draw  its  supplies. 

highest  altitude  there  is  greater  danger  of  the  intercep- 
tion of  the  communications. 

One  writer,  arguing  profusely  but  strictly  mathemat- 
ically, arrived  at  a  conclusion  that  an  operation  could  only 
be  carried  on  successfully  if  the  altitude  of  the  triangle 
was  such  that  the  angle  opposite  the  base  was  greater  than 
60  degrees,  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  claim  that  the  semi- 
circular enveloping  form  of  a  base  was  the  best  because 
within  such  an  arc  the  enemy  could  not  take  up  a  tenable 
position.  Decidedly  academic. 

170 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  171 

MEANING  OF  BASE  IN  THE  MODERN  SENSE* 

The  term  base  nowadays  means  the  entire  district 
from  which  we  draw  our  supplies,  and  we  say  that  an 
army  is  based  on  such  and  such  a  district  or  province. 

During  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  Japanese  were 
based  on  the  entire  islands  of  Japan. 

HIGHER  VALUATION  ON  BASE  IN  OLDEN.  TIMES 

The  armies  of  olden  days  placed  a  higher  valuation 
on  the  base  than  we  do  at  present,  the  reason  being  that 
they  did  not  have  the  modern  means  of  transportation; 
so  it  was  imperative  that  they  remain  in  close  touch  with 
their  supplies. 

BEST  BASES  IN  FORMER  TIMES 
NAVIGABLE  RIVER 

Formerly  a  navigable  river,  with  a  row  of  fortifications 
commanding  both  banks  at  the  principal  points  of  crossing, 
appeared  to  be  the  best  base  of  operations. 

MILITARY  ROAD 

Lines  of  fortification  connected  by  a  military  road 
were  next  in  order  of  value. 

In  1805,  Napoleon  used  the  Danube  with  the  various 
fortresses  on  it  as  a  base,  and  in  1806,  the  Main  and  the 
Rhine  with  the  principal  magazines  respectively  at  Mainz 
and  Strassburg. 

Along  the  base,  and  protected  by  fortresses,  were 
established  commissary  depots  where  clothing  and  shoes 
were  stored,  and  enough  ammunition  for  the  whole  cam- 
paign was  collected.  Workshops  were  erected  there  for  the 
repair  of  war  material  that  was  damaged  and  for  the  re- 
placing of  that  which  was  lost.  Artillery,  pontons  and 
wagons  were  collected.  Even  recruiting  depots  were  es- 
tablished in  order  to  make  good  the  losses  sustained  in 
battle.  In  a  word,  the  household  of  the  army  was  so  ar- 


*NOTE : — In  the  study  of  this  chapter  we  must  not  confuse  the  term  base  with 
the  source  of  supply.  When  the  word  base  is  used  it  must  be  understood  to  mean 
the  base  of  operations,  immediate  base  or  advance  base ;  and  when  we  use  the 
term  base  of  supply  we  mean  the  ultimate  base  which  generally  is  the  home  country. 
We  must  also  remember  that  often  the  base  of  operations  and  base  of  supply  are 
one  and  the  same  thing. 


172  -STRATEGY 

ranged  as  to  be  able  to  be  put  in  good  condition  again 
after  previous  exertions  and  losses. 

After  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  one  of  the  first  things 
that  Napoleon  did  was  to  open  up  a  line  of  magazines 
along  the  road  leading  back  to  France. 

Louis  XIV  was  the  most  successful  monarch  of  his 
age  and  carried  on  a  great  many  successful  wars,  the 
success  of  which  was  due  to  his  system  of  commissariat. 
Louvois,  his 'minister  of  finance,  had  established  in  France 
a  cordon  of  magazines  which  he  kept  stocked  at  all  times 
with  six  months'  war  materials.  As  a  result,  Louis 
was  able  to  begin  his  wars  at  least  half  a  year  before  his 
opponents  were  ready. 

All  great  commanders  have  attached  the  greatest  im- 
portance to  the  possession  of  a  good  base,  no  matter  how 
much  their  campaigns  may  have  been  characterized  by 
audacity. 

ALEXANDER 

Alexander  the  Great,  after  his  first  victories  over  the 
Persians  in  Asia  Minor,  was  sorely  tempted  to  follow  at 
the  heels  of  the  defeated  armies,  and  thus  derive  the  full 
benefit  from  the  advantages  he  had  gained ;  but  he  refrained 
from  doing  it  from  fear  of  failure  of  supplies. 

After  the  battle  of  Granicus,  and  again  after  the  battle 
of  Issus,  he  turned  first  to  the  maritime  countries  along 
the  coast  of  the  Mediterranean  and  undertook  wearisome 
sieges  in  order  to  gain  the  harbors  situated  there,  so  as 
to  establish  communication  with  his  own  country  and  its 
emporiums,  for  the  maintenance  of  his  army.  He  consid- 
ered the  conquest  of  Egypt  necessary  before  he  could  em- 
bark on  his  march  into  the  interior,  for  he  wished  to  pro- 
vide himself  with  the  naval  forces  which  he  required  in 
the  continuance  of  his  conquests.  Having  started  from 
small  and  remote  Macedonia,  he  changed  his  base,  after 
his  invasion  of  Asia,  and  used  the  whole  eastern  coast  of 
the  Mediterranean  for  that  purpose. 

NAPOLEON  IN  1800 

In  the  campaign  of  1800,  characterized  by  the  greatest 
audacity,  Napoleon  was  more  than  careful  as  to  his  base. 
Bonaparte,  then  first  consul,  was  to  oppose  the  Austrians, 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  173 

under  Kray  on  the  Rhine,  and  Melas  in  Italy.  Grasping 
the  importance  of  the  Danube,  he  Wished  to  mass  a  force 
of  180,000  men  on  the  Rhine  and  40,000  in  the  Alps.  His 
plan  was  to  occupy  Switzerland,  which  projected  between 
the  two  theaters,  and,  using  it  as  one  side  of  the  angle,  to 
have  the  Rhine  the  other  side  of  this  angular  base  of 
operations  against  Kray.  He  massed  his  reserve  army  at 
Lake  Geneva  and  held  it  there  until  Moreau  had  driven  Kray 
back,  when  he  moved  through  Saint  Bernard  Pass,  over  the 
French  Alps,  while  Moreau  sent  Moncey  with  a  force  over 
Saint  Gothard  Pass  through  the  Swiss  Alps  to  co-operate. 
As  soon  as  Napoleon  effected  a  junction  with  Moncey  at 
Milan,  he  used  the  Saint  Gothard  Pass  as  his  line  of  com- 
munications and  based  himself  on  Switzerland,  to  which 
supplies  were  sent  by  way  of  Strassburg.  This -campaign, 
characterized  by  so  much  audacity,  was  not  carried  out  by 
the  first  consul  without  careful  arrangements  for  a  base 
of  supplies  and  a  line  of  retreat. 

NAPOLEON  IN  1813 

Napoleon,  in  preparation  for  the  campaign  of  1813, 
chose  the  line  of  the  Elbe  as  his  base  of  operations,  having 
lost  the  line  of  the  Vistula  and  Oder  the  winter  before. 

At  first,  he  planned  the  undertaking  of  the  offensive 
on  a  large  scale  from  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Elbe  in 
order  to  win  back  his  communications  with  the  strong 
garrisons  which  he  had  left  behind  in  the  fortresses  of  the 
Prussian-Polish  theater  of  war. 

LOWER  ELBE — FIRST  PHASE  OF  His  CAMPAIGN 

He  attached  the  greatest  importance  to  the  securing 
of  the  northern  course  of  the  Elbe  with  Madgeburg  and 
Hamburg,  in  order  to  use  it  as  a  base,  and  with  this  in 
view  recommended  to  the  Viceroy  Eugene  the  plan  of  taking 
up  a  menacing  position  with  the  remains  of  the  army 
returning  from  Russia,  in  advance  of  the  former  place, 
on  the  road  to  Berlin. 

MIDDLE  ELBE — SECOND  PHASE  OF  His  CAMPAIGN 

"In  the  second  phase  of  the  same  campaign  the  Em- 
peror chose  the  middle  Elbe  as  a  base  for  the  defensive." 


174  STRATEGY 

Quite  contrary  to  his  general  inclinations  he  decided  upon 
this  on  account  of  the  'general  situation. 

He  already  possessed  the  three  fortresses  of  Madge- 
burg,  Wittenberg,  and  Torgau  along  the  banks  of  the  Elbe. 
But  these  did  not  suffice. 

Hamburg  and  Dresden  were  both  strongly  fortified. 

Hamburg  was  fortified  strongly  enough  to  enable  it 
to  offer  independent  resistance  to  the  enemy  for  consid- 
erable time. 

Dresden  was  fortified  and  made  into  a  double  bridge- 
head sufficiently  strong  to  enable  it  to  hold  out  unaided  for 
a  week. 

The  Emperor  did  not  expect  to  be  far  away  from  that 
city  for  a.  longer  period  under  any  circumstances. 

He  even  thought  of  acquiring  two  more  fortresses  in 
the  course  of  the  campaign;  one  where  the  Plauen  Canal 
unites  with  the  Elbe  and  the  other  at  the  junction  of  the 
Havel  and  Elbe  Rivers. 

"In  this  way  Napoleon  wished  to  free  himself  from  all 
apprehension  as  to  the  safety  of  his  base  while  he  dealt 
short,  powerful,  offensive  blows  at  the  allies.  The  latter 
had  invested  him  by  means  of  a  long  arc  extending  from 
Mecklenburg  through  Silesia  to  Bohemia. 

Napoleon  had  collected  all  the  war  material  and  an 
abundant  store  of  provisions  in  the  fortresses  along  the 
Elbe.  As  a  result  he  could  confidently  look  forward 
to  a  long  and  decisive  campaign. 

The  armistice  gave  him  plenty  of  time  to  equip  pro- 
perly his  bases. 

Events  of  a  war  will  not  always  grant  us  time  to  ac- 
complish what  Napoleon  did ;  therefore,  it  is  always  well  to 
operate  in  a  rich  country,  possessing  good  communications, 
and  from  which  we  can  draw  all  the  necessary  supplies, 
even  during  operations. 

The  Valley  of  the  Liao,  in  Manchuria,  is  one  of  the 
most  fertile  known,  and  there  was  no  reason  why  the  Rus- 
sians should  have  been  so  dependent  on  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railroad  for  foodstuffs  if  any  system  had  been 
utilized  in  gathering  fruits  of  the  soil.  With  Japan  it 
was  different,  for  after  leaving  Korea  the  country  was 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  175 

devoid  of  supplies  until  the  Valley  of  the  Liao  was  reached, 
but  by  the  time  the  Japanese  arrived  there  all  the  supplies 
had  been  consumed  or  wasted  by  the  Russians. 

CONSIDERATIONS  AFFECTING  MODERN  BASES 

First. — The  establishment  of  railroads  and  the  intro- 
duction of  the  motor  vehicles. 

Second. — Supplies  formerly  assembled  in  base  maga- 
zines will  be  assembled  in  warehouses  along  railroads  or 
motor  roads  under  charge  of  the  army  transport  service. 

Third. — The  direction  of  the  base,  with  regard  to  the 
enemy's  line  of  operations,  will  increase  in  importance  in 
proportion  as  the  masses  become  more  numerous  and  the 
first  conflicts  more  imminent. 

Fourth. — An  angular  base  will  always  be  the  most  ad- 
vantageous. 

Fifth. — Having  a  sufficient  number  of  railroads  run- 
ning from  the  interior  of  the  country  to  the  theater  of 
operations  to  warrant  prompt  concentration  and  shipment 
of  supplies.  All  should  be  double  tracked  if  possible. 

ADVANCE  BASE 

As  the  armies  began  to  move  forward  considerable  dis- 
tances from  their  bases  the  need  for  auxiliary  bases  be- 
came apparent,  so  advance  bases  were  established  and 
stocked  from  the  rear. 

Some  writers  call  them  mobile  bases — in  other  words, 
one  that  moves  forward  and  backward  with  the  army. 

It  is  evident,  without  any  further  explanation,  how 
fortunately  situated  an  army  is  that  operates  with  such  a 
movable  base. 

As  the  assailant  advances  he  will  repair  the  railroad 
and  get  it  into  operating  condition  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  fact  that  the  allies  were  able  to  switch  their  ad- 
vance bases  (depots)  quickly  saved  the  day  on  many  oc- 
casions on  the  west  front  in  the  recent  war. 

The  retreating  force  must  make  sure  that  all  roads, 
both  rail  and  electric,  are  rendered  unserviceable  to  the 
enemy,  either  by  demolition  or  by  barrier  fortresses.  Nearly 
all  the  main  avenues  leading  into  France  from  the  north 


176  STRATEGY 

and  east  are  controlled  by  fortresses  of  some  kind  and 
the  same  is  true  regarding  the  main  avenues  of  entrance 
from  Russia  into  Germany  on  the  Russian  eastern  frontier. 

The  area  in  which  the  army  is  concentrated  should  be 
sufficiently  extensive  to  accommodate  the  force.  The  conges- 
tion at  Tampa  in  1898  would  not  have  occurred  had  this 
principle  been  observed. 

An  army  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  cannot  base 
itself  adequately  on  one  or  two  railroad  stations  or  fort- 
resses. 

The  supply  depots  for  so  many  people  require  more 
room  and  a  great  number  of  roads  in  both  directions. 

At  Tampa  with  a  force  as  small  as  the  5th  United 
States  Army  Corps,  in  1898,  we  see  the  need  of  a  number 
of  railroads  running  to  the  rear.  Some  of  the  cars  had 
to  be  side-tracked  as  far  back  as  Columbia,  South  Carolina. 

All  movements  will  be  hampered  when  the  district  to 
which  the  army  must  return,  in  case  of  necessity,  is  too 
contracted. 

OVERSEA  TRANSPORTATION 

The  principle  objection  to  oversea  expeditions  is  the 
fact  that  they  are  limited  to  one  or  two  ports  of  embarka- 
tion. 

The  Japanese,  however,  during  the  recent  war  in 
Manchuria,  had  several  ports  of  embarkation  after  they 
had  gotten  control  of  the  sea,  but  at  the  outset  they  had 
but  one,  and  that  was  at  Sasebo. 

The  stupendous  amount  of  work  at  New  York  City  and 
Newport  News  in  creating  those  embarkation  points  shows 
that,  in  modern  war,  their  establishment  is  no  small  task. 

RIGHT-ANGULAR  BASE 

The  base  that  surrounds  the  theater  of  war  on  two 
sides  makes  the  situation  most  favorable,  especially  if  the 
two  legs  form  approximately  a  right  angle.  The  $>arty 
operating  within  this  angle  can  find  support  and  security 
in  two  entirely  different  directions.  This  is  called  the 
right-angular  base  or  double  base. 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  177 

In  1805,  Napoleon  had  a  base  on  the  Main,  and  one  upon 
the  Rhine,  menacing  the  front  of  the  Austrians,  almost 
parallel  to  their  lines  of  operations,  and  threatening  their 
rear.  The  capitulation  of  Ulm  resulted.  In  1806,  Napoleon 
had  an  apparent  base  upon  the  Rhine,  extending  from 
Mainz  to  Strassburg.  Therefore,  when  the  Prussians  were 
informed  of  the  great  concentrations  that  he  was  effecting 
in  the  Valley  of  the  Main,  their  first  plan  was  to  march 
on  Mainz,  by  way  of  Frankfort,  to  separate  him  from 
his  base. 

At  that  time  Napoleon's  true  base  lay  off  to  the  east, 
obliquely  to  the  Rhine  base,  with  a  line  of  departure  that 
led  toward  the  flank  of  the  contemplated  Prussian  line  of 
advance.  It  extended  from  Wurzburg  to  Kronach,  by  way 
of  Bamberg. 

He  then  massed  his  forces  upon  the  extremity  of  his 
base  at  Coburg,  Kronach,  and  Bayreuth,  which  he  tem- 
porarily fortified;  whence  debouching  rapidly  onto  Saal- 
feld,  Saalberg  and  Hof,  he  overlapped  the  left  of  the  Prus- 
sian army  and  threatened  its  communications.  The  defeat 
at  Jena  and  Auerstadt  was  the  result. 

LATERAL  ROADS 

To  have  one  or  more  lines  of  railroad  to  the  rear,  and 
to  be  certain  that  in  the  advance  others  will  soon  be  found, 
constitutes  the  most  favorable  situation  and  greatly  assists 
in  maintaining,  changing  or  establishing  new  bases. 

The  advance  of  Halleck  from  Shiloh  to  Corinth  put 
him  in  possession  of  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad 
which  tied  together  from  east  to  west  the  other  lines  that 
ran  in  a  general  north  and  south  direction.  This  line,  once 
securely  in  the  possession  of  the  Federals,  brought  the  war 
generally  to  south  of  it. 

In  South  Africa  the  lateral  lines  de  Aar-Middleburg- 
Stormberg  Junction  enabled  Roberts  to  concentrate  well  for- 
ward near  the  southern  boundary  of  the  Orange  Free  State. 

CHANGING  OF  THE  BASE 

A  change  of  base  during  military  operations  is  gen- 
erally a  very  difficult  thing  to  accomplish.  Even  if  we 


178  STRATEGY 

have  the  use  of  a  domestic  system  of  railroads  it  is  dif- 
ficult, for  there  is  always  a  lot  of  confusion  in  the  rear 
which  is  added  to  by  the  change,  and  which  multiplies  in 
the  same  ratio  as  the  movement  becomes  more  involuntary. 
McClellan  made  a  complete  change  of  base  from  White 
House  to  Harrison's  Landing  across  the  front  of  the  enemy 
in  the  Peninsula  in  1862.  He  had  about  2,500  wagons 
which,  if  stretched  in  a  continuous  line,  would  have  extended 
nearly  the  whole  distance.  Grant,  in  the  campaign  of 
1864  against  Lee  in  Virginia,  changed  his  base  after  the 
Wilderness  to  Fredericksburg ;  after  Spottsylvania  to  Port 
Royal ;  after  Cold  Harbor  to  White  House ;  and  after  cross- 
ing the  James  River,  to  Harrison's  Landing.  As  McClellan 
moved  south  after  Antietam,  he  switched  his  line  of  com- 
munications from  the  Loudon  Valley  to  the  Orange  &  Alex- 
andria Railroad. 

BASES  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 
PENINSULA  CAMPAIGN — 1862 

BASE  DEPOTS — ALEXANDRIA,  BALTIMORE  AND  ANNAPOLIS 

During  the  Peninsula  campaign  advance  bases  were 
established  at  Fort  Monroe,  Cheeseman's  Landing,  and 
Brick  House  on  the  York  River.  The  railroad  was  restored 
from  White  House  to  Savage  Station  when  the  army  was 
in  front  of  Richmond,  and  an  advance  base  was  estab- 
lished thereat.  This  was  destroyed  after  the  battle  of 
Games'  Mill.  An  advance  base  was  established  at  Har- 
rison's Landing  after  the  close  of  the  Seven  Days'  fight. 

MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN 

Base,  Alexandria. — Supplies  were  shipped  to  the  army 
via  wagons  until  the  recapture  of  Frederick.  Then  an  ad- 
vance base  was  established  at  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Rail- 
road bridge  over  the  Monocacy  where  the  bridge  had  been 
destroyed,  and  Baltimore  became  the  base.  Supplies  were 
shipped  to  that  point  by  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

AFTER  SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 

An  advance  depot  was  established  at  Hagerstown  and 
supplies  were  forwarded  by  the  Cumberland  Valley  Rail- 
road. 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  179 

AFTER  ANTIETAM 

Supplies  were  forwarded  from  Alexandria,  New  York, 
Philadelphia,  and  Baltimore  and  an  advance  base  was 
formed  at  Harper's  Ferry  and,  later,  at  Berlin. 

WHEN  THE  ARMY  CROSSED  THE  POTOMAC  IN  THE  LATTER 
PART  OF  OCTOBER 

Base,  Alexandria,  with  advance  base  at  Salem,  using 
the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad. 

FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN 

Depots  at  Belle  Plain  and  Acquia.  From  these  two 
points  the  army  was  supplied  by  the  Acquia  &  Fredericks- 
burg  Railroad,  stations  for  issue  being  established  at  dif- 
ferent points.  The  advance  base  was  Falmouth. 

AFTER  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Depot  at  Falmouth  broken  up.  Army  moved  via  Dum- 
fries, Fairfax,  Leesburg,  Edward's  Ferry  and  Poolesville 
to  Frederick. 

GETTYSBURG 

Advance  bases  were  established  at  Westminster  and 
Frederick,  and  supplies  forwarded  via  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad. 

AFTER  GETTYSBURG 

Before  crossing  into  Virginia,  the  army  was  in  the 
vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  Sharpsburg.  Supplies  were 
sent  to  it  via  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  and  the 
Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Canal  and  an  advanced  base  was  estab- 
lished at  Berlin. 

After  crossing  the  Potomac,  bases  were  first  established 
at  Gainesville  and  White  House  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail- 
road, the  latter  line  being  used  to  forward  supplies  from 
Alexandria.  An  auxiliary  base  was  also  established  at  this 
time  at  Warrenton. 

LINE  OF  RAPPAHANNOCK 

Line  of  communications,  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad.  Advance  depot  at  Warrenton  Junction,  Warren- 
ton,  and  Bealton. 


180  STRATEGY 

CAMPAIGN  OF  MANEUVERS 

During  the  campaign  of  maneuvers,  the  advance  bases 
were  at  Manassas  and  Gainesville,  the  depots  to  the  front 
and  railroad  having  been  destroyed.  When  the  concentra- 
tion was  made  at  Centreville,  the  advance  depot  was  at 
Fairfax  Court  House. 

When  the  Confederate  army  again  withdrew  to  the 
Rappahannock  line,  followed  by  the  Federal  army,  the  ad- 
vance base  was  at  Brandy  Station. 

MINE  RUN 

While  at  Mine  Run,  the  army  was  supplied  by  wagon 
from  Brandy  Station.  This  was  the  supply  depot  until  the 
4th  of  May,  when  Grant  abandoned  it  and  transferred  the 
base  to  Acquia  Creek  and  Belle  Plain  with  depots  at  Alex- 
andria. 

SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE 

Trains  parked  at  Fredericksburg  where  the  advance 
depot  was  located. 

MAY  21ST 

Advance  depots  at  Acquia,  Belle  Plain,  and  Freder- 
icksburg abandoned  and  advance  base  established  at  Port 
Royal. 

MAY  31ST 

Army  at  Cold  Harbor.    Advance  base  at  White  House. 

JUNE  12TH 

Movement  to  the  James  River.  Advance  base  at  City 
Point.  Base,  Harrison's  Landing.  City  Point  remained 
the  advance  base  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

• 

SIMPLE  ADVANCING  OF  THE  BASE 

The  simple  pushing  forward  of  the  base,  so  as  to  follow 
up  an  advancing  army,  is,  of  course,  the  least  difficult. 
We  merely  have  to  lengthen  the  lines  of  communications 
already  existing  and  put  into  operation  the  railroads  cap- 
tured from  the  enemy.  After  the  railroads  have  been  put 
into  running  condition,  it  becomes  merely  a  question  of  get- 
ting supplies  and  reinforcements  forward,  and  impedimenta 
and  wounded  to  the  rear. 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  181 

RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR 

During  August,  at  least  in  the  early  part,  there  was  a 
decided  slowing  up  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  in  their  ad- 
vance on  Liao  Yang,  and  the  European  newspapers  and 
curbstone  critics  were  free  with  their  criticism,  most  of 
them  being  unfavorable  to  the  Japanese. 

It  was  due  to  the  service  at  the  rear. 

The  2d  Army  under  Oku  had  a  railway  at  its  disposal. 
But,  after  the  battle  of  Nanshan,  although  rolling  stock  had 
been  captured  at  Dalny,  locomotives  were  not  available  to 
draw  it. 

After  the  action  at  Ta-Shih-Chiao,  the  Japanese  were 
in  possession  of  the  Yingkou  branch  line.  Yingkou  was  an 
excellent  point  for  the  establishment  of  a  base  or  entre- 
pot for  reinforcements,  supplies  and  stores.  Here  more 
rolling  stock  was  captured;  but  the  engines  had  time  to 
get  away. 

Locomotives  constructed  in  America  for  the  east  Chi- 
nese' Railway  Company,  and  therefore  suitable  for  the  Rus- 
sian gauge,  were  bought  by  the  Japanese.  There  was  thus 
good  reason  for  the  hope  that  the  difficulties  with  their  line 
of  communications  would  soon  disappear.  But  fate  ruled 
otherwise.  On  June  15th,  the  transports  Hiatchi  Maru 
and  Sado  Maru,  in  which  the  engines  were  being  conveyed, 
were  intercepted  and  sunk  near  Tsujima  by  the  Russian 
Vladivostok  cruiser  squadron. 

At  first,  the  only  thing  that  was*to  be  done  was  to  set 
coolies  and  horses  to  pull  a  few  truck  loads  of  supplies. 

There  was  nothing  in  Manchuria  at  the  time  worthy 
of  the  name  of  a  road.  As  for  the  track  dignified  by  the 
name  Mandarin  Road,  thaw  and  rain  had  transformed  it 
into  a  mere  marsh,  and  the  fields  were  so  thoroughly 
soaked  that  after  a  rear  guard  fight  at  An-shan-chan,  on 
August  27th,  that  it  became  necessary  to  harness  the  Rus- 
sian infantry  to  the  guns  in  order  to  get  them  out  of  the 
sea  of  mud.  So  we  see  that  in  Manchuria  for  a  long  time 
the  Yalu  was  the  advance  base  of  Kuroki's  army ;  Dalny  that 
of  Oku,  and  Takusan  that  of  Nodzu. 


182  STRATEGY 

CO-OPERATION  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY 

If  the  sea  washes  one  boundary  of  the  theater  of  war, 
a  fleet  and  a  land  army  can  support  each  other  admirably 
in  the  advancing  of  a  base.  The  Japanese,  in  their  advance 
against  China  in  1894-95,  and  again  against  Russia  in  1904, 
give  us  a  rather  exceptional  illlustration.  In  1894,  they 
occupied  Korea,  which  was  the  objective  of  the  war.  Then, 
after  a  victorious  fight,  they  crossed  the  Yalu  River,  which 
is  situated  on  the  frontier  between  the  two  countries, 
namely,  Manchuria  and  Korea. 

By  this  time  the  distance  of  the  army  on  the  Yalu 
from  the  landing  harbor  in  Korea  became  too  great.  The 
Japanese  fleet  appeared  and  defeated  the  Chinese  fleet  off 
Elliot's  Island  (Chinese  commanded  by  Maguire)  and  a 
second  army  under  Oyama  landed  and  captured  Port  Ar- 
thur. Afterwards  Wei-hei-wei,  opposite  Port  Arthur,  was 
taken.  These  points  now  furnished  supports  for  further 
land  advances.  From  their  positions  the  Japanese  forces 
commanded  the  great  basin  of  Pechili  Gulf.  Provisions, 
ammunition,  and  reinforcements  could,  be  dispatched  to 
every  port  on  the  coast.  An  earlier  appearance  of  the 
assailant  before  these  fortified  places  would  have  exposed 
them  to  the  action  of  relieving  armies;  a  later  one  would 
have  missed  its  purpose. 

In  1904,  the  original  base  depot  or  port  of  Japanese 
embarkation  was  Sasebo.  After  the  capture  of  Chemulpo, 
the  2d  Division  was  landed  and  took  Seoul.  The  advance 
base  was  Chemulpo.  The  fleet  then  left  for  Port  Arthur 
to  stop  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  and  thereby  limit 
the  operations  of  the  Russian  navy  on  the  waters  of  the 
gulf.  An  advance  was  then  begun  by  Kuroki,  who  now 
commanded  the  1st  Army,  and  went  as  far  as  Pingyang. 
The  base  was  then  advanced  up  to  the  mouth  of  the  river 
on  which  the  town  is  located.  The  Guard  Division  then 
joined  Kuroki  and  the  advance  continued  to  Anju  on  the 
river  Chechen.  Again  the  base  was  advanced  along  the 
coast  to  the  mouth  of  this  river;  the  advance  was  now 
taken  up  to  Wiju  and  the  battle  of  the  Yalu  was  fought, 
after  which  the  base  was  moved  up  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Yalu  River. 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  183 

2D  ARMY 

A  second  raid  was  made  on  Port  Arthur  by  the  fleet 
when  commercial  vessels  were  sunk  in  the  harbor's  mouth. 

An  army  was  now  conveyed  to  Pi-Tzu-Wo,  landed 
and  a  base  established.  This  force  moved  down  and, 
after  capturing  Port  Adams,  took  Kinchow  and  then  de- 
feated the  Russians  at  Nanshan  Hill,  thereby  forcing  the 
evacuation  of  Dalny.  Dalny  then  became  the  base  of  this 
force. 

Reinforcements  were  landed;  the  3d  Army  of  three 
divisions  was  formed  and  placed  under  Nogi ;  the  2d  Army 
was  formed  and  placed  under  Oku.  Nogi's  duty  was  to 
invest  Port  Arthur  and  Oku  to  cover  the  rear  toward 
Liao  Yang. 

3D  ARMY 

A  third  army  was  now  landed  at  Takusan  and  was 
ordered  to  move  north,  connecting  with  the  1st  Army  under 
Kuroki  on  the  right  and  Oku's  2d  Army  on  the  left.  Until 
these  armies  arrived  and  captured  the  line  of  passes  through 
the  mountains  their  advance  bases  were:  1st  Army,  the 
Yalu ;  3d  Army,  Takusan ;  and  2d  Army,  Dalny.  As  soon 
as  the  town  on  the  Yingkou  was  captured  the  base  was 
changed  to  that  point  and  the  armies  were  supplied  by  rail 
and  dirt  road.  When  the  navy  got  control  of  the  sea,  the 
Japanese  had  no  trouble  in  advancing  the  base  along  the 
coast,  and  they  postponed  their  movements  until  such  was 
secured.  Only  once  was  this  base  in  jeopardy  seriously, 
and  that  was  when  the  cruiser  fleet  of  the  Russians  made 
its  raid  from  Vladivostok. 

The  great  difficulty  in  the  Gallipoli  expedition  was  the 
supplying  of  food,  ammunition  and  replacements  so  far 
from  the  home  base.  Also,  there  was  no  convenient  suit- 
able place  to  establish  an  advance  base  nearer  than  Mudros. 

In  ancient  times,  Alexander  the  Great  depended  greatly 
on  his  navy.  He  required  the  fleet  of  Nearchus  to  assist 
his  army  on  its  march  to  India  and  back  again.  In  a  small 
way  Grant,  in  his  movement  around  Vicksburg,  was  ac- 
companied by  Porter's  fleet  that  guarded  his  left  flank  until 
he  arrived  at  De  Shorn's  Plantation. 


184  STRATEGY 

Productiveness  and  the  safety  of  the  bases  are  among 
the  primary  qualifications  of  victory.  The  greatest  com- 
manders have  not  lost  sight  of  this. 

They  have  all  striven  for  maintenance  of  proper  con- 
nection between  the  theater  of  operations  and  their  well 
supplied  and  secure  base. 

Napoleon,  in  1813,  after  he  had  lost  the  lines  of  the 
Oder  and  Vistula  as  a  base,  fell  back  upon  the  lower  Elbe. 

The  allies,  in  three  armies,  were  operating  against 
Napoleon.  On  two  different  occasions,  he  had  had  to  aban- 
don his  pursuit  of  Blucher  because  Swartzenburg,  with  an 
army  of  Bohemia,  was  threatening  his  base.  Napoleon  was 
apprehensive,  notwithstanding  he  had  taken  extraordinary 
measures  to  protect  it. 

ABANDONING  OF  A  BASE 
SHERMAN  IN  GEORGIA 

Circumstances  occasionally  demand  that  the  base  be 
entirely  disregarded,  and  that  we  look  forward,  not  back- 
ward. We  then  seek  an  objective  which,  when  attained, 
gives  us  another  base  for  future  operations  in  place  of  the 
one  given  up. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  famous  march  .to  the  sea, 
covered  about  300  miles  between  Atlanta  and  Savannah  and 
during  this  march  he  had  no  base  other  than  the  country 
through  which  he  passed.  He  had  spent  considerable  time 
in  having  statistical  reports  of  the  country  prepared,  from 
which  he  was  able  to  learn  that  the  territory  to  be  covered 
was  sufficiently  productive  for  his  army  (65,000  men,  72 
guns  and  2,500  wagons). 

He  marched  in  four  columns  and  made  a  mean  dis- 
tance of  15  miles  a  day  when  traveling.  Each  corps 
had  its  special  munition  and  provision  train.  The  army 
was  to  live  off  the  country  and  to  keep  its  wagons  con- 
stantly filled  with  provision  for  at  least  20  days. 

The  march  was  begun  on  the  14th  day  of  November, 
without  apprehension  of  other  difficulties  than  those  aris- 
ing from  the  character  of  the  country.  Not  wishing  to 
make  use  of  the  railroads,  Sherman  destroyed  them  all  along 
.his  line  of  march,  which  led  through  Milledgeville,  Saunders- 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  185 

ville,  Louisville  and  Millen.  He  arrived  before  Savannah 
on  the  10th  of  December,  seizing  Fort  McAllister  first, 
then  the  city  itself,  and  opened  communications  with  the 
Federal  fleet  cruising  in  the  vicinity. 

Thenceforth,  the  Union  commander  was  free  to  move 
toward  the  north  to  unite  his  operations  with  Grant's. 
His  army  was  set  in  motion  on  the  1st  of  February,  after 
having  received  reinforcements.  Charleston  fell  as  soon 
as  the  railroads  leading  to  it  were  destroyed. 

Sherman  continued  his  march  direct  upon  Fayetteville, 
stripping  the  whole  of  South  Carolina  of  its  resources. 
Wilmington  had  already  been  captured  by  the  Federals. 
Finally  he  met  the  Confederate  forces  at  Averysboro,  on 
the  17th  of  March,  and  at  Bentonville  on  the  21st,  when 
he  again  checked  Johnston,  restored  a  short  time  before 
to  command  of  the  army.  On  the  22d,  Sherman  was  joined 
by  Schofield,  whom  Grant  had  sent  from  the  north,  and 
Johnston  was  pushed  upon  Raleigh,  where  he  was  held 
until  the  25th  of  April.  At  this  point  hostilities  ceased. 

GRANT  AT  VICKSBUKG 

Grant's  plan  of  cutting  loose  from  his  base  and  living 
off  the  country  was  looked  on  favorably  in  view  of  the  social 
and  economic  conditions  existing  in  the  theater.  In  describ- 
ing the  terrain,  Major  Steele,  in  his  American  Campaigns, 
speaks  of  Mississippi  being  a  country  with  a  few  towns  and 
many  big  plantations.  The  cultivation  of  cotton  on  a  large 
scale  required  large  numbers  of  laborers,  and  in  order  to 
properly  subsist  his  slaves  each  planter  had  to  maintain 
an  efficient  commissary.  As  the  means  of  transportation 
were  primitive,  the  roads  bad  and  the  towns  few,  it  was 
necessary  to  keep  on  hand  sufficient  foodstuffs  for  a  con- 
siderable period  of  time.  The  supplies  required  by  General 
Grant  were  therefore  concentrated  at  well  defined  points, 
and  in  quantities  that  rendered  concealment  or  removal 
difficult.  Most  of  the  white  combatant  population,  sparse 
at  best,  were  with  Pemberton,  at  Vicksburg.  There  was 
a  servile  population  well  disposed  to  the  invading  army, 
which  was  always  ready  to  give  information  and  to  furnish 
guides.  All  these  elements  combined  to  make  living  off 


186  STRATEGY 

the  country  a  reasonably  safe  proposition,  provided  it  was 
not  persisted  in  too  long.  Nevertheless,  for  the  operation  to 
be  successful,  every  fight  had  to  result  in  favor  of  Grant, 
for  a  retreat  without  supplies,  through  a  denuded  country, 
in  the  face  of  an  active  enemy,  would  have  resulted  only  in 
disaster.  Grant's  complete  abandonment  of  his  base  was, 
so  to  speak,  "a  leap  in  the  dark." 

TEMPORARY  SEVERANCE 

At  times,  when  making  a  tactical  movement  in  modern 
war  a  force  will  be  cut  off  from  its  base  for  a  few  days. 

The  Germans,  at  St.  Privat,  and  Kuroki,  at  Liao 
Yang,  when  he  moved  the  12th  Division  across  the  Tsai- 
Tzu-Ho,  were  temporarily  separated  from  their  bases. 

Victory  in  battle  restores  complete  freedom  and  opens 
all  communications  that  have  been  abandoned. 

It  requires  a  trained  mind  to  be  able  to  determine 
in  each  individual  case  when  and,  to  what  extent,  the  base 
can  be  given  up  without  risking  the  starvation  of  the  troops. 
Counter-blows  are  generally  ruinous  under  such  circum- 
stances. 

The  destruction  of  the  grand  army  of  La  Vendee  on 
its  march  north  of  the  Loire  in  December,  1793,  is  a  good 
example  of  this  principle. 

MUST  TAKE  CHANCES 

A  general  who  fears  separation  from  his  base  more 
than  he  loves  victory  will  seldom  accomplish  anything  really 
great.  Commanders  who  make  the  establishing  and  se- 
curing of  their  base  the  main  and  ruling  factor  generally 
miss  the  favorable  time  to  act.  This  characterized  the  move- 
ments of  McClellan  in  the  east  and  Halleck  in  the  west  in 
the  Civil  War. 

UNEXPECTED  SEPARATION 

It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  be  cut  off  expectedly  from 
a  base,  but  it  is  more  so  to  be  cut  off  unexpectedly. 

The  term  "cut  off"  should  not  be  taken  in  the  geomet- 
ric sense,  for  the  mere  presence  of  a  hostile  body  on  our 
communications  should  not  of  itself  cause  much  alarm. 


BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  187 

It  is  only  when  the  enemy  strikes  in  force  at  those  dis- 
positions without  which  we  cannot  maintain  ourselves  any 
length  of  time  that  we  should  worry. 

Morgan's  destruction  of  the  tunnel  on  the  L.  &  N. 
Railroad  north  of  Nashville  caused  a  great  deal  of  annoy- 
ance to  Rosecrans,  but  did  not  of  itself  cut  him  off  from 
his  supplies.  The  presence  of  Jackson's  18,000  men  at 
Manassas  Junction,  where  Pope's  advance  base  was  located, 
was  sufficient  cause  for  apprehension. 

If  an  army  has  established  a  new  base  or  is  about 
to  enter  a  country  affording  sufficient  supplies,  it  should  not 
worry  if  its  communications  with  its  old  base  are  inter- 
cepted. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Lines  of  Communication  and  Retreat 


"The  lines  of  communication  are  the  routes  by  land,  water,  or  rail,  by  means, 
of  which  the  army  is  continually  fed  and  cared  for."  An  army  cut  off  from  it& 
base  at  least  need  not  worry  about  its  communications. 

TT7HEN  Emperor  Julian  invaded  Mesopotamia,  upon 
^  *  crossing  the  Tigris,  in  a  desire  to  eliminate  the  ques- 
tion of  a  base  and  communications,  he  destroyed  in  one 
stroke  all  of  his  boats.  This  action  was  his  undoing,  for 
later  when  he  was  driven  back  on  the  river  he  was  unable  to 
cross,  his  army  was  defeated  and  he  lost  his  life. 

Hernando  Cortez  burned  his  ships  upon  setting  foot 
on  the  Mexican  shore  at  Vera  Cruz,  probably  convinced 
that  with  his  small  force,  in  that  populous  foreign  country, 
it  would  have  been  impossible  to  keep  up  communications. 
Thus  by  one  stroke,  he  rid  himself  of  two  great  hindrances. 

The  two  illustrations  above  give  both  sides  of  the 
proposition,  so  we  may  deduce  a  corrollary,  "the  army  that 
surrenders  its  base  and  communications  does  it  at  its  ex- 
treme peril." 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  REGARDING  LINES 
OF  COMMUNICATION 

First:  An  army  should  never  compromise  its  line  of 
communication. 

Second:  To  change  the  line  of  communication  is  a 
difficult  operation,  but  one  which  is  essential  to  execute, 
whenever  the  security  of  the  army  demands  it. 

The  best  equipped  base  is  of  no  value  if  the  roads 
that  lead  to  it  are  insecure.  The  amount  of  traffic  in  rear 
of  an  army  increases  with  its  size.  Therefore,  the  number 
and  quality  of  lines  of  communication  must  be  in  proportion 
thereto. 

"With  the  increased  size  of  bodies  of  troops  met  with 
at  present,  communications  have  gained  in  importance  to- 

188 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  189 

such  an  extent  that  strategy  itself  is  being  considered  by 
some  as  merely  a  study  of  communications — a  conception 
which  is,  of  course,  much  too  narrow." 

SAFEST  KIND  OF  COMMUNICATIONS 

Well  constructed  roads  that  the  enemy  may  harass, 
intercept,  even  destroy  in  places,  but  which  can  very  seldom 
be  blocked  entirely  are  the  best  kind  of  communications 
in  the  theater  of  operations. 

The  ideal  would  be  macadamized  roads  suitable  for 
trucks.  In  the  communications  zone  railroads  are  better. 

ADVANTAGES  OF  HIGHWAYS 

First: — If  one  road  is  blocked,  another  one,  if  con- 
venient, can  be  used  to  reach  the  main  road  or,  in  default  of 
secondary  roads,  "turn  outs"  around  the  break  can  be  built. 
It  is  imperative,  however,  that  suitable  road  repair  material 
and  road  building  equipment  be  kept  at  hand  available  at 
all  times. 

Second:  With  the  use  of  highways  less  difficulty  is 
experienced  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  effect  a  change 
of  direction  and  a  transfer  of  the  whole  system  of  commun- 
ications of  the  army. 

PETERSBURG 

When  Grant,  in  1864-65,  was  endeavoring  to  isolate 
Lee's  army  from  the  south,  he  tried  to  effect  it  by  inter- 
rupting Lee's  lines  of  communication.  As  each  railroad  was 
blocked,  General  Lee  merely  took  the  next  dirt  road  west. 
The  Norfolk  Railroad  was  the  most  easterly  road,  but  it 
was  of  no  consequence  as  it  did  not  connect  with  a  base. 
Sheridan  interrupted  the  Virginia  Central  as  far  west*  as 
Trevilian  station,  but  this  made  very  little  difference.  There 
were  two  remaining  railroads,  namely,  the  Southside  and 
the  Weldon. 

The  Weldon  Railroad  was  first  interrupted,  but  it  was 
soon  reopened.  It  was  again  interrupted,  but  Lee  used  the 
Vaughn  dirt  road,  changing  roads  until  the  Southside  Rail- 
road was  beyond  the  break.  When  the  Vaughn  road  was 
blocked,  he  moved  over  to  the  Squirrel  Level  dirt  road  far- 


190  STRATEGY 

ther  west.  When  this  road  was  blocked  he  moved  still  far- 
ther west  to  the  Boynton  dirt  road  and  then  finally  to  the 
White  Oak  dirt  road,  and  so  on  until  the  Southside  Railroad 
was  interrupted. 

DISADVANTAGES 

1.  The  rate  of  progress  of  both  animals  and  wagons  is  slow. 
If  the  road  is  good  enough  for  trucks,  their  use  reduces  this 
disadvantage. 

2.  Loads  transported  are  comparatively  small. 

3.  The  elements  have  a  bad  effect  on  the  movements. 

4.  The  continual  movement  of  transportation  cuts  up  the  road. 

5.  In  the  winter  time,  some  roads,  mostly  through  the  moun- 
tains, are  closeo!. 

In  the  operations  through  the  western  theater,  during 
the  Civil  War,  the  rains  and  snows  of  winter  made  all  but 
a  very  few  roads  absolutely  impassable.  Railroads  had 
to  be  relied  upon. 

In  the  absence  of  standard  gauge  railroads  the  de- 
mands on  dirt  roads  may  be  greatly  relieved  by  small 
railroads  such  as  the  60-cm.,  the  motive  power  being  steam, 
coolie  or  animal.  Experience  has  shown  that  these  lines 
can  be  laid  very  rapidly.  Tractors  with  a  string  of  trailers 
are  a  great  assistance,  but  tractors  as  a  general  rule  are 
very  destructive  of  roads. 

Expedients  of  this  kind  are  only  applicable  to  the  prin- 
cipal highways  and  cannot  be  used  to  any  great  degree  of 
success  in  mountainous  country  or  byroads. 

When  the  Japanese  took  over  the  East  Chinese  Railroad 
they  found  a  shortage  of  engines,  so  the  cars  were  pro- 
pelled by  coolies,  mules,  and  soldiers. 

We  all  know  the  assistance  the  narrow  gauge  roads 
afforded  us  in  France. 

•  An  army  of  respectable  strength,  which  relies  entirely 
upon  the  dirt  roads  of  the  country,  will  be  hampered  in  its 
movements,  and,  according  to  modern  ideas,  be  clumsy. 

Kuroki's  army  took  about  two  months  to  march  from 
Seoul  to  the  Yalu,  its  delay  being  due  to  the  fact  that  it 
could  not  get  supplies  over  the  horrible  dirt  roads  of  Korea. 
Had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  Kuroki  was  able  to  move  his 
base  successively  along  the  coast,  he  would  have  been  de- 
layed in  his  movements  probably  until  the  dry  season. 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  191 

All  the  campaigns  in  the  Orient,  such  as  the  operations 
of  the  British  in  India,  of  the  allies  in  North  China,  and  of 
the  Japanese  in  Korea,  both  in  1894  and  1904,  most  of  those 
in  the  Balkan  States  and  in  Anatolia  were  slow  and  clumsy 
because  all  supplies  had  to  be  brought  up  on  the  backs  of 
mules,  horses  and  camels. 

Wagons  drawn  by  oxen,  such  as  we  find  in  the  country, 
can  be  used  in  flat  terrain  only. 

Taylor's  army  from  Corpus  Christi  to  the  Rio  Grande 
used  oxen  for  hauling  its  heavy  guns  and  some  of  its  heav- 
ier baggage.' 

RAILROADS 

Of  recent  years  the  network  of  railroads  has  caused 
that  means  of  transportation  to  assume  an  important  posi- 
tion. 

The  railway  connecting  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  which 
leads  from  Dedeagatch  to  Salonica,  played  an  important 
part  in  the  Greek  War  of  1897.  In  spite  of  the  poor  man- 
agement, it  expedited  concentration  quite  materially. 

A  glance  at  a  railway  map  of  Germany  and  of  the  in- 
vaded sections  of  Belgium  and  France  shows  wherein  the 
great  superiority  of  railroads  in  rapid  concentration  lay. 

A  large  army  is  poorly  supplied  that  has  but  one 
railroad  connecting  it  with  its  base,  and  must  from  neces- 
sity advance  slowly. 

RUSSIANS  IN  MANCHURIA 

The  Russian  army  in  Manchuria,  after  it  had  exhausted 
the  supplies  of  the  Liao  Valley,  was  hard  put  supplying 
itself  by  the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad. 

SHERMAN  IN  GEORGIA 

In  the  Civil  War,  Sherman  in  Georgia  never  got  any 
farther  than  25  miles  from  the  railroad  line  supplying  his 
army  and  was  greatly  delayed  whenever  it  was  interrupted ; 
and  during  this  same  war  when  the  single  line  of  railroad 
to  the  rear  of  any  army  exceeded  more  than  145  miles, 
that  army  had  to  change  its  line  of  communications.  Rose- 
crans  at  Nashville,  before  the  Stones  River  campaign,  had 


192  STRATEGY 

great  difficulty  in  supplying  himself  with  the  single  line  of 
the  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad. 

SEVERAL  ROADS  NECESSARY 

There  must  be  several  railroads  in  the  direction  of  the 
line  of  communications  generally  if  any  degree  of  freedom 
of  movement  is  expected. 

In  1870,  the  Germans  had  prepared  nine  lines  of  ap- 
proach from  their  base,  three  of  which  led  through  Neu- 
kirchen,  Homburg,  and  Landau  to  the  base  itself — the  others 
in  the  proximity. 

SINGLE  AND  DOUBLE  TRACK  LINES 

A  great  distinction  should  be  made  between  the  single 
and  double  track  lines.  The  military  value  of  the  former 
is  limited,  for  running  in  both  directions  over  the  same 
track  is  difficult.  Blocking  of  communications,  irregular 
accumulations  and  piling  together  of  rolling  stock  at  various 
points  are  very  much  more  likely  to  occur  than  when 
traffic  proceeds  quite  independently  in  both  directions. 

The  German  army  before  Metz  suffered  considerably 
on  account  of  the  restricted  power  of  the  one  track  Rhein- 
Hahe-Bahn  Railroad. 

Lord  Roberts'  advance  on  Bloemfontein  has  also  shown 
that  a  single  track  railroad  is  of  little  value  as  a  sole  com- 
munication of  a  large  army  or  even  one  of  moderate  size 
such  as  that  of  Lord  Roberts'.  Interruptions  are  unavoid- 
able. After  the  line  through  Graspan  had  been  interrupted 
and  a  part  of  the  wagon  train  captured  by  De  Wet,  Lord 
Roberts'  army  was  on  half  rations  until  it  reached  Bloem- 
fontein. 

ROUTES  BY  WATER 

RIVERS 

Waterways,  navigable  canals  and  rivers  furnish  ex- 
cellent lines  of  communication. 

SEA 

Transportation  by  sea  is  the  cheapest,  and  permits  the 
largest  amount  to  be  carried  in  one  trip. 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  193 

Big  canal  boats  operated  by  cables  are  used  at  present 
on  the  Elbe,  parts  of  the  Rhine,  and  several  other  rivers 
which  makes  such  means  of  communication  of  more  value 
than  when  reliance  had  to  be  placed  on  oars,  sails  and  the 
whims  of  the  winds. 

ELBE 

"Possession  of  the  middle  Elbe  by  Frederick  the  Great, 
during  the  Seven  Years'  War,  was  one  of  the  principal 
elements  of  superiority  he  held  in  his  invasion  of  Saxony 
and  Bohemia,  for  the  reason  that  the  river  divided  the 
theater  of  war  and  became  of  inestimable  value  as  a  line 
of  communications  for  him." 

MISSISSIPPI 

The  possession  of  the  Mississippi  River  by  the  Fed- 
erals was  one  of  the  leading  factors  in  bringing  the  Civil 
War  to  a  close,  for  with  it,  communication  between  the 
North  and  the  Gulf  was  assured  and  it  could  be  used  by 
the  armies  operating  to  the  east  or  west  of  the  stream. 

Napoleon  in  1805  made  use  of  the  Danube  during  his 
advance  which  ended  with  Austerlitz.  Grant  likewise  used 
the  Tennessee  River  in  1862. 

OBJECTION  TO  RIVERS  AS  MEANS  OF  COMMUNICATION 

First. — Freezing  in  the  winter  time. 

Second. — Their  direction  cannot  be  changed  to  meet  the  var- 
ious changes  of  direction  of  the  line  of  operations. 

In  the  wars  of  1866,  1870  and  1878,  the  rivers  were 
greatly  used  at  the  outset,  but  once  operations  had  begun 
the  armies  made  little  use  of  them. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  of  1878,  the  Rus- 
sians utilized  the  Danube  and  in  1870,  the  Germans  used 
the  Rhine.  "In  1870,  during  the  concentration  of  troops, 
the  staff  of  the  II  Prussian  Army  organized  a  flotilla  of 
ten  steamboats  and  numerous  tow-barges,  which  were  to 
serve  as  movable  magazines  on  that  part  of  the  Rhine 
between  Worms  and  Bingen.  The  provisions  carried  were 
purchased  in  Holland,  on  the  lower  Rhine,  and  in  the 
countries  where  the  concentration  took  place.  When  the 


194  STRATEGY 

German  armies  penetrated  the  French  territory,  these  boats 
deposited  their  cargoes  at  Bingen  and  Worms  in  magazines." 

LIMITATION  ON  THE  SEA 

The  sea  is  free  from  either  of  these  two  objections  to 
rivers  for  the  reason,  first,  that  it  does  not  freeze  up  except 
in  the  Arctic,  and  second,  it  does  not  tie  down  ships  to 
any  particular  route. 

DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE  SEA 

The  great  disadvantage  is  in  the  restriction  as  to 
landing  places. 

We  should  not  be  restricted  to  one  harbor  or  a  small 
number  of  them,  especially  while  the  enemy  possesses  any 
means  at  all  of  being  a  menace  to  us  on  the  seas. 

Under  such  conditions,  the  enemy  would  be  able  to  lie 
in  wait  for  our  transports  and  destroy  them  as  they  ap- 
proach the  destination  to  which  they  must  shape  their 
course. 

Many  bays  and  harbors  with  long  fore  shore  and  into 
which  rivers  empty  or  that  have  a  bar  at  the  entrance  are 
unsuited  for  use  during  the  winter  as  a  result  of  ice  jams 
caused  by  repeated  thaws. 

Vessels  are  unable  to  ascend  the  Pei  Ho  from  Pichili 
Gulf  during  the  winter  months  and  ships  are  forced  to 
anchor  out  from  the  mouth  of  the  river,  about  seven  miles, 
to  escape  the  ice  flow.  Gray's  Harbor  on  the  Pacific  is 
another  illustration. 

PREFERENTIAL  MEANS  OF  COMMUNICATION 
RAILROADS 

As  among  the  three  methods  of  communication,  we 
must  give  the  preference  to  the  railroad.  The  following 
are  some  of  the  reasons : 

Because :  1.  It  is  the  most  rapid  and  is  not  dependent  on 
wind,  weather,  heat,  nor  cold.  2.  In  probable  theaters  rail- 
roads are  more  numerous  than  rivers;  so  that,  should  an 
army  start  out  in  a  new  direction,  it  is  more  apt  to  find  a 
branch,  cross  or  side  line  railroad  that  will  connect  it  with 
its  base.  3.  One  can  use  the  railroad  or  prevent  the  enemy 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  195 

from  using  it.  4.  The  rolling  stock  can  be  run  off  and  the 
road  rendered  useless  to  an  invader. 

The  transfer  of  Bragg's  army  from  Tupelo  to  Chat- 
tanooga, and  of  the  llth  and  12th  Corps  from  Virginia  to 
Stevenson,  during  our  own  Civil  War,  was  accomplished 
in  sufficient  time  so  that  the  troops  had  a  most  deciding 
influence  on  subsequent  operations.  It  would  have  been  out 
of  the  question  to  have  made  the  move  by  wagons.  The 
Russians  deprived  the  Japanese  of  the  use  of  the  East 
Chinese  Railroad  for  some  time  by  demolitions  and  by  run- 
ning off  the  rolling  stock. 

In  The  World  War,  while  motor  transportation  was 
used  extensively  in  effecting  reliefs,  local  transfers  and  in 
many  large  operations  such  as  Tannenberg,  and  the  move- 
ment of  the  Paris  garrison  to  the  assistance  of  Maunoury's 
6th  French  Army  in  September,  1914,  the  railroads  were 
the  main  reliance. 

DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE  RAILROAD 

1.  It  can  be  more  easily  interrupted  than  the  other  means, 
although  it  is  believed  that  an  aerial  bomb  can  do  more  damage 
to  a  dirt  road. 

2.  It  does  not  carry  as  bulky  loads. 

3.  It  is  difficult  to  ship  equipment  overseas,  yet  with   suf- 
ficient effort  it  can  be  done. 

4.  It  requires  a  maximum  of  railroad  guards. 

Notwithstanding  the  victorious  nature  of  the  German 
movements  in  1870,  the  Germans  had  166,000  men  guarding 
the  communications,  most  of  which  were  by  rail,  for  an  army 
of  900,000.  The  Federal  armies  in  the  west  in  the  Civil 
War  used  about  half  their  strength  in  guarding  their  rail- 
road communications. 

CHANGE  BROUGHT  BY  MODERN  TRANSPORTATION 

The  complete  change  in  means  of  communication  that 
has  been  brought  about  recently  naturally  changes  the  con- 
ditions for  basing  armies. 

Steam  and  electricity  throw  open  so  many  new  arteries 
that  it  becomes  easy  for  us  to  have  at  our  disposal  re- 
inforcements and  supplies  from  the  remote  parts  of  a 
country  in  a  few  days.  Therefore,  we  are  no  longer  con- 
fined to  a  certain  area  as  a  base.  The  whole  territory  of  a 


196  STRATEGY 

state  now  does  duty  as  such.  We  can  make  use  of  the 
enemy's  railroads  unless  he  has  undertaken  a  too  system- 
atic and  thorough  destruction  of  them. 

In  western  Europe,  the  dense  network  of  railways 
permits  reinforcements  and  supplies  to  be  brought  up  in 
a  few  days  from  the  most  remote  parts  of  any  country. 
This  network  even  obviates  the  necessity  of  restricting 
the  base  to  one  district;  the  whole  area  of  the  state  may 
become  the  base.  Since  we  can  make  use  of  the  railways 
in  a  hostile  country,  where  the  enemy  has  not  carried  out  too 
systematic  demolitions,  a  frontier  no  longer  constitutes  an 
obstacle. 

The  conduct  of  war  of  our  time,  therefore,  has  to 
deal  with  a  movable  base,  and  this  is  an  advantage  which 
enables  us  to  act  with  utmost  energy. 

We  have  already  taken  up  the  definition  of  the  line  of 
operations  and  of  the  line  of  communications.  Generally,  one 
is  a  continuation  of  the  other,  for  as  the  army  advances,  it 
has  before  it  its  line  of  operations  and  leaves  behind  its 
line  of  communications. 

In  1805,  after  the  capitulation  of  Ulm,  Napoleon  re- 
solved to  march  immediately  upon  Vienna,  following  the 
Valley  of  the  Danube. 

The  river,  which  ran  parallel  to  the  direction  of  his 
march,  was  to  become  part  of  the  line  of  operations. 

West  of  Lintz,  the  road  was  shut  in  between  the  river 
bank  and  the  mountains.  It  was  thus  indispensable  to 
insure  the  possession  of  the  left  bank,  in  order  to  attempt 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Russians,  and  to  cover  the 
march  of  the  army  on  that  side. 

Dupont's  division,  numbering  hardly  3,480  men,  in 
six  battalions,  was  charged  with  this  duty,  and  with  making 
reconnaissance  of  the  roads  leading  into  Bohemia.  But 
these  forces  being  considered  too  weak,  Napoleon  soon 
reinforced  them  with  Gazan's  division,  having  an  effective 
of  4,460  men. 

There  was  thus  on  the  left  bank  a  small  army  corps 
which  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Marshal  Mortier. 
He  was  to  move  down  the  valley,  on  the  side  he  then  oc- 
cupied. Being  too  weak,  it  became  necessary  to  connect 
him  with  the  main  army.  For  this  purpose,  Napoleon  had 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  197 

all  the  boats  available  assembled  into  a  flotilla  and  placed 
under  the  command  of  Commander  Lostange.  The  crews 
were  made  up  of  the  sore-footed  and  worn-out  soldiers  of  the 
various  divisions.  These  boats,  loaded  with  supplies  and 
ammunition,  descended  the  river  abreast  of  the  army. 

Napoleon  desired  400  boats  so  as  to  be  able  to  sud- 
denly embark  10,000  men  and  throw  them  upon  the  Rus- 
sians in  an  hour,  if  Mortier  found  himself  too  strongly 
engaged.  "There  must  be  no  Danube,"  wrote  he  from 
Lintz,  on  the  7th  of  November.  "I  must  be  able  to  cross 
it  promptly.  The  Russians,  who  do  not  expect  this  man- 
euver, may  become  the  victims  of  it,  since  they  think 
themselves  engaged  only  with  Marshal  Mortier,  while  I 
shall  be  able  to  bring  a  superior  force  against  them." 

Thus  the  river  was  a  line  of  operations  and  of  com- 
munications. From  Lintz,  the  army  had  for  its  line  of 
operations  the  road  from  that  place  to  Vienna — in  some 
places  some  distance  from  the  river. 

In  his  advance  on  Khartum,  during  the  campaign  in 
Egypt,  Kitchener  used  the  Nile  the  same  way  as  Napoleon 
used  the  Danube,  but  to  a  greater  extent. 

Occasionally  the  direction  of  the  two  lines  differ  con- 
siderably. 

"In  the  late  fall  of  1870,  when  the  II  German  Army 
advanced  to  the  Loire,  it  chose  its  main  line  of  operations 
via  Joinville,  Troyes,  Sens,  Nemours  and  Pithiviers.  It 
would  not  have  been  practicable  to  have  used  this  road 
permanently  as  a  line  of  communications  on  account  of  the 
long  hauls  for  wagons.  Instead  the  railroad  line  through 
Joinville,  Chaumont,  Chatillon  on  the  Seine,  Tonnerre,  Joig- 
ny,  Moret,  Montargis  and  Juvissy  to  Orleans  was  chosen. 
Thus  a  long,  sinuous  line,  easy  to  intercept,  and  unfor- 
tunately situated,  being  in  rear  of  the  left  flank  of  the 
army  which  it  supplied,  was  formed. 

"Occasionally,  the  railroad  from  Paris  to  Lagny  served 
as  a  line  of  communication." 

During  Grant's  operations  around  Richmond  in  the 
summer  of  1864,  his  line  of  operations  ran  generally  south 
while  his  line  of  communications  followed  him  down  the 
coast  in  rear  of  his  left.  Being  in  control  of  the  sea,  this 
was  possible.  The  Japanese  1st  Army,  in  its  advance  to  the 


198  STRATEGY 

Yalu,  was  similarly  situated.    So  we  see  that  the  two  lines 
may  be  far  apart. 

It  is  immaterial,  in  this  case,  whether  or  not  the  enemy 
intercepts  our  lines  in  rear  of  us,  for  they  lose  their  im- 
portance as  soon  as  the  army  has  advanced. 

SECURITY  OF  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION 

Above  all  things  the  lines  of  communication  must  be 
made  secure.  With  their  length  increases  the  difficulty  of 
doing  this,  since  their  vulnerability  and  the  ease  with 
which  the  enemy  can  intercept  them  makes  their  preser- 
vation difficult. 

LONG  LINES  DANGEROUS 

Advance  along  very  extended  lines  of  operations,  which 
necessitate  similar  lines  of  communications,  are  dangerous. 
Whole  expeditions  have  come  to  grief  through  this  exten- 
sion. 

Charles  XIFs  expedition  into  South  Russia,  Massena's 
into  Portugal,  Napoleon's  campaign  to  Moscow,  and  Fred- 
erick the  Great's  advance  into  Bohemia  in  1744  are  illus- 
trations. 

LENGTH  OF  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION 

A  line  of  communications  of  more  than  five  or  six  good 
days'  marches  may  generally  be  considered  a  long  one.  It 
is  well,  in  such  a  case,  to  establish  a  new  base,  at  least 
for  commissaries  and  ammunition. 

SAFETY  OF  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  DEPENDS  ON  How 
WELL  THE  COUNTRY  IN  REAR  is  POLICED 

The  British  lines  of  communication  were  being  con- 
tinually cut  in  South  Africa,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Brit- 
ish did  not  control  the  territory. 

.  INHABITANTS 

Much  depends  upon  the  inhabitants,  their  number  and 
attitude  toward  the  advancing  army. 

The  attitude  of  the  Spanish  during  the  Peninsula  War 
had  a  decided  effect  upon  the  operations  of  Napoleon.  Also 
the  action  of  the  Franc-Tireurs  caused  great  annoyance 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  199 

to  the  Germans  during  the  invasion  of  France  in  1870. 
So  much  so  that  it  took  166,000  troops  to  guard  the  com- 
munications. 

SIZE  OF  TRAIN 

If  we  calculate  how  many  baggage  trains  and 
wagon  trains  of  all  kinds,  each  belonging  to  a  separate 
body  of  troops,  come  and  go  behind  an  army,  we  can  easily 
understand  the  great  effect  on  the  lines  of  communication 
exercised  by  every  change  in  the  position  of  the  base,  or  in 
the  front  of  the  operations. 

McClellan,  in  changing  his  base  from  White  House 
to  Harrison's  Landing,  had  to  move  2,500  wagons  and 
countless  stores  and  herds  of  cattle. 

In  July  of  1862,  the  army  of  the  Potomac  had  in  its 
possession  3,100  wagons,  350  ambulances,  17,000  horses 
and  8,000  mules. 

Strength,  of  army  80,000,  which  gives  an  average  of 
about  26  wagons  to  every  thousand. 

AFTER  ANTIETAM 

The  army  consisted  of  110,000  men,  average  of  49 
wagons  to  the  thousand. 

Three  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eleven  wagons,  907 
ambulances,  12,483  mules,  and  8,693  horses. 

GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN 
Four  thousand  heavy  wagons. 

Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan  with  4,300  wagons,  or  34 
to  the  thousand. 

In  the  final  campaign  he  had  2,448  wagons  or  22  per 
thousand. 

SHERMAN  JULY  1,  1864 

One  hundred  thousand  men.  Wagons  5,180  or  60 
per  thousand. 

On  leaving  Atlanta  he  had  2,520  wagons  or  40  to 
the  thousand. 

The  American  army  in  France  averaged  1  truck  for 
every  40  or  50  men. 


200  STRATEGY 

SLIGHT  CHANGE  OF  POSITION  CAUSES  TROUBLE 

A  mere  change  in  the  relative  positions  of  bodies  of 
troops  in  the  front  produces  difficulties. 

Columns  of  baggage  wagons  on  the  march  become 
crossed,  thus  entailing  unavoidable  confusion. 

The  attempt  of  Bazaine  to  move  his  transportation 
ahead  of  him  over  the  Moselle  is  an  illustration  of  the 
confusion  that  will  result  if  the  routes  of  trains  are  changed, 
and  what  may  result  therefrom. 

On  two  different  occasions  during  the  German  drive 
on  Paris  in  1914  the  army  of  Von  Hausen  came  to  grief 
as  a  result  of  corps  communications  becoming  crossed. 
The  IX  and  XIX  Corps,  were  the  offenders  on  August 
24th  and  25th  and  at  Fere  Champenoise,  September  9th 
and  10th. 

The  change  of  the  lines  of  communication  in  the  grand 
wheel  to  the  right  of  the  Germans  moving  on  Sedan  shows 
how  this  change  may  be  effected  successfully  if  plans  are 
laid  in  advance. 

Likewise  the  turn  of  about  90  degrees,  made  by  the 
1st  American  Army  in  the  Meuse-Argonne,  was  handled 
in  a  manner  that  reflected  credit  on  the  army,  corps  and 
division  staffs. 

OPENING  A  NEW  LINE  BY  TAKING  UP  A  FLANK 
POSITION 

When  the  lines  of  communication  are  interrupted,  they 
are  often  reopened  by  seeking  a  strong  position  gen- 
erally to  the  flank.  McClellan's  shift  from  the  York  to 
the  James  River  enabled  him  to  extricate  himself  from 
what  otherwise  would  have  been  a  very  embarrassing  sit- 
uation. 

BASE  MAY  BE  OFF  TO  A  FLANK 

The  situation  may  so  develop  that  a  base  must  be  se- 
lected off  to  the  flank.  This  is  not  a  disadvantage  if  re- 
inforcements and  supplies  can  be  obtained  and  the  strength 
of  our  forces  are  such  as  to  influence  the  enemy  to  come 
in  our  direction.  If  he  does  so,  he  will  form  front  to  flank 
and  if  he  does  not,  but  tries  to  march  past,  his  line  of 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  201 

communications  can  be  cut.  A  transfer  of  this  kind  was 
offered  Johnston  during  the  Atlanta  campaign  by  moving 
over  toward  Rome. 

SURRENDERING  THE  LINE  OF  COMMUNICATIONS 
TEMPORARILY  TO  SECURE  ANOTHER 

Before  the  line  of  communications  is  given  up,  it  is 
imperative  that  arrangements  be  made  for  the  assumption 
of  another.  An  army,  when  it  sees  its  line  threatened, 
cannot  merely  give  it  up  and  trust  to  luck  that  it  will 
find  another. 

"Careful  preparations,  very  determined  leadership  on 
the  part  of  the  general,  and  a  decided  superiority  over 
the  enemy  are  some  of  the  indispensable  prerequisites." 

It  is  quite  clear  in  this  case  that  there  is  a  limit  to 
the  size  of  the  army  and  it  must  be  proportioned  to  the 
productiveness  of  the  country. 

While  Sherman  was  able  to  obtain  supplies  for  his 
army  in  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  yet  had  it  been  larger 
and  numbered  in  hundreds  of  thousands  his  move  would 
have  been  impossible.  Grant  was  able  to  move  his  army 
around  the  south  and  east  of  Vicksburg,  cutting  loose  from 
his  original  base  because  he  found  a  very  productive  sec- 
tion of  country ;  yet  when  he  attempted  to  move  on  the  city 
from  the  direction  of  Grand  Junction,  and  Van  Dorn  de- 
stroyed his  advance  base  at  Holly  Springs,  Grant  had  to 
abandon  his  forward  movement  and  fall  back  to  the  line 
of  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad. 

SEVERING  CONNECTION  WITH  COMMUNICATIONS  AT  THE 
PRESENT  TIME 

With  our  modern  armies  of  millions  of  men  it  will  be 
out  of  the  question  to  think  of  operating  without  relying  on 
our  base  in  rear.  Of  course  the  country  will  be  exploited 
as  much  as  possible.  It  will  be  as  Bernhardi  says — "sup- 
plies from  the  country  and  then  magazines." 

How  THE  CHANGE  SHOULD  BE  MADE 

The  best  way  to  change  from  one  line  of  communication 
to  another  is  to  do  it  gradually. 


202  STRATEGY 

Give  up  the  old  line,  little  by  little,  and  establish  the 
new  one  gradually,  so  that  for  a  time  both  will  be  in 
operation  side  by  side. 

When  McClellan  advanced  from  Antietam  in  October, 
1862,  he  used  the  Loudon  Valley  Railroad  as  his  line  of 
communication  until  he  reached  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail- 
road, which  with  the  Orange  &  Alexander  Railroad  became 
his  lines.  The  transfer  was  made  gradually  and  without 
confusion. 

Napoleon,  on  the  22d  of  September,  1808,  had  the  fol- 
lowing to  say  to  his  brother  Joseph  regarding  his  opera- 
tions in  Spain:  "The  military  art  is  one  possessing  prin- 
ciples which  must  not  be  violated.  To  change  the  lines  of 
communication  is  an  undertaking  which  should  be  confined 
to  men  of  genius ;  its  loss  is  so  serious  an  event  as  to  render 
the  author  criminal." 

LINES  OF  RETREAT 

When  the  line  of  operations  leads  to  the  rear  it  is 
called  the  line  of  retreat. 

It  will  generally  be  along  the  line  of  communication 
by  which  a  defeated  army  falls  back  on  its  supplies  or  for 
reinforcements. 

ARMY  THAT  is  NOT  DEFEATED   . 

When  an  army  that  has  not  been  defeated  merely 
falls  back  to  a  more  favorable  position  to  receive  reinforce- 
ments, it  follows,  then,  that  the  line  of  retreat  must  be  such 
as  will  lead  it  toward  those  reinforcements.  And  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  the  line  of  operations  of  the  rein- 
forcements is  the  same  or  different. 

BLUCHER — WATERLOO 

Sometimes  by  paying  more  attention  to  a  union  with 
reinforcements  and  not  so  much  to  the  base  great  results 
can  be  attained.  We  have  but  to  recall  the  case  of  Blucher 
and  Gneisneau  after  Ligny.  By  all  rules  of  the  game  they 
should  have  retired  through  Sombref  to  Liege  and  Maas- 
tricht, where  their  natural  line  of  communications  led. 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  203 

Beaulieu,  in  1796,  did  what  Napoleon  hoped  Blucher 
would  do.  But  the  latter  did  otherwise.  He  withdrew 
through  Wavre  and  Tilly  toward  his  reinforcements,  which 
were  Wellington,  and  encompassed  the  defeat  of  Napoleon. 

ECCENTRIC  OR  DIVERGENT  LINES  OF  RETREAT 

A  retreat  that  is  eccentric  or  divergent,  so  valuable  in 
defending  one's  own  country,  is  greatly  facilitated  if  there 
are  good  railroads  or  motor  roads. 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  in  the  retreat  after  Henry 
and  Donelson,  diverged  to  the  east  away  from  the  Confed- 
erate forces  near  Corinth.  By  using  the  lateral  railroad, 
namely,  the  Memphis  &  Charleston,  he  was  able  to  unite 
his  army  again. 

"Napoleon,  in  1813,  would  have  secured  Paris  with 
more  certainty  from  an  attack  if  he  had  taken  up  a  position 
as  some  distance  in  a  lateral  direction  somewhere  behind 
the  Canal  Burgundy,  leaving  with  the  large  force  of  National 
Guard  of  Paris  a  few  thousand  regular  troops.  The  allies 
would  never  have  had  the  courage  to  march  a  corps  of 
50,000  or  60,000  against  Paris  whilst  Bonaparte  was  in 
the  field  at  Auxerre  with  100,000  men." 

DISADVANTAGES  OF  AN  ECCENTRIC  OR  DIVERGENT  RETREAT 

"(1)  It  divides  our  forces.  (2)  The  enemy  secures  the 
advantages  of  operating  on  interior  lines  and  can  remain 
more  concentrated  than  we  are,  consequently,  can  appear 
in  so  much  the  greater  force  at  any  one  point.  (3)  Our 
action,  if  we  resume  the  offensive,  will  be  concentric  which 
is  not  suitable  to  a  weaker  force/' 

Experience  has  taught  that  an  army  should  always 
retire  upon  its  supports. 

This  principle  was  expounded  by  Napoleon  on  many 
different  occasions,  notably  in  1808. 

The  Dupont  Division  had  just  capitulated  at  Baylen. 
The  situation  of  the  French  troops  in  Spain  seemed  com- 
promised thereby,  and  King  Joseph  believed  it  necessary 
to  evacuate  Madrid  and  retire  to  the  Ebro.  This  action  was, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  retreat  upon  the  .reinforcements  that 
were  arriving  from  France.  But  after  reaching  the  Ebro, 


204  STRATEGY 

he  conceived  the  idea  of  abandoning  his  communications 
with  France  making  movements  to  the  various  points 
where  the  enemy  might  show  himself  or  where  provisons 
were  obtained. 

He  submitted  his  project  to  his  brother  and  received  the 
following  reply : 

"Chalons-sur-Marne, 
"September  22,  1808. 

"The  preservation  of  the  line  of  operations  (commun- 
ications) is  not  imperative  in  order  to  hold  connection  with 
the  depot — the  place  of  rendezvous,  the  magazine  of  supply, 
and  the  point  where  prisoners  and  the  wounded  and  sick 
may  be  sent.  To  shut  one's  self  up  in  the  interior  of  Spain 
at  this  time,  without  an  organized  center  or  well  supplied 
magazine,  exposed  to  the  risks  of  having  the  enemy's  armies 
on  the  flank  and  rear,  is  to  be  guilty  of  a  folly  unexampled 
in  the  history  of  the  world.  Those  who  venture  to  advise 
such  a  measure  would  be  the  first  to  lose  their  senses  when 
events  had  made  clear  the  folly  of  the  operation.  It  is, 
then,  upon  the  point  where  it  may  reform  its  forces,  secure 
new  resources,  and  receive  fresh  support,  that  an  army 
should  retire." 

In  August,  1813,  when  Napoleon  had  established  him- 
self along  the  upper  Elbe,  the  idea  that  the  Austrians  from 
Bohemia  might  push  through  via  Baireuth  and  enter  the 
heart  of  Germany  and  cut  him  off  from  France  did  not 
worry  him.  On  August  16th  he  wrote  St.  Cyr:  "What  I 
am  anxious  about  is  the  idea  of  being  cut  off  from  Dres- 
den and  the  Elbe;  it  makes  very  little  difference  to  me  if 
they  separate  me  from  France."  If  the  Austrians  under- 
took such  an  advance  he  had  decided  "to  wish  them  a  pleas- 
ant journey  and  let  them  go." 

All  that  the  Austrians  could  have  done  was  to  have  en- 
tered Franconia,  Hesse  and  Thuringia,  capturing  possibly 
a  supply  train  here  and  there,  but  in  no  way  injuring  the 
Emperor.  They  could  have  done  much  had  they  captured 
his  principal  depot  and  bridgehead  at  Dresden. 


LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AND  RETREAT  205 

CONCLUSION 

"Nothing  can  better  inspire  the  inventive  genius  of 
the  general  to  soar  to  greater  undertakings  than  the 
feeling  that  he  can  switch  his  lines  of  communication  read- 
ily." 

THE  MORE  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION  AN  ARMY 
HAS  THE  BETTER 

The  greater  number  of  lines  of  communication  an 
army  possesses  the  better. 

The  most  favorable  condition  is  for  each  unit  that  is 
separately  administered,  that  has  a  separate  supply  depart- 
ment and  recruitment,  to  have  its  own  separate  line  of 
communications. 

In  1870  and  1871,  the  Germans  almost  always  succeeded 
in  assigning  to  each  corps  a  special  road  for  its  exclusive  use. 

"The  importance  of  lines  of  communication  has  grown 
with  the  size  of  armies.  Even  in  the  richest  country,  mil- 
lions of  men  are  more  dependent  on  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation. This  is  the  cause  of  the  endeavor,  seen  everywhere 
today,  to  press  into  the  service  to  the  furthest  extent  every 
scientific  auxiliary  to  maintain  the  traffic  behind  the  army 
and  within  the  same." 


CHAPTER  XIII 


Strategic  Concentration  and  Method 
of  Advance 


THE  AIM  of  all  strategical  operations  is  to  bring  about 
a  tactical  decision  under  conditions  that  are  as  much 
as  possible  to  one's  advantage. 

This  is  attained  by  falling  upon  the  enemy  at  his  weak- 
est point  with  superior  numbers. 

OBJECT 

The  object  sought  by  all  commanders  is  to  be  stronger 
at  the  decisive  point.  Napoleon  is  supposed  to  have  said 
that  he  had  always  noticed  that  the  Lord  generally  was  on 
the  side  with  the  heaviest  battalions. 

"The  prime  condition  to  attain  this  strength  is  to  bring 
about  a  surprise. 

"Either  concealment  entirely  until  the  blow  falls,  or  at 
least  concealment  so  long  that,  when  the  move  is  discovered, 
the  enemy  will  not  have  time  to  maneuver  to  meet  it." 

On  the  Sha-Ho,  the  Russian  offensive  failed,  due  prin- 
cipally to  the  fact  that  the  element  of  surprise  was  missing. 

At  Chancellorsville,  Jackson's  turning  movement  suc- 
ceeded because  the  element  of  surprise  was  present. 

Therefore,  when  the  movement  has  reached  such  a 
stage  that  the  enemy  can  no  longer  be  deceived  as  to  its 
aim,  the  most  distant  portions  of  our  army  must  be  nearer 
to  the  decisive  point  than  those  of  the  enemy. 

Napoleon's  concentration  before  Waterloo  was  con- 
cealed by  the  Beaumont  Forest  to  such  an  extent  that, 
when  he  launched  forth  across  the  Sambre,  he  caught  the 
allies  scattered  on  a  broad  front  looking  for  him. 

The  failure  of  the  campaign  was  not  due  to  the  ab- 
sence of  the  element  of  surprise. 

206 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    207 

Meade's  concentration  before  Gettysburg  was  not 
known  to  Lee,  due  to  the  absence  of  Stuart's  cavalry. 

Sometimes  we  may  overlook  the  fact  that  we  are  not 
concentrated  if  we  see  a  good  opportunity  to  strike. 

At  Koniggratz,  Prince  Frederick  Charles'  army  at- 
tacked before  the  concentration  had  been  effected,  but  came 
very  near  being  defeated.  This  campaign  is  often  cited  as 
an  illustration  of  the  superiority  of  the  von  Moltke  concen- 
tration, yet  the  incapacity  of  von  Benedek  had  more  to  do 
with  the  effectiveness  of  the  concentration  than  any  inher- 
ent virtue  in  its  form. 

Von  Alvensleben,  at  Vionville,  impetuously  attacked 
the  whole  French  army  before  the  Germans  were  concen- 
trated ;  yet  again  we  see  the  defender,  by  incapacity,  play- 
ing into  the  assailant's  hands. 

"The  most  trying  time  for  the  commander  on  the  of- 
fensive is  the  period  before  contact  is  gained." 

"He  must  decide  upon  the  most  likely  action  of  the 
defender  and  move  his  army  in  such  a  formation  as  to 
meet  it." 

"Conflicting  reports  will  come  in  and  he  may  be  tempted 
to  change  his  deployment.  In  the  crisis,  everything  de- 
pends on  the  proper  estimate  of  the  situation  and  result- 
ing decision." 

Unless  the  commander  is  prepared  to  stake  his  all 
on  his  decisions  and  is  ready  to  make  those  decisions 
promptly,  he  has  no  business  commanding  an  army  on  the 
offensive. 

"The  first  quality  of  a  commander  is  a  cool  head,  which 
will  judge  things  in  their  true  light;  he  should  not  let  him- 
self be  dazed  by  good  or  bad  news;  the  sensations  he 
receives  successively,  or  once  during  the  course  of  the  day, 
should  be  classed  in  the  memory  so  as  to  occupy  only  the 
place  they  deserve,  for  reasoning  and  judgment  are  but 
the  results  of  many  sensations  equally  considered.  There 
are  men  who  from  their  nature,  physical  or  moral,  make 
of  each  thing  a  complete  picture,  whatever  may  be  their 
skill,  or  talent,  or  courage;  nature  has  not  called  them  to 
the  command  of  armies  and  to  the  direction  of  great  op- 
erations of  war." — Napoleon's  War  Maxim  LXXIII. 


208  STRATEGY 

SELECTION  OF  POINT  OF  CONCENTRATION 

Even  after  an  objective  has  been  selected  and  the 
troops  have  been  directed  toward  it,  a  great  deal  still  de- 
pends on  the  choice  of  the  point  of  concentration. 

If  our  forces  cannot  co-operate  at  the  time  we  strike 
the  enemy  we  have  been  seeking,  our  operation  fails,  for  the 
necessary  superiority  will  be  lacking. 

If  the  Crown  Prince  had  not  arrived  when  he  did  at 
Koniggratz,  it  would  have  been  a  sad  day  for  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles. 

Geological  reasons  may  prevent  our  concentration 
where  we  wish,  and  we  may  be  forced  to  concentrate  for- 
ward and  either  near,  or  on  the  field  of  battle. 

In  the  Koniggratz  campaign,  von  Moltke  was  forced 
to  concentrate  in  the  Elbe  basin,  for  had  he  concentrated 
in  rear  of  the  mountains  he  would  have  had  to  surrender 
the  initiative  to  the  Austrians. 

Two  CLASSES  OF  CONCENTRATION 

There  are  two  great  principles  of  concentration  that 
stand  opposed  to  each  other;  one  is  known  as  the  Napoleonic 
and  the  other  as  the  von  Moltkean  concentration. 

1.  The  Napoleonic  concentration  is  the  assemblage  be- 
fore arriving  on  the  field  of  battle.     "He  used  to  form 
his  army  into  a  united  serried  mass  and  then  dealt  the  enemy 
an  irresistible  blow.    To  avail  himself  at  the  same  time  of 
the  element  of  surprise,  he  always  took  care  to  conceal 
the  concentration  by  means  of  some  natural  feature  in  the 
country,  such  as  a  chain  of  mountains,  the  course  of  a 
river,  etc."     He  called  his  system  "attacking  in  mass." 

2.  Von  Moltke  was  the  exponent  of  the  principle  of 
concentration  on  the  field  of  battle. 

CONCENTRATIONS  OF  NAPOLEONIC  TYPE 
CAMPAIGN  IN  ITALY  IN  1796 

In  the  campaign  of  1796,  Napoleon,  with  surprising 
rapidity,  collecting  three  of  his  four  divisions  in  the  Ri- 
viera at  Savona  and  Finale,  advanced  and  struck  a  blow 
between  the  armies  of  the  allies  that  opposed  him,  and  then 
fell  upon  each  of  them  separately  with  superior  numbers 
before  the  other  could  come  to  its  assistance. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    209 

Beaulieu,  the  Austrian  commander-in-chief,  had  taken 
up  a  position  along  Bochetta  in  order  to  invade  the  Riviera. 
From  there,  his  right  wing  was  to  go  slowly  southward  in 
the  Apennines  and  gain  possession  of  the  western  passes. 
He  thus  expected  to  approach  the  French  on  the  sides  and 
crush  them.  Colli,  with  his  Piedmontese,  guarded  the  val- 
leys of  Piedmont.  Thus,  the  allies  had  a  long  line  over- 
extended, and  Napoleon  decided  to  strike  them  first  in  the 
center.  By  making  a  demonstration  toward  Genoa,  Bon- 
aparte succeeded  in  drawing  Beaulieu  toward  that  place. 

He  then  quickly  turned  and  struck  the  center  under 
Argenteau  and  defeated  him,  at  Montenotte  on  April  llth 
and  12th,  at  Millesimo  on  the  13th,  and  at  Dego  on  the  14th. 
This  action  forced  Beaulieu  to  abandon  the  advance  on 
Genoa  and  retire. 

Thereupon  Napoleon  left  La  Harpe's  division  to  oppose 
the  Austrians,  and  uniting  all  his  remaining  forces  against 
Colli,  threw  the  latter  back  from  Ceva  on  April  17th,  and 
Mondovi  on  the  22d,  against  Fossano  on  the  river  Stura. 
Continuing  to  push  his  opponent,  on  the  28th  of  April,  he 
forced  him  to  sign  the  truce  of  Sardinia  which  ensured 
Napoleon  the  undisturbed  possession  of  Southern  Piedmont 
and  gave  him  a  prospect  of  the  free  use  of  the  crossing 
of  the  Po  at  Valenza. 

Thus  an  important  campaign  was  won  in  a  few  days. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1805 

At  the  beginning  of  this  campaign,  the  army  on  the 
channel  was  directed  upon  the  Rhine,  while  the  corps  sta- 
tioned in  Holland  and  Hanover  were  put  in  motion  toward 
the  Main. 

"The  resulting  celebrated  marches  were  "true  marches 
of  concentration/' 

They  were  accomplished  under  extremely  favorable 
circumstances,  which  we  must  bear  in  mind  are  not  to 
be  met  with  today. 

As  soon  as  war  was  resolved  upon,  Napoleon's  first 
thought  was  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemies'  forces. 

When  he  learned  that  the  Russians  were  still  in  Mor- 
avia, while  the  Austrians  had  moved  to  the  Iller,  the  aim 
of  his  future  marches  became  well  defined. 


210  STRATEGY 

The  enemy  had  made  the  mistake  of  dividing  his  forces, 
and  this  was  to  be  turned  to  advantage. 

With  this  in  view,  Napoleon  endeavored,  first  of  all, 
to  keep  up  the  separation  of  the  two  masses,  then  to  seize 
the  communications  of  the  near  force  without  uncovering 
his  own.  The  march  objectives  answering  to  these  com- 
binations were  to  be  the  points  of  passage  of  the  Danube, 
by  which  the  armies  of  his  two  antagonists  mutually  com- 
municated, and  at  which  the  Austrian  line  of  retreat  could 
be  directly  threatened.  These  points  were  Gunzburg,  Ingol- 
stadt,  Neuburg,  Donauwerth  and  Ratisbon.  The  surrender 
of  Ulm  resulted.  Napoleon's  concentration  was  effected 
under  cover  of  the  Danube  and,  with  his  forces  massed, 
he  moved  against  the  separated  allies. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1806 

Before  the  war  against  Prussia,  in  the  fall  of  1806, 
the  French  army  was  between  the  Rhine,  Danube  and  Main 
Rivers.  Napoleon  expected  resistance  along  the  Elbe.  He, 
accordingly,  collected  his  whole  army  of  160,000  men  in  the 
territory  inclosed  by  Baireuth,  Bamberg,  Nuremberg  and 
Wurzburg,  under  cover  of  the  Main,  and  the  Thuringian 
Forest. 

From  there,  he  began  his  closed  up  advance  on  three 
roads  one  day's  march  apart  through  Hof,  Kronach  and 
Coburg.  He  assumed  the  Prussians  to  be  at  Erfurt  on 
October  7th.  Thus,  from  the  very  start  his  advance  cut 
off  the  enemy's  communications  with  Berlin  and  the  heart 
of  his  country,  with  Dresden,  and  communication  with 
Prussia  and  Saxony. 

In  this  way,  Napoleon  was  certain  that  the  enemy  would 
fight  him  in  decisive  battle  in  order  to  save  his  state. 

Napoleon  wrote  to  Soult  from  Wurzburg,  on  October 
5th,  as  follows :  "You  can  imagine  that  it  would  be  a  fine 
thing  to  move  forward  to  that  place  (Dresden)  in  a  square 
of  battalions,  200,000  men  strong." 

He  thus  gave  expression  to  his  intention  to  use  his 
massed  advance  to  force  the  enemy  to  fight  a  decisive  ac- 
tion in  an  unfavorable  position. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE      211 

DEFENSE  OF  FRANCE  IN  1814 

On  the  21st  of  December  of  1814,  the  allied  armies 
crossed  the  Rhine  and  began  the  second  invasion  of  France. 

The  allies  numbered  1,025,000  men,  while  Napoleon 
numbered  227,000. 

The  Emperor's  plan  was  in  compliance  with  his  ideas 
and  consisted  in  the  renouncing  of  the  defense  of  the  fron- 
tier, in  the  having  of  all  the  detachments  move  slowly  upon 
Paris,  and  in  the  assembling  of  all  his  disposable  forces 
in  a  central  position. 

In  this  campaign,  at  the  outset,  Napoleon  scattered  his 
troops  in  isolated  detachments  on  the  frontier. 

This  was  contrary  to  his  usual  practice,  but  was  war- 
ranted by  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case.  He  needed 
time  to  assemble  his  depot  troops,  the  divisions  that  were 
in  Spain,  marshal  the  "feeble  resources  at  his  disposal ;,  so 
it  was  imperative  that  he  delay  the  advance  of  the  allies. 

But  his  strategic  movements  showed  that  he  desired 
to  concentrate  his  troops  before  acting  decisively.  The  re- 
treat of  his  various  corps  was  concentric.  He  picked  out 
a  point  of  assembly  between  the  frontier  and  the  capital. 
He  operated  continuously  and  energetically  on  interior  lines 
against  the  various  hostile  columns. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1815 

In  March,  1815,  the  Emperor  wished  to  conceal  the 
concentration  of  his  army  from  the  allies  and  to  effect  this 
concentration  before  advancing  into  the  theater  of  battle. 

"The  British  cantonments  extended  from  the  Scheldt, 
in  the  vicinity  of  Oudenarde,  to  the  high  road  from  Brussels 
to  Charleroi.  Those  of  the  Prussians  covered  Namur  and 
Sombref,  near  the  confluence  of  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse. 

"In  the  space  comprised  between  these  two  rivers,  to  the 
south  of  Marchienne,  the  forest  of  Beaumont  formed  a 
vast  curtain,  which  hid  from  the  allies  the  country  between 
Solre,  Beaumont  and  Philippeville.  It  was  there  that  Na- 
poleon resolved  to  assemble  his  forces. 

"But  the  enemy  was  near;  he  must  be  deceived  as  to 
the  real  points  of  concentration.  The  garrisons  of  Lille, 
Dunkirk,  and  the  neighboring  places  received  orders  to 


212  STRATEGY 

advance  upon  the  English  outposts  and  push  them  vigor- 
ously, to  give  the  impression  that  the  offensive  was  to  be 
launched  at  those  points. 

"At  the  same  time  the  most  rigorous  measures  were 
ordered  to  prevent  all  communication  upon  the  frontier. 
Even  camp  fires  were  forbidden. 

"The  measures  succeeded,  and  on  the  evening  of  June 
14th,  the  French  army,  entirely  assembled,  occupied  the 
covered  position  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  debouched 
in  three  columns,  crossed  the  Sambre,  and  on  the  next  day, 
at  Ligny,  gave  battle  to  the  Prussians,  who,  on  account  of 
the  measures  adopted,  had  not  discovered  Napoleon's  prep- 
arations for  attack." 

The  concentration  behind  the  screen  of  the  forest  of 
Beaumont  and  the  Sambre  River,  the  irruption  "en  masse" 
in  three  columns  in  a  direction  between  the  allies'  armies 
and  the  attack  on  each,  driving  them  asunder  with  inten- 
tion of  falling  on  one  while  holding  off  the  other  and  then 
turning  on  that  other,  was  the  plan  of  Napoleon,  and  it 
was  no  fault  of  the  plan  that  he  did  not  succeed. 

We  see  from  all  these  cases  that  Napoleon  was  fairly 
consistent  in  carrying  out  his  principles. 

Marshal  Joffre  concentrated  in  1914  behind  the  Marne 
in  the  Isle  of  France,  with  the  result  known  to  every  one. 

CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  VON  MOLTKE  TYPE 
KONIGGRATZ 

In  the  spring  of  1866,  Austria  gained  a  start  on  Prus- 
sia in  the  preparations  for  war.  To  meet  this,  it  was  neces- 
sary for  the  Prussians,  by  rapid  mobilization  and  concen- 
tration, to  overcome  the  advantage. 

The  Austrians,  now  having  the  start,  Moltke  did  not 
feel  as  if  he  could  spare  any  more  time  to  concentrate  north 
of  the  mountain  barrier  that  separated  Prussia  and  Silesia 
from  Saxony  and  Bohemia. 

The  two  armies,  commanded  respectively  by  the  Crown 
Prince  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  were  about  160  miles 
apart. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    213 

Moltke  had  captured  a  copy  of  the  orders  of  von  Ben- 
edek,  the  Austrian  commander,  which  set  forth  the  Austrian 
project  as  an  invasion  of  Silesia.  He  also  knew  that  the 
Austrian  concentration  had  not  been  completed  and  that 
some  of  the  corps  were  still  back  at  Lundenburg. 

He  therefore  prepared  his  troops  for  the  invasion  of 
Bohemia  by  assembling  them  along  the  circular  arc  from 
the  Elbe  to  Glatz,  passing  through  Gorlitz  and  conforming 
to  the  frontier  of  the  country. 

This  arc  measured  30  German  miles  (something  less 
than  150  English  miles). 

In  this  way,  all  the  railroad  lines  could  be  used  sim- 
ultaneously for  the  concentration  march  and  the  necessarily 
great  number  of  separate  roads  required  for  the  advance 
also  would  be  gained. 

The  natural  concentration  point  that  could  be  most 
quickly  reached  by  all  his  subdivisions  lay  in  advance,  in 
Austrian  territory,  in  the  direction  of  the  Upper  Elbe. 

It  is  true  that  the  enemy  could  reach  this  point  first,  but 
not  with  his  whole  army.  Some  of  the  corps  were 
back  at  Lundenburg,  175  miles  to  the  southeast.  The  two 
Prussian  armies  were  then  at  Neisse  and  Dresden,  about 
75  miles  from  the  basin  of  the  Upper  Elbe. 

Gitchin  (Jicin)  was  selected  as  the  concentration  point 
because  it  lay  south  of  the  mountain  barrier  and  was  pro- 
tected by  the  Elbe. 

His  CONTROL  MUST  NOT  BE  COMPLETE 

"It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  point  of  concentration 
may  be  looked  for  in  the  territory  controlled  by  the  enemy, 
but  he  must  not  be  there  massed  and  awaiting  for  us, 
otherwise  he  may  fall  upon  successive  columns  in  force 
and  defeat  them  before  assistance  can  come  up." 

This  was  the  case  with  the  one  army  under  Wurmser 
and  the  two  under  Alvinzi  in  northern  Italy  in  1796  and 
1797.  They  advanced  in  two  columns  into  the  territory 
controlled  by  Napoleon  with  the  result  that  he  defeated  them 
in  detail. 

We  find,  however,  neither  Napoleon  nor  Moltke  ad- 
hering strictly  to  his  particular  principle. 


214  STRATEGY 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1805 

During  the  campaign  of  1805,  Napoleon  effected  a 
junction  on  several  occasions  on  the  battlefield.  He  moved 
the  army  from  the  channel  down  to  the  line  of  the  Rhine ; 
Marmont  from  Holland  to  Mainz:  and  Bernadotte  from 
Hamburg  to  Wurzburg.  He  then  moved  toward  the  Danube 
and  got  possession  of  it  between  Donauwerth  and  Ingol- 
stadt. 

He  was  now  concentrated  under  cover  of  the  Danube, 
according  to  his  own  principle  of  concentration.  The  sit- 
uation having  changed,  he  adopted  the  concentration  after- 
wards known  as  the  Moltkean. 

The  Russians  not  coming  up,  he  left  Bernadotte  at 
Weissenburg  to  watch  for  them  and  to  guard  the  left  flank, 
while,  with  the  balance  of  the  force,  he  started  in  three 
columns,  the  right  one  directed  toward  Ulm,  the  center 
toward  Augsburg,  and  the  left  toward  Munich. 

The  orders  were  that  if  any  column  struck  the  enemy, 
it  was  to  engage  him,  while  the  other  hurried  to  its  as- 
sistance. 

You  see  quite  a  similarity  between  the  principle  of 
Moltke  and  the  plan  used  by  Napoleon  on  this  occasion. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1813 

This  campaign  is  another  concentration  on  the  battle- 
field. After  the  battle  of  Gross  Gorschen,  southwest  of 
Leipsic,  the  Prussians  retreated  through  Dresden,  followed 
by  Napoleon  with  his  main  army  of  100,000  men.  Ney 
was  sent  across  the  Elbe  at  Torgau  to  advance  on  Berlin. 
The  Prussians,  after  crossing  the  Elbe  at  Meissen  (north 
of  Dresden),  formed  a  junction  with  the  Russians  at  Kam- 
enz  and  remained  united  with  them  at  Bautzen  behind  the 
river  Spree.  As  soon  as  Napoleon  learned  of  this,  he 
ordered  Ney  to  move  around  the  right  rear  of  the  allies 
while  he  attacked  them  in  front.  The  objective  assigned 
Ney  was  the  town  of  Dreysa,  which  was  in  rear  of  the 
line  of  the  allies.  This  was  unquestionably  carrying  out 
the  principle  enunciated  by  Moltke  of  assembling  on  the 
field  of  battle. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    215 

Moltke  often  adopted  concentrations  according  to  Na- 
poleon's principle. 

In  July  of  1870,  the  concentration  march  of  the  German 
army  shows  the  actual  execution  of  a  close  concentration 
of  the  masses  before  the  beginning  of  operations.  All  the 
forces  available  for  use  in  France  were  brought  together 
in  the  southern  Rhine  provinces  and  in  the  Palatinate 
(Pfalz  in  German).  In  fact,  the  whole  Upper  Rhine  was 
denuded  of  troops  in  conformity  with  the  plan.  In  round 
numbers,  about  400,000  men  were  assembled  within  a  front 
of  a  little  over  62  English  miles. 

After  the  investment  of  Metz,  and  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  and  III  Army  had  continued  west  looking  for  Mac- 
Mahon,  Moltke  again  showed  that  he  was  willing  to  adopt 
the  Napoleonic  principle  and  concentrate  before  battle.  On 
the  25th  of  August,  when  he  heard  that  MacMahon  was 
marching  north,  and  would  move  along  the  Belgium  fron- 
tier to  the  assistance  of  Bazaine,  Moltke  ordered  a  con- 
centration of  the  1st  and  2d  Bavarian  Guards,  3d  and  4th, 
9th  and  12th  Corps  at  Damvillers,  Mangiennes,  and  Azan- 
nes  on  an  area  of  six  British  miles  and  took  four  days  to 
do  so.  He  preferred  this  concentration  before  advancing 
to  check  MacMahon. 

ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  TYPE 

In  event  of  surprise,  or  the  situation  developing  dif- 
ferently from  that  expected,  the  troops  at  least  are  con- 
centrated and  no  great  amount  of  harm  can  be  done. 

DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  TYPE 

1.  Requires  a  considerable  amount  of  territory  for  its 
execution. 

2.  If  the  enemy  is  in  position  near  the  frontier,  it  can 
only  be  done  by  drawing  the  troops  together  on  the  base 
line.    This  results  in  flank  marches  which,  if  executed  too 
near  the  enemy,  may  result  in  flank  attacks,  surprises,  and 
unpremeditated  combats. 

3.  A  change  in  the  situation,  however,  may  occur  while 
the  concentration  is  going  on. 


216  STRATEGY 

This  is  exactly  what  happened  to  Napoleon  in  1806. 
He  thought  that  the  Prussians  were  retiring  before  him 
on  the  road  from  Leipsic  to  Berlin  and  found  them  in 
position  back  of  the  Saale. 

4.  The  crowded  advance,  of  course,  causes  great  hard- 
ships. In  1813,  Napoleon  virtually  wore  his  army  out  by 
his  continual  marching  in  mass  formation.  In  1859  and 
1866,  the  Austrians  suffered  very  much  from  the  same 
cause.  If  the  enemy  is  able  to  dodge  the  blow,  as  did 
Blucher  twice  in  August  and  in  the  beginning  of  September, 
1813,  the  united  mass  will  soon  be  constrained  to  give  up 
the  game,  or  to  separate  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
either  plan  being  dangerous. 

ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  VON  MOLTKE  TYPE 

1.  Allows  the  retention  of  separate  columns  up  to  the 
last  moment. 

2.  In  case  the  enemy  falls  back,  the  point  of  concen- 
tration can  be  pushed  farther  into  his  territory. 

3.  The  separation  of  the  columns  facilitates  the  sub- 
sistence. 

DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE  VON  MOLTKE  TYPE 

1.  The  enemy  may  appear  suddenly  in  mass  and  de- 
feat one  or  more  of  the  columns. 

2.  Lack  of  skillful  handling  may  cause  the  defeat  of  a 
single  column   and  jeopardize  the   success   of  the  whole 
movement. 

3.  The  movement  in  parallel  columns  makes  it  possible 
to  defeat  the  heads  before  their  rears  arrive  and  will  force 
a  concentration  to  the  rear. 

This  is  what  occurred  at  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne. 
The  heads  of  the  various  German  columns  engaging  the 
assembled  British  and  French  were  thrown  back  and  forced 
to  assemble  on  the  Aisne,  which  was  to  their  rear. 

The  defeat  of  Sigel,  in  the  Shenandoah,  in  the  spring 
of  1864  and  the  bottling  up  of  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred, 
when  the  operations  of  these  two  forces  were  part  and 
parcel  of  the  general  Federal  movement,  might  have  had 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    217 

a  disastrous  effect  on  the  general  plan,  had  not  the  Con- 
federates virtually  lost  the  war  by  that  time. 

4.  When  the  columns  are  widely  separated  the  in- 
fluence of  the  commander-in-chief  naturally  becomes  less 
and  less,  and  he  is  dependent  on  the  actions  of  his  sub- 
ordinates. 

The  defeat  of  von  Benin's  separate  columns  at  Trau- 
stanazi  when  the  Crown  Prince's  army  was  marching  to 
unite  with  Prince  Frederick  Charles'  might  have  caused  a 
disaster  had  the  Austrians  taken  advantage  of  their  suc- 
cess. 

KIND  OF  GENERALS  NECESSARY  IN  THE  VON  MOLTKE 

TYPE 

'The  great  majority  of  the  generals  must  be  energetic, 
circumspect  and  quite  in  harmony  with  the  ideas  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief." 

KIND  OF  TROOPS  NECESSARY  IN  THE  VON  MOLTKE 

TYPE 

Troops  must  be  seasoned  and  of  the  type  that  will  not 
be  demoralized  by  an  unfavorable  turn  of  affairs. 

APPLICATION  OF  THE  Two  PRINCIPLES 

The  principles  of  Napoleon  and  Moltke  have  both  led 
to  great  results.  They  both  seek  a  similar  purpose,  which 
is  to  bring  the  united  action  of  a  superior  force  into  battle. 

Each  principle  is  of  equal  value,  each  one  is  appropriate 
to  certain  preceding  conditions,  and  neither  of  them  can 
be  arbitrarily  applied. 

CONCLUSION 

The  choice  as  to  which  of  the  two  principles  is  to  be 
our  guide  in  selecting  the  concentration  point  for  our  armies 
must  be  made  by  the  commander  after  careful  considera- 
tion of  all  the  good  and  bad  points  of  each. 

The  main  idea  to  keep  uppermost  is  to  concentrate  the 
troops  so  as  to  be  able  to  have  them  co-operate  on  the 
field  of  battle. 


218  STRATEGY 

STRATEGIC  LINES  OF  ADVANCE 

The  line  of  advance  to  a  strategical  attack  is  largely 
determined  by  the  location  of  the  objective  and,  when  the 
army  is  separated,  by  the  point  of  concentration.  The 
arranging  of  these  details  is  of  the  utmost  importance. 
During  the  advance  the  question  of  supply  must  be  care- 
fully considered.  While  the  supply  question  should  not 
dictate  the  strategy  and  tactics,  yet  it  is  so  important  that 
it  cannot  be  ignored.  The  ability  to  plan  and  carry  on  the 
operation,  to  move,  and,  at  the  decisive  moment,  to  deploy, 
must  be  preserved. 

In  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  where  from  six  to  eight 
corps  were  set  in  march  at  the  beginning  in  the  same 
direction  at  the  same  time,  it  was  comparatively  easy  for 
the  army  to  advance,  for  the  system  of  roads  in  France 
was  then  almost  the  same  as  it  is  now. 

The  increase  in  size  of  armies,  and  the  immense  amount 
of  transportation  at  the  rear,  makes  it  imperative  that 
the  army  be  broken  into  as  many  columns  as  the  number 
of  roads  will  allow.  In  the  recent  war,  we  had  the  Germans 
advancing  west  of  the  Vosges  in  parallel  columns  in  the 
following  order  from  right  to  left: 

First  Army Von  Kluck 

Second  Army  — Von  Bulow 

Third  Army Von  Hausen 

Fourth  Army Duke  of  Wurtemberg 

Fifth  Army Crown  Prince  of  Prussia 

Their  advance  covered  a  frontage  of  about  150  miles 
and  was  made  generally  in  columns  of  army  corps.  Where 
roads  are  scarce  it  may  be  necessary  to  move  across  country, 
but  of  course  in  a  country  like  western  Europe,  this  can  only 
be  done  with  extreme  difficulty. 

Napoleon  did  not  always  feel  called  upon  to  confine  his 
marches  to  roads  and  frequently  went  across  country. 

Due  to  the  scarcity  of  roads  in  Thessaly  and  South 
Africa,  the  Turks  and  British  respectively  moved  across 
country. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE      219 

PARALLEL  ADVANCE 

The  parallel  advance  has  many  advantages,  among 
which  are  the  following: 

First. — Facilitates  camping  and  subsisting. 

Second. — Each  column  has  its  own  line  of  operations 
and  generally  its  own  line  of  communications. 

Third. — It  obviates  the  chances  for  confusion  among 
the  trains. 

Fourth. — Larger  masses  can  be  moved. 

Fifth. — Halting  of  one  column  need  not  delay  another. 

In  the  marching  of  Stonewall  Jackson's  troops  to  Cedar 
Mountain,  columns  became  intermingled  and  roads  con- 
gested as  a  result  of  his  staff  not  having  selected  suitable 
separate  roads  for  respective  columns. 

DISADVANTAGES 

First. — A  junction  will  not  occur  on  the  battlefield 
unless  the  columns  are  close  enough  together. 

Second. — Danger  of  obstacles  intervening  between  the 
roa'ds  to  prevent  rapid  co-operation  in  event  of  a  column 
being  attacked  separately. 

This*  kind  of  an  advance  is  most  efficacious  after  a 
decisive  battle  when  pursuing  the  enemy,  or  when  it  is 
desired  to  get  over  a  section  of  country  quickly. 

Von  Schlichting  has  elaborated  on  the  Moltke  idea  of 
parallel  lines  (von  Schlieffen  parallel  columns)  and  con- 
centration on  the  field  of  battle  in  quite  an  extensive  work. 
He  recommends  that  in  case  of  two  columns,  the  deploy- 
ment should  be  by  the  inner  flank.  In  case  there  are  three 
parallel  columns,  the  middle  one  deploys  on  its  center  and 
the  outer  ones  toward  their  inner  flank. 

The  paramount  idea  is  to  direct  the  main  column  toward 
the  point  of  desired  contact,  the  other  columns  marching 
by  and  attempting  a  double  envelopment. 

The  great  danger  is  that  one  column  may  strike  the 
bulk  of  the  enemy  and  be  defeated  before  the  other  can 
assist.  This  occurred  at  Trantenau. 

In  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne,  the  Germans  were 
advancing  from  the  Aisne  in  these  so-called  von  Schlieffen 
parallel  columns  when  the  right  columns,  namely,  those  of 


220  STRATEGY 

von  Kluck,  were  hit  in  the  front  and  right  by  the  British 
and  French  respectively.  The  result  was  that  von  Bulow 
was  forced  to  go  to  von  Kluck's  assistance  and  this,  coupled 
with  Foch's  skillful  maneuvering,  forced  a  German  concen- 
tration to  the  rear. 

The  Germans  have  always  favored  an  advance  of  this 
kind,  contending  that  it  requires  dependable  troops  and 
competent  column  commanders  who  will  act  with  the 
required  judgment  if  attacked.  Having  had  what  was 
probably  the  finest  military  machine  that  has  ever  existed, 
they  thought  that  they,  and  they  alone,  could  gain  results  by 
accepting  this  principle  as  doctrine. 

At  Tannenberg,  we  find  Samsonov  advancing  in  parallel 
columns  on  a  front  of  25  miles  and  failing,  while  von  Hin- 
denburg,  advancing  in  parallel  columns,  was  successful. 

The  reason  is  obvious  from  a  study  of  the  map.  The 
Russians,  five  corps  strong,  moved  in  columns  west  of  the 
Masurian  Lake  and  Forest  region.  Von  Hindenburg  first 
concentrated  his  forces,  according  to  the  Napoleonic  idea, 
east  of  Thorn  and  Graudenz.  He  then  waited  until  4he 
Russians  were  well  strung  out  when  he  struck  the  heads  of 
their  columns,  first  feinting  against  their  left,  and  driving 
that  section  of  their  line  back  on  Neidenburg  and  seizing 
their  communications  which  led  from  that  flank.  The  Rus- 
sians weakened  their  center  to  reinforce  their  left.  Mean- 
while, von  Hindenburg,  utilizing  lorries,  omnibuses  and 
taxicabs,  moved  about  60,000  men  around  the  Russian 
right,  and  with  two  corps  and  a  separate  brigade  brought 
down  from  Rennenkampf 's  front,  drove  back  the  Russians 
and,  in  conjunction  with  his  right,  surrounded  and  de- 
cisively defeated  Samsonov's  Army  of  the  Narev. 

Hindenburg's  success  was  due  partly  to  his  knowledge 
of  the  country,  and  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  both  rail 
and  dirt  road  transport  were  more  abundant  in  his  army 
than  in  Samsonov's. 

In  1870,  in  the  advance  from  Saar  to  the  Moselle,  the 
Germans  moved  in  parallel  columns,  yet,  when  the  French 
made  the  stand  on  the  Nied,  it  necessitated  a  change  in  the 
routes  of  the  columns. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    221 

• 

While  in  position  north  of  the  Etowah,  Johnston,  in 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  had  an  opportunity  to  defeat  Sher- 
man's left  columns  under  Schofield  and  Hooker,  when  the 
Federal  army  was  advancing  in  parallel  columns  separated 
by  Gravelly  Plateau.  Due  to  disobedience  of  orders  by 
Hood,  the  opportunity  slipped  through  the  Confederates' 
fingers. 

CONVERGENT  ADVANCE 

As  the  columns  approach  the  enemy,  there  must  be  a 
closing  in.  The  Japanese  columns  in  Manchuria  all  marched 
parallel,  but  generally  converging  on  the  hills  south  of 
Liao  Yang. 

One  must  not,  however,  start  a  convergence  too  soon, 
otherwise  it  will  betray  to  the  enemy  the  point  of  concentra- 
tion. And,  also,  one  will  be  subjected  to  the  inconvenience 
of  congested  territory  without  just  cause. 

POINT  OF  CONCENTRATION 

The  exact  place  of  concentration  cannot  be  decided 
upon  beforehand.  It  is  not  a  fixed  point,  but  moves  about, 
so  to  speak,  in  a  certain  area  because  the  hostile  army  is 
doing  the  same  thing. 

The  convergent  directions  of  the  columns  are  given  in 
a  general  way  and  they  are  moved  toward  a  certain  district 
until  it  becomes  evident  where  the  tactical  decision  is  to  be 
expected. 

This  was  what  the  Prussians  did  in  1866.  They  directed 
their  advance  toward  the  area  within  the  boundaries  of 
the  Upper  Elbe.  They  happened  to  get  in  touch  with  the 
Austrians  near  Gitchin  (Jicin).  This  was  a  coincidence. 

At  Tannenberg  the  point  of  culmination  was  Willen- 
berg,  where  the  two  wings  of  the  Germans  united.  It  was 
well  in  the  rear  of  the  Russian  army. 

We  must  not  take  the  term  "concentration"  to  mean 
literally  that  the  army  stands  shoulder  to  shoulder  on  the 
same  field. 

"An  army  is  concentrated  when  even  its  most  distant 
corps  are  able  to  arrive  on  the  battlefield  on  the  same  day 
at  the  required  time." 


222  STRATEGY 

• 

Napoleon  expressed  his  ideas,  along  these  lines,  to  his 
brother  Joseph  as  follows: 

"January  12,  1806. 

"I  say  to  you  again,  do  not  divide  your  forces.  Let 
your  entire  army  cross  the  Apennines,  and  let  your  three 
corps  be  directed  upon  Naples,  and  so  disposed  as  to  be  able 
to  unite  upon  the  same  field  of  battle  in  a  single  day.  In 
order  to  concentrate  in  a  day,  an  army  of  five  corps,  with 
two  divisions  of  cavalry,  or  from  150,000  to  180,000  men 
in  all,  you  should  have  a  depth  of  not  to  exceed  the  extent 
of  a  day's  march  and  a  front  of  not  in  excess  of  twice  this 
distance." 

"The  most  favorable  position  the  several  units  of  an 
army  can  occupy  is  when  they  are  disposed  in  a  semi-circle 
around  the  battlefield." 

Such  was  the  case  with  Napoleon  on  the  Danube,  in 
1806,  and  with  the  Prussians  at  Koniggratz  in  1866. 

DIVERGENT  ADVANCE 

Von  der  Goltz  says  that  the  divergent  advance  is  the 
epilogue  of  victory. 

Having  concentrated  our  forces  and  fought  a  vic- 
torious battle,  we  now  must  diverge  again  for  comfort  and 
to  expedite  the  pursuit.  However,  we  must  be  careful 
and  not  start  the  movement  too  soon,  for  with  the  enemy 
close  at  hand,  he  may  strike  back  in  force  at  one  of  our  col- 
umns and  change  a  victory  into  defeat. 

After  Tannenberg,  Hindenburg  attempted  to  cut  off 
Rennenkampf,  then  holding  the  lake  line.  The  Ger- 
mans advanced  on  a  broad  front  in  parallel  columns  sep- 
arated in  the  heavy  forests  and  swamps.  Rennenkampf, 
learning  of  Samsonov's  defeat,  fell  back  across  the  Niemen, 
but  not  before  he  had  checked  the  German  left  in  a  rear 
guard  action  at  Gumbinnen.  The  German  right  was  also 
held  up  for  a  day  or  so  at  Augustovo.  Had  Hindenburg 
kept  his  forces  closer  in  hand  he  might  have  made  his 
victory  even  more  complete. 

CAMPAIGN  IN  CHAMPAGNE,  1814 

In  this  campaign,  the  allies  separated  to  envelop  Na- 
poleon and  had  their  respective  columns  repeatedly  de- 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    223 

feated  by  him.  Their  strategy  might  have  been  disastrous 
had  it  not  been  that  the  disparity  of  numbers — the  allies 
had  1,025,000  men  and  Napoleon  but  227,000— made  Na- 
poleon's task  impossible. 

Line  of  advance  of  allies:  Army  of  the  north,  con- 
sisting of  the  corps  of  Bulow  and  Winzingerode,  traversed 
Belgium,  pushed  back  MacDonald  upon  Namur;  Blucher's 
army  of  Silesia  crossed  the  Rhine  between  Mainz  and  Co- 
blenz  and  advanced  on  Nancy,  which  was  in  front  of 
its  left;  Grand  "Army  of  Schwarzenberg,  right  under  Witt- 
genstein, crossed  the  Rhine  at  Breisach,  advanced  toward 
Epinal  and  Saint-Die;  center  advanced  via  Neuchatel  to- 
ward Besancon,  Auzonne,  Dijon  and  Langres;  left  under 
Buba  advanced  through  Switzerland  into  Jura  and  got  pos- 
session of  the  Saone.  The  plan  was  to  effect  a  junction  of 
Blucher  and  Schwarzenberg  on  the  Marne  and  then  to  ad- 
vance on  Paris. 

One  of  the  reasons  that  the  allies  divided  their  forces 
and  advanced  on  two  occasions  on  divergent  lines  was  the 
desire  on  the  part  of  Blucher  to  be  independent,  and  a 
divergent  advance  would  eventually  make  him  so. 

SERBS  IN  1876 

In  the  Serbo-Turkish  War  of  1876,  the  Serbs  advanced 
at  the  outset  in  four  parallel  columns  consisting  of  a  corps 
each,  and  ingloriously  failed. 

MARENGO,  1800 

In  1800,  Kray  and  Melas  advanced  from  the  Danube 
on  divergent  lines.  Melas  moved  into  Italy  and  Kray  along 
the  Rhine.  Napoleon,  taking  advantage  of  the  fact  that 
the  Alps  separated  the  two  armies,  arranged  for  Moreau 
to  defeat  Kray,  while  he  quickly  crossed  the  Alps  and  de- 
feated Melas. 

FLANK  MARCHES 

"The  march  forward  to  the  concentration  may  not  lead 
exactly  to  the  point  most  desired,  for  when  gaining  contact 
we  may  find  our  position  oblique  to  the  enemy  or  even 
parallel  to  it.  The  result  will  be  that  we  will  have  to  do 
some  shifting  by  making  flank  marches.  The  safest  way 


224  STRATEGY 

to  march  by  the  flank,  under  these  circumstances,  is  to 
leave  a  covering  detachment  in  front  and  march  in  the  rear 
of  it."  One  of  the  most  famous  flank  marches  made  re- 
cently was  that  of  the  42d  French  Division  on  the  Marne 
when  it  was  taken  out  of  the  left  of  the  9th  Army  line 
by  Foch,  and  sent  across  country,  in  the  rear,  to  fall  sud- 
denly upon  the  flanks  of  the  victorious  Prussian  Guard  and 
Saxons. 

ADVANTAGES 

Inasmuch  as  the  column  is  moving  across  the  hostile 
front,  in  event  of  attack,  the  line  can  be  formed  to  the 
flank,  the  easiest  direction  for  a  deployment. 

DISADVANTAGES 

That  of  being  struck  in  flank  and  cut  in  half.  Witness 
the  tactical  flank  march  of  T.  J.  Wood's  division  at  Chick- 
amauga.  The  flank  march  is  most  dangerous  when  the  force 
making  it  is  not  aware  of  the  fact,  and  the  column  is  sud- 
denly taken  by  surprise  and  struck  in  the  flank.  De  Failly's 
force  at  Beaumont  was  in  this  predicament. 

PENINSULA  CAMPAIGN,  1862 

McClellan's  flank  march  across  the  Confederate  front, 
in  changing  his  base  from  White  House  to  Harrison's  Land- 
ing, almost  courted  disaster.  It  was  no  fault  of  his  that 
the  army  was  not  annihilated. 

FLANK  DETACHMENTS 

If  forced  to  make  a  flank  march,  the  safest  thing  to  do 
is  to  have  out  a  strong  detachment  on  the  exposed  flank. 

If  the  detachment  is  too  weak,  it  invites  attacks  by  the 
enemy  at  the  least  favorable  moment;  and  if  too  strong, 
it  will  delay  the  march  of  the  main  army. 

The  defeat  of  De  Failly's  corps  at  Beaumont,  when  it 
was  acting  as  a  flank  guard  to  MacMahon's  army,  is  an 
illustration  of  too  weak  a  force  inviting  attack. 

In  Grant's  flank  march  south,  when  he  crossed  the 
-James  River  after  Cold  Harbor,  his  right  flank  was  pro- 
tected by  cavalry,  and  while  this  cavalry  was  driven  back, 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    225 

yet  it  accomplished  its  mission,  for  the  Confederates  never 
seriously  interfered  with  the  movement. 

It  is  true  that  a  force  attacked,  while  making  a  flank 
march,  is  thrown  more  or  less  into  confusion,  for  its  ob- 
ject is  to  reach  a  certain  fixed  point  and  every  fight  even, 
if  successful,  causes  delays,  and  delays  mean  a  certain 
amount  of  confusion. 

PENINSULA,  1862 

During  this  campaign,  it  was  imperative  that  McClel- 
lan  should  reach  Harrison's  Landing  as  soon  as  possible. 
The  attacks  at  White  Oak  Swamp  and  Charles  City  Cross- 
roads caused  considerable  confusion.  Had  the  Confederates 
managed  better,  the  Civil  War  might  have  been  won  by  the 
capture  of  McClellan's  army. 

If  the  enemy's  army  is  not  in  motion,  a  flank  march 
can  be  more  readily  carried  out,  as  it  requires  some  time 
for  the  enemy  to  make  the  necessary  deployments.  The 
situation  becomes  more  difficult  when  the  enemy  is  already 
in  motion  and  we  are  trying  to  slip  past  the  heads  of  his 
columns. 

Often,  we  may  be  forced  to  attack  some  of  the  columns 
in  order  to  delay  them  until  the  balance  of  the  force  marches 
by. 

This  is  what  was  done  at  Savage  Station  in  the  Penin- 
sula campaign  of  1862. 

FLANK  MARCHES  NECESSARY 

Flank  marches  are  nevertheless  necessary,  especially 
if  the  concentration  is  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  and 
if  done,  must  be  done  quickly. 

Illustration:  Marches  of  Grant  by  the  flank  in  the 
Wilderness. 

RADETSKY'S  FLANK  AND  NIGHT  MARCH  IN  1848 

"In  the  year  1848,  the  Piedmontese  army,  commanded 
by  King  Charles  Albert,  stood  upon  the  heights  of  Somma- 
Campagna,  eastward  of  Peschiera,  engrossed  in  covering  the 
siege  of  that  city  and  observing  toward  Verona,  where 
the  bulk  of  the  Austrian  army  was  under  Radetsky. 


226  STRATEGY 

"Thinking  to  deliver  Peschiera,  the  Austrian  general 
formed  the  design  of  executing  a  flank  march  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Mantua  (south),  debouching  then  by  the  right  bank 
of  the  Mincio  upon  the  communications  of  the  enemy  and 
attacking  him  unexpectedly." 

PLANS 

First. — Stationed  a  brigade  in  front  of  Verona  to  at- 
tract the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction. 

At  9 :00  PM,  on  the  27th  of  May,  the  Austrians  moved 
out.  in  three  columns.  The  right  column  consisted  of  a 
corps.  Center  of  two  corps.  The  left  column  was  made 
up  of  the  corps  cavalry  of  one  of  the  corps  of  the  central 
column. 

FLANKERS 

In  order  to  cover  the  exposed  flank,  each  brigade  of  the 
right  column  furnished  a  company  of  infantry  and  a  platoon 
of  cavalry  on  the  right  flank,  the  exposed  one. 

At  daylight,  the  cavalry  of  the  left  column  joined  the 
rear  of  the  center  column. 

On  the  28th,  the  army  assembled  at  Mantua  and  the 
brigade  left  at  Verona  joined. 

On  the  29th,  the  debouchment  was  made  into  the  Val- 
ley of  the  Mincio,  the  Piedmontese  were  attacked  and  de- 
cisively defeated. 

COMMENTS 

This  march  illustrates  three  points  that  are  necessary 
to  the  success  of  a  flank  movement. 

1.  An  offensive  demonstration  made  in  a  direction  other  than 
that  to   be   pursued. 

2.  Employment  of  flankers  on  the  exposed  flank. 

3.  Movement  by  night. 

NIGHT  MARCHES 

Night  marches  have  been  tried  in  recent  wars  in 
moving  of  troops  over  exposed  areas  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  them  into  position  to  attack  at  daylight. 

The  great  difficulty  is  in  keeping  to  the  road  and  the 
danger  of  suddenly  encountering  the  enemy. 


CONCENTRATION  AND  METHOD  OF  ADVANCE    227 

Grant  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House  in  1864,  and  Mac- 
Mahon  before  Sedan,  in  1870,  conducted  strategic  night 
marches,  lighting  the  way  by  bonfires.  In  Grant's  case 
the  fires  were  extinguished  by  rain,  in  MacMahon's 
case,  they  gave  information  to  the  Germans  that  he. was 
retiring  to  the  northwest  toward  Sedan,  and  was  not  march- 
ing, as  was  expected,  to  the  relief  of  Bazaine. 

In  the  tropics  marches  of  concentration  are  made  at 
night  where  possible,  in  order  to  escape  the  terrific  heat 
of  the  day. 

As  to  which  form  of  strategic  advance  the  army  will 
adopt,  the  commander  must  decide.  There  should  be  no 
"cut  and  dried"  method,  deduced  from  almost  mathemat- 
ical-like  computations,  such  as  the  Germans  had,  but  each 
case  should  be  handled  by  itself,  the  general  deciding  as 
to  the  best  method  to  be  followed  in  each  specific  case. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Special  Forms  of  Strategic  Offensive 


WE  MUST  be  careful  in  our  study  of  specific  forms  not 
to  become  academic  and  think  that  all  we  have  to  do 
is  to  store  away  in  the  cells  of  our  brains  a  collection  of 
set  forms  to  be  applied  with  the  straightedge  and  thereby 
become  masters  of  strategy.  There  are,  however,  a  few 
of  the  simpler  forms  that  always  occur  in  one  shape  or 
another  which  can  be  isolated  and  given  a  name. 

SPECIAL  FORMS 
STRATEGICAL 

1.  Frontal  attack. 

2.  Penetration. 

3.  Attack  of  a  wing. 

4.  Envelopment. 

5.  Turning  movement. 

6.  Attack  on  flank  and  rear. 

FRONTAL  ATTACK 

When  the  commander  knows  that  he  has  superior  num- 
bers, he  should  make  for  the  enemy  by  the  most  direct 
route,  strike  his  main  body,  and  defeat  him  by  sheer  weight 
of  numbers.  All  artificial  aids  to  magnify  the  success 
obtained  by  superior  numbers  should  be  neglected. 

ADVANTAGES 

"It  is  the  simplest  form,  facilitating  leadership  and 
diminishing  the  chances  of  confusion,  misunderstanding, 
and  errors." 

DISADVANTAGES 

First. — It  does  not  threaten  the  enemy's  line  of  re- 
treat, or  communications. 

Second. — There  is  no  surprise  by  the  direction  of  the 
attack. 

228 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  229 

To  thrust  the  enemy  back  by  dint  of  superior  numbers 
or  superior  fighting  power  is  nothing  more  than  the  appli- 
cation of  brute  strength. 

Having  decided  upon  this  form  of  strategy,  full  ad- 
vantage must  be  sought  in  energetic  action  and  celerity 
of  movement. 

We  should  not  detach  troops,  the  loss  of  which  might 
weaken  us,  nor  attempt  a  combination  of  our  frontal  attack 
with  some  other  form  unless  there  are  special  reasons  for 
so  doing,  such  as  the  configuration  of  the  terrain,  the  sys- 
tem of  roads,  the  peculiar  position  of  our  own  and  the 
enemy's  forces. 

Our  object  is  to  bring  about  a  battle,  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, so  we  must  go  at  it  in  the  simplest,  quickest  and 
shortest  way. 

CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR,  1864 

The  plan  of  Grant  for  the  operations  in  1864  was 
for  a  strategical  frontal  attack;  a  going  after  the  enemy 
"hammer  and  tongs"  wherever  found. 

RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR,  1904-1905 

The  Japanese,  in  Manchuria,  adopted  the  strategical 
offensive  in  their  advance  on  Liao  Yang  for  the  reason  that, 
to  succeed  from  their  point  of  view,  the  war  had  to  be 
short,  and  the  direct  advance  against  the  Russians  would 
bring  about  this  condition. 

GERMAN  RUSH  THROUGH  BELGIUM  AND  FRANCE  IN  1914 

The  German  government  had  assured  the  people  at 
home  that  the  war  would  be  a  short  one  and  be  over  in 
three  months.  Having  superior  numbers  at  the  outset,  the 
army  had  to  rush  things.  They  made  one  mistake,  which 
will  always  occur  when  one  army  rushes  madly  at  another, 
and  that  is  they  became  badly  strung  out  on  the  road  and 
supply  agencies  could  not  keep  up. 

ADVANCE  IN  PARALLEL  COLUMNS 

The  strategical  frontal  attack  is  greatly  simplified  if 
combined  with  a  strategical  march  in  parallel  columns. 


230  STRATEGY 

In  such  a  case,  the  columns  are  engaged  with  the  en- 
emy at  the  same  time,  but  the  movement  does  not  neces- 
sarily promise  decisive  results,  unless  the  attacker  is  greatly 
superior  to  the  defender  and,  backed  up  by  inexhaustible 
resources,  can  simply  run  over  the  enemy  and  ruin  him  by 
losses. 

The  final  campaign  between  Grant  and  Lee  was  a  cold 
question  of  staying  powers.  Grant  had  greater  resources, 
more  men,  and  knew  that  he  could  win  if  he  adopted  sim- 
pler movements  and  relied  on  his  known  superiority. 

The  columns  need  not  necessarily  be  of  equal  strength, 
for  the  column  that  is  marching  in  the  decisive  direction 
would  probably  be  reinforced  the  most. 

In  the  Meuse-Argonne,  we  carried  out  a  strategical 
frontal  attack,  reinforcing  our  left  flank,  the  line  of  opera- 
tions of  which  was  in  our  decisive  strategic  direction. 

It  was  a  cold  question  of  man  power,  so  we  used  it  in 
the  most  effective  manner. 

LATER  ENVELOPMENTS  AND  TURNING  MOVEMENTS 

The  strategical  frontal  attack  will  probably  conclude 
with  an  envelopment  or  a  turning  movement,  just  as  it 
did  in  the  Meuse-Argonne,  so  one  must  be  prepared  for  it. 

We  should  figure  on  the  section  of  the  hostile  line, 
which  if  broken,  will  offer  us  the  attainment  of  the  greatest 
success  and  have  our  reserve  nearest  that  point. 

STRATEGICAL  PENETRATION 

The  strategic  penetration  is  an  operation  consisting 
of  piercing  of  the  hostile  front  at  some  point  and  sep- 
erating  the  several  parts  so  as  to  defeat  each  in  detail. 
The  movement  is  brought  about  by  massing  forces  at  a 
certain  point,  breaking  through,  and  then  enveloping  some 
of  the  forces.  The  Germans  repeatedly  did  this  in  the 
recent  war. 

It  is  quite  apparent,  that  if  successful,  such  a  move- 
ment must  be  attended  with  the  greatest  results  because: 

First. — The  two  separated  wings  are  open  to  flank  attacks. 
Second. — The    communications    of   one    or   both    wings    are 
threatened. 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  231 

Third. — It  makes  it  possible  to  surround  parts  of  either 
wing  and  capture  them. 

Fourth. — It  makes  it  possible  for  the  assailant  to  mass 
superior  numbers  against  one  face  of  the  salient  while  holding 
off  the  enemy  on  the  other  face  with  inferior  numbers. 

There  is  a  new  strategic  type  called  "the  action  of 
dislocation"  which  has  been  coined  as  a  result  of  Foch's 
movement  in  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 

This  is  a  form  of  penetration  caused,  not  by  a  con- 
centrated blow,  but  by  mismanagement  on  the  part  of  the 
staff,  whereby  a  gap  is  left  in  the  line  of  the  assailant  into 
which  the  defender  pours  his  troops,  thereby  dislocating 
the  line.  Such  a  situation  occurred  on  Foch's  right,  and 
into  the  gap  he  threw  the  42d  Division.  As  soon  as  the 
penetrating  troops  have  entered  the  breach,  advantages 
accruing,  as  a  result  of  the  situation,  are  the  same  as  when 
the  line  is  deliberately  penetrated. 

DISADVANTAGES 

The  great  danger  in  a  strategic  penetration  is  that 
unless  there  are  sufficient  reserves  to  throw  in  to  widen 
the  breach  and  full  advantage  is  taken  of  the  situation,  the 
wedging  force  becomes  inert  and  the  enemy  may  mass 
troops  against  the  faces  of  the  salient,  and  defeat  the  troops 
in  it. 

This  is  what  happened,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  Gen- 
eral Byng's  attacking  forces  at  Cambrai. 

When  von  Mackensen  drove  the  wedge  into  Rutsky's 
line  between  Strykov  and  Lodz  in  November,  1914,  during 
the  second  attack  on  Warsaw,  the  Russian  line  split  into 
two  parts  and  the  Germans  interrupted  the  two  Russian 
north  and  south  railroads  to  Warsaw.  It  looked  as  if  von 
Hindenburg  had  succeeded  beyond  his  wildest  dreams,  yet 
next  day,  a  Siberian  corps,  coming  from  the  north,  and 
troops  arriving  from  the  south  from  Ivanov's  army,  struck 
in  on  both  faces  of  the  salient,  cutting  off  the  apex,  rees- 
tablishing the  Russian  line  and  nearly  annihilating  two 
German  corps  whose  escape  was  due  to  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  Germans,  which  enabled  them  to  press 
outward  the  enclosing  Russian  forces. 


232  STRATEGY 

HENRY  AND  DONELSON 

The  campaign  in  western  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  in 
1862  illustrates  the  strategical  penetration  with  the  pen- 
etrating force  becoming  embedded.  The  two  wings  of  the 
Confederate  army  were  driven  asunder,  Johnston  retiring 
toward  the  southeast  and  Beauregard  toward  the  south- 
west. Grant  held  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  and,  although 
willing  and  able  to  move  after  Johnston,  was  not  allowed 
to  do  so  on  account  of  an  imaginary  scare  that  caused  the 
withdrawal  of  his  gunboats  and  personal  differences  with 
Halleck,  due  to  jealousy  of  the  latter. 

The  penetration,  if  properly  carried  out,  results  in  a 
series  of  frontal  attacks  from  central  positions,  which  due 
to  the  effect  of  the  highly  developed  fire  action  of  today,  are 
very  difficult  to  carry  out.  This  will  be  particularly  true 
if  the  enemy's  forces  are  united;  he  is  able  to  assemble 
them  coincident  with  the  penetration,  and  they  are  able  to 
co-operate. 

This  is  what  happened  in  the  German  drive  to  the 
Marne  in  1918.  The  allies  were  able  to  assemble  reserves 
coincident  with  the  penetration  and  these  reserves  were 
able  to  co-operate. 

BEST  TIME  FOR  PENETRATION 

The  best  time  for  the  penetration  is  before  the  strategic 
concentration. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT  IN  BOHEMIA 

"Frederick  the  Great  entered  Bohemia  in  1757  at  a 
time  when  he  knew  that  the  Austrians  were  not  assembled 
but  were  strung  out  billeted  between  Koniggratz  and  the 
Egar  River  on  the  west." 

"Frederick  figured  that  he  could  penetrate  their  ex- 
tended line  and  drive  Daun  to  the  east,  and  Prince  Charles 
of  Lorraine  to  the  west  toward  Prague,  and  defeat  each 
in  detail." 

"Frederick  did  not  have  his  army  all  together  but  had 
it  distributed  over  too  much  country  and  separated  by 
the  Elbe.  As  a  result,  the  propelling  force  was  not  strong 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  233 

enough,  and  Daun's  attempt  at  the  relief  of  Prince  Charles, 
who  was  besieged  in  Prague,  was  successful." 

POLITICAL  INTERESTS 

Political  interests  may  cause  armies  to  retire  in  op- 
posite directions  if  penetrated. 

The  Austrians,  with  characteristic  self-interest,  when 
the  line  was  penetrated  by  Napoleon  in  1796,  in  Italy, 
withdrew  away  from  their  helpless  ally  and  not  toward  him 
as  did  Blucher  at  Waterloo.  Political  interests  doubtless 
prompted  this  action. 

ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  BONAPARTE  IN  1796 

In  March,  the  French  army,  barely  42,000  strong, 
spread  out  upon  a  line  of  cantonments  extending  from  the 
Col  di  Tenda  to  Savona,  had  before  it  the  Piedmontese 
and  Austrian  armies.  Bonaparte's  aim  was  to  divide  these 
forces,  and  separately  overwhelm  them. 

"The  operation  to  be  understood/'  said  he,  "is  simple. 
Are  the  Piedmontese  alone?  March  upon  them  by  Gar- 
ressio,  Bagnasco,  La  Solata,  Castel  Nuovo  and  Montezemolo. 
Having  beaten  them,  and  forced  the  entrenched  camp,  lay 
siege  to  Ceva." 

"Have  the  Austrians  the  good  sense  to  unite  at  Mont- 
ezemolo with  the  Piedmontese  ?  Separate  them  by  marching 
on  Alessandria;  and  as  soon  as  the  separation  is  ef- 
fected, give  24  hours  to  the  seizure  of  the  entrenched  camp 
at  Ceva."  "Once  this  camp  is  occupied  by  us,  double  forces 
will  be  required  to  compel  us  to  raise  the  siege  of  the  fort- 
ress." 

The  allies  were  united  but  on  a  very  extended  front. 
Napoleon  made  a  demonstration  toward  Genoa  with  the 
result  that  Beaulieu  was  drawn  in  that  direction  while 
Colli,  with  the  Piedmontese,  guarded  the  Valley  of  the 
Piedmont.  This  attenuation  weakened  the  center.  Bon- 
aparte saw  this  and  attacked,  leaving  a  force  to  hold  Beau- 
lieu,  turned  and  defeated  the  Austrian  right  under  Argen- 
teau  at  Montenotte,  Millesimo  and  Debo;  and  from  this 
moment  forced  the  allies  to  adopt  exterior  lines  of  operation. 


234  STRATEGY 

Napoleon,  as  soon  as  he  came  into  the  possession  of 
interior  lines,  turned  against  Colli,  the  weaker,  and  de- 
feated him,  forcing  him  to  sign  an  armistice ;  then  turning 
on  Beaulieu  pushed  him  beyond  the  Po  River,  thence  to  the 
Mincio  River,  and  finally  into  the  Tyrol. 

It  is  hardly  probable  that  in  future  times  we  will  be 
able  to  attack  the  point  of  union  of  two  armies  allied  to- 
gether as  they  were  in  1796,  and  effect  penetration.  Polit- 
ical insight  in  times  of  peace  will  cause  treaties  to  be  made 
providing  for  alliances  in  event  of  war.  And  these  will  be 
so  understood  that  there  will  be  a  certain  community  of 
interests  that  has  not  existed  in  the  past. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  WATERLOO 

Napoleon,  having  massed  his  army  secretly  south  of 
the  Sambre  River,  on  the  morning  of  June  15,  1814,  launched 
it  forward  in  three  columns.  His  objective  was  the  Som- 
bref  Crossroads  which,  if  seized,  would  separate  the  Brit- 
ish from  the  Prussian  allies.  The  communications  of  each 
one  of  the  allies  diverged  from  those  of  the  other.  On  the 
16th,  Napoleon  defeated  Blucher  at  Ligny,  but  Ney,  by  his 
dilatory  tactics,  allowed  the  British  to  assemble  at  Quatre 
Bras  and  defeat  him.  The  British,  learning  of  the  defeat 
at  Ligny,  retired,  and  Napoleon  urged  Ney  in  vain  for  an 
active  pursuit.  Grouchy,  detailed  to  follow  Blucher,  whom 
Napoleon  erroneously  believed  would  retire  on  Liege  and 
Maastricht,  lost  touch  with  him. 

Napoleon  effected  the  penetration,  but  there  was  no 
celerity  by  Ney  on  the  16th,  such  as  Napoleon  showed  in 
1796  after  driving  back  the  Austrians.  The  allies  were 
able  to  assemble  and  co-operate  at  Waterloo. 

Due  to  the  increased  size  of  armies,  the  lightning-like 
changes  of  position,  such  as  were  made  by  Napoleon,  will 
be  impossible.  With  European  nations  that  have  worked 
out  their  mobilization  and  concentration  plans  in  times  of 
peace,  it  will  be  impossible  to  strike  them  at  the  most  favor- 
able moment,  i.e.,  before  they  have  mobilized  and  concen- 
trated. 

We  have  seen  in  the  recent  war  that  the  strategy 
adopted,  after  the  first  Marne  battle,  was  that  of  merely 
trying  to  work  through  at  the  weakest  point. 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  235 

It  is  difficult  to  illustrate  the  special  forms  of  strate- 
gical and  tactical  offensives  or  defensives  by  operations 
on  the  east  front  in  the  recent  war,  for  intrigue,  treason 
and  disloyalty  so  honeycombed  the  high  command,  that 
failure  occurred  for  those  reasons  more  often  than  as  a 
result  of  inferior  strategy  and  tactics. 

VON  MACKENSEN'S  PENETRATION  IN  THE  SPRING 
OF  1915 

Having  failed  to  force  the  Grand  Duke  to  withdraw 
from  the  Carpathians  by  operating  in  Poland,  von  Hin- 
denburg,  who  had  been  placed  in  charge  of  affairs  on  the 
east  front,  conceived  another  plan. 

It  was  to  allow  the  Grand  Duke  to  continue  with  his 
endeavors  to  seize  the  passes  of  the  Carpathians,  meanwhile 
attracting  his  attention  from  the  vital  point  by  operations 
against  his  flanks. 

So  von  Hindenburg  first  attacked  Warsaw  from  the 
west,  using  this  movement  to  cover  the  advance  against  the 
Russian  northern  flank  in  East  Prussia,  which  terminated 
with  the  Russians  again  on  the  Niemen. 

Almost  immediately  after  the  operation  in  East  Prus- 
sia started,  a  movement  against  the  extreme  southern  flank 
was  inaugurated.  The  Austrian  general,  Pflanzer,  advanced 
toward  Dolina  and  the  valley  of  the  Pruth,  occupying  Stan- 
islau. 

The  Grand  Duke  rushed  assistance  against  both  of  these 
movements  which  resulted  in  their  being  driven  back. 

Whether  the  respective  retreats  were  voluntary  or  in- 
voluntary it  matters  not,  for  they  further  accomplish  their 
purpose  by  giving  to  the  Grand  Duke  a  sense  of  feeling 
of  security  as  to  his  flanks. 

Meanwhile,  Mackensen,  taking  advantage  of  Cracow  as 
a  railroad  center,  was  gathering  troops  and  material  in  that 
vicinity,  preparing  to  act  on  the  flank  of  the  Russian  armies 
that  were  operating  in  the  Carpathians,  and  as  success 
depended  upon  secrecy,  the  Germans  who  had  the  matter 
in  hand,  did  all  they  could  to  conceal  their  plans.  This  is 
why  they  gave  such  a  publicity  to  their  attacks  at  Borizmow, 
west  of  Warsaw,  the  battle  of  Lyck,  and  their  efforts  in 
Courland. 


236  STRATEGY 

Aerial  observation  in  the  Carpathians  and  their  foot- 
hills is  very  difficult  in  the  winter,  during  which  this  con- 
centration was  going  on. 

The  result  was  that  the  Grand  Duke  continued  ac- 
cumulating forces  for  the  capture  of  the  Carpathians,  leav- 
ing his  Carpathian  right  flank  weak. 

On  April  28th,  Mackensen's  army,  reinforced  by  2,000 
guns,  started  its  penetration,  which,  as  has  been  shown, 
came  as  a  surprise,  and  before  it  had  spent  itself,  the  Rus- 
sians were  virtually  cut  off  from  Galicia.  In  a  study  of 
military  history,  one  will  find  no  more  perfect  strategical 
penetration  than  this.  The  three  elements,  namely,  rapidity, 
secrecy  and  surprise  were  present  to  a  superlative  degree. 

SINGLE  AND  DOUBLE  LEADERSHIP 

The  disadvantage  of  double  leadership  is  well  illustrated 
on  the  western  front  during  The  World  War.  It  was  not 
until  Foch  was  made  generalissimo  that  true  co-ordination 
occurred.  Even  then,  there  was  not  absolute  harmony. 

POINT  OF  UNION  OF  THE  Two  ARMIES 

By  a  study  of  hostile  concentration,  one  can  guess  as  to 
where  the  union  of  the  two  armies  is  and,  in  that  event,  an 
attack  may  be  more  successful  if  launched  at  that  point. 

This  is  what  the  Germans  repeatedly  endeavored  to 
do  in  the  recent  war,  and  their  final  drive  was  a  last  grand 
effort  to  separate  the  British  and  the  French  armies  before 
the  United  States  was  in  in  force. 

ACTION  IN  EVENT  OF  THIS  PENETRATION 

In  the  event  of  effecting  this  penetration  at  the  point  of 
junction  of  the  two  armies,  the  danger  of  being  tactically 
invested  can  be  rapidly  obviated  if  one  of  the  opposing 
armies  can  be  decisively  defeated  immediately  after  the  first 
blow. 

One  of  the  best,  and  doubtless  the  most  complete  illus- 
trations of  the  strategic  penetration,  is  the  battle  of  Vit- 
torio-Veneto  that  culminated  with  the  Austrian  armistice 
in  the  recent  war. 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  237 

The  features  of  celerity  and  surprise  were  present, 
and  the  Italian  wedge  was  not  allowed  to  become  imbedded, 
but  swift  action  followed  swift  action,  with  the  result  that 
the  Austrians  were  annihilated. 

VlTTORIO-VENETO 

In  this  battle,  the  Italian  strategic  plan  was  a  pene- 
tration between  the  Austrian  masses  in  the  Trentino  and 
those  of  the  Piave.  The  6th  and  5th  Austrian  Armies,  in 
the  order  named  from  north  to  south,  were  deployed  on 
the  Italian  east  front  between  the  Grappa  and  the  sea; 
The  line  of  communication  ran  from  the  right  rear  of  the 
6th  Army — a  most  dangerous  location. 

The  line  of  communication  was  Vittorio-Conegliano- 
Sacile.  By  seizing  Vittorio,  the  6th  Army,  in'  the  center, 
was  at  the  mercy  of  the  Italians. 

Having  penetrated  at  the  weakest  point,  namely,  the 
junction  between  the  two  armies,  the  idea  was  to  seize  the 
communications  of  the  armies  of  the  Piave  and,  at  the  same 
time,  attack  through  Feltre  and  Belluno,  the  left  of  the 
Trentino  army  in  co-operation  with  an  attack  on  its  front, 
and,  proceeding  through  the  Cismone  and  Sugana  Valleys 
also  to  threaten  its  communications. 

The  success  of  the  movement  was  based  essentially  on 
surprise  and  on  rapidity  of  movement. 

By  the  28th  of  October,  the  8th  Italian  Army  had 
broken  through  on  the  east  front,  turning  back  the  right 
of  the  Piave  group,  while  their  10th  and  3d  Armies  held 
the  Austrians  in  front. 

The  4th  Italian  Army  attacking  the  left  of  the  Tren- 
tino group,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  12th  Army  toward 
Feltre,  had  driven  the  Austrians  back  and  penetrated  their 
front,  thus  assisting  the  Piave  group  in  the  valley. 

The  Italians  continued  to  widen  the  breach  in  the  Bel- 
luno Valley  by  the  co-operation  of  their  8th  and  12th  Armies. 
The  Italian  armies  on  the  flanks  of  the  8th  and  12th,  by 
active  operations,  caused  the  Austrians  to  weaken  their 
center  to  secure  reinforcements. 

As  soon  as  the  main  Austrian  lines  began  to  give  away, 
the  Italians,  supported  by  the  navy  on  the  right,  began  to 
push  forward. 


238  STRATEGY 

The  1st  and  6th  Italian  Armies  moved  against  the 
Trentino  group,  with  the  4th  and  12th  enveloping  the  hostile 
left  and  the  7th  the  hostile  right.  Meanwhile  in  the  valley, 
the  3d,  10th,  and  8th  Armies  shoved  back  the  Piave  group. 

The  result  was  a  general  dissolution  of  the  Austrian 
armies. 

A  sufficiently  large  breach  having  been  made  between 
the  two  armies,  the  cavalry  and  motor  corps  were  thrown 
in  and  started  cutting  off  bodies  of  troops,  interrupting 
communications,  seizing  towns,  etc.  They  pushed  on  toward 
Udine,  Gorizia,  Tolmino,  Palmanova  and,  in  fact,  all  impor- 
tant places.  The  Austrians  were  in  such  a  complete  rout  that 
all  that  remained  for  them  was  to  ask  for  an  armistice 
which  they  did  November  4th. 

STRATEGICAL  ATTACK  OF  A  WING 

The  strategical  attack  of  a  wing  is  merely  a  second 
stage  of  a  penetration.  With  a  successful  penetration,  the 
gap  is  widened  by  throwing  in  reinforcements.  In  order 
to  meet  this,  the  enemy  must  form  front  to  flank  with  each 
separated  wing,  either  one  of  which  may  be  attacked  while 
the  other  is  held  off. 

CONDITIONS  THAT  MUST  BE  OBSERVED 

1.  One  wing  of  the  enemy  must  be   decisively  defeated  or 
driven  back. 

2.  Our  own  refused  wing  must  be  strong  enough  to  hold  the 
attention  of  the  enemy  or,  if  forced  to  retire,  will  be  able  to  check 
the  enemy  long  enough  to  allow  our  other  wing  to  accomplish 
its  victory. 

3.  The  deciding  wing  must  be  strong  enough,  after  crushing 
its  opponent,  to  turn  on  the  remaining  wing. 

4.  The  communications  must  be  secure. 

An  attack  upon  a  wing  and  the  surrounding  of  it  is  a 
result  of  the  penetration,  and  a  situation,  that,  of  course,  is 
ideal.  One  must  be  able  to  throw  superior  numbers  against 
that  wing,  however. 

ULM,  1805 

Napoleon  effected  his  penetration  of  the  Austrian  stra- 
tegic front  while  the  Austro-Italian  army  and  the  Russian 
allies  were  too  far  apart.  With  180,000  men,  he  surrounded 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  239 

Mack's  wing  and  forced  its  surrender  at  Ulm,  at  the  same 
time  holding  Davoust's  corps  along  the  Inn  River  to  block 
off  the  Russians.  Having  eliminated  Mack,  Napoleon  moved 
his  forces  to  the  east,  and  at  Austerlitz  defeated  the  com- 
bined Russian  and  Austrian  armies. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  of  1870,  the  Germans 
intended  to  do  something  of  this  kind.  They  planned  to 
destroy  the  French  right  wing  in  Lower  Alsace  first,  and 
then  to  envelop  the  main  army  in  Lorraine  from  the  south, 
so  as  to  push  it  northward  away  from  communications  with 
Paris.  The  battle  of  Spicheren,  which  caused  the  French 
to  retreat  to  the  Moselle  line,  interfered  with  the  plan. 
But  later,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Moselle,  the  plan  was 
realized  in  an  altered  form  through  the  operations  that 
lead  to  the  battle  of  Sedan. 

The  strategical  attack  of  the  wing  will  probably  be  the 
most  usual  form  of  strategic  attack  in  the  future. 

Diaz  carried  out  the  most  successful  one  of  modern 
times  at  Vittorio-Veneto.  After  penetrating,  he  proceeded 
to  efface  the  Piave  group  and  was  successful. 

STRATEGICAL  ENVELOPMENT 

By  strategical  envelopment,  is  meant  a  simultaneous 
attack  on  the  front  and  one  or  both  flanks  of  a  theater  of 
war. 

POINT  OF  CULMINATION 

In  an  envelopment,  we  must  figure  on  a  point  of  cul- 
mination and,  inasmuch  as  we  do  not  wish  a  junction  in 
front  of  the  enemy,  since  then  we  would  not  envelop  him, 
we  must  have  it  in  rear  of  his  lines. 

DANGERS 

The  movement  from  necessity  must  be  wide  to  succeed, 
consequently  the  danger  exists  of  (1)  advancing  on  separate 
lines  of  operations;  (2)  the  enemy  becoming  aware  of  the 
movement  and,  while  merely  containing  the  frontal  attack, 
turning  in  force  on  the  enveloping  attack  and  annihilating 
it. 

If  the  envelopment  is  not  well  carried  out,  the  enemy 
may  discover  it  and  withdraw  to  a  location  beyond  the  point 
of  culmination — the  result  being  that  the  attackers'  forces 


240  STRATEGY 

come  together  in  front  of  the  hostile  line  with  nothing  left 
to  do  but  make  a  straight  frontal  attack. 

"If  the  hostile  army  is  to  be  enveloped  on  one  or  both 
flanks  while  the  front  is  being  attacked  at  the  same  time, 
the  envelopment  must  be  initiated  early,  and  based  laterally 
in  accordance  with  the  front  desired  to  be  enveloped.  The 
enveloping  army  must  have  sufficient  start  on  the  armies 
attacking  the  front,  so  as  to  co-operate  with  them  in  the 
combat  before  the  issue  in  front  is  decided.  The  rate  of 
marching  of  both  the  portions  must  accordingly  be  brought 
to  harmonize." 

The  whole  point  of  an  envelopment  is  to  keep  it  a 
secret.  This  manifestly  is  quite  difficult  with  modern  air- 
craft and  the  means  of  transmitting  information. 

It  can  be  carried  out  by  small  armies  numbering  a  few 
hundred  thousand,  but  with  the  whole  force  of  a  state,  it 
will  manifestly  be  impossible  to  make  such  a  substantial 
shift  as  would  be  necessary  and  not  have  it  detected. 

The  German  army,  in  1914,  tried  to  envelop  the  French 
army  with  von  Kluck's  force,  but  the  French,  forecasting 
the  plan,  slipped  Maunoury's  6th  French  Army  around  von 
Kluck's  right  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  British  army  in 
front,  von  Kulck's  army  was  enveloped. 

The  envelopment  with  an  army  such  as  the  one  that 
fought  on  the  western  front  can  only  be  carried  out  by  with- 
drawing troops  and  reserves  from  one  section  to  extend  the 
line  in  the  desired  direction  of  envelopment. 

EFFECT  ON  THE  ENEMY 

If  the  enemy  is  not  yet  ready  for  us,  the  advance  of 
a  strategical  envelopment,  simultaneously  felt  at  several 
points,  will  confuse  him,  cause  changes  in  his  dispositions 
and  bring  about  a  splitting  up  of  his  forces  available  for 
defense. 

This  changing  of  dispositions  is  what  occurred  on  the 
part  of  the  Austrians  at  Koniggratz.  At  Liao  Yang,  Kuro- 
patkin  kept  shifting  his  troops  from  his  right  to  his  left 
to  prevent  Kuroki's  extension  without  avail.  On  the  Sha- 
Ho  and  at  Mukden  the  same  thing  occurred  with  the  result 
that  Kuropatkin  wore  out  his  reserves,  and  on  many  oc- 
casions did  not  have  them  where  most  needed. 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  241 

Frederick  the  Great  achieved  advantage  of  this  kind 
in  1757,  when  he  invaded  Bohemia  in  four  columns.  He 
enveloped  the  enemy  and  in  the  attempt  to  stop  him,  one 
whole  Austrian  corps,  namely,  that  of  Serbelloni,  was 
absent  from  the  battle  of  the  Prague. 

SUPERIOR  NUMBERS 

If  we  were  to  assume  that  all  armies  are  equal  in 
efficiency,  we  might  then  say  that  only  the  one  with  superior 
numbers  can  envelop.  Since  all  armies  are  not  equally 
efficient,  we  at  times  find  the  weaker,  but  the  more  efficient, 
enveloping. 

This  was  the  case  at  Liao  Yang  where  the  Japanese, 
though  of  inferior  strength,  enveloped  the  Russian  left.  On 
the  Sha-Ho,  taking  advantage  of  the  mountainous  condi- 
tions of  the  country  held  by  their  right  wing,  the  Japanese 
weakened  it  to  send  troops  to  reinforce  their  left  for  the 
purpose  of  enveloping  the  Russian  right  and  then,  when  the 
Russian  center  of  gravity  swung  in  that  direction,  moved 
forward  with  their  right. 

At  Mukden,  it  was  a  complete  double  envelopment. 

FORCES  A  BATTLE 

The  strategical  envelopment  forces  an  enemy  to  fight, 
who  might  otherwise  fall  back. 

The  principal  characteristic  of  a  maneuver  of  this 
kind  is  that  all  is  attained  at  one  blow. 

On  July  3,  1866,  during  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  the 
grim  fight  was  going  on  with  f ever-changing  success,  and 
the  second  army  under  the  Crown  Prince  had  not  arrived. 
In  the  early  hours  of  the  afternoon  the  King  asked  the  chief 
of  staff  what  he  thought  of  the  situation.  The  latter  replied, 
"Your  Majesty  is  winning  today,  not  only  the  battle  but  the 
campaign." 

As  in  the  case  of  an  attack  on  a  wing,  which  is  the 
same  thing  magnified,  the  envelopment  may  result  from  a 
preliminary  penetration. 

BEARS  RESULTS  ON  THE  BATTLEFIELD 

If  the  envelopment  either  wholly  or  in  part  encircles 
the  hostile  army,  there  is  success  on  the  battlefield. 


242  STRATEGY 

The  Austro-German  drive  that  broke  through  the  Ital- 
ian line  in  October  of  1917  bore  its  fruits  on  the  field,  for 
the  Italians  lost  approximately  200,000  men  and  1,200  guns. 

GENERALLY  No  PURSUIT 

There  is  generally  no  pursuit,  for  the  reason  that  the 
troops  advancing  along  concentric  lines  naturally,  as  the 
lines  approach,  become  intermingled. 

After  Koniggratz,  when  the  troops  of  the  Crown  Prince 
and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  met  on  the  heights  around 
Chlum,  they  were  badly  mixed  up,  and  a  vigorous  pursuit 
was  not  made. 

There  was  no  real  pursuit  after  Liao  Yang,  not  on  ac- 
count of  the  fact  .that  enveloping  strategy  was  used,  but' 
because  the  Japanese  were  in  sore  need  of  reinforcements 
and  ammunition.  They  were  also  short  in  cavalry. 

After  the  envelopment  of  the  Piave  group  in  the  Vit- 
torio-Veneto  battle,  the  Italian  cavalry,  assisted  by  the 
motor  corps,  went  forward  and  carried  out  a  most  effective 
pursuit. 

DOUBLE  BASE 

If  the  assailant  has  a  double  base  and  angular  fron- 
tier, an  envelopment  will  be  easy.  The  great  advantage 
that  the  Austrians  and  Germans  had  on  the  east  front  was 
due  to  their  reentrant  frontier  which  enabled  them,  when 
their  efforts  were  co-ordinated,  to  advance  on  convergent 
lines  against  the  Russians  and  envelop  them. 

THE  Two  MOST  IMPORTANT  REQUIREMENTS  WITH 
REGARDS  TO  TROOPS 

For  the  success  of  this  movement,  the  two  most  im- 
portant requirements  that  the  assailant  must  possess  are: 

1.  Tactical  superiority  of  the  troops. 

2.  Uniformly  good  leadership. 

"During  the  uprising  in  1793  in  La  Vendee,  the  Re- 
publican armies  tried  a  double  envelopment  and  signally 
failed,  due  to  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  their  superior 
numbers,  their  troops  were  too  poor  in  quality  for  such 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE         243 

DOUBLE  ENVELOPMENT 

A  double  envelopment  is  a  dangerous  maneuver  to 
attempt  unless  the  assailant  has  superior  numbers,  so  much 
so,  that  either  of  the  enveloping  groups  can  maintain  itself 
until  the  other  begins  to  make  its  presence  felt. 

The  Federals  at  Missionary  Ridge  attempted  a  double 
envelopment,  Sherman  enveloping  the  Confederate  right 
while  Hooker  enveloped  the  left. 

Sherman  was  checked  before  Hooker  was  heard  from, 
and  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  Sheridan  and  T.  J. 
Wood,  taking  advantage  of  a  faulty  location  of  the  hostile 
trenches  and  contrary  to  orders,  attacked  and  broke  the 
Confederate  center,  the  story  of  that  battle  might  have 
been  different. 

The  enveloping  maneuver  is  essentially  a  maneuver 
for  a  trained  army  and  was  consequently  the  form  of  strat- 
egy that  the  Germans  relied  upon.  They  thought  that  they 
had  tactical  superiority  of  troops  and  uniformly  good 
leaders. 

POSSIBLE  TOWARD  THE  CLOSE  OF  WAR 

We  may  have  a  strategic  envelopment  toward  the  close 
of  a  war  as  a  result  of  one  army  becoming  disarranged  and 
its  means  of  obtaining  and  transmitting  information  having 
broken  down. 

In  The  World  War,  there  was  very  little  chance  for 
enveloping  movements  of  a  strategical  nature  after  the  al- 
lies on  the  west  front  settled  down  to  war  of  position. 

STRATEGICAL  TURNING  MOVEMENT 

"When  the  attack  not  only  envelops  the  enemy's  flank, 
but  reaches  so  far  to  his  rear  that  his  communications  are 
threatened,  and  he  is  forced  into  such  a  position  that  defeat 
would  cut  him  off,  then  the  envelopment  has  become  a 
turning  movement." 

The  turning  movement  is  nothing  more  than  a  form 
of  envelopment  carried  so  far  that  it  threatens  the  enemy's 
communications. 


244  STRATEGY 

DIFFICULT  TO  CARRY  OUT  IN  THE  FUTURE 

The  execution  of  a  strategic  turning  movement  will  be 
difficult  in  the  future  for  the  reason  that: 

1.  The  concentration  being  restricted  to  a   certain  definite 
district,   it  will   be   difficult   for  the  turning   force   to   gain    its 
distance. 

2.  The  size  of  the  force  will  be  so  great  that  the  details  of 
movement  may  become  complicated. 

Modern    strategy   demands    simple   movements   and    such    a 
movement  is  not  one. 

3.  The  modern   reconnaissance   service  renders   concealment 
difficult. 

4.  The  element  of  surprise  will  be  missing. 

5.  The    same   counter-moves   by  the   enemy  that   jeopardize 
the,  success  of  the  attack  of  a  wing  and  envelopment  likewise 
endanger  the  success  of  the  turning  movement. 

AUSTRIAN  INVASION  OF  SERBIA  IN  1914 

This  campaign  was  a  brilliant  example  of  a  turning 
movement  that  was  frustrated  by  the  more  rapid  move- 
ments of  the  defender  who  took  advantage  of  his  interior 
lines. 

The  Austrian  first  plan  for  the  offensive  against  Ser- 
bia was  based  on  the  natural  disposition  of  the  Austrian 
forces  north  of  the  Danube  and  Save,  and  those  in  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 

Under  the  assumption  that  the  Austrians  would  attack 
Belgrade  from  the  north,  the  Serbs  had  concentrated  be- 
tween the  Morava  and  Kolubara  Rivers  south  of  Belgrade. 

The  Austrians  had  the  option  of  holding  on  the  north 
and  attacking  from  the  west  or  the  reverse. 

The  plan  finally  decided  upon  was  to  seize  the  heights 
on  either  side  of  the  Jadar  River  in  conjunction  with  a 
turning  movement  from  the  north  toward  Shabatz  in 
order  to  drive  the  Serbs  into  the  valley.  The  principal  ele- 
ment of  rapidity  and  secrecy  was  missing. 

General  Putnik,  the  Serbian  commander,  as  soon  as 
he  learned  of  the  Austrian  design,  moved  his  veterans, 
tried  by  previous  campaigns,  quickly  to  the  heights  in  ques- 
tion which  were  some  40  miles  away. 

When  the  invading  hordes  crossed  the  boundary  line 
into  the  Jadar  Valley,  they  found  the  enemy  in  their  posi- 
tion awaiting  them. 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  245 

A  general  action  ensued  in  which  the  Austrians  were 
badly  managed,  became  confused,  and  finally  broke  and 
fled  in  all  directions. 

The  northern  force  was  slow,  but  hearing  the  way 
things  were  going  south,  moved  to  the  assistance  of  their 
comrades,  but  arrived  too  late. 

The  southern  force  having  been  routed,  the  northern 
force  withdrew  across  the  Save. 

TURNING  MOVEMENTS  IN  THE  FUTURE 

This  movement,  in  The. World  War,  was  generally  a 
succeeding  stage  of  penetration.  The  penetration  having 
been  made,  a  series  of  engagements  followed  in  which  the 
defender,  in  falling  back,  gradually  lost  his  communications 
while  the  attacker  gradually  gained  possession  of  them  in 
the  same  measure.  In  future  wars  it  will  probably  be 
similar. 

Allenby's  advance  through  Philistia  and  into  Judea, 
culminating  in  the  fall  of  Jerusalem,  included  a  series  of 
strategical  envelopments  and  turning  movements  that 
started  at  Gaza,  showing  that  movements  of  this  nature, 
although  difficult,  are  not  improbable. 

STRATEGIC  FRONTS  PARALLEL 

The  concentration  of  armies  in  the  future  will  prob- 
ably be  on  fronts  more  or  less  parallel,  and  such  being  the 
case,  a  turning  movement  will  only  be  possible  as  a  result 
of  a  general  shifting  of  the  line  until  one  flank  overlaps 
the  enemy,  when  an  envelopment  will  occur,  growing  into 
a  turning  movement  and  then  an  attack  of  a  wing. 

"The  defender,  however,  will  not  quietly  look  on  while 
troops  are  taken  from  his  front  to  be  used  against  his 
flank  and  rear  but  will  follow  the  assailant's  lead,  bar  his 
road  or  attack  him,  so  that  the  turn,  even  if  successful, 
will  involve  a  series  of  engagements." 

THE  EXTENSION  TO  THE  SEA  IN  1914 

The  battle  of  the  Aisne  demonstrated  that  the  allies 
could  not  break  the  German  lines  by  a  frontal  attack.  The 
Germans,  from  whom  the  allies  hoped  to  wrest  the  initiative, 
were  regaining  it. 


246  STRATEGY 

Joffre  now  attempted  to  envelop  the  German  right  by 
shifting  troops  from  his  right  to  his  left  and,  moving  from 
the  direction  of  Amiens,  to  strike  in  on  the  network  of 
railroads  by  which  the  Germans  obtained  their  supplies. 

The  strategic  deployment  at  this  time  from  east  to 
west  was  as  follows: 

Dubail  held  the  Vosges  with  right  at  Belfort. 

Castelnau  with  the  2d  Army,  was  covering  Nancy,  confronted 
by  the  Bavarians  under  their  Crown  Prince. 

SarraiPs  3d  Army  covered  Verdun,  confronting  the  Imperial 
Crown  Prince. 

Langles'  4th  Army  was  in  Champagne,  confronting  the  Duke 
of  Wurtemberg.  ^ 

Foch's  new  9th  Army  confronted  von  Bulow  along  the  Aisne. 

Next  in  order  came  d'Esperey's  5th  Army,  the  British  army 
and  Maunoury's  6th  Army,  confronting  von  Kluck's  and  part 
of  von  Bulow's  armies. 

Castelnau,  placed  in  command  of  the  new  7th  Army, 
being  in  part  his  old  2d  Army,  was  shifted  from  the  vicinity 
of  Nancy  to  the  west  of  the  Oise  to  find  his  old  opponent, 
Prince  Rupprecht,  confronting  him.  Rupprecht's  place  in 
Lorraine  was  taken  by  a  new  army  under  von  Strantz. 
Maud'huy  was  brought  from  the  Aisne  to  command  the 
new  10th  Army,  ten  days  after  Castelnau's  movement  ex- 
tended the  left  of  the  line  to  the  vicinity  of  Arras,  encoun- 
tered his  old  opponent  von  Bulow  in  his  front.  Von 
Bulow's  place  on  the  Aisne  front  had  been  taken  by  von 
Heeringen  from  Alsace.  Now  follows  the  desperate  fight- 
ing for  the  Albert  plateau. 

This  extension  is  now  met  by  the  Germans  who  take 
the  lead  and  shift  the  Duke  of  Wurtemberg's  army  to  the 
vicinity  of  Lens,  their  original  position  being  taken  by  a 
new  army  under  von  Einen,  whereupon  Foch  is  shifted 
to  that  vicinity  and  given  complete  command  of  the  armies 
north  of  Noyon.  Now  follows  the  fighting  on  the  Iser,  at 
La  Bassee  and  Arras.  The  British  are  now  shifted  to  the 
north  to  extend  Maud'huy's  left,  their  places  being  taken 
by  a  new  French  8th  Army  under  d'Urbal. 

Von  Besseler,  Antwerp  having  fallen,  now  strikes 
south  and  driving  the  Belgians  before  him,  continues  the 
German  line  to  the  sea,  but  his  movement  is  met  by  Sir 
John  French,  later  supported  by  the  8th  French  Army,  and 
the  terrific  fighting  at  Ypres  and  West  Flanders  ensues. 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  247 

It  can  be  seen  from  this  general  description  how  diffi- 
cult it  is  for  either  army  to  envelop  the  other  when  fronts 
are  parallel  and  troops  are  numbered  in  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands. 

First  the  French  tried  to  turn  the  Germans  and  then 
the  Germans  tried  the  French,  and  both  failed. 

WILDERNESS 

Grant's  movement  on  the  4th  of  May,  1864,  is  an 
example  of  the  strategical  turning  movement. 

He  had  the  option  of  turning  the  right  or  left  flank 
of  Lee's  army.  He  chose  the  right  because  he  would  not 
be  held  to  one  line  of  communications  and,  if  that  were  cut, 
be  helpless  and  forced  to  retreat. 

Grant  began  the  wide  turning  movement  around  Lee's 
right  with  the  intention  of  placing  his  own  army  across 
Lee's  line  of  communication  and  forcing  him  to  fight  with 
his  front  to  flank.  In  that  position  if  Lee  were  defeated, 
he  would  have  been  cut  off  from  Richmond,  his  base.  Lee 
did  not  quietly  look  on  and  let  Grant  disappear  from  his 
front  but  from  the  summit  of  Clark's  Mountain  saw  the 
move  and  only  delayed  long  enough  to  be  sure  that  Grant 
was  well  into  the  Wilderness  before  attacking  him. 

Up  to  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  the  advantage  was 
with  Grant,  for  Lee  had  waited  too  long  in  delivering  his 
counter-stroke. 

Grant  was  now  dilatory  in  that  he  did  not  push  on  dur- 
ing the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the  4th  and  get  out  of 
the  Wilderness,  but  waited  for  his  attenuated  supply  train. 

The  advantage  now  passed  to  Lee  who  moved  against 
Grant's  right  flank  and  brought  him  to  bay  with  front  to 
flank  with  a  counter-stroke. 

Grant's  communications  were  threatened,  but  Grant 
had  forestalled  disaster  in  that  event  by  making  arrange- 
ments to  transfer  them  to  Fredericksburg.  Yet  Ewell  and 
Early  lost  their  opportunity  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th  in 
not  sweeping  down  on  Sedgwick's  right,  and  cutting  in  on 
the  old  line  and  putting  the  transportation  hors  de  combat 
before  the  transfer  to  Fredericksburg  could  be  made.  The 
loss  of  his  wagon  transportation  would  have  unquestionably 


248  STRATEGY 

put  an  end  to  Grant's  forward  movement,  even  though  he 
had  a  new  base  at  Fredericksburg. 

Marengo,  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  and  the  operation  lead- 
ing up  to  the  investment  of  Metz  offer  brilliant  illustra- 
tions of  successful  strategical  turning  movements. 

BATTLES  WITH  REVERSE  FRONTS 

Strategical  turning  movements,  from  their  nature,  gen- 
erally lead  to  a  battle  with  reversed  fronts.  And  the  side 
that  turns  the  enemy  and  deprives  him  of  his  communi- 
cations has  at  the  same  time  abandoned  his  own.  The  de- 
cisive battle  must  therefore  necessarily  terminate  in  the 
total  defeat  of  one  side  or  the  other.  This  is  what  Napoleon 
always  strove  to  attain. 

If  successful,  of  course,  the  victor's  communications  are 
restored. 

MUST  NOT  BE  DILATORY 

The  turning  movement,  if  it  is  to  succeed,  must  in  ad- 
dition to  being  secret,  be  executed  quickly,  for  if  done  in  a 
dilatory  manner,  the  enemy  may  withdraw  or  even  fall  upon 
the  turning  force  and  intercept  its  communications. 

Likewise,  the  containing  force  must  not  be  too  active 
or  the  enemy  will  withdraw,  nor  too  passive,  or  the  enemy 
will  discover  what  is  going  on. 

LULE  BURGAS,  1912 

At  Lule  Burgas,  in  the  Bulgarian  war  with  Turkey, 
it  was  Savoff's  plan  to  attack  the  hostile  front  with  his 
III  Army  and  envelop  it,  turning  its  left  with  the  I  Army 
and  cavalry  corps.  But  the  III  Army  was  too  impetuous, 
and  the  I  Army  too  slow,  with  the  result  that  the  Turks 
were  driven  back  all  along  the  line  and  the  envelopment 
failed.  Not  even  the  cavalry  got  up,  but  this  was  brought 
about  by  the  terrible  condition  of  the  country,  due  to  rain 
and  mud. 

THE  STRATEGICAL  ATTACK  ON  FLANK  AND  REAR 

The  strategical  attack  on  the  flank  of  a  hostile  frontier 
in  modern  times  will  probably  result  from  a  breaking  of 
fortified  lines.  The  attacker  will  try  to  deceive  the  enemy 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  249 

as  to  the  point  of  strongest  attack  and  then  break  through, 
after  which  he  will  proceed  to  roll  up  the  inner  flank  of 
the  pierced  line. 

ST.  MIHIEL  IN  1914 

In  the  operations  against  the  Verdun-Toul  line  this  is 
what  the  Germans  tried  to  do:  Their  aim  being  to  break 
the  line  south  of  Verdun  and,  advancing  to  Revigny,  west 
of  Bar  le  Due,  to  co-operate  with  the  Crown  Prince  who  was 
attacking  from  the  north.  Von  Strantz's  army,  while  fail- 
ing to  carry  Fort  Troyon,  did  break  through  at  St.  Mihiel 
and  secured  possession  of  the  bridge  across  the  Meuse  at 
that  point.  This  movement  was  checked  west  of  the  Meuse 
by  the  French  cavalry. 

The  introduction  of  modern  means  of  communication 
will  make  movements  of  this  kind  improbable  in  the  future. 
Just  as  the  movement  toward  Revigny  was  prevented  by 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  opposite  the  piercing  army, 
and  by  counter-attacks  on  its  flanks,  so  will  similar  move- 
ments be  prevented  in  the  future. 

ROUMANIA 

In  the  military  operations  in  the  northern  Balkans, 
there  are  several  illustrations  of  attacks  on  flank  and  rear. 

In  1916,  when  Roumania  entered  the  war,  the  situa- 
tion was  almost  a  "battle  royal."  Bulgaria,  to  the  south, 
had  to  be  accounted  for.  Von  Mackensen  had  been  sent 
to  take  charge  of  the  mixed  force,  operating  in  the  rear 
of  Roumania.  General  Sarrail,  who  commanded  in  Mace- 
donia, was  ordered  to  move  on  the  Bulgars  from  the  south 
while  General  Zainchovsky  with  a  Russian  force  was  to 
move  through  Dobruda  against  von  Mackensen,  who  was 
protecting  the  Bulgarian  rear  along  the  Danube,  and  threat- 
ening the  Roumanian  rear.  The  Russian  general  figured 
that  von  Mackensen  would  merely  remain  on  the  defensive 
and  so  arranged  to  invade  Bulgaria.  Von  Mackensen,  how- 
ever, made  a  false  concentration  at  Dobritch  on  the  Russian 
front,  and  then  moved  quickly  by  his  left  flank  to  turn  the 
Russian  right,  first  capturing  the  Danube  fortresses  of  Tur- 
tukan  and  Silistria.  The  Russian  general,  hearing  of  their 
fall,  and  being  apprehensive  of  his  communications,  fell  back 


250  STRATEGY 

to  the  line  of  the  Danube-Black  Sea  Railroad.  The  Bulgars 
in  Macedonia,  while  tactically  defeated,  held  up  Sarrail, 
so  there  was  no  strategic  danger  to  be  anticipated  from 
him.  Von  Falkenhayn  now  swinging  around  to  the  south- 
east connected  with  von  Mackensen  and  drove  the  Rouman- 
ians out  of  Wallachia  into  Moldavia,  and  captured  their 
capital.  The  opportunity  offered  von  Mackensen  was  ex- 
ceptional and  he  took  advantage  of  it  like  a  Napoleon. 

STRATEGICAL  ATTACKS  ON  THE  REAR 

Attacks  of  this  kind  which  are  given  a  separate  class- 
ification by  strategists  are  nothing  more  than  a  final  stage 
of  a  wing  attack.  That  a  hostile  army  will  get  in  the  strat- 
egical rear  of  another  in  modern  war  does  not  seem  prob- 
able, yet  that  is  what  von  Mackensen  did  in  the  operations 
in  Roumania  and  it  was  only  with  extreme  difficulty  that  the 
Roumanians  extricated  themselves.  Should  there  be  a  mod- 
ern Ulm  it  could  only  be  a  result  of  deliberate  treason. 

THE  STRATEGIC  SQUARE 

This  is  an  expression  coined  by  Jomini  under  the  name 
"carre  strategique"  and  was  a  typical  formation  of  Na- 
poleon. He  always  marched  his  forces  with  a  center  column 
flanked  by  a  column  on  either  side,  about  a  day's  march  away. 

The  division  and  corps  in  each  column  followed  with 
not  more  than  a  day's  march  distance. 

The  fronts  of  the  three  columns  were  covered  by  cav- 
alry. 

Marching  in  this  formation,  deployment  could  be  made 
on  any  element  or  in  any  direction. 

At  Jena,  his  left  column  at  the  outset  was  under  Lannes, 
his  center  under  Bernadotte  and  his  right  under  Soult. 

On  the  12th  of  October,  when  Hohenlohe  was  parallel 
to  the  Wiemar-Jena  Road,  he  was  also  parallel  to  Napoleon's 
line  of  march,  consequently  upon  learning  this,  Napoleon 
had  his  left  column  slow  up  while  his  center  column  (Bern- 
adotte and  Davoust)  pushed  on  through,  and  his  right  col- 
umn (Soult  and  Ney)  turned  north  and  became  the  center 
column.  Next  day  Davoust  pushed  out  toward  Auerstadt 
as  the  right  column,  Bernadotte  toward  Apolda  as  the  center 


SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  251 

column,  and  the  balance  of  the  army  toward  Jena  as  the  left 
column ;  thereby  making  a  complete  wheel  to  the  north. 

The  complete  wheel  of  the  Germans  was  carried  out 
in  their  pursuit  of  MacMahon  in  1870  by  marching  eche- 
loned from  left  to  right,  the  III  Army  on  the  left  being 
forward  while  the  IV  Army  on  the  right  was  retired. 

Grant  at  Vicksburg  adopted  the  strategic  square,  Mc- 
Pherson's  corps  was  the  right  column,  Sherman's  the  center 
and  McClernand's  the  left.  When  the  Confederates  ap- 
peared at  Jackson,  McPherson  passed  on  to  Clinton  while 
Sherman  turned  toward  Raymond,  becoming  the  right  col- 
umn. 

The  weakness  of  Napoleon's  formation  was  that  he 
commanded  the  center  column  and,  as  a  result,  the  others 
merely  became  flank  guards. 

To  get  the  greatest  results,  all  column  commanders 
should  have  equal  authority. 

MASS  MANEUVER 

The  French  "mass  maneuver"  is  similar  to  the  strate- 
gic square  and  was  the  basis  of  their  deployment  for  the  de- 
fense of  France  in  The  World  War. 

Not  knowing  exactly  where  the  German  main  attack 
would  come,  the  army  was  formed  on  the  two  faces,  namely, 
the  eastern  and  northern.  The  reserves  were  to  the  south 
and  east  of  Paris,  behind  the  Verdun-Toul  line,  and  about 
Chalons,  Langres,  Dijon  and  Besangon. 

They  really  formed  a  "timed"  square. 

The  apex  of  the  square,  or  lozenge,  or  pivoting  square, 
or  strategical  vanguard,  as  it  is  variously  called,  was  at 
Namur. 

The  idea  of  the  pivot  is  that  if  the  enemy  throws  its 
greatest  weight  against  one  face  of  the  salient,  that  face 
will  naturally  recede  rapidly,  swinging  the  other  faces  for- 
ward until  they  envelop  the  enemy. 

The  greater  weight  was  first  thrown  against  the  east- 
ern face  of  the  salient  which  withdrew  followed  by  the 
French  and  British  on  the  northern  face.  Consequently, 
the  reserves  were  shifted  to  the  west  and  the  line  extended 
until  von  Kluck  was  enveloped  and  the  greater  pressure 
brought  against  the  German  right. 


252  STRATEGY 

In  the  course  of  this  chapter,  reference  has  been  made 
to  attacks,  penetrations,  flank  attacks,  etc.,  as  special  forms 
of  the  strategical  offensive  which  are  to  be  classified  accord- 
ing to  their  characteristics.  The  impression  must  not  be 
left  that  it  is  merely  a  question  of  choosing  the  most  suitable 
form  and  then  applying  it  blindly. 

THE  DECISIVE  STRATEGICAL  DIRECTION 

The  main  effort  should  be  aimed  in  the  direction  that 
if  taken  and  successful,  will  bring  about  the  greatest  results 
viewed  from  the  strategical  viewpoint. 

That  direction  might  be  toward  the  point  of  junction 
of  two  allied  armies,  or  toward  the  flank  of  a  single  army 
in  rear  of  which  its  line  of  communications  leads-  to  its 
base,  or  toward  the  direction  from  which  reinforcements 
are  expected.  It  will  be  seen  that  in  event  of  the  success 
of  the  movement,  the  total  defeat  of  the  enemy  results. 

THE  DECISIVE  TACTICAL  DIRECTION 

The  direction  of  the  attack  on  the  battlefield  should  be 
such  as  to  facilitate  tactical  victory  without  defeating  the 
general  strategical  plan. 

In  the  Confederate  invasion  of  Maryland  in  1862, 
after  McClellan  found  Lee's  S.  0.  101,  his  decisive  strategi- 
cal direction  was  against  the  right  flank  of  the  troops 
assembling  at  Sharpsburg,  for  that  was  the  flank  that  con- 
nected the  Confederates  with  their  supplies  coming  down 
the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

Apparently  McClellan's  idea  was  to  drive  the  Confed- 
erates back  onto  the  Potomac;  for  the  stronger  Federal 
force  was  to  the  north.  If  that  was  his  strategical  plan, 
attacking  the  Confederate  left  was  the  correct  thing  to  do 
as  the  ground  in  that  vicinity  facilitated  tactical  victory. 

But  if  McClellan's  strategical  plan  was  to  cut  off  Lee 
from  the  Potomac,  then  his  main  effort  should  have  been 
directed  toward  Sharpsburg  and  the  south,  and  his  de- 
cisive tactical  direction  would  have  been  toward  the  Con- 
federate right.  To  show  that  there  were  no  insurmount- 
able tactical  difficulties  to  defeat  the  attack  in  that  direc- 
tion, we  have  but  to  recall  that  Burnside  actually  crossed 
the  Antietam  in  the  neighborhood  of  Burnside  Bridge  and 


SPECIAL   FORMS   OF   STRATEGIC   OFFENSIVE          253 

Snavely  Ford,  and  was  driving  back  the  Confederate  right 
when  A.  P.  Hill  fortuitously  arrived  and  struck  the  attack- 
ing troops  in  flank. 

There  can  be  no  question  but  that  the  decisive  stra- 
tegical direction  should  govern,  for  a  study  of  campaigns 
shows  that  there  are  no  insurmountable  tactical  difficulties 
to  a  determined  commander. 

The  characteristic  feature  of  Napoleon's  campaigns 
and  battles  is  that  he  always  selected  the  point  of  attack 
after  a  general  consideration  of  the  whole  situation  and  on 
strategical  ground,  heedless  of  the  tactical  difficulties  which 
might  possibly  exist. 

Napoleon's  battles  prove,  that  for  a  modern  army, 
there  are  no  tactical  difficulties  that  cannot  be  overcome, 
and  thus  his  battles  were  always  attended  with  the  greatest 
results.  At  Marengo,  it  was  the  surrender  of  the  army  of 
Melas ;  at  Ulm  it  was  the  capture  of  the  army  of  Mack ;  at 
Jena  and  Auerstadt  it  was  the  routing  of  the  allied  army ; 
and  at  Wagram,  it  was  the  complete  defeat  of  the  army  of 
Archduke  Charles. 

This  choice  is  hardly  ever  free.  One's  position  and 
that  of  the  enemy,  the  relation  between  the  armies  and  the 
nature  of  the  theater  of  war  determine  the  decision  as  to 
the  form  to  be  chosen. 

It  has  been  seen  how  varying  Napoleon  I  and  Moltke 
were  in  their  measures,  although  certain  ways  of  operating 
have  been  designated  here  as  typical  of  each  formation. 
These  examples  only  serve  as  models. 

It  is  not  a  matter  of  always  doing  the  one  thing,  but 
rather  of  carrying  on  the  strategical  attack  to  which  con- 
ditions force  us,  of  taking  into  consideration  the  peculiar- 
ities of  the  movement,  and  of  recognizing  the  dangers  that 
are  associated  with  it.  Circumstances  will  generally  show 
the  way  in  which  one  can  most  easily  attain  victory  and 
it  would  be  incorrect,  in  by  far  the  greatest  number  of 
cases,  to  desist  from  this  way  in  order  to  proceed  in  another 
that  is  considered  especially  efficacious. 

Having  decided  upon  a  plan,  carry  it  out  as  long  as 
it  is  working  all  right  and  do  not  allow  yourself  to  be  at- 
tracted from  it  by  any  other  scheme,  no  matter  how  allur- 
ing it  may  be. 


CHAPTER  XV 


Tactical  Offensive  Operations  with 
Special  Forms 


THE  LAST  part  of  a  strategical  offensive  is  the  tactical 
culmination  on  the  field  of  battle. 
The  object  of  all  tactical  offensive  operations  is  to 
attack  the  enemy  and,  if  that  enemy  can  be  caught  in  mo- 
tion, it  will  be  much  easier  than  if  he  is  "dug  in"  on  the 
field  of  battle. 

At  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne,  the  attack  of  the  42d 
French  Division  might  not  have  been  so  successful  had  the 
Prussian  Guard  not  been  in  motion. 

TACTICAL  SUPERIORITY 

"To  succeed  on  the  battlefield,  we  must  have  tactical 
superiority. 

"This  not  only  refers  to  numbers  but  more  particularly 
to  morale,  discipline,  leadership  and  training. 

"The  infantry  is  still  the  'Queen  of  Battle'  and  must 
go  forward,  hold  or  retire,  and  everything  else  goes  with  it. 

"Tactical  superiority  also  means  carefully  laid  plans, 
most  minute  arrangements  and  unwavering  adherence  to 
the  scheme  determined  upon." 

A  blind  rush  can  only  be  justified  when  we  are  so 
superior  to  the  enemy  that  it  matters  not  how  it  is  done  so 
long  as  the  attack  is  done  quickly. 

The  blind  rush  at  Fredericksburg,  while  manifesting 
an  almost  commendable  disregard  of  death,  has  no  place 
on  a  field  of  battle.  A  member  of  the  Washington  artillery 
of  New  Orleans  said  that  not  before  nor  thereafter  in  the 
course  of  the  war,  and  he  participated  in  the  entire  conflict 
with  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  was  there  such  a 
charge.  The  troops  moved  forward  without  the  elan  that 

254 


TACTICAL    OFFENSIVE    OPERATIONS  255 

should  characterize  a  forward  movement,  but  appeared  to  be 
moving  in  pursuance  to  a  sense  of  duty.  Having  been 
ordered.to  charge  they  were  determined  to  take  their  punish- 
ment like  men.  With  the  hopelessness  of  despair  they 
moved  forward  to  certain  defeat. 

Our  desire  to  avoid  precipitation  must  not  cause  us 
to  be  too  cautious  and  delay  our  moves  at  the  expense  of 
tactical  advantage. 

"A  general  who  sees  that  he  will  be  stronger  tomorrow, 
yet  attacks  today,  commits  an  error  unless  he  has  a  reason- 
able ground  for  thinking  the  enemy  will  slip  away  in  the 
night." 

On  the  other  hand,  a  general  who  keeps  fresh  troops 
for  the  day  after  the  battle  almost  always  is  beaten. 

CHICKAMAUGA 

At  Chickamauga,  there  was  no  urgent  need  for  Bragg 
to  atttack  on  the  20th  of  September.  Had  he  waited  a  few 
days  he  would  have  had  four  more  of  Longstreet's  infantry 
brigades  and  Alexander's  artillery.  There  was  no  danger 
of  Rosecrans  slipping  away. 

ANTIETAM 

Whether  or  not  McClella'n  was  beaten  at  Antietam  is 
a  matter  that  has  occasioned  much  discussion,  but  had  he 
put  in  Fitz-John  Porter's  5th  Corps  there  would  have  been 
no  question  about  it. 

VIONVILLE 

Had  von  Alvensleben  waited,  on  the  16th  of  August, 
1870,  in  all  probability  Bazaine  would  have  made  good  his 
escape  to  Verdun. 

ALLOWING  THE  STRATEGICAL  SITUATION  TO  MATURE 

"While  we  must  be  careful  not  to  allow  our  tactical 
advantage  to  slip  away,  yet  we  must  not  be  too  precipitous 
but  must  wait  for  the  strategical  introduction  to  ripen." 

The  allies  erred  in  this  respect  before  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz.  Prussia  was  on  the  point  of  declaring  for  them. 


256  STRATEGY 

She  intended  completing  her  preparations  by  the  middle 
of  December.  By  making  skillful  dispositions,  the  Arch- 
duke Charles  could  have  led  from  40,000  to  50,000  men 
into  Moravia.  Three  weeks  later  the  allies  would  have 
been  able  to  take  the  field  in  much  greater  strength  than 
they  could  at  the  end  of  November.  The  general  situation 
invited  delay.  In  spite  of  this,  the  allies  proceeded  over 
hastily  to  attack. 

THE  RIGHT  TIME 

"The  right  time  will  generally  be  reached  when  we 
have  brought  the  greater  part  of  our  troops  so  close  to- 
gether that  their  co-operation  on  the  chosen  field  of  attack 
is  assured.  At  the  same  time,  we  must  be  sure  that  the 
enemy  is  not  able  to  deploy  a  superior  force  there.  We  can 
often  succeed  in  this  by  determining  which  hostile  organi- 
zations are  too  far  to  arrive  in  time."  Good  and  numerous 
cavalry  will  find  this  out  for  us,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
aircraft. 

Sidney  Johnston,  at  Shiloh,  had  figured  on  the  prob- 
able time  of  arrival  of  Buell, ,  and  thought  he  could  defeat 
Grant  before  the  former  could  join  him.  Had  a  little 
more  care  been  taken  regarding  logistics  and  tactical  for- 
mations, he  might  have  realized  his  plan. 

SADOWA 

Moltke,  in  1866,  well  knew  that  he  would  find  some 
Austrians  at  Gitchin,  but  he  was  satisfied  that,  when  he 
encountered  them,  he  would  have  the  necessary  superior- 
ity of  numbers,  so  he  selected  that  point  as  the  point  of 
culmination.  Moltke  had  made  a  careful  study  of  the 
marching  powers  of  the  Austrians. 

Rapidity,  energy  and  surprise  are  more  important  in 
the  tactical  than  the  strategic  offensive. 

"Surprise  is  an  essential  element  of  a  successful  at- 
tack. In  small,  as  well  as  large  operations,  the  effect  of 
surprise  should  constantly  be  striven  for.  This  effect  is 
attained  by  concealment  of  the  place  or  time  of  attack, 
coupled  with  rapidity  of  maneuver.  Concealment  of  the 
point  of  attack  permits  the  assailant  to  concentrate  super- 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  257 

ior  forces  and  gain  the  time  required  for  the  prosecution 
of  a  sustained  offensive,  before  its  action  can  be  countered 
by  a  hostile  concentration.  Concealment  of  the  time  of 
attack  favors  the  moral  effect,  which  is  the  essence  of  all 
offensive  action,  and  prevents  the  defense  from  taking 
timely  counter-measures." 

"The  effect  of  surprise  must  be  reinforced  and  ex- 
ploited by  fire  superiority.  The  advance  can  dispense  with 
fire  protection  only  when  covered  by  darkness,  fog,  or 
smoke." 

CO-OPERATION 

The  principle  of  co-operation  and  mutual  support 
should  regulate  the  conduct  of  all  troops,  regardless  of 
arms. 

In  other  words,  successful  troop  leading  is  indispen- 
sable. 

The  requisites  to  a  successful  tactical  offensive  are: 

First. — Superiority  of  artillery   fire. 

Second. — Superiority  of  small  arms,  machine  guns  and  ac- 
companying weapons  fire  at  the  first  firing  position. 
Third. — Shock  action. 

The  offensive,  if  it  is  to  succeed,  must  be  followed  by 
an  assault. 

This  will  probably  come  in  the  nature  of  local  assaults 
against  weaker  parts  of  the  line  and  will  be  delivered  by 
each  group  at  the  earliest  moment  that  promises  success. 

"Where  the  assault  is  prepared  by  the  fire  of  artillery, 
machine  guns,  and  accompanying  weapons,  then  fire  ceases 
or  is  lifted  off  the  objective  either  at  a  prearranged  hour, 
or  by  preconcerted  signal." 

A  battle  cannot  be  won  by  fire  action  alone,  for  you 
seldom  can  shoot  an  enemy  out  of  position. 

The  British  often  in  South  Africa  shelled  the  enemy 
for  hours  without  doing  any  considerable  amount  of  dam- 
age, for  when  the  infantry  advanced,  they  were  met  by 
a  withering  fire. 

MAGERSFONTEIN 

This  is  what  happened  at  Magersfontein.  The  British 
shelled  the  Boers  for  two  hours,  sweeping  the  crests  and  top 
of  the  kopjes  which  were  not  held,  the  trenches,  unbe- 


258  STRATEGY 

known  to  the  British,  being  at  the  bottom  of  the  slopes. 
Under  cover  of  darkness  and  rain,  the  Highland  Brigade 
moved  forward  and,  when  they  were  about  550  yards  away 
from  the  Boer  trenches,  were  met  with  a  withering  fire 
showing  clearly  that  the  Boers  had  not  been  shot  out  of 
position. 

In  the  recent  war,  the  enemy  was  often  shelled  inces- 
santly with  no  results,  as  he  quickly  manned  his  trenches 
unless  the  assailant's  advance  was  covered  by  a  rolling 
barrage. 

DISPOSITIONS  FOR  ATTACK 

In  a  war  of  position,  all  dispositions  are  made  under 
cover,  troops  utilizing  communication  trenches  to  proceed 
to  the  "jumping-off"  trenches  if  they  exist. 

They  line  up  on  the  tape,  " jumping-off"  from  it  or  the 
trench,  as  the  case  may  be,  at  H  hour. 

In  a  war  of  movement,  it  will  require  greater  care  to 
assure  the  co-operation  among  the  troops  and  effective  fire 
action. 

Getting  the  desired  direction  will  be  much  more  difficult. 

JUMPING-OFF  POINT 

This  is  easily  selected  in  trench  warfare,  but  in  open 
warfare  it  is  not  so  easy. 

Features  of  topography  that  mark  the  line  must  be 
those  that  are  easily  located  on  the  ground. 

ADVANCING  THE  ATTACK 

"Where  troops  are  not  in  contact  with  the  enemy  prior 
to  the  attack,  the  assaulting  echelon  must  ordinarily  ad- 
vance a  long  distance  before  it  is  justified  in  opening  fire. 
It  cannot  combat  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  it  is  at  a  dis- 
advantage if  it  combats  the  defender's  long  range  rifle  and 
machine  gun  fire.  Hence  it  ignores  both,  and  by  taking  full 
advantage  of  cover  and  of  the  discipline  of  the  troops  ad- 
vances to  a  first  firing  position  at  the  shortest  range  pos- 
sible." 

"At  long  range,  the  best  protection  of  advancing  troops 
against  loss  consists  in  their  own  movement  and  the  util- 
ization of  cover  from  view.  It  should  be  impressed  on  all 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  259 

ranks  that  cover  alone  does  not  diminish  losses,  but  that 
their  best  protection  consists  in  the  most  rapid  possible 
advance  to  a  point  where  they  can  make  most  effective  use 
of  their  own  weapons.  By  clinging  to  cover  and  opening 
fire  at  long  range,  they  play  into  the  enemy's  hands  by  en- 
gaging in  a  fire  fight  in  which  they  are  at  a  relative  dis- 
advantage, and  moreover  constitute  a  stationary  target  upon 
which  his  artillery  can  easily  range. 

"It  will  sometimes  be  necessary  to  cross  fire-swept 
zones  by  the  advance  of  individuals  who  work  their  way 
forward  separately  and  re-form  on  a  designated  position." 

"It  will  frequently  become  necessary  for  infantry  mov- 
ing to  the  attack  to  pass  through  deployed  artillery.  This 
should  be  done  so  as  to  interfere  as  little  as  possible  with 
the  latter's  fire,  and  never  so  as  to  cause  that  fire  to  cease 
entirely.  As  far  as  practicable,  advantage  should  be  taken 
of  intervals  in  the  line.  An  understanding  between  artil- 
lery and  infantry  commanders  should  be  had,  so  as  to  effect 
the  movement  to  the  best  advantage." 

THE  FIRE  ATTACK 

"At  the  first  firing  position,  attacking  units  seek  to  gain 
fire  superiority  over  the  opposing  resistances.  This  may 
necessitate  a  steady,  accurate  fire  for  a  long  time.  The 
object  is  to  subdue  the  enemy's  fire  and  keep  it  subdued  so 
that  the  attacking  troops  may  advance  from  this  point  to 
a  favorable  place  near  the  enemy  from  which  the  assault 
may  be  delivered." 

"Assaulting  units  advance  from  one  cover  or  firing  po- 
sition to  another  by  successive  rushes,  the  movement  of 
advancing  fractions  being  covered  by  the  fire  of  those  re- 
maining in  position.  Diminution  of  the  enemy's  fire  and  a 
pronounced  loss  in  effectiveness  are  the  surest  signs  that 
fire  superiority  has  been  gained  and  that  a  part  of  the 
attacking  group  can  advance.  Enough  rifles  must  be  con- 
tinued in  action  to  keep  down  the  enemy's  fire;  this  deter- 
mines the  size  of  the  fraction  rushing. 

"Every  lull  in  hostile  fire  is  utilized  to  push  groups  to 
the  front  and  occupy  the  natural  strong  points  of  the  ter- 
rain from  which  covering  fire,  particularly  that  of  auto- 


260  STRATEGY 

matic  rifles,  can  be  delivered  to  facilitate  the  further  pro- 
gress of  the  assaulting  units. 

"The  attack  will  not  generally  encounter  a  uniformly 
held,  continuous  line  of  defense.  It  will  have  to  overcome 
a  defense  disposed  in  depth  and  a  series  of  centers  of  re- 
sistance or  strong  points  covering  the  main  routes  of  ad- 
vance with  relatively  lightly  held  intervening  intervals. 
By  a  stubborn  defense  of  these  strong  points,  the  defense 
will  seek  to  limit  the  penetrating  action  of  the  attack  and 
overwhelm  by  counter-attack  the  assaulting  elements  which 
succeed  in  penetrating  its  front. 

"There  will  consequently  be  inequality  in  the  resistance 
encountered  on  the  front  of  attack.  Certain  units  of  con- 
siderable size  will  be  held  up  in  front  of  the  stronger  cen- 
ters of  resistance.  Others,  which  encounter  only  minor 
resistances,  press  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible  without 
regard  to  the  progress  of  units  on  their  flanks  and  attempt 
to  outflank  the  main  hostile  resistances.  The  battle  thus 
becomes  a  series  of  local  combats  carried  on  by  units 
of  varying  importance.  The  combat  is  not  carried  on  by 
continuous  lines,  but  by  groups  disposed  in  depth  and  cap- 
able of  acting  in  any  direction. 

"Sections  of  the  assaulting  echelon  held  up  are  not  re- 
inforced when  the  resistance  in  their  front  can  be  out- 
flanked. By  their  own  fire  and  that  of  the  accompanying 
weapons,  they  attempt  to  neutralize  or  mask  the  opposing 
resistances  and  prevent  them  from  enfilading  the  attacking 
elements  advancing  on  their  flanks. 

"In  principle,  assaulting  units  endeavor  to  obtain  su- 
periority of  fire  over  the  defensive  elements  into  which  the 
hostile  dispositions  are  broken  up  by  enveloping  action. 
While  the  assaulting  echelon  seeks  to  approach  as  closely 
as  possible  to  the  hostile  position  and  immobilize  the  en- 
emy with  its  fire  and  that  of  the  accompanying  weapons 
and  machine  guns,  additional  forces  are  brought  up  on 
the  flanks  to  envelop  the  enemy  or  gain  his  rear." 

"The  advantage  of  the  enveloping  action  consists  in 
the  longer  line  with  consequent  superiority  in  the  number 
of  weapons  in  action  and  in  convergent  fire  as  opposed  to 
the  enemy's  divergent  fire.  In  many  cases,  however,  the 
mutual  flanking  of  hostile  centers  of  resistance  will  be  un- 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  261 

favorable  to  enveloping  action.  In  such  a  case,  frontal 
attack  will  be  necessary." 

"Where  the  opposing  resistance  consists  of  isolated  ma- 
chine gun  nests,  the  precision  of  the  accompanying  weapons 
at  close  range  is  often  sufficient  to  put  the  enemy  out  of 
action.  In  any  event,  their  fire  will  cover  the  advance  of 
the  infantry  to  close  range  and  prepare  for  its  assault. 
They  may  also  be  used  to  assist  the  infantry  to  outflank 
points  of  resistance  by  neutralizing  the  flank  toward  the 
infantry-  In  some  cases,  this  neutralizing  may  be  effected 
by  the  use  of  smoke  barrages." 

"It  is  the  special  duty  of  supports  and  reserves  dur- 
ing the  advance  to  take  timely  measures  in  anticipation 
of  hostile  counter-attack.  They  utilize  all  lulls  in  the  ac- 
tion to  occupy  the  natural  strong  points  of  the  terrain  and 
dispose  machine  guns  and  accompanying  weapons  so  as 
to  check  any  hostile  reaction." 

After  the  enemy  has  been  driven  from  a  village,  the 
assailant  should  not  actually  occupy  it  and  fall  a  victim  to 
hostile  retaliatory  artillery  fire  and  gassing  but  should  hold 
the  outskirts  in  such  a  manner  as  will  prevent  its  recapture. 

"The  deep  disposition  of  attacking  units  does  not  im- 
ply a  passive  following  of  the  assaulting  echelon  by  sup- 
ports and  reserves.  On  the  contrary,  one  of  the  purposes 
of  the  disposition  in  depth  is  to  enable  the  attacking  units 
to  act  in  any  direction.  Commanders  of  supports  and  re- 
serves must  keep  in  touch  with  the  situation  on  their  front 
and  flanks  by  constant  reconnaissance  and  be  ready  to  act 
on  their  own  initiative  in  the  execution  of  the  various  mis- 
sions which  the  situation  may  impose.  These  missions  may 
involve  the  protection  of  the  flanks  of  neighboring  units  by 
the  attack  of  counter-attacking  hostile  forces ;  wheeling  into 
an  adjacent  sector  for  the  purpose  of  taking  in  flank  hos- 
tile resistances  still  holding  out;  covering  gaps  which  may 
arise  between  adjacent  assaulting  units.  For  supports 
and  reserves  no  less  than  for  assaulting  units,  there  is  no 
reason  for  continued  inaction  on  the  battlefield." 

"Supports  and  reserves  are  in  principle  put  into  action 
where  least  losses  are  being  suffered  rather  than  where 
they  are  greatest.  All  commanders  must  endeavor  to  locate 


262  STRATEGY 

the  points  where  the  enemy  is  offering  least  resistance  in 
order  to  exploit  any  weakness  he  may  develop  by  the  use 
of  troops  in  rearward  echelons." 

It  should  be  the  rule  never  to  throw  in  reinforcements 
where  you  cannot  get  through,  but  where  you  can. 

THE  ASSAULT 

The  final  stage  is  the  assault  which,  if  successful,  is 
followed  by  a  pursuit  or,  if  a  failure,  by  digging  in. 

The  assault  at  present  is  carried  forward  in  a  line 
or  echelon  of  section  or  squad  columns  until  a  point  is 
reached  beyond  which  it  is  impracticable  to  advance  with- 
out opening  fire,  when  one  or  more  waves  are  deployed  as 
skirmishers  in  assault  formation. 

MEETING  ENGAGEMENTS  OR  RENCONTRE 

The  situation  is  much  more  difficult  when  two  moving 
forces  come  in  contact. 

The  troops  intended  for  the  decisive  blow  may  get 
involved  in  the  wrong  place. 

Shock  troops  may  have  been  drawn  into  the  prelim- 
inary action  and  you  are  forced  to  use  inferior  troops  for 
the  assault. 

"The  great  art  in  the  rencontre  is  to  stop  the  aim- 
less expenditure  of  troops  and  to  continue  to  hold  the  en- 
emy in  check  with  those  -already  involved.  The  balance  of 
the  forces  should  be  held  in  mass  in  some  suitable  place 
from  which  to  launch  the  decisive  attack/' 

Therein  lay  Napoleon's  mastery,  as  the  leadership  of 
his  battles  show. 

The  plan  for  the  engagement  cannot  go  much  farther 
than  give  the  original  disposition  for  the  attack,  zones 
of  action  and  objectives. 

The  remainder  depends  so  much  on  the  actions  of  the 
enemy,  which  are  learned  only  in  the  course  "of  events, 
that  no  definite  arrangements  can  be  made  beforehand. 

THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  TACTICAL  DECISION 

Parallel  advance  can  only  take  place  when  decisive  re- 
sults are  not  looked  for.  A  simple  frontal  overrunning 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  263 

of  the  enemy's  position  by  the  weight  of  advancing  masses 
is,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  impossible  today  on 
account  of  the  power  of  modern  firearms. 

The  columns  that  do  get  through  will  turn  in  and 
envelop  hostile  troops  holding  up  other  columns.  The 
weakening  of  a  line  by  death,  wounds,  and  straggling  will 
be  so  great  that  provisions  must  be  made  for  this  by  having 
a  maximum  distribution  in  depth. 

CONVERGENT  ADVANCE 

The  parallel  advance,  in  the  end,  becomes  convergent 
toward  the  point  where  the  strategical  penetration  is  to 
occur.  In  our  envelopment,  by  its  very  nature,  the  lines 
of  advance  are  convergent. 

The  great  difficulty  is  in  keeping  the  lines  from  con- 
verging too  soon. 

In  the  selection  of  objectives,  the  error  of  concentrating 
our  attack  on  advanced  positions  must  be  avoided. 

LIMITED  OBJECTIVES 

The  rule  of  limiting  the  objectives,  an  outgrowth  of 
position  warfare,  has  no  place  in  'the  modern  battle  of  move- 
ment. As  so  often  happened  with  the  allies,  by  limiting  the 
objective,  they  lost  great  opportunities  to  capture  positions, 
hostile  artillery,  etc. 

In  the  modern  attack,  one  must  strive  for  the  great- 
est results,  which  can  only  be  attained  by  the  victorious 
troops  pushing  in  as  far  and  as  fast  as  they  can,  consistent 
with  keeping  up  the  supply  from  the  rear  and  maintaining 
contact  with  troops  on  the  flanks.  The  movements  of  units 
advancing  to  attack  should  be  by  bounds,  i.  e.,  successive 
positions,  along  the  axis  of  movement,  and  selected  as  inter- 
mediate objectives  and  reconnoitered  prior  to  occupation. 

DIVERGENT  LINES 

Every  splitting  up  of  forces  is  a  weakness.  Inasmuch 
as  the  divergent  advance  causes  this,  it  must  be  discarded 
except  in  most  extraordinary  cases. 

One  exception :  When  we  wish  to  hold  a  force  of  the 
enemy  at  distant  points  on  the  battlefield. 


264  STRATEGY 

In  the  battle  of  Antietam,  had  Hooker,  Mansfield 
and  Sumner  held  the  attention  of  the  Confederate  left 
near  Dunkard's  Church  and  Stuart  Hill  at  the  same  time 
that  Burnside  attacked  the  bridge,  there  would  have  been 
a  victory  by  an  army  tactically  operating  on  divergent 
lines.  This  would  have  prevented  the  shifting  of  troops 
by  the  Confederates. 

SIGNAL  COMMUNICATION 

One  of  the  most  important  elements  in  contributing 
to  the  success  of  a  modern  battle  is  signal  communications. 
The  agencies  we  have  at  our  disposal  are  the  telephone, 
buzzer,  radio,  signal  lamps,  flags,  pyrotechnics,  carrier 
pigeons,  motorcycles,  runners,  etc. 

The  most  valuable  agency  is  the  telephone  and  every 
effort  should  be  sought  to  keep  it  in  iv  or  king  order.  All 
other  means  are  auxiliary  and  should  be  so  treated.  Not 
only  should  forward  and  rear  communication  be  kept  up 
but  lateral  also. 

SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE 

Owing  to  the  greater  flexibility  of  the  chain  of  tactical 
events,  the  more  powerful  effect  of  moral  impressions  and 
the  more  rapid  development  of  the  action,  in  which  cause 
and  effect  are  immediately  connected  with  one  another, 
the  number  of  combinations  are  even  greater  in  the  tactical 
offensive  than  in  the  strategical. 

TACTICAL  FRONTAL  ATTACK 

A  uniform  attack  all  along  the  enemy's  front  has  the 
least  chance  of  decisive  results  because  in  such  an  attack 
we  must  fight  the  enemy's  full  strength  simultaneously 
with  all  the  advantages  of  the  defense  against  us,  and  at 
the  best  we  merely  push  the  enemy  back  on  his  commun- 
ications. 

"The  frontal  attack  cannot  boast  of  any  natural  ma- 
terial advantages  over  the  defense.  On  the  contrary,  the 
disadvantages  seem  to  be  all  on  the  side  of  the  attack 
except  the  moral  impetus  that  every  forward  movement 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  265 

gives  to  the  troops   composing  it.     But  the  convergency 
which  gives  strength  to  the  tactical  attack  is  lacking." 

All  strategical  attacks  culminate  in  frontal  attacks, 
no  matter  what  the  form  of  strategy. 

To  MAKE  THE  ATTACK  POSSIBLE 
We  must  have: 

First.  Fire  superiority,  both  combined  and  individually. 

Second.  Distribution  in  depth  with  reserves  to  make  good 
losses. 

Third.  Greater  activity,  better  trained  troops,  proper  co- 
operation and  good  leadership. 

Fourth.  Moral  superiority  which  will  favor  the  assailant  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  he  is  attacking. 

As  a  result  of  studies  of  the  South  African  War,  we 
have  grown  to  over-value  the  power  of  the  defensive  and 
assume  that  a  frontal  attack  will  no  longer  take  place. 
Those  who  may  have  entertained  such  an  idea  have 
had  it  pretty  well  shattered  by  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
and  The  World  War.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  the  Boers  gained  their  success  in  the  face  of  almost 
obsolete  tactics  and  the  Japanese  theirs  in  the  face  of  troops 
singularly  badly  led. 

The  Manchurian  War  and  The  World  War  have  both 
clearly  shown  that  the  frontal  attack  will  succeed  and  is 
the  rule  of  modern  warfare. 

On  larger  battle  fronts,  where  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  men  are  engaged,  the  only  function  of  the  division  will 
be  that  of  frontal  attack  covered  by  artillery  barrage 
looking  for  a  penetration,  when  envelopments  may  take 
place. 

PENETRATIONS 

Penetrations  will  occur  more  often  in  meeting  engage- 
ments, but  cannot  be  said  to  be  confined  entirely  to  that 
form  of  action. 

The  whole  theory  of  reinforcements  in  the  modern 
battle  is  to  send  them  in  to  assist  at  points  from  which  they 
can  advance. 

In  this  way,  strong  points  are  enveloped  and  taken  in 
reverse. 

It  often  occurred  in  The  World  War  that  the  Germans 
would  concentrate  a  large  body  of  "sturm"  troops  at  a 


266  STRATEGY 

certain  place  and  launch  them  forward,  penetrating  the 
hostile  lines  and  gaining  tactical  success. 

This  was  particularly  done  in  the  spring  and  summer 
drives  of  1918. 

On  this  subject  Bernhardi  has  the  following  to  say: 
"Piercing  the  front  can  obviously  be  only  carried  out  suc- 
cessfully if  the  assailant  succeeds  in  concentrating,  by 
surprise,  a  substantial  superiority  opposite  the  line  to  be 
attacked.  The  chance  of  doing  so  may  arise  if  the  enemy, 
dreading  an  envelopment  and  being  confirmed  in  his  fears 
by  demonstrations,  has  echeloned  his  reserves  chiefly  be- 
hind his  flanks." 

The  superiority  must,  nevertheless,  be  very  substan- 
tial, for  the  defender  must  not  only  be  beaten  frontally 
on  ground  chosen  by  himself,  but  enough  reserves  must 
also  be  available  to  turn  to  account  the  success  obtained 
after  penetration  and  to  ward  off  hostile  counter-attacks. 

The  greatest  results  of  a  tactical  penetration  occur 
when  the  penetration  is  effected  at  a  point  that  leads  toward 
the  hostile  communications. 

Unless  we  can  bring  a  numerical  superiority  into  our 
attack,  together  with  overwhelming  artillery  fire,  we  have 
small  chance  of  success. 

The  terrific  fighting  at  Ypres  illustrates  the  futility 
of  frontal  attacks  without  superiority.  Of  course,  if  the 
Germans  had  won,  they  might  have  cut  off  the  British,  but 
their  attacks  took  a  great  deal  of  the  fighting  spirit  out  of 
the  Germans. 

Unless  there  are  reserves  to  throw  in  to  exploit  the 
penetration,  the  attack  had  better  not  be  launched. 

At  Spion  Kop,  the  British  after  successfully  storming 
the  Kop  and  Twin  Peaks  had  to  withdraw  because  they 
did  not  have  sufficient  reserves  to  hold  the  positions. 

At  Mukden,  the  Russians  had  engaged  all  their  re- 
serves against  the  hostile  force  enveloping  their  right  and 
could  not  thwart  the  attack  on  their  center. 

On  the  evening  of  March  9th,  portions  of  the  Japanese 
4th  and  1st  Armies  were  pushed  across  the  river  between 
Mukden  and  Peigitun  Valley  and,  breaking  down  all  re- 
sistance, penetrated  to  the  north.  By  the  next  day  they 
had  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  Mandarin  Road.  The  whole 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  &67 

left  of  the  Russian  army  was  cut  off  from  the  right  and 
center.  The  Japanese  were  too  weak  to  take  full  advantage 
of  their  success,  for  if  they  had  had  sufficient  reserves 
they  might  have  held  off  the  Russian's  left,  and,  with  Nogi, 
who  had  enveloped  the  entire  flank  of  the  Russian  right, 
entirely  annihilated  the  right  and  center.  The  penetration 
was  on  a  twenty-kilometer  front  which  almost  places  it  in 
the  strategical  category. 

Grant's  penetration  at  Missionary  Ridge  is  a  splendid 
illustration  of  a  tactical  penetration. 

ATTEMPTS  OF  BESIEGED  TO  BREAK  OUT 

The  attempts  of  the  besieged  to  break  out  have  gen- 
erally failed,  due  to  the  fact  that  they  could  not  effect  a 
penetration  on  a  broad  enough  front  and  exploit  their 
success  by  marching  out. 

This  occurred  at  Plevna,  when  Osman  Pasha  tried  to 
break  through,  although  his  attempt  was  prompted  more 
by  desire  to  save  his  face  than  hope  of  success.  At  Metz, 
had  Bazaine  attempted  to  break  through  to  the  south,  he 
might  have  succeeded  and  escaped  with  his  army.  At 
Donelson,  vacillation  on  the  part  of  Floyd  prevented  what 
otherwise  might  have  been  a  success. 

In  the  future  penetrations  of  a  tactical  nature  may 
occur  in  the  rencontre  when  the  assailant,  advancing  in 
several  columns,  has  encountered  the  enemy  advancing 
in  a  similar  formation. 

The  assailant  may  merely  hold  one  column  and  mass 
against  the  others.  This  is  what  Kuroki  did  at  Motienling. 

If  we  are  able  to  force  the  enemy  back  of  a  stream 
and  hold  him  with  a  weak  force,  while  we  combine  at 
another  point,  our  task  will  be  facilitated. 

SUCCESSIVE  ATTACK 

This  is  a  form  of  attack  now  more  or  less  obsolete 
which  was  used  by  the  Confederates  in  the  Civil  War  a 
great  deal. 

The  attack  is  launched  from  one  or  the  other  flank 
and,  as  soon  as  it  is  well  under  way,  is  taken  up  by  the 
next  unit,  and  so  on  through  the  whole  line. 


268  STRATEGY 

It  leaves  to  the  individual  judgment  of  the  commander 
of  the  successive  units  the  selection  of  the  proper  moment 
for  putting  in  his  troops.  It  throws  upon  the  subordinate 
commanders  the  responsibility  for  a  decision  which  they 
are  unaccustomed  to  bear.  Many  men  who  are  capable 
and  trustworthy  subordinates,  fighting  bravely  and  vig- 
orously under  orders  from  higher  authority,  will  shrink 
from  the  responsibility  of  themselves  inaugurating  an  of- 
fensive. And  herein  lies  the  weakness  of  the  successive 
attack.  At  the  critical  moment,  if  there  is  lack  of  aggres- 
siveness on  the  part  of  a  single  leader,  the  whole  plan  falls 
into  ruin. 

The  history  of  the  Civil  War  shows  that  in  nearly 
every  instance  the  successive  commanders,  dreading  to 
attack  prematurely,  have  held  back  until  the  golden  mo- 
ment has  passed.  As  a  result,  a  disconnected,  unsupported 
series  of  attacks,  each  being  repulsed  and  %  driven  back 
before  the  attack  of  the  units  next  succeeding  has  made 
itself  felt. 

This  formation  distinctly  failed  at  Gettysburg  and 
Charles  City  Crossroads  where  the  greatest  opportunities 
were  offered. 

TACTICAL  ENVELOPMENT 

When  the  attacking  line  extends  beyond  one  or  both 
flanks  of  the  defender  and  bends  in  we  have  a  tactical 
envelopment. 

This  form  of  attack  seems  to  give  the  assailant  a  great 
advantage  but,  upon  inspection,  this  superiority  is  some- 
what qualified. 

The  elements  of  numbers  and  surprise  are  all-impor- 
tant. The  tactical  envelopment  has  this  superiority  over 
the  frontal  attack  in  that,  if  successful,  it  will  threaten  the 
enemy's  line  of  retreat.  Also,  it  enables  the  assailant  to 
bring  a  converging  fire  to  bear. 

Cronje's  line  of  communication,  on  the  Modder  River, 
ran  off  toward  the  northeast  to  his  rear  in  the  direction  of 
Bloemfontein  and,  when  Lord  Roberts  threatened  it,  Cronje 
had  to  withdraw.  At  Mukden,  the  Russian  line  of  communi- 
cation extended  from  the  right  rear,  so  the  Japanese  en- 
veloped the  right. 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  269 

The  envelopment  has  this  additional  advantage,  also, 
in  that  if  successful  the  defender  is  forced  back  into  a 
restricted  area  and  a  state  of  confusion  results. 

If  the  assailant  can  secure  a  separate  line  of  retreat 
for  his  two  attacks,  namely,  the  frontal  and  enveloping, 
he  will  have  a  great  advantage. 

The  defender  has  this  advantage  in  that  he  may  occupy 
his  front  with  weaker  force,  while  massing  the  bulk  of 
his  troops  against  the  enveloping  force. 

The  defender  may  also  retire  his  enveloped  wing  form- 
ing a  crochet  and,  with  his  reserves,  a  defensive  flank. 
These  reserves  may  in  their  turn  envelop  if  they  are  eche- 
loned in  the  rear  of  the  outer  flank  of  the  enveloped  wing. 

The  great  difficulty  in  the  envelopment  is  to  co-ordinate 
the  frontal  and  enveloping  attacks. 

The  defender  may  defeat  the  frontal  attack  before 
the  envelopment  takes  place,  or  he  may  fall  back  and 
avoid  an  envelopment. 

We  may  also  have  a  case  of  both  combatants  envel- 
oping the  same  hostile  flank  and,  in  that  event,  the  one 
who  starts  first  has  the  greater  chance  of  winning. 

This  is  what  occurred  at  Stones  River  where  Rosecrans 
intended  to  envelop  the  Confederate  right  and  Bragg  the 
Federal  left.  Bragg  won  tactically  at  the  outset  because 
of  an  earlier  start. 

A  double  envelopment,  such  as  was  attempted  at  Mis- 
sionary Ridge  in  a  strategical  way,  and  in  a  tactical  way 
at  Woerth,  is  impossible  of  successful  execution  unless 
the  assailant  has  vastly  superior  numbers. 

TACTICAL  TURNING  MOVEMENT 

The  tactical  turning  movement  is  open  to  all  the  ob- 
jections of  the  strategical  turning  movement,  but  to  a 
greater  degree,  for  distances  are  less  and  the  movement  is 
more  easily  detected.  It  is  a  continuation  of  an  envelop- 
ment in  that  it  strikes  at  the  enemy's  communications  or 
line  of  retreat. 

In  forces  larger  than  a  division,  turning  movements 
may  be  used  in  conjunction  with  a  frontal  or  a  frontal 
and  enveloping  attack.  As  a  turning  movement  separates 
the  entire  force  into  two  parts,  each  part  for  a  time  outside 


270  STRATEGY 

of  the  immediate  supporting  distance  of  the  other,  both, 
the  holding  and  the  turning  force,  should  be  made  up  of 
all  arms,  and  each  force  should  be  strong  enough  to  main- 
tain itself  in  position  without  calling  upon  the  other  for 
support.  The  turning  movement  is  justifiable  only  when 
it  can  be  made  in  such  a  manner  as  to  permit  of  dividing 
the  entire  force,  without  giving  the  enemy  a  favorable 
opportunity  to  defeat  the  separated  parts  in  detail. 

THE  HOLDING  ATTACK 

This  attack,  as  the  name  implies,  is  for  the  purpose 
of  holding  the  enemy  to  his  position  by  offensive  action 
in  one  part  of  the  field  while  a  decisive  blow  in  the  nature 
of  an  assault  or  of  an  enveloping  or  turning  movement 
is  struck  in  another  quarter.  The  governing  idea  of  the 
holding  attack  is  to  make  it  energetic  enough  to  deceive 
the  enemy,  in  order  that  he  may  use  as  many  of  his  troops 
as  possible  in  resisting  it,  even  drawing  upon  his  reserves 
for  such  a  purpose.  Early  development  of  the  maximum 
volume  of  rifle  and  artillery  fire  is  therefore  essential,  and 
for  that  reason  the  deployment  is  on  extended  lines.  Sup- 
ports and  reserves  are  reduced  to  the  minimum  that  will 
be  needed  to  replace  losses,  secure  the  flanks,  and  strengthen 
those  parts  of  the  line  against  which  the  enemy  might  act 
most  aggressively.  Holding  attacks  differ  from  delaying 
actions  in  that  the  guiding  principle  in  the  former  is  of- 
fense and  in  the  latter  defense.  The  holding  force  may  be 
called  upon  to  push  the  attack  to  the  point  of  an  assault, 
and  in  the  end  will  join  in  the  advance  on  the  enemy's 
position  when  the  decisive  attack  has  succeeded.  Care 
must  be  taken  that  the  holding  attack  does  not,  because 
of  promising  conditions  in  its  front,  make  a  premature 
assault  on  the  enemy's  line  and  be  defeated  before  the 
decisive  blow  can  be  struck  in  another  part  of  the  field. 
There  is  danger,  also,  in  prematurely  pushing  this  attack 
so  far  that  its  weakness  or  its  intentions  may  be  'disclosed 
to  the  enemy  and  give  him  the  opportunity  to  defeat  the 
entire  force  in  detail. 

Lord  Roberts  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  activity 
as  commander  in  South  Africa  stuck  to  the  principle  of 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  271 

envelopment  and  tactical  turning  movements.  Cronje  held 
Lord  Methuen  at  Modder  River,  but  when  Lord  Roberts  came 
along  and  operated  against  Cronje's  line  of  retreat  the 
latter  started  toward  his  base  but  was  intercepted  at 
Paardeburg.  Lord  Roberts'  practice  was  to  have  his  holding 
force  very  weak  and  put  his  strength  in  his  turning  force. 
Louis  Botha,  at  Diamond  Hill,  after  the  loss  of  Pretoria, 
knowing  that  Lord  Roberts  was  executing  his  principle  of  en- 
velopment, extended  his  forces  beyond  Roberts'  flanks  and, 
as  the  British  cavalry  turned  what  they  supposed  was  the 
Boer  flank  and  seized  the  Delagoa  Bay  Railroad,  they  were 
in  turn  turned  and  driven  back  with  result  that  the  Boers 
were  able  to  retire. 

Due  to  the  increased  range  of  modern  weapons,  the 
turning  movement  must  be  carried  out  with  a  greater 
interval  between  the  holding  attack  and  the  turning  attack. 

COUNTER-ATTACK 

The  great  danger  is  that  the  defenders  will  make  a 
counter-attack  while  the  turn  is  in  operation. 

MOUNTAIN  PASSES  AND  RIVERS 

The  turning  movement  is  of  particular  value  when 
the  enemy  is  in  position  holding  a  river  crossing  or  a 
mountain  pass.  In  the  former  case,  he  cannot  harm  the 
holding  attack  unless  he  crosses  the  river  himself  and,  in 
the  latter  case,  he  can  operate  in  no  other  way  than  from 
the  rear  against  the  turning  column. 

Mountain  warfare  is  by  all  means  the  field  for  the 
application  of  turning  movements. 

RIVERS 
CROSSING  OF  THE  YALU  RIVER  IN  1904 

On  April  28th,  the  1st  Army  was  ready  to  attempt 
the  crossing.  The  Russians  held  the  right  bank  of  the  river 
from  Antung  to  the  junction  with  the  Ai-Ho  and  thence 
along  the  Ai-Ho  north.  This  river  is  smaller  than  the 
Yalu,  and  about  waist  deep.  The  Russians  numbered  only 
about  4,500  men  with  17  guns  and  were  commanded  by 
General  Zasulich.  The  islands  between  the  Yalu  and  Ai-Ho, 


272  STRATEGY 

in  front  of  the  center  of  the  Russian  position,  were  held 
by  the  Japanese.  On  the  30th,  the  Japanese  12th  Divi- 
sion crossed  the  river  and  occupied  the  heights  between 
the  Yalu  and  Ai-Ho,  while  the  artillery  subjected  the  Rus- 
sian front  to  a  terrific  bombardment;  river  gunboats  also 
demonstrated  downstream  to  attract  Russian  reserves  in 
that  direction. 

The  2d  Division,  on  the  morning  of  May  1st,  moved 
out  onto  the  islands  between  the  two  rivers,  followed  by  the 
Guard  Division,  which  deployed  to  the  right. 

Without  waiting  for  the  12th  Division,  the  2d  and  the 
Guard  Division  rushed  forward,  attacking  at  7:00  AM.  By 
9 :00  AM,  they  had  captured  the  position  which  the  Russians 
were  evacuating.  The  2d  and  the  Guard  Division  then,  for 
some  unaccountable  reason,  stopped.  Meanwhile,  the  12th 
Division  started  forcing  the  crossing  in  their  front  at  9:00 
AM,  and  continued  to  push  forward  vigorously.  By  11 :00 
o'clock  they  were  bearing  down  upon  the  Russian  line  of 
retreat  toward  Hamatan.  The  2d  and  the  Guard  Division 
did  not  start  forward  until  1 :00  PM.  At  about  2 :00  PM  they 
were  advancing  on  the  Tschin-gou  Road,  the  one  over  which 
the  Russians  intended  to  retire.  Consequently,  the  Russians 
took  up  a  position  on  hill  192,  and  being  practically  sur- 
rounded, had  to  cut  their  way  through  to  the  west.  As  a 
result  only  a  few  escaped. 

The  turning  movement  was  not  well  co-ordinated,  for 
the  frontal  attack  had  carried  the  main  position  before  the 
turning  force  was  across  the  Ai-Ho. 

Had  the  Russian  commander  retired  to  the  north,  tak- 
ing up  a  strong  position  with  his  right  a  ad  reinforcing 
his  left,  the  whole  Japanese  attack  would  have  been  frontal. 

Hooker's  crossing  of  the  Rappahannock  River,  during 
the  Chancellorsville  campaign,  and  McDowell,  at  first  Bull 
Run,  are  good  illustrations  of  the  tactical  turning  move- 
ment in  connection  with  a  river  crossing. 

MOUNTAIN  PASSES 

In  mountain  warfare,  turning  movements,  while  not 
necessarily  recommended,  yet,  if  they  are  ever  to  be  used, 
they  will  be  most  efficacious  in  warfare  of  that  kind. 


TACTICAL  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  273 

The  Japanese  repeatedly  turned  the  Russians  out  of 
the  positions  in  the  Feng-shui-Ling  since  the  Japanese,  due 
to  the  fact  that  they  are  natives  of  a  mountainous  country, 
were  more  than  a  match  for  their  more  sluggish  enemy 
in  climbing  over  hills. 

BATTLE  OF  MONTIENLING 

The  Japanese  2d  Division  was  deployed  with  the  30th 
Infantry  holding  the  Motienling  Pass,  with  the  29th  Infantry 
and  2d  Cavalry  regiments  at  Lienshankuan,  six  miles  east 
in  reserve. 

The  16th  Infantry  held  the  northern  pass  about  two 
miles  away  with  main  body  at  Hsiamatang,  about  five  miles 
in  rear.  The  4th  Infantry  held  Hsinkai-Ling  Pass  about 
four  miles  south.  The  division  was  deployed  on  a  front 
of  about  six  miles  in  the  mountains — Count  von  Keller 
with  about  six  regiments  attacked  Motienling  driving  the 
30th  Infantry  back.  The  30th  then  enveloped  the  Russian 
left,  and  three  companies  of  the  16th  came  from  the  north, 
enveloping  that  flank  also. 

The  4th  Infantry  repulsed  an  attack  on  its  front  and 
then  sent  a  detachment  north,  over  the  mountains,  which 
completely  turned  the  Russian  right,  driving  the  Russians 
back  with  the  assistance  of  heavy  artillery  fire. 

This  small  affair  is  typical  of  the  mountain  fighting 
and  shows  how  easily  tactical  turning  movements  can  be 
carried  out. 

Killed  Wounded  Missing 

Off.         Men  Off.         Men  Off.         Men 

Japanese   loss  4  39  15  241  0  0 

Russian    loss  8  215  37  1,069  2  224 

TACTICAL  ATTACKS  ON  FLANK  AND  REAR 

An  attack  of  this  kind  will  develop  from  successful 
turning  movements  and  will  be  decisive,  as  it  takes  the 
enemy  by  surprise  and  deprives  him  of  his  line  of  retreat 
and  communications. 

In  order  to  make  such  an  attack  possible,  the  enemy 
must  be  grossly  careless  and  paying  no  attention  to  recon- 
naissance. 


274  STRATEGY 

Attacks  of  this  nature  will  occur  in  the  course  of  a 
modern  battle  when  the  enemy  is  in  confusion. 

These  affairs  will  be  small  and  will  be  sudden  incur- 
sions and  not  orderly  combats. 

The  same  applies  to  a  flank  attack. 

CEDAR  MOUNTAIN 

The  left  of  Jackson's  line,  commanded  by  Winder, 
rested  on  a  heavy  wood  that  had  not  been  thoroughly  ex- 
amined. 

The  Federals,  suddenly  debouching  from  this  wood, 
took  Garnett's  brigade  in  the  flank  and  routed  it. 

CONCLUSION 

The  history  of  every  war  teaches  that  success  is 
not  bound  to  a  distinct  form  of  attack  and  defense.  Every 
war  develops  something  new  that  has  not  been  used  before, 
with  results  that  tactics  change. 

The  element  of  luck  enters  into  the  tactical  fight  so 
much  that  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  that  element  or  skill 
is  the  responsible  factor.  Probably  a  combination  of  the 
two. 

In  the  heat  of  battle,  the  commander  does  what  he 
thinks  is  proper  under  the  circumstances  based  on  his 
tactical  knowledge;  the  men  carry  out  the  plan;  and  the 
strategist  afterwards  gives  the  operation  a  name,  using  it 
as  a  brilliant  illustration  or  a  horrible  example. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Strategical  Defensive  Operations  with 
Special  Forms 


OBJECT 

THE  object  of  a  strategical  defensive  is  to  avoid  an 
unfavorable  decision  at  the  beginning  of  an  opera- 
tion, and  to  await  a  more  favorable  opportunity  later. 
The  defender  either  realizes  his  own  weakness  from  the 
outset  or  has  reason  to  believe  that  the  assailant  may 
become  exhausted  as  a  result  of  hard  service  or  disease 
or,  that  he,  the  defender,  may  receive  assistance  in  the 
nature  of  reinforcements. 

SERIOUS  RESISTANCE  NOT  ALWAYS  NECESSARY 

It  is  not  by  any  means  always  necessary  that  we 
should  decide  on  serious  resistance  whenever  we  take  up 
the  defensive.  Victory  may  be  gained  by  merely  holding 
a  position  for  a  certain  time. 

When  Napoleon  was  forced  to  recross  the  Danube 
after  the  battles  of  Aspern  and  Essling,  the  duty  of  Mas- 
sena,  in  covering  the  withdrawal,  did  not  depend  for  its 
success  on  anything  other  than  the  holding  back  of  the 
Austrians  until  the  troops  had  gotten  over  to  the  Island  of 
Lobau. 

AIDS  THAT  MAY  ASSIST  THE  DEFENDER 

1.  Time  and  space. 

2.  Terrain. 

3.  Artificial  works  of  defense,  such  as  fortresses. 

4.  Weather. 

5.  Disease. 

6.  Exhaustion  of  the  enemy. 

TIME  AND  SPACE 

The  truest  ally  of  the  defensive  is  time.  The  defender 
may  count  himself  successful  if  he  has  not  been  defeated 
by  a  certain  time. 

275 


276  STRATEGY 

In  South  Africa,  Baden-Powell  at  Mafeking,  Kekewich 
at  Kimberly  and  General  Sir  George  White  at  Ladysmith 
won  by  merely  being  able  to  hang  on. 

To  have  a  large  amount  of  time  and  space  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  retreating  force  is  always  of  advantage  for 
the  reason  that,  even  though  at  the  outset  means  of  defense 
have  not  been  thought  of,  they  may  develop  later.  • 

Moscow 

In  the  retreat  of  Bagration  and  Kutusov  into  the  in- 
terior of  Russia,  there  was  no  attempt  at  an  organized 
withdrawal  at  the  outset,  but  later,  when  they  began  to 
realize  the  exhausting  effects  of  the  long  march  and  lack 
of  supplies  on  Napoleon's  army,  they  adopted  a  system 
of  co-operation  that  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  Moscow 
and  retreat  of  the  Grande  Armee. 

KNOXVILLE 

The  importance  of  time  to  the  defensive,  and  the  re- 
sults to  be  gained  by  consuming  as  much  of  it  as  possible, 
are  well  illustrated  by  Burnside's  defense  of  Knoxville  in  the 
fall  of  1863. 

Burnside  was  sure  that  if  he  could  hold  out  until  Grant 
defeated  Bragg  he  would  be  relieved.  So  he  sent  General 
Sander's  cavalry  out  to  delay  the  advance  of  Longstreet's 
forces  to  gain  as  much  time  as  he  could.  Longstreet's 
slowness,  awaiting  reinforcements,  contributed  to  Burn- 
side's  success  so  that  when  the  attack  was  made,  winter 
having  set  in,  the  ice  and  sleet  caused  it  to  fail. 

Every  gain  of  time  is  of  advantage  to  the  defenders, 
first,  because  the  very  fact  of  the  time  being  gained  pre- 
vents the  conquest  of  the  country,  for  that  period;  and, 
second,  because  it  forces  the  assailant  to  increase  his  ef- 
forts, exhausting  thereby  the  latter's  strength,  and  pro- 
curing the  chance  of  bringing  about  a  change  in  the  polit- 
ical situation.  The  longer  the  Austrians  could  keep  the 
field  in  1866,  the  more  readily  could  they  count  on  France's 
intervention  in  their  favor.  Of  the  same  import  it  was  to 
the  French  in  1870-71  to  hold  out  in  Paris  as  long  as 
possible.  They  not  only  gained  time  thereby  for  renewed 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  277 

military  efforts  in  the  provinces,  but  could  also  hope  for 
the  intervention  of  the  neutral  powers  if  the  fight  for  the 
capital  continued  for  any  length  of  time.  Likewise,  the 
Confederates  in  the  Civil  War  had  all  to  gain  by  pro- 
longing it. 

The  longer  it  was  protracted  the  greater  the  possi- 
bility of  foreign  intervention  and  the  probability  of  the 
Anti-War  Party  of  the  North  winning  out  and  granting 
the  desired  independence. 

TERRAIN 

The  terrain,  by  its  very  nature,  may  be  of  the  great- 
est assistance  to  the  defender  and  may  of  itself  suggest 
that  kind  of  strategy. 

In  South  Africa,  after  the  Boers  had  been  forced  to 
assume  the  defensive,  the  open  veldt  enabled  them  to 
delay  greatly  the  British,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Boer 
was  "par  excellence"  mounted  and  had  acclimated  animals. 
In  South  Africa,  there  is  an  animal  disease  that  affects 
imported  horses  which  does  not  affect  domestic  animals. 
It  was  prevalent  among  the  British  remounts,  so  that  the 
lives  of  these  animals,  after  arriving  in  South  Africa,  was 
about  six  weeks. 

In  the  Tyrol  and  Switzerland,  the  mountainous  nature 
of  the  country  dictates  the  defensive.  In  neither  of  these 
countries  was  Napoleon  able  to  make  any  headway  in  his 
efforts  to  overcome  Europe. 

Moltke  in  his  memoirs  gives  a  very  interesting  ac- 
count of  the  campaign  in  Sarthe  and  shows  how  the  terrain 
greatly  assisted  the  defender  and  even  dictated  the  assail- 
ant's tactics. 

"The  roads  leading  to  Le  Mans  (capital)  are  all  in- 
tersected at  right  angles  by  numerous  streams  flowing 
through  broad  and  somewhat  deep  meadow  valleys.  Groves, 
villages,  and  country  houses  with  walled  parks  cover  the 
cultivated  high  ground;  vineyards,  orchards,  and  gardens 
are  enclosed  by  hedges,  ditches,  or  fences.  Hence  almost 
the  whole  burthen  of  the  struggle  in  view  had  to  be  borne 
by  the  infantry ;  there  was  no  space  for  deploying  cavalry, 
and  the  use  of  artillery  must  be  extremely  limited,  since 


278  STRATEGY 

in  a  country  so  closely  overgrown,  only  one  gun  could  be 
brought  to  bear  at  a  time.  The  enemy's  center  could  only 
be  approached  by  four  high  roads,  and  the  communication 
between  the  columns,  starting  at  least  six  miles  apart,  were 
confined  to  crossroads,  which  were  almost  impassable  from 
the  severity  of  the  season  and  the  hostility  of  the  inhab- 
itants. Anything  like  mutual  support  was,  at  first,  quite 
out  of  the  question." 

ARTIFICIAL  WORKS 

While  the  Germans,  prior  to  The  World  War,  had  m^in- 
tained  that  fortresses  could  not  hold  up  field  armies  equipped 
with  modern  siege  artillery,  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  did. 
Verdun  is  the  best  illustration,  likewise  the  little  Fort 
Troyon.  The  defense  at  Liege  to  a  greater  extent  and 
Maubeuge  to  a  lesser  degree  were  important  factors  in  de- 
ciding the  outcome  of  the  first  German  advance  in  1914. 

LIEGE 

Probably  no  more  brilliant  illustration  of  the  defensive 
has  occurred  than  Lehman's  defense  of  Liege.  About  mid- 
night on  August  4th-5th  the  preliminary  bombardment 
began.  The  Belgian  field  forces  fell  back  on  the  6th-7th, 
but  the  forts  kept  up  their  passive  resistance. 

The  Germans  had  to  bring  up  their  siege  train  which 
bombarded  the  town  and  forts,  but  notwithstanding  the 
town  held  out  until  the  10th,  and  the  forts  until  the  13th. 
The  delay  imposed  on  the  Germans  was  invaluable  to  the 
allies. 

WEATHER 

The  weather  and  the  time  of  the  year  are  of  great 
importance  to  the  defensive.  Had  Napoleon's  invasion  of 
Russia  happened  earlier  in  the  year  he  would  not  have  en- 
countered the  rigors  of  the  strenuous  Russian  winter  cli- 
mate. 

The  Bulgarians  in  October,  1912,  in  the  war  with  Tur- 
key, were  prevented  from  carrying  out  their  strategic 
envelopment  at  Lule  Burgas  by  the  rain  and  -mud. 

In  The  World  War,  it  was  impossible  to  operate  at  all 
in  Flanders  during  the  winter  months  on  account  of  the 
mud. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  279 

DISEASE 

In  the  various  wars  in  the  Balkans,  not  excepting  The 
World  War,  typhus  has  killed  almost  as  many  men  as  bul- 
lets. After  Valmy,  the  Brunswick  troops  were  forced  to 
retire  on  account  of  an  epidemic  of  dysentery  that  had 
broken  out. 

EXHAUSTION 

If  the  defender  can  protract  the  war  long  enough  he 
may  win,  due  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  enemy  who  cannot 
keep  up  the  war. 

Whether  the  exhaustion  of  the  Central  Powers  was  a 
controlling  influence  in  ending  The  World  War  is  not  ac- 
curately known.  It  is  a  fact,  however,  that  the  shortage 
of  lubricating  oils,  rubber,  copper,  fats  and  grain  were 
handicapping  greatly  the  German  efforts.  The  Russians 
after  Liao  Yang  were  able  to  halt  on  the  Sha-Hor  and  as- 
sume the  offensive,  as  the  Japanese  were  exhausted  and 
had  to  await  reinforcements. 

"The  great  strength  in  the  defensive  is  the  power  of 
attraction  exerted  by  its  army.  The  assailant  must  fol- 
low it  wherever  it  may  go  and  in  so  doing  the  influences 
just  mentioned  exert  an  enervating  effect." 

PURSUER  OFTEN  CONTROLS  MOVEMENT  OF  PURSUED 

The  case  too  often  occurs  of  the  pursuer  controlling 
the  movement  of  the  pursued  when  the  latter  ought  to 
control  those  of  the  former.  The  retreat  is  too  often  an 
orderly  flight. 

"Clausewitz  suggests  that  after  Smolensk,  Kutusov 
should  have  fallen  back  toward  Kaluga;  Napoleon  would 
have  been  forced  to  follow  him  and  Moscow  would  have 
been  saved.  He  could  then  have  continued  his  retreat  into 
Poland. 

In  the  Atlanta  campaign,  Johnston  did  exactly  what 
Sherman  wanted  him  to  do,  and  that  was  to  fall  back  into 
the  heart  of  the  Confederacy.  Had  Johnston  retired  through 
Rome  into  Alabama,  Sherman  would  have  been  forced  to 
follow  him,  and  Atlanta,  at  least  temporarily,  would  have 
been  saved. 


280  STRATEGY 

Of  course  the  defender,  if  he  does  not  feel  as  if  he  will 
increase  his  strength  at  some  time  later,  gains  little  in 
avoiding  battle,  yet  he  can  always  bank  on  the  unexpected 
which  favors  the  defensive  more  often  than  the  offensive. 

DARKNESS  HAS  WON  MANY  BATTLES 

After  a  lost  battle,  if  an  army  is  hard  pressed  by  the 
enemy  and  leaves  its  rear  guard  in  position  in  order  to 
gain  the  necessary  start,  which  it  requires  in  order  to  move 
to  a  sheltered  position,  the  rear  guard  generally  has  com- 
pletely accomplished  its  purpose  if  it  is  able  merely  to 
stay  in  position  for  a  few  hours.  If  a  halt  is  made  toward 
evening,  it  is  sufficient  for  the  resistance  of  the  rear  guard 
to  last  until  nightfall. 

"Gaining  time  may  then  be  a  complete  substitute  for 
advantage  in  battle;  whereas  in  the  offensive,  the  advan- 
tages must  be  obtained  at  any  price." 

DELAYS  MUST  NOT  BE  Too  COSTLY 

Naturally  success  in  the  tactical  defensive  must  not 
be  bought  at  too  dear  a  cost  in  losses.  Otherwise,  for 
example,  we  might  gain  the  desired  delay  in  operations, 
or  hold  a  position  to  which  we  attach  some  value  by  means 
of  a  battle  but  be  so  crippled  by  losses  that  we  could  no 
longer  continue  the  war. 

The  sum  of  all  defensive  measures  should  be  such  as 
to  lead  us  to  count  on  victory  as  a  thing  to  be  expected. 

THE  TURNING  POINT 

A  retreating  force  cannot  keep  falling  back  indefinitely. 
There  must  come  a  time  when  the  decisive  battle  must 
take  place.  The  exhausting  influences  that  affect  the  assail- 
ant may  also  affect  the  defender.  Typhus  killed  as  many 
Turks  in  1912-13  as  it  did  allies. 

If  we  rely  upon  exhaustion  of  the  assailant  to  equalize 
his  superiority,  we  must  be  sure  that  the  distance  we  can 
afford  to  retreat  is  long  enough  to  allow  those  influences 
to  work. 

The  point  at  which  the  decisive  stand  is  to  be  made 
must  not  be  so  far  to  the  rear  that  it  affects  the  strength 
and  morale  of  our  own  troops  in  a  negative  way. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  281 

DEVASTATION  OF  COUNTRY 

If  we  attempt  to  delay  the  enemy  by  a  devastation 
of  the  country,  we  must  be  sure  that  the  line  of  retreat 
to  the  point  where  we  expect  to  take  the  offensive  is  long 
enough. 

After  the  capture  of  Shipka,  and  the  rout  at  Phil- 
ippopolis,  the  Turks  took  to  the  hills,  all  heading  for  Con- 
stantinople. They  attempted  to  delay  the  Russians  by 
devastating  the  country.  The  distance,  being  175  miles, 
was  not  far  enough.  While  the  devastation  did  cause 
some  delay  the  winter  weather  caused  more.  During  the 
storm  of  December  18-23d,  Gourko  lost  2,000  men  by  freez- 
ing. 

The  proposition  would  have  been  different  had  the 
Russians  tried  to  reach  the  capital  via  Asia  Minor;  the 
distance  would  have  been  about  1,200  miles. 

The  tables  are  turned  if  the  retreating  force,  at  the 
end  of  a  long  line  of  retreat,  can  find  a  strong  fortress 
that  the  assailant  is  unable  to  capture  because  he  in  the 
meantime  has  become  reduced  in  strength. 

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR,  1870 

Had  MacMahon  fought  a  retreating  defensive  from 
the  Marne  to  Paris  against  the  German  3d  and  4th  Armies, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  they  would  have  arrived  before 
Paris  too  weak  to  capture  the  place. 

PORTUGAL,  1810 

In  the  spring  of  1810,  Spain's  prospects  in  her  war 
with  France  were  hopeless.  With  the  exception  of  Portugal, 
the  whole  Iberian  Peninsula  had  been  captured.  Napoleon 
had  just  finished  with  the  Fifth  Coalition  and  had  won  the 
battle  of  Wagram.  He  therefore  formed  an  army  of  125,- 
000  men  under  Massena  for  the  purpose  of  driving  the 
British  army  out  of  Portugal.  They  advanced  south  through 
Portugal  against  about  30,000  British  under  Wellington. 
The  British  retired  slowly,  fighting  a  delaying  action,  until 
they  arrived  at  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras.  Here  they 
rested  on  Libson  and  the  sea  that  was  controlled  by  the 


282  STRATEGY 

British  fleet.  As  a  result  of  covering  detachments,  losses 
and  bodies  investing  fortified  places,  the  French  had  but 
45,000  men  to  attack  this  line. 

This  method  of  warfare  showed  the  people  of  Europe 
how  it  was  possible  to  defeat  Napoleon,  and  whether  or 
not  the  Russians  adopted  a  similar  line  of  action  in  1812 
it  is  not  known,  but  the  fact  remains  that  their  withdrawal 
into  the  interior  of  Russia  very  closely  resembles  that  of 
Wellington  into  the  Peninsula. 

Russo-TuRKiSH  WAR 

After  the  fall  of  Plevna  and  the  capture  of  the  passes 
of  the  Balkans,  had  the  Turks  merely  fallen  back  to  the 
last  line  of  defense  of  Constantinople  they  would  have 
been  better  off.  This  line  is  located  at  a  point  where  the 
Peninsula  is  20  miles  wide,  with  its  front  covered  by  12 
miles  of  impassable  lake,  and  8  miles  of  swamps  and  thickets. 

Behind  these  obstacles  runs  a  ridge  from  400  to  700 
feet  in  elevation.  The  Turks  could  have  mustered  about 
20,000  men  to  hold  these  lines  and  still,  retaining  control 
of  the  sea,  could  have  landed  another  force  in  the  quad- 
rilateral at  the  mouth  of  the  Danube  and  operated  against 
the  flanks  of  the  Russians.  The  Russians  would  have  been 
too  weak  to  carry  the  lines  around  Constantinople  and 
would  have  been  forced  to  retreat  when  this  force  appeared 
on  their  flanks.  At  about  this  time  England  was  making 
moves  such  as  sending  troops  into  Constantinople  osten- 
sibly to  protect  her  subjects,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  to 
give  Turkey  her  moral  support. 

There  never  has  been  a  campaign  of  modern  times 
where  a  situation  so  hopeless  offered  such  a  brilliant  solu- 
tion. 

MUST  ARRIVE  AT  POSITION  WITH  ARMY  NOT 
•     DEMORALIZED 

It  is  quite  important  that  the  army  arrive  at  the  line 
in  a  good  state  of  morale.  In  the  case  of  Turkey,  the 
army  had  completely  disintegrated  and  about  50,000  men 
came  stragging  in  from  Philippopolis  over  the  mountains, 
and  others  straggled  in  from  the  passes  of  the  Balkans,. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  283 

so  that  the  city  was  overrun  with  about  100,000  disor- 
ganized men. 

The  danger  in  a  retreat  of  this  kind  is  that  it  may  in- 
volve us  in  a  decisive  engagement  at  an  inopportune  time. 
"Non-resisting  retreat  may  degenerate  into  a  rout." 

The  matter  assumes  a  different  aspect  if  a  favorable 
change  in  the  situation  is  expected  from  the  junction  of 
reinforcement;  for  example,  allies. 

CASE  WHEN  ASSISTANCE  is  EXPECTED  FROM  ALLIES 

When  allies  are  at  a  distance  or  are  unprepared,  some 
resistance  becomes  absolutely  necessary.  To  secure  strong 
positions,  the  capture  of  which  will  cause  the  enemy  loss 
of  time  and  numbers,  is  all-important. 

In  The  World  War,  the  entente  forces  held  on  long 
enough  for  the  United  States  to  get  ready. 

EVEN  IF  THE  ASSAILANT  is  SUCCESSFUL,  His  ARMY 
MAY  GROW  TIRED  OF  WAR 

A  defense  of  this  kind,  while  awaiting  an  ally,  is  of 
advantage  to  the  defender,  even  if  his  forces  are  defeated. 

After  a  time  even  the  successful  assailant's  army  gets 
tired  of  war,  for  if  after  one  force  is  defeated  another 
appears  on  the  scene  and  a  fresh  start  must  be  made  by 
him,  it  is  bound  to  react  unfavorably  on  the  officers  and 
men. 

This  was  the  case  in  Napoleon's  Prussian  War  of  1806. 
After  he  had  defeated  the  Prussians,  the  weaker  Russian 
army  appeared  in  Poland  and  brought  his  operations  to 
a  standstill. 

It  was  the  same  way  in  1870,  when  the  Germans,  after 
defeating  the  armies  of  the  Empire,  were  forced  to  face 
the  armies  of  the  Republic. 

PREVIOUSLY  PREPARED  POSITIONS 

The  first  defensive  position  will  probably  be  one  pre- 
viously selected  and  coincident  with  the  starting  point 
of  the  whole  strategical  defensive  operation. 


284  STRATEGY 

The  initial  position  may  be  a  place  on  the  frontier, 
carefully  selected  beforehand,  where  the  defender  either 
expects  to  await  the  attack  of  the  assailant  or  to  attack 
the  latter. 

FREDERI  c  K  SBURG 

At  Fredericksburg,  Lee  took  up  a  position  on  the  then 
Confederate  frontier,  and  awaited  the  attack,  well  knowing 
what  the  outcome  would  be. 

AUSTERLITZ 

At  Austerlitz,  Napoleon  was  on  the  strategic  defensive 
and  his  first  position  was  well  forward  in  hostile  territory. 

To  begin  with,  he  had  circulated  stories  telling  of  the 
poor  condition  of  his  army  so  as  to  invite  attack. 

The  Russians,  advancing  from  Olmutz  to  Brunn,  found 
the  French  barring  the  way  on  the  Goldbach.  They  had 
a  false  impression  that  Napoleon's  communications  were 
the  Brunn- Vienna  Road. 

The  Russian  plan  was  to  make  a  demonstration  against 
Napoleon's  left,  meanwhile  moving  three  columns  abreast, 
with  one  in  support,  around  his  right  and  cutting  him  off 
from  Vienna. 

The  plan  was  so  apparent  on  the  afternoon  of  De- 
cember 1st,  that  Napoleon  felt  constrained  to  issue  his 
famous  order. 

His  plan  was  to  deploy  Soult,  reinforced  by  Berna- 
dotte,  and,  as  soon  as  the  turning  movement  had  progressed 
sufficiently  far,  to  attack  the  Heights  of  Pratzen,  mean- 
while Lannes  encountering  Bagration  on  the  left. 

It  was  a  most  unusual  engagement  where  the  victor- 
ious side  did  nothing  until  the  enemy  had  committed  him- 
self, when  full  advantage  was  taken  of  the  strategical  error. 

In  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  French  chose  to 
occupy  their  frontier,  but  not  intending  to  assume  the  de- 
fensive. The  German  attacks  at  Spicheren  and  Weissen- 
berg,  however,  changed  their  plans  and  from  that  time  on 
they  were  on  the  strategic  defensive. 

Any  army  would  gladly  see  itself  attacked  between 
or  behind  the  frontier  forts  for  the  supporting  influence 
of  such  forts. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  285 

The  fact  that  there  are  forts  of  this  kind  is  temptation 
to  adopt  such  a  method  of  defense. 

One  is  only  justified  in  occupying  a  line  of  this  kind 
when  there  is  something  that  forces  the  enemy  to  attack. 

In  event  of  holding  the  frontier  line  or  any  line  of 
fortresses,  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  defense  is  to  shift 
the  troops  rapidly  in  rear  of  the  line  to  the  point  where 
the  enemy  expects  to  attempt  penetration. 

With  armies  of  the  modern  size  the  holding  of  a  rigid 
line  might  prove  disastrous. 

The  enemy  might  appear  suddenly  on  one  flank  and 
there  would  be  trouble  in  dispatching  reinforcements. 

DIRECT  RETIREMENT 

A  direct  withdrawal,  at  the  outset,  indicates  an  error 
in  the  strategical  concentration,  unless  important  political 
reasons  have  influenced  the  strategy. 

It  should  not  have  required  Worth  and  Spicheren  to 
convince  the  French  of  their  error  in  attempting  a  concen- 
tration before  they  were  mobilized. 

If  politics  demanded  an  aggressive  move,  they  might 
have  prepared  the  line  of  the  Moselle  for  their  main  de- 
fense and  merely  sent  forward  delaying  detachments. 

CONVERGENT  RETREAT 

The  object  of  the  convergent  retreat  is  to  assemble 
the  armies  in  a  favorable  position,  previously  selected, 
that  lies  across  the  enemy's  line  of  operations. 

It  might  be  deemed  proper  to  fall  back  to  rear  posi- 
tions at  once,  but  such  a  policy  means  the  abandonment  of 
territory,  which  if  overmuch,  may  have  a  bad  effect  on  the 
morale  of  the  country. 

KENTUCKY 

By  abandoning  Kentucky  in  1862,  A.  S.  Johnston  lost 
the  state  to  the  Confederacy. 

When  there  is  doubt  whether  the  disposition  of  an  army 
will  be  completed  before  the  enemy  is  ready,  then  it  is  a 
good  plan  to  have  a  position  in  rear  to  retreat  upon. 


286  STRATEGY 

In  the  concentration  of  the  2d  Army  during  the  War 
of  1870,  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  such  a  position  at 
Goldheim  in  the  Palatinate  north  of  the  Saar. 

CONVERGENT  RETREAT  IN  CASE  OF  SURPRISE 

"In  the  event  of  surprise,  a  convergent  retreat  to  a 
position  in  rear  is  the  natural  thing.  The  army  of  Prince 
Charles  of  Lorraine,  when  surprised  by  Frederick  the  Great, 
fell  back,  converging  on  Prague." 

CONCENTRATION  TO  THE  REAR 

When  preliminary  operations  demonstrate  the  imprac- 
ticability of  previously  planned  offensive  operations  there 
is  nothing  left  but  to  fall  back. 

The  Austrians  fell  back  behind  the  Bistritz  in  1866, 
when  they  saw  their  plan  for  invasion  blocked. 

If  advancing  parallel  columns  are  driven  back,  the  only 
thing  left  for  them  to  do  is  to  concentrate  to  the  rear. 

This  is  what  occurred  in  the  first  German  drive  in 
1914. 

The  Russians  in  Manchuria,  realizing  their  weakness, 
gradually  fell  back  on  Liao  Yang.  However,  they  selected 
a  faulty  tactical  position. 

DIVERGENT  RETREAT 

A  divergent  retreat,  which  generally  leads  to  a  flank 
position,  will  not  be  possible  if  the  army  is  taken  by  sur- 
prise. 

The  natural  thing  for  it  to  do  then  is  to  fall  back 
straight  to  the  rear. 

If  the  retreat  is  orderly,  the  retiring  force  may  with- 
draw to  a  flank  position  and  there  await  the  enemy. 

Bazaine's  retreat  from  the  Saar  to  the  French  Nied 
was  a  divergent  retreat  to  a  flank  position. 

BENEFIT  OF  A  DIVERGENT  RETREAT 

The  main  benefit  of  a  divergent  retreat  is  that  it 
is  apt  to: 

1.  Cause  a  surprise  to  the  enemy. 

2.  Force  him  to  change  his  dispositions  and  order  of  march. 

3.  Cause  him  to   lose  time. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  287 

DOUBLE  DIVERGENT  RETREAT 

The  double  divergent  line  of  retreat  divides  the  army 
and  for  the  time  being  deprives  it  of  its  ability  to  fight. 
It  gives  the  assailant  the  advantage  of  interior  lines. 

When  we  wish  to  avoid  contact  with  the  enemy  after 
an  unsuccessful  battle,  the  double  divergent  retreat  is  the 
best  as  it  is  easier  to  subsist  the  troops  and  they  will 
probably  be  able  to  use  more  roads. 

MAY  MISLEAD  THE  ENEMY 

The  double  divergent  retreat  may  mislead  the  enemy 
as  to  the  line  of  withdrawal  of  the  main  body. 

"The  battle  of  Orleans  on  the  4th  of  December,  1870, 
furnishes  us  with  an  illustration  of  the  confusion  that 
such  a  withdrawal  may  cause  to  the  assailant.  The  city 
lay  in  the  center  of  the  French  position  and  was  captured 
by  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  The  Germans  were  advanc- 
ing from  the  north  when  the  French  withdrew  to  the  west 
with  their  right;  to  the  east  with  their  left;  and  to  the 
south  in  their  center.  The  French  were  all  intermingled, 
so  that  for  some  time  it  was  impossible  to  tell  the  direc- 
tion of  the  main  withdrawal." 

This  also  occurred  after  Worth.  Lartigue  retired  to 
the  south  toward  Hagenau.  The  balance  of  forces  fled  at 
dark,  part  toward  Savern,  and  others  toward  Bitsch.  The 
Crown  Prince  lost  touch  and  could  not  tell  the  direction 
the  main  body  took. 

CROSSING  AN  OBSTACLE 

A  formidable  obstacle  in  our  rear  which  has  to  be 
crossed  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  may  be  cause  for  a 
double  divergent  retreat. 

In  the  retreat  of  Bragg  after  the  Tullahoma  opera- 
tions, he  diverged  his  columns  in  order  to  cross  the  Ten- 
nessee. 

ALLIES 

If  a  defeated  army  is  expecting  assistance  in  the  nature 
of  allies,  it  is  well  to  retire  toward  the  flank  so  as  not  to 
interfere  with  their  advance. 


288  STRATEGY 

In  the  divergent  retreat,  one  must  not  lose  sight  of  the 
importance  of  assembling  somewhere. 

After  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  two  diverging  forces 
assembled  at  Corinth. 

A  divergent  retreat  will  cause  pursuit  to  end  sooner, 
as  the  pursuer  cannot  be  sure  whether  he  is  following  the 
more  important  column,  and  for  that  reason  may  slow  up 
and  not  follow  either. 

SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  STRATEGIC  DEFENSIVE 

System  of  flank  positions. 
Interior  lines. 
Combined  operations. 

SYSTEM  OF  FLANK  POSITIONS 

When  we  do  not  feel  strong  enough  to  oppose  the  en- 
emy on  the  straight  path,  we  resort  to  flank  positions. 

ADVANTAGES  , 

1.  The  main  advantage  is  that  we  divert  the  enemy  from 
his  main  objective  as  in  case  of  a  divergent  retreat.     Thus  "we 
protect  indirectly  what  we  could  not  protect  directly. 

2.  Enemy  must  change  his  lines  of  operations,  and  that  is 
apt  to  cause  confusion. 

DISADVANTAGES 

1.  Our  line  of  communications  and  retreat  lead  toward  one 
flank  and  may  be  intercepted. 

2.  If  we  are  defeated,  our  chance  of  barring  the  enemy  in 
another  position  are  probably  gone. 

REQUISITES  OF  A  GOOD  STRATEGICAL  FLANK  POSITION 
POWER  OF  ATTRACTION 

The  retreating  force  must  be  strong  enough  to  exert 
the  necessary  power  of  attraction,  otherwise  the  assailant 
will  merely  detail  a  containing  force  and  move  on  in  his 
original  direction. 

LINE  OF  DEPARTURE 

The  position  must  have  a  good  line  of  departure  for 
the  offensive  and  not  be  at  the  mouth  of  a  pass  that  can 
be  easily  blocked  by  the  assailant  with  a  few  forces. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  289 

BROAD  STREAM  OR  OTHER  OBSTACLE 

A  combatant  who  crosses  a  river  and  destroys  the 
bridges  behind  him  of  course  surrenders  this  essential 
requirement  of  a  good  line  of  departure.  He  virtually  locks 
the  door  of  the  theater  of  war  against  himself. 

POSITION  MUST  NOT  BE  SEEN  Too  SOON 

The  flank  position  must  not  be  perceived  too  soon  by 
the  enemy,  otherwise  he  will  change  direction  toward  it  in 
time  and  no  delay  will  be  caused  by  us. 

LINE  OF  RETREAT 

It  must  be  possible  to  withdraw  from  the  position. 

If  retreat  is  possible  in  several  directions  we  are  in 
possession  of  a  valuable  power  to  lead  the  enemy  off  first 
against  our  flank  position,  and  then  by  a  slow  withdrawal 
still  farther  to  the  rear  and  away  from  his  original  direc- 
tion. 

BORODINO 

After  Borodino,  the  Russians  might  have  turned  south 
toward  Kaluga  and  taken  up  a  flank  position.  The  French 
would  hardly  have  been  strong  enough  to  have  continued 
on  to  Moscow  and  to  have  followed  Kutusov. 

Here  the  Russians  would  have  had  a  good  line  of  de- 
parture, and  the  French  would  have  had  to  attack  them. 

The  reason  this  position  was  not  adopted,  according 
to  Clausewitz,  was  lack  of  preparation  coupled  with  the 
fact  that  no  one  had  foreseen  the  dwindling  of  the  French 
forces. 

A  FLANK  POSITION  MAY  BE  TAKEN  UP  AS  A  PART  OF 
AN  OFFENSIVE  PLAN 

Osman  Pasha  at  Plevna,  marched  from  Widdin  to 
Plevna  offensively  and  then  assumed  the  tactical  defensive 
and  blocked  the  Russian  advance  for  four  months. 

Great  opportunities  were  offered  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
in  a  flanking  position  at  Rome,  in  the  Atlanta  campaign. 

Whether  it  would  have  diverted  Sherman  is  problem- 
atic, yet  such  a  position  offered  success  which  the  direct 
withdrawal  to  Atlanta  did  not. 


290  STRATEGY 

It  was  situated  behind  the  screen  of  the  Coosa-Etowah 
River  system,  and  so  not  liable  to  be  discovered  prema- 
turely. 

A  line  of  retreat,  flanked  by  two  obstacles,  led  directly 
to  the  rear. 

The  country  between  the  Coosa  and  Tallapoosa  Rivers 
was  as  well  supplied  with  roads  as  any  other  position  of 
the  theater,  and  had  as  a  "hinterland"  the  state  of  Al- 
abama, heretofore  untouched  by  the  war. 

There  was  no  obstacle  in  front  of  the  position,  which 
therefore  offered  a  good  line  of  departure  for  an  offensive. 

The  geographical  objective,  Atlanta,  to  be  guarded  was 
not  of  predominant  importance,  and  such  a  garrison  as  it 
needed  for  protection  against  raids  could  have  been  fur- 
nished by  exempted  men,  militia,  and  citizens  generally. 

The  Confederate  government  maintained  in  Atlanta 
a  rolling  mill,  an  arsenal  and  machine  shop  for  the  repair 
of  arms  and  the  fabrication  of  equipments,  a  tannery, 
and  two  ordnance  laboratories. 

The  operatives  of  these  establishments  were  exempts, 
many  of  whom  had  been  soldiers,  and  they  would  have 
formed  a  reliable  nucleus  for  defense. 

The  city  was  provisionally  fortified. 

While  it  was  important  to  Sherman,  the  possession  of 
it  was  nothing  compared  with  the  destruction  of  John- 
ston's army,  and  as  the  numerical  strength  of  the  latter 
was  now  65  per  cent  that  of  Sherman's  army,  it  had  the 
necessary  power  of  attraction,  and  would  have  remained 
the  primary  object. 

But  the  main  advantage  to  be  expected  from  the  pro- 
posed strategy  was  that  it  would  have  taken  Sherman 
away  from  his  railroad. 

Without  the  assistance  of  the  Western  &  Atlantic 
Railroad  he  could  never  have  crossed  the  Etowah. 

Sherman  says  himself  that  he  could  not  have  subsisted 
his  army  100  miles  away  from  a  railroad. 

This  estimate  reflects  the  sanguine  temperament  with 
which  General  Sherman  was  blessed. 

In  point  of  fact  he  never  got  the  bulk  of  his  army 
25  miles  away  from  a  railroad  without  getting  into  diffi- 
culties. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  291 

In  retiring,  the  Confederates  could  not  destroy  the 
railroads  so  effectively  as  to  delay  materially  Sherman's 
advance. 

He  had  an  expert  corps  of  railroad  constructors  and 
repairers  constantly  following  his  army,  and  in  anticipa- 
tion of  the  campaign,  he  had  concentrated  rolling  stock 
and  material  for  repair  in  Chattanooga. 

With  these  resources  he  could  repair  and  operate  the 
railroad  almost  as  fast  as  Johnston  could  destroy  it,  and 
with  a  constant  stream  of  supplies  and  reinforcements 
pouring  in  upon  him,  the  railroad  was  of  vastly  more  im- 
portance to  him  than  it  was  to  Johnston. 

But  repair  of  a  railroad,  even  after  the  most  system- 
atic demolition,  is  one  thing. 

Construction  of  a  new  railroad  is  quite  another. 

It  would  have  been  impracticable  fo/r  Sherman  to 
extend  the  railroad  from  Rome  to  the  southwest  against 
the  opposition  of  Johnston's  army. 

With  the  latter  in  his  front,  the  gap  of  65  miles  be- 
tween Rome  and  Blue  Mountain,  Alabama,  would  have 
formed  a  perfect  barrier. 

An  advance  into  Alabama  on  that  line  would  have 
subjected  him  to  a  wearing  out  process  from  which  he 
was  largely  exempt  so  long  as  Johnston  obligingly  kept 
on  the  railroad. 

As  Johnston  approached  Blue  Mountain  his  commun- 
ications would  have  shortened,  and  become  daily  more  effi- 
cient while  those  of  Sherman  would  become  a  shackle, 
whose  wreight  was  increased  geometrically  with  the  length 
of  his  advance. 

Viewing  the  campaign  in  the  retrospect,  it  seems  in- 
contestable that  the  proposed  strategy  had  in  it  some 
promise  of  success. 

The  campaign  actually  adopted  had  none. 

SECOND  BULL  RUN 

Jackson's  position  along  the  unfinished  railroad  in  the 
second  Bull  Run  campaign  has  some  of  the  elements  of  the 
tactical  flank  position.  The  threatened  wing  or  flank  had 
a  good  point  of  support  in  that  it  rested  on  the  hills  over- 
looking Sudley's  Springs  Ford  of  Bull  Run.  The  other 


292  STRATEGY 

flank  was  shoved  forward  almost  to  the  Warrenton  Pike. 
Jackson  did  leave  the  main  road  open,  namely,  the  War- 
renton Pike,  as  he  knew  that  Longstreet  would  arrive  be- 
fore Pope  could  cut  him  (Jackson)  off  from  Thoroughfare 
Gap.  Jackson's  batteries  on  his  right  could  sweep  the 
Warrenton  Pike  with  its  fire.  The  position  had  a  good 
line  of  departure  for  an  attack.  The  line  of  retreat  was 
not  good.  Had  Jackson  been  turned  on  his  right  flank 
he  would  have  been  forced  to  retreat  to  the  west  through 
Aldie  and  Snicker's  Gap  away  from  his  reinforcements,  and 
if  turned  on  both  flanks,  he  would  have  been  forced  back  on 
the  Bull  Run  Mountains. 

STRATEGICAL  INTERIOR  LINES 

When  a  defender,  marching  in  closely  concentrated  for- 
mation, between  the  two  portions  of  a  hostile  army,  en- 
gages both,  we  say  he  has  the  advantage  of  interior  lines  in 
that  he  can  deploy  a  smaller  force  to  guard  one  side  while 
bringing  superior  numbers  against  the  other. 

The  same  applies  if,  in  position,  he  is  attacked  in  front 
by  a  portion  of  the  assailant's  army  and  enveloped  by  an- 
other portion. 

ELEMENTS  THAT  CONTRIBUTE  TO  THE  SUCCESS  OF  A  FORCE 
ON  THE  INTERIOR  LINES 

1.  The  distance  between  the  two  wings  must  be  favorable. 
In  other  words,  it  must  be  strategic  distance;  otherwise  one  wing 
may  be  taken  with  reverse  fire  by  the  assailants  engaging  the 
other  wing. 

2.  The  commander  must  be   a   man  of  force  who  will  act 
quickly  when  his  opportunity  appears. 

3.  The  troops   must  be  of  a  high  order,  for  the  fact  that 
they  are  on  the  defensive,  coupled  with  excessive  marching,  is 
calculated  to  dishearten  any  but  good  troops. 

The  success  of  the  interior  lines  is  greatly  added  to 
if  there  is  lack  of  co-operation  between  the  two  attacking 
forces. 

WORLD  WAR 

The  Central  Powers  had  a  decided  advantage  in  that 
their  interior  lines  enabled  them  to  move  troops  from  the 
west  to  the  east  front,  from  the  west  front  to  the  Italian 
front,  and  so  on.  The  network  of  strategic  railroads  of 
Germany  made  this  possible. 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  293 

CAMPAIGN  IN  CHAMPAGNE,  1814 

There  is  probably  no  better  illustration  of  the  proper 
use  of  interior  lines  than  that  executed  by  Napoleon  in  1814. 

Retiring  on  Paris  before  the  allied  armies,  the  Em- 
peror found  himself  with  his  main  body  at  Sezanne  on 
February  9th.  To  the  north,  separated  from  him  by  the 
Petit  Morin  and  its  marshy  valley,  the  Silesian  army  under 
Blucher  was  moving  on  the  capital.  It  was  scattered  out 
and  advancing  on  two  roads,  one  along  the  Marne  and 
the  other  farther  south  through  Champaubert.  Napoleon 
took  posesssion  of  the  crossings  over  the  Petit  Morin  and 
then  struck  the  Russian  corps,  under  Olsuvief  at  Cham- 
paubert. On  the  llth,  he  struck  Sacken's  corps  at  Mont- 
mirail.  York's  Prussian  corps,  hastening  to  Sacken's  as- 
sistance, was  driven  back  across  the  Marne  at  Chateau 
Thierry.  Napoleon  then  turned  back  and  struck  Blucher 
coming  up  with  two  corps  at  Etoges,  defeating  him  so 
badly  that  he  had  to  retire  to  Chalons  to  collect  his  army 
before  moving  again. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Lee's  operations  in  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  pre- 
sent the  most  striking  instance  of  the  successful  employ- 
ment of  interior  lines  furnished  by  the  Civil  War.  The 
qualities  of  the  general  and  of  the  troops  were  fully  equal 
to  the  standard,  and  the  only  elements  left  to  be  considered 
are  the  distances  and  numbers  involved.  From  Chan- 
cellorsville to  Marye's  Heights  is  ten  miles.  When  Lee 
first  threw  his  army  against  Hooker,  the  latter's  numer- 
ical superiority  was  a  little  less  than  7  to  4.  Sedgwick's 
numerical  superiority  over  Early  was  2  to  1. 

EARLY'S  RESISTING  POWER 

Early's  resisting  power  could  not  be  expected  to  ex- 
ceed six  hours.  In  point  of  fact  the  Marye's  Heights 
position  was  carried  by  Sedgwick  before  noon  on  the  3d 
of  May.  If  Sedgwick,  after  defeating  the  containing  force, 
had  pushed  at  once  against  Lee's  rear,  the  march  to  Chan- 
cellorsville should  not  have  required  more  than  four  hours. 
From  a  purely  theoretical  consideration  of  the  problem, 


294  STRATEGY 

General  Lee  could  not  count  on  more  than  ten  hours  in 
which  to  defeat  Hooker's  superior  force,  and  then  be  in 
readiness  to  meet  Sedgwick  coming  up  from  Fredericksburg. 
It  took  a  most  sanguine  temperament  to  expect  success 
from  such  an  unfavorable  situation,  and  the  risks  assumed 
were  very  great. 

SEDGWICK 

After  Sedgwick  had  defeated  Early  on  May  3d,  and 
had  advanced  to  Salem  Church,  the  situation  became  still 
more  critical,  for  the  distance  between  the  Union  wings 
was  now  reduced  to  six  miles,  which  brought  the  operations 
almost  within  the  domain  of  tactics. 

MAY  STH 

As  a  retaining  force  in  front  of  Hooker's  six  corps, 
Lee  could  leave  only  Jackson's  corps,  shattered  by  three 
days'  fighting,  while  turning  on  Sedgwick.  Had  Hooker 
suddenly  assumed  the  offensive  on  the  5th  of  May,  Lee 
would  have  been  between  two  fires  before  noon.  It  re- 
quired until  nightfall  to  drive  Sedgwick  across  the  river. 

ELEMENTS  THAT  MADE  SUCCESS  POSSIBLE 

The  elements  that  made  success  possible  in  this  in- 
stance were : 

First. — The  inactivity  imposed  on  Sedgwick  by  his  orders 
until  midnight,  2d  May. 

Second. — The  want  of  aggressiveness  displayed  by  Hooker 
subsequent  to  April  30th. 

Third. — The  want  of  co-operation  between  the  Union  wings, 
due  to  the  difficulty  of  transmitting  intelligence. 

This  last  one  was  the  only  element  on  which  Lee 
had  any  right  to  count  with  any  degree  of  certainty. 

WILDERNESS 

If  Hooker's  position,  instead  of  being  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  had  been  behind  Wilderness  Run,  six  miles  farther 
west,  the  risk  would  have  been  materially  diminished. 
Neither  Sedgwick  nor  Hooker  could  have  hoped  to  defeat  the 
force  in  front  of  him  and  cover  the  space  intervening  be- 
tween their  wings  in  a  single  day.  In  such  a  case,  had  the 
operation  gone  against  him,  Lee  would  not  necessarily  have 


STRATEGICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  295 

been  caught  between  two  fires,  and  might  have  extricated 
his  army  under  cover  of  the  night.  But  considering  the 
numbers  at  his  disposal,  the  maneuver,  even  under  these 
assumed  conditions,  would  have  been  one  that  no  cautious 
general  would  care  to  undertake. 

As  the  problem  was  actually  solved,  the  short  distances, 
while  they  naturally  increased  the  risk,  were  a  distinct 
advantage;  for  the  wear  and  tear  inseparable  from  forced 
marching  was  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

ROUMANIANS 

We  have  no  better  illustration  of  the  advantages  of 
interior  lines  than  the  action  of  the  Central  Powers  against 
Roumania. 

To  begin  with,  the  Roumanians,  instead  of  concen- 
trating their  army  under  cover  of  the  Transylvanian  Alps 
and  the  Carpathians,  attempted  the  von  Moltke  concentra- 
tion forward  of  the  barrier  in  the  hopes  of  carrying  the 
war  into  Hungary. 

To  carry  out  such  a  concentration,  one  must  have  good 
troops  and  competent  generals,  but  Roumania  had  neither. 

Von  Falkenhayn  concentrated  his  forces  in  the  valley 
of  the  Maros  River;  then  moving  quickly  south,  attacked 
the  head  of  the  southern  Roumanian  columns  in  the  Alps 
on  the  Kronstadt-Petroseny  line,  while  von  Arr,  his  coadju- 
tor, kept  the  northern  Roumanian  columns  busy  in  the  upper 
Maros  Valley. 

The  Roumanians  waged  a  good  fight,  but  their  faulty 
dispositions  proved  their  undoing,  as  the  German  right 
wing  soon  was  invading  Wallachia  and  connecting  with 
the  Bulgars  and  Turks  on  the  River  Argesh. 

COMBINED  OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS 

By  these  is  meant  the  procedure  of  the  defender  when 
he  combines  offensive  and  defensive  movements. 

He  falls  back  with  his  forces  when  he  can  do  so  with- 
out serious  disadvantage  and  moves  forward  when  there 
is  a  prospect  of  advantage,  hoping  by  a  series  of  smaller 
successes  to  build  up  an  overwhelming  whole. 

The  operations  of  the  allies  in  1813,  referred  to  before, 
are  a  good  illustration. 


296  STRATEGY 

The  whole  idea  is  to  force  the  weak  points,  merely 
containing  or  falling  back  before  the  stronger. 

To  carry  out  these  movements,  it  is  necessary  to  have 
a  sufficiently  large  theater  of  operations. 

We  may  sum  up  the  points  of  the  strategic  defensive 
as  follows: 

It  is  only  adopted  from  a  feeling  of  weakness  and 
with  a  hope  that  later  more  favorable  conditions  may 
arise  whereby  we  are  justified  in  taking  the  offensive.  Not- 
withstanding Clausewitz,  we  must  contend  that  of  the  two, 
offensive  or  defensive,  the  former  is  to  be  preferred. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


Tactical  Defensive  Operations  with 
Special  Forms 


OBJECT 

THE  tactical  defensive  has  a  two-fold  object  to  attain 
generally  and  that  is'  to  repulse  the  assailant  and  to 
gain  time. 

A  force  may  at  times  fully  accomplish  its  mission  by 
retaining  its  position  for  a  specified  time  with  or  without 
combat.  The  object  is  to  avoid  giving  the  enemy  the  de- 
cision, either  by  avoiding  combat  altogether  or,  if  he  attacks, 
by  preventing  him  from  carrying  the  position  held  by  the 
defensive  troops. 

The  gaining  of  time  may  be  the  only  reason  for  leaving 
a  rear  guard  at  a  certain  point  to  hold  a  position.  The 
sole  object  of  Lee  in  taking  up  a  position  on  the  Antietam 
after  Gettysburg  was  to  gain  time  during  which  the  Poto- 
mac could  recede  and  his  army  might  recross. 

DARKNESS 

Many  of  the  engagements  of  the  past  have  been  broken 
off  by  the  interposition  of  darkness,  which  has  always  been 
more  to  the  defender's  advantage  than  to  the  assailant's. 

"Would  to  heaven  that  night  or  Blucher  would  come!" 
is  the  exclamation  credited  to  Wellington  at  Waterloo. 

If  biblical  history  has  been  correctly  interpreted,  Joshua 
found  it  necessary  to  prolong  the  daylight  by  some  miracu- 
lous means  in  order  to  give  him  time  to  annihilate  completely 
the  enemy. 

Several  times  on  the  Russian  east  front,  in  Manchuria, 
the  interposition  of  darkness  saved  the  Russians  and  pre- 
vented the  Japanese  from  continuing  their  attacks  and,  as 
a  result,  the  Russians  were  enabled  to  withdraw  under 
cover  of  the  night. 

297 


298  STRATEGY 

LOSSES 

The  question  which  the  defender  must  always  keep 
in  mind  is  whether  or  not  the  losses  are  justified  by  the 
combat.  In  operating  on  the  defensive,  we  must  always 
have  in  mind  an  attack  ultimately,  but  if  we  are  so  badly 
battered  that  we  cannot  counter-attack,  what  strategic  ad- 
vantage arises,  even  if  we  are  tactically  successful? 

ANTIETAM 

While  it  is  a  fact  that  Lee  was  tactically  successful 
at  Antietam,  yet  he  had  suffered  so  many  losses  that  his 
only  alternative  was  to  withdraw  into  Virginia  and  aban- 
don his  offensive  operations. 

AIDS 

Those  aids  to  the  strategic  defensive,  such  as  fire  action, 
terrain,  artificial  defenses,  exhaustion  of  the  enemy,  etc., 
are  of  equal  if  not  greater  assistance  to  the  tactical  de- 
fensive* 

These  aids  manifest  themselves  in  the  course  of  the 
tactical  attack.  The  assailant  in  his  initial  deployment  is 
subjected  to  long  range  fire  that  will  cause  heavy  losses 
at  the  outset  and  will  have  a  tendency  to  shake  the  morale 
of  his  troops. 

TERRAIN 

"The  defender  in  selecting  his  position  will  take  care 
to  utilize  to  its  fullest  extent  all  features  of  terrain  and 
will  strengthen  them  by  artificial  means,  placing  obstacles 
in  front  to  impede  the  hostile  advance." 

RECONNAISSANCE 

Before  the  assailant  attacks  hei  must  make  recon- 
naissance to  determine  the  enemy's  position,  the  location 
of  his  flanks,  the  character  of  the  terrain,  the  nature  of 
the  hostile  field  works,  etc.,  in  order  to  prevent  premature 
deployment  and  the  resulting  fatigue  and  loss  of  time. 

It  will  frequently  be  necessary  to  send  forward  a  thin 
skirmish  line  in  order  to  induce  the  enemy  to  open  fire  and 
reveal  his  position. 


TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE   OPERATIONS  299 

"It  will  frequently  be  impossible  to  obtain  satisfactory 
information  until  after  the  action  has  begun.  The  delay 
that  may  be  warranted  for  the  purpose  of  reconnaissance 
depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  attack  and  the  necessity 
for  promptness.  For  example,  in  a  meeting  engagement, 
and  sometimes  in  a  holding  attack,  the  reconnaissance  may 
have  to  be  hasty  and  superficial,  whereas  in  an  attack 
against  an  enemy  carefully  prepared  for  defense  there  will 
generally  be  both  time  and  necessity  for  thorough  recon- 
naissance. 

DEPLOYMENT 

"When  an  encounter  with  the  enemy  is  probable,  the 
assailant  will  take  every  available  means  to  gain  informa- 
tion and  to  lessen  beforehand  the  time  that  will  be  required 
in  the  deployment  for  action.  Single  route  columns  of 
such  length  that  the  rear  elements  are  out  of  supporting 
distance  of  those  in  the  lead  must  be  shortened  by  an  ex- 
tension of  front,  as  far  as  security  and  the  terrain  will 
permit.  This  extension  is  secured  by  breaking  this  single 
column  into  two  or  more  parallel  columns,  rather  than  by 
an  extension  of  the  front  of  such  units,  as  for  instance, 
marching  section  or  squad  columns — a  difficult  and  fatiguing 
method  of  march.  As  the  enemy  draws  nearer  and  combat 
becomes  imminent,  these  columns  are  again  broken  up  into 
smaller  parallel  columns,  until  the  final  development  i»  such 
as  to  insure  rapid  deployment  and  still  retain  sufficient 
depth  in  formation  to  enable  the  leader  to  meet  the  after 
requirements  of  the  situation." 

"Precautions  must  be  taken,  in  this  development  for 
action,  that  each  column  is  directed  upon  its  probable  ob- 
jective, and  that  the  different  columns  and  parts  of  col- 
umns do  not  get  out  of  supporting  distance  of  each  other. 
This  development  for  action  takes  place  in  divisions  and 
smaller  units  before  the  route  column  comes  within  the  zone 
of  hostile  artillery  fire." 

"When  the  deployment  can  be  made  deliberately,  under 
the  protection  of  troops  already  in  position,  units  are  con- 
ducted to  predetermined  places  of  deployment  and  formed 
for  attack,  usually  under  the  cover  of  darkness.  Silence 
and  order  in  forming  up  are  indispensable." 


300  STRATEGY 

"Troops  are  massed  preparatory  to  deployment  when 
the  nature  of  their  deployment  cannot  be  foreseen,  or  it 
is  desirable  to  shorten  the  column  or  clear  the  road." 

"Where  time  does  not  permit  of  a  deliberate  deploy- 
ment regulated  in  detail,  large  commands  are  ordinarily 
first  formed  into  line  of  columns  to  facilitate  the  exten- 
sion of  the  front  prior  to  deploying.  These  columns  march 
on  assigned  direction  lines  and  take  up  an  approach  for- 
mation as  soon  as  they  enter  the  zone  of  the  enemy's  ar- 
tillery fire." 

As  the  size  of  the  forces  increase,  the  greater  the 
demands  on  their  energy,  for  distances  are  longer  and  front- 
ages greater. 

If  the  ground  is  soaked  or  the  fields  are  covered  with 
deep  snow,  the  laboriousness  of  progress  may  amount  to  a 
downright  calamity. 

Mud  at  Waterloo  prevented  the  maneuvering  of  ar- 
tillery, mud  at  Lule  Burgas  prevented  the  infantry  envel- 
oping the  Turkish  left  in  time,  snow  prevented  effective  pur- 
suit at  Hohenlinden,  mud  interfered  greatly  with  operations 
on  the  west  front  in  The  World  War  and  in  Manchuria  in 
1904-5. 

PURSUIT 

"After  a  successful  assault,  the  situation  will  deter- 
mine whether  to  follow  up  the  enemy  in  pursuit  or  organize 
the  position  for  defense  against  counter-attack.  Rapid 
fire  should  be  opened  on  the  retreating  enemy  if  he  is  in 
sight.  It  is  not  generally  advisable  for  units  mixed  and 
disorganized  by  the  assaults  to  follow  the  enemy.  The 
pursuit  should  be  immediately  undertaken  by  the  nearest 
organized  echelons  and  the  assaulting  troops  reorganized 
and  placed  in  support." 

"If  the  assault  fails,  the  assaulting  troops  must  dig 
in  and  hold  their  ground.  To  attempt  to  withdraw  would 
result  in  annihilation.  If  the  assault  is  to  be  repeated, 
fresh  troops  must  be  sent  in  as  reinforcements,  and  the  fire 
preparations  for  the  assault  renewed." 

"Where  the  attack  succeeds  in  penetrating  through 
the  defensive  position  on  a  broad  front,  the  infantry  must 
be  organized  in  still  greater  depth.  Column  of  march  is 


TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE   OPERATIONS  301 

resumed  as  soon  as  the  range  of  hostile  guns  permits,  se- 
curity detachments  are  sent  out,  and  the  cavalry  main- 
tains contact." 

"Should  the  cavalry  or  aviators  discover  hostile  guns 
within  range,  infantry  must  take  up  an  approach  forma- 
tion and  make  ready  to  reconnoiter  and  attack." 

From  these  quotations  it  will  be  seen  that  an  attack 
in  modern  war  requires  the  superlative  of  energy  on  the 
part  of  the  attacker.  Unless  he  is  well  led,  has  had  the 
proper  amount  of  training,  has  developed  good  teamwork, 
all  of  which  speaks  for  a  high  state  of  discipline  and 
morale,  he  had  better  not  attack.  All  the  aids  to  the  de- 
fender appears  in  a  negative  way,  for  he  does  not  have  to 
move  to  the  extent  that  the  assailant  does. 

If  the  defender  succeeds  in  deceiving  a  large  hostile 
unit  and  in  making  it  deploy  for  battle,  and  then  with- 
draws without  any  great  loss,  it  has  gained  a  day.  Ney 
at  the  Redinha,  with  5,000  men  forced  Wellington  to  deploy 
30,000  men.  The  fact  is  often  overlooked,  that  merely 
threatening  to  fight  is  a  valuable  means  of  attaining  the 
object  aimed  at. 

YORKTOWN 

Magruder  by  displaying  his  troops  repeatedly  at  dif- 
ferent places  and  by  the  use  of  so-called  Quaker  guns  was 
able  to  hold  off  McClellan's  army  with  5,000  men  for  a 
month  until  reinforcements  could  be  sent  to  him  from 
the  Centerville  line.  Lee  contributed  very  much  to  the  with- 
drawal of  McClellan  by  the  newspaper  accounts  of  the  ar- 
rival of  reinforcements  and  the  construction  of  gunboats, 
all  of  which  caused  McClellan  to  insist  on  withdrawal  from 
the  Peninsula  without  another  fight. 

"In  an  attempt  to  deceive  the  enemy,  it  is  very  difficult 
to  recognize  the  exact  time  at  which  we  may  consider  that 
we  have  attained  our  purpose.  The  penalty  for  allowing 
this  moment  to  slip  by  follows  immediately.  The  appar- 
ent becomes  reality,  that  is  to  say,  the  real  decisive  battle 
begins  without  our  being  prepared  for  it  and  against  our 
wishes.  We  should  especially  bear  in  mind  always  that 
when  our  infantry  is  once  seriously  engaged  with  the  enemy 
the  fight  must  be  fought  through  to  a  decision.  For  it  is  no 


302  STRATEGY 

longer  possible  to  call  the  infantry  back  without  causing  it 
heavy  loss.  If  we  make  the  attempt  the  enemy  will  notice 
it  and  soon  begin  to  press  us  vigorously." 

DECISIVE  BATTLE 

When  the  defender  believes  that  he  has  at  his  disposal 
the  utmost  available  powers  of  resistance,  he  should  en- 
deavor to  bring  about  the  decisive  battle. 

Numbers  and  condition  of  troops,  the  strength  of  their 
position  and  moral  potentialities  are  factors  to  be  consid- 
ered in  arriving  at  the  decision  for  the  tactical  stand. 

As  has  already  been  stated  we  should  never  bring 
on  the  action  unless  all  our  reinforcements  are  at  hand. 

The  wasting  process  may  make  greater  headway  with 
our  own  than  with  the  assailant's  forces. 

The  losses  suffered  by  straggling  in  the  Civil  War 
made  as  great  inroads  on  the  fighting  strength  of  Confed- 
erates as  the  Federals. 

DEFENSIVE  DISPOSITIONS 
DISPOSITION  OF  TROOPS 

In  every  kind  of  combat  the  defender  must  decide  on 
some  disposition  of  his  forces  which  will  constitute  an  or- 
ganized whole.  If  he  allows  himself  to  be  attacked  on  the 
move  or  wherever  his  troops  chance  to  be,  the  situation 
will  slip  from  his  grasp  and  he  will  become  dependent  on 
the  action  of  the  opponent. 

This  is  very  clearly  illustrated  by  the  second  Manassas 
campaign.  By  his  vacillating  policy,  Pope  was  absolutely 
at  the  mercy  of  and  subject  to  the  moves  of  Lee  and 
Jackson.  He  merely  followed  them  around. 

When  it  is  a  question  of  a  determined  stand,  in  select- 
ing a  defensive  position,  one  must  not  forget  that  those 
features  which  favor  fire  efficiency  are  of  paramount  im- 
portance. 

According  to  our  Field  Service  Regulations  the  re- 
quirements of  the  position  are  as  follows: 

1.  Clear  field  of  fire  up  to  the  effective  range  of  artillery. 

2.  Flanks  that  are  naturally  secure  or  that  can  be  made  so 
by  the  use  of  reserves. 

3.  Extent  of  ground  suitable  to  the  strength  of  the  force 
that  is  to  occupy  it. 


TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE   OPERATIONS  303 

4.  Effective  cover  and  concealment  for  the  troops,  especially 
the  reserves. 

5.  Good   communications  throughout  the   position. 

6.  Good  lines  of  retreat. 

7.  Unless  the  defense  is  to  be  purely  a  passive  one,  obstacles 
in  front  of  the  position  must  not  be  such  as  would  impede  the 
counter-attack. 

The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  corrected  to  April  15, 
1917,  give  as  one  of  the  requirements  (which  it  is  believed 
should  come  first,  although  it  appears  last  in  that  book,  and 
is  not  mentioned  at  all  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations)  the 
following : 

"It  should  be  one  which  the  enemy  cannot  avoid  but 
must  attack  or  give  up  his  mission." 

FIELD  OF  FIRE 

The  most  important  requirement  is  a  clear  field  of 
fire  at  long  ranges,  if  we  do  not  expect  to  fight  tc  a  decision, 
and  at  short  and  mid-ranges  if  we  do. 

This  applies  more  particularly  to  small  arms  fire,  for 
with  the  artillery  the  principal  requirement  is  to  have 
direct  terrestrial  observation  on  the  lines  of  advance  of  the 
enemy  and  covered  positions  for  guns  close  at  hand,  easy 
to  get  into  and  easy  to  get  out  of. 

OBSTACLES 

If  the  defender  wishes  to  fight  in  a  certain  position, 
it  is  a  disadvantage  to  have  too  formidable  an  obstacle  in 
front,  for  the  assailant,  seeing  that  his  chances  for  success 
are  slight,  will  avoid  the  position  by  moving  past  it,  or 
will  move  in  such  a  manner  that  he  will  deprive  the  de- 
fender of  whatever  advantage  may  arise  from  having  the 
obstacle  where  it  is. 

Joseph  E.  Johnston  had  a  fine  strong  position  at  Buz- 
zard's Roost,  so  much  so  that  Sherman  decided  to  turn  it, 
as  the  position  was  too  strong  in  front. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  position  has  any  weaknesses 
the  assailant  is  sure  of  finding  it  sooner  or  later.  This  is 
what  occurred  at  Nanshan  Hill — the  Japanese  soon  dis- 
covered the  weakness  of  the  Russian  left.  To  have  a  por- 
tion of  the  position  strong  by  nature  so  that  it  can  be  held 


304  STRATEGY 

by  a  weaker  force  while  use  is  made  of  the  stronger  force 
to  carry  on  operations  in  the  field  is  an  ideal  situation. 

Lee,  as  a  result  of  the  strength  of  the  Marye's  Height- 
Prospect  Hill  position  at  Chancellorsville,  was  able  to  hold 
up  Sedgwick  while  the  majority  of  his  forces  attacked 
Hooker. 

Gulp's  Hill  at  Gettysburg  assisted  Meade  in  the  same 
way. 

An  obstacle  in  front  of  a  position,  passable  at  a  few 
points  by  the  assailant,  is  of  advantage  to  the  defender  for 
he  can  concentrate  his  fire  on  that  point  and  the  enemy 
is  virtually  tied  down. 

Burnside's  bridge  was  a  possible  point  of  crossing  of 
the  Antietam,  made  doubly  difficult  by  the  concentrated  Con- 
federate fire. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  find  a  suitable  obstacle  on  which 
to  rest  a  flank  in  the  tactical  than  in  the  strategical  de- 
fensive, as  distances  are  shorter  and  no  one  can  tell  exactly 
where  the  fight  will  occur. 

SUFFICIENT  IN  EXTENT 

It  is  very  important  that  the  position  be  sufficient  in 
extent  for  the  forces  that  are  to  occupy  it.  Too  much 
congestion  causes  heavy  losses  from  artillery  and  confusion 
if  any  maneuvering  is  attempted. 

If  we  are  distributed  in  depth  we  may  be  able  to 
prolong  the  line  so  as  to  overlap  the  assailant. 

LIAO  YANG 

As  the  Russian  left  was  extended  at  Liao  Yang,  the 
right  of  Kuroki  was  extended  to  overlap  it. 

RONCOURT 

By  keeping  his  reserves  in  rear  of  the  interior  flank, 
Bazaine  was  not  able  to  get  them  up  in  time  to  prevent 
the  Saxons  from  rolling  up  his  right. 

The  best  way  of  securing  flank  protection  is  to  place 
troops  beyond  and  to  the  rear  of  a  wing  in  echelon  for- 
mation. 


TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  305 

GENERAL  RESERVE 

Consequently  the  main  reserve  should  be  stationed  in 
rear  of  the  exposed  flank.  If  this  reserve  is  needed  else- 
where, a  substitute  should  be  left.  Its  mission  is  to  strike 
the  assailant  in  the  flank  and  envelop  him. 

The  position  of  the  general  reserve  is  such  as  will 
enable  it  to  respond  to  the  most  probable  demands  to  be 
made  upon  it.  If  the  line  is  such  that  the  enemy  may 
attempt  a  decisive  attack  along  any  part  of  it,  the  reserve 
will  be  held  in  a  central  position.  Dividing  the  general 
reserve  and  holding  it%  in  two  or  more  positions  widely 
apart  is  inadvisable,  except  where  necessary  to  insure  the 
reinforcements  of  any  part  of  the  line  in  time  to  be  ef- 
fective. • 

The  reserve  should  be  posted  so  as  to  be  entirely  free 
to  act  as  a  whole,  according  to  the  developments.  The 
distance  from  the  firing  line  to  the  reserve  is  generally 
greater  than  in  the  attack.  By  reason  of  such  a  location 
the  reserve  is  best  able  to  meet  a  hostile  enveloping  attack. 
It  has  a  better  position  from  which  to  make  a  counter-at- 
tack; it  is  in  better  position  to  cover  a  withdrawal  and  permit 
an  orderly  retreat.  The  distance  from  the  firing  line  to  the 
reserve  increases  with  the  size  of  the  reserve.  When  the 
situation  is  no  longer  in  doubt,  the  reserve  should  be  held 
in  rear  of  the  flank  which  is  most  in  danger  or  offers  the 
best  opportunity  for  a  counter-attack.  Usually  the  same 
flank  best  suits  both  purposes. 

BOTH  FLANKS  IN  THE  AIR 

If  both  flanks  are  in  the  air,  the  reserve  should  be 
located  in  rear  of  the  one  which,  if  turned,  would  lead  the 
assailant  by  the  most  direct  route  to  our  line  of  commun- 
ications or  retreat,  or  in  the  direction  from  which  we  expect 
reinforcements  to  arrive. 

COVER  AND  CONCEALMENT 

Today  the  necessity  for  cover  and  concealment  is  of 
the  greatest  importance.  We  must  first  have  concealment 
by  camouflage  or  otherwise,  and  second,  actual  cover.  Aerial 
observation  has  made  those  two  elements  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. 


306  STRATEGY 

GOOD  COMMUNICATIONS 

Numerous  covered  or  camouflaged  roads,  or  at  least 
practicable  approaches,  to  the  foremost  fighting  lines  and 
toward  the  flanks  are  necessary.  Close  ground  is  found 
more  especially  in  highly  cultivated  districts,  and  these 
abound  in  obstacles  to  movement. 

The  road  question  is  the  all-important  one  in  modern 
war.  It  does  no  good  to  have  transportation  galore  with- 
out roads. 

ADVANCE  POST  AND  ADVANCE  POSITION 

The  occupation  by  a  strong  force  of  any  position  in 
advance  of  the  main  position  is  objectionable,  in  that  it 
involves  a  dispersion  of  strength  on  the  part  of  the  defense 
and  may  result  in  compelling  the  entire  force  to  right  to  a 
decision  in  the  advanced  position,  and  not  in  the  position 
prepared  for  that  purpose.  Where  necessary  to  occupy 
advanced  positions  in  order  to  secure  more  time  before  the 
enemy  can  attack  the  main  position,  or  in  order  to  keep 
the  enemy  out  of  them  as  long  as  possible,  care  must  be 
taken  that  the  force  detailed  for  the  purpose  is  not  so  weak 
that  it  will  fall  back  to  the  main  position  before  it  accom- 
plishes its  mission,  and  not  so  strong  that  it  will  be  tempted 
to  hold  out  too  long,  with  the  resultant  danger  of  com- 
mitting the  remaining  troops  to  action  in  advance  of  the 
main  position.  It  is  not  a  question  of  how  strong  a  force 
can  be  spared  for  the  purpose  of  occupying  an  advanced 
position,  but  rather  how  weak  can  this  force  be  made  and 
yet  have  strength  sufficient  to  accomplish  its  mission. 

The  holding  of  strong  posts  in  advance  of  the  main 
position,  either  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  the  enemy  or 
for  observation,  is  not  objectionable,  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  forces  necessary  for  the  purpose  is  restricted  in  strength. 
Unlike  advanced  positions  held  in  force,  advanced  posts 
may  be  occupied  up  to  the  last  so  long  as  any  advantage 
is  gained  thereby,  even  to  the  extent  of  risking  the  total 
loss  of  the  occupying  detachment. 

Even  on  .comparatively  level  and  open  ground  it  is 
rarely  necessary  or  advisable  to  occupy  or  strengthen  the 
defensive  line  to  the  same  degree  throughout  its  entire 


TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE   OPERATIONS  307 

extent.  The  terrain  will  generally  offer  some  points  in  the 
line  that  are  unusually  strong  naturally,  or  that  can  be 
readily  strengthened,  and  such  points  will  be  used  as  sup- 
ports on  which  to  rest  the  entire  line.  They  should  be  se- 
lected with  a  view  to  affording  each  other  mutual  support, 
flanking  the  ground  over  which  the  enemy  must  attack,  and 
compelling  him  to  capture  one  or  more  of  them  before  he 
can  force  a  decision.  Supporting  points  are  especially  de- 
sirable on  the  flanks  of  the  position  and  where  there  are 
unavoidable  salients  in  the  line.  They  must  form  a  part, 
and  not  be  in  advance  of  the  main  position.  , 

Saint  Hubert  Farm,  Leipsic,  L'Envie  and  Champenois 
are  illustrations  of  advanced  posts,  while  Sainte  Marie  aux 
Chenes  and  the  position  of  Wagner's  division  at  Franklin 
are  illustrations  of  the  advanced  positions.  In  order  to 
gain  time,  a  commander  may  sometimes  find  it  advan- 
tageous to  occupy  and  temporarily  defend  advanced  posi- 
tions lying  still  farther  to  the  front.  In  doing  so,  favorable 
terrain  and  skillful  leadership  are  essential. 

The  Russians  constructed  advanced  positions  along  the 
Sha-Ho  in  order  to  gain  time  for  their  offensive  movement 
by  their  left  flank.  The  uncertainty  and  hesitation  pro- 
duced by  the  constant  changes  in  orders,  and  the  excessive 
reinforcements  of  the  detachment  holding  these  positions, 
which  led  them  into  making  a  stubborn  defense,  ruined  the 
movement.  Advanced  positions  are  apt  to  mask  the  fire 
from  the  main  position,  and  fights  for  their  possession  may 
easily  lead  to  the  defeat  of  the  troops  holding  them.  The 
battle  of  Tellissu,  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  was  fought 
around  an  advanced  position  which  the  Russians  did  not 
intend  to  hold. 

SPECIAL  FORMS  OF  DEFENSIVE 

There  are  two  special  forms  of  tactical  defensive  opera- 
tions, one  known  by  the  von  der  Goltz  designation  as  (1)  an 
ambuscade  defensive  and  the  other  (2)  tactical  flanking 
positions. 

The  ambuscade  defensive  derives  its  name  from  the 
manner  of  its  execution.  The  defender,  with  a  portion  of 
his  force,  occupies  a  position  and  allows  the  enemy  to  attack 


308  STRATEGY 

until  he  is  exhausted,  when  the  defender  in  turn  falls  upon 
him  with  a  greater  portion  of  his  whole  force,  whose  pres- 
ence or  time  of  arrival  may  not  be  known  to  the  assailant. 
It  is  nothing  more  than  the  decisive  counter-attack. 

ELEMENTS  THAT  MUST  BE  PRESENT 

1.  The  assailant  must  be  exhausted. 

2.  The  counter-stroke  must  be  delivered  by  fresh  troops. 

3.  Their  arrival  must  come  as  a  "surprise  to  the  assailant. 

4.  Their  arrival  must  be  according  to  schedule,  and  not  as 
the  result  of  fortuitous  circumstances. 

SHILOH 

The  battle  of  Shiloh  presents  some  of  the  features  of 
the  ambuscade  defensive. 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston's  army  exhausted  itself  on 
April  6,  1862,  in  assaulting  Grant's  army  in  defensjve  posi- 
tions at  Shiloh.  The  counter-stroke  was  delivered  on  April 
7th  by  Buell's  army  which  did  not  arrive  on  the  field  until 
the  decisive  moment,  i.e.,  at  the  point  at  which  Johnston's 
army  had  exhausted  its  defensive  power. 

It  differs  in  that  the  combination  of  the  tactical  roles 
on  the  part  of  the  Union  forces  was  accidental,  and  not 
premeditated.  Second,  in  that  the  approach  of  the  troops 
that  delivered  the  counter-stroke  was  shown  to  the  assail- 
ants, and  the  element  of  surprise  was  therefore  eliminated. 

ANTIETAM 

The  arrival  of  A.  P.  Hill  on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th 
of  September,  1862,  and  his  attack  on  Burnside's  left  flank 
was  in  the  nature  of  an  ambuscade  defensive.  While  the 
Federals  were  not  exactly  exhausted  by  the  attack,  their 
enthusiasm  was  decidedly  on  the  wane  as  a  result  of  the 
determined  opposition.  The  counter-attack  was  made  by 
fresh  troops  in  so  far  as  they  had  not  been  engaged,  but 
they  had  been  marching  rapidly  from  Harper's  Ferry  to 
join  in  the  battle.  The  assailant  did  not  know  of  the  arrival 
nor  did  the  defenders  know  the  exact  time.  The  arrival  of 
Hill  and  attack  at  the  time  was  fortuitous  rather  than 
premeditated. 

The  battle  of  Austerlitz  is  the  classic  illustration  of  the 
ambuscade  defensive.  All  the  elements  were  present. 


TACTICAL  DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  309 

MODIFIED  FORM  OF  AMBUSCADE  DEFENSIVE 

The  ambuscade  may  be  adopted  if  the  ground  is  favor- 
able. If  there  is  a  strong  position,  too  extended  for  the 
troops  to  occupy,  it  may  be  held  for  temporary  resistance. 
This  will  cause  the  enemy  to  deploy  his  strength.  When 
involved  in  this  deployment,  he  may  be  attacked  by  the  de- 
fender's main  body  held  in  a  covered  position.  If  the  posi- 
tion held  by  the  defender  is  a  range  of  mountains,  then 
the  enemy  as  he  passes  through  any  one  of  the  passes  may 
be  struck,  before  he  has  cleared  the  defile,  by  troops  held 
in  concealment  on  the  far  side. 

TACTICAL  FLANK  POSITIONS 

The  tactical  flank  position  differs  from  the  strategical 
in  that  (1)  it  is  more  limited  as  to  space,  (2)  there  is  less 
danger  of  premature  discovery,  (3)  there  is  greater  danger 
of  the  enemy  attacking  and  defeating  the  flank  turned 
toward  him. 

REQUIREMENTS 

1.  The  threatened  wing  must  have  a  good  point  of  support 
while  the  other  wing  is  somewhat  pushed  forward  from  the  par- 
allel to  the  enemy's  line  of  advance. 

2.  In  occupying  the  position,  the  defender  must  not  leave 
the  main  road  to  the  principal  object  open — a  rear  guard  retiring 
in  the  direction  of  the  main  object  will  probably  draw  the  enemy 
along. 

3.  Position  must  not  be  more  than  artillery  range  from  this 
main  line  of  advance,  otherwise  the  enemy  has  too  much  freedom 
in  deploying. 

4.  The  flank  position  must  have  a  good  line  of  departure. 

5.  It  must  have  a  good  line  of  retreat. 

A  tactical  flank  position  is  most  effective  when  the 
enemy  has  to  deal  with  it  immediately  after  crossing  a 
stream  or  passing  through  a  defile.  In  case  of  defeat  his 
retreat  is  most  difficult  because  he  has  to  retire  through 
a  narrow  passage  situated  on  his  flank. 

The  flank  position  becomes  particularly  effective  if  it 
is  so  located  that  the  enemy  cannot  tell  whether  he  has 
struck  the  old  force  that  he  has  recently  engaged  in  posi- 
tion, or  the  advance  guard  of  a  new  force  arriving. 

The  assailant  is  under  the  disadvantage,  if  unsuccess- 
ful, of  retiring  to  the  flank. 


310  STRATEGY 

In  that  case,  the  enemy  may  move  around  him  and 
strike  his  communications  as  Jackson  did  at  Chantilly, 
September  1,  1862. 

In  the  tactical  defensive  we  must  bear  in  mind  that 
we  are  playing  another  man's  game,  and,  such  being  the 
case,  we  must  be  wary,  figuring  that  he  will  do  the  thing 
most  inconvenient  for  us  and  make  our  arrangements  ac- 
cordingly. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

Special  Types  of  Warfare 


T  N  THE  study  of  the  various  works  on  strategy,  there  is 

found  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  some  writers  to 
classify  operations  under  separate  headings  according  to 
the  kind  of  terrain  in  which  each  might  occur.  For  ex- 
ample, mountain  warfare,  forcing  or  defending  river  lines, 
etc.  The  chief  influence  these  features  have,  is  tactical 
rather  than  strategical,  yet  they  have  been  regarded  as  of 
sufficient  importance  and  difference  to  require  knowledge 
of  a  special  kind. 

The  utilizing  of  the  features  of  terrain  should  be  studied 
in  connection  with  the  defensive  as  they  are  of  special  ad- 
vantage to  that  side,  either  as  obstacles  or  as  a  means  of 
cover  and  concealment  to  troops  making  counter-moves. 
In  the  latter  respect  they  also  assist  the  offensive. 

But*  there  is  really  no  reason  why  warfare  of  this 
kind  should  be  completely  separated  from  the  whole,  at 
least  not  with  respect  to  the  general  rules  of  strategy. 

The  general  rules  of  war  are  applicable  to  such  a  ter- 
rain and  in  a  way  the  same  principles  will  be  seen  in  opera- 
tion. 

Of  course  the  tactical  formation  of  troops  must  be 
changed  to  meet  the  situation. 

MOUNTAIN  RANGES 

Strategically,  mountain  ranges  have  two  directions, 
namely,  perpendicular  and  parallel  to  the  line  of  operations. 

Perpendicular  to  the  line  of  invasion,  they  are  of  as- 
sistance to  the  defender,  provided  all  the  passes  are  held. 

Yet  it  always  has  been  easy  for  an  assailant  to  make 
feints  at  certain  points,  then  break  through  at  some  one 
pass.  If  one  pass  goes,  generally  they  all  go. 

311 


312  STRATEGY 

SHIPKA  PASS 

When  the  Turks  held  the  Shipka  Pass,  the  Russians 
turned  their  position  by  crossing  to  the  east  at  the  Hainkoi 
Pass. 

THOROUGHFARE  GAP 

Rickett's  division  was  turned  out  of  Thoroughfare  Gap 
by  the  Confederates  passing  over  a  trail  called  Hopewell's 
Gap  after  frontal  attacks  had  failed. 

The  defensive  has  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  de- 
bouch from  the  mouth  of  one  of  the  passes  and  to  threaten 
the  assailant's  communications. 

Napoleon's  crossing  of  the  Alps  in  1800  shows  how 
little  such  obstacles  to  crossing  deter  a  determined  leader. 

In  a  careful  study  of  the  terrain  of  France  and  eastern 
Belgium,  it  will  be  seen  that  all  mountains  trend  generally 
north  and  south.  This  made  the  situation  very  bad  for 
the  Germans,  when  the  line  of  the  Meuse  was  seized  by 
the  1st  American  Army,  for  all  that  army  had  to  do  was 
move  down  the  valley  to  threaten  the  German  line  of  retreat, 
whereas  the  Germans  had  either  to  cross  the  mountains  or 
retire  between  Holland  and  Luxemburg. 

If  the  mountains  are  parallel  to  the  line  of  invasion, 
they  permit  the  defender  to  debouch  upon  the  hostile  rear 
or  flank  of  the  assailant.  Likewise,  the  assailant  may  do 
the  same  thing  to  the  defender  if  the  opportunity  is  offered. 

ATLANTA 

Sherman's  movements  to  get  Johnston  out  of  the  Dai- 
ton  position  were  generally  facilitated  by  the  north  and 
south  trend  of  the  mountain  ranges  and  particularly  by  the 
location  of  Snake  Creek  Gap. 

"Mountain  ranges  in  general  offer  to  weak  detachments 
the  advantages  of  strong  defensive  positions,  which  gener- 
ally cannot  be  attacked  on  flank  or  turned  without  great 
loss  of  time4' 

Too  EXTENDED  REALLY  A  WEAKNESS 

If  the  mountains  are  very  extended,  they  are  generally 
a  source  of  weakness  rather  than  strength  for  the  reason 
that  all  passes  must  be  held  while  the  enemy  can  concen- 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  313 

trate  against  any  one.  The  defender  will  have  difficulty 
in  reinforcing  in  any  other  manner  than  from  the  rear,  in 
which  case  the  reinforcing  troops  will  be  subjected  to  all 
the  difficulty  the  assailant  experiences. 

HOLDING  ALL  THE  PASSES 

If  the  defender  attempts  to  hold  all  the  passes,  he  will 
soon  become  so  weak  that  the  assailant  will  be  able  to  break 
through  most  anywhere. 

The  action  for  the  assailant  to  take  is  to  demonstrate 
against  all  the  passes  and  break  through  at  one. 

AMPING 

This  was  Kuroki's  repeated  practice  in  the  Fen-Schui 
Mountains.  At  Amping,  the  2d  Division  moved  direct,  get- 
ting possession  of  the  heights  overlooking  the  Tang-Ho. 
The  Guard  Division  was  on  its  left.  Farther  north  the  12th 
Division  attacked  Yu-Schu-Ling  (Pass)  and  carried  it, 
outflanking  the  Russian  left,  so  that  the  Russians  had  to 
abandon  their  entire  position  to  save  their  communications. 

ROUMANIANS 

The  Roumanians,  in  their  initial  plunge  into  The  World 
War,  instead  of  concentrating  under  cover  of  the  Transyl- 
vanian  Alps  and  the  Carpathians,  which  would  have  offered 
them  protection,  threw  their  three  armies  forward,  cross- 
ing the  mountains  by  passes  and  trails,  either  on  foot  or  by 
rail. 

Von  Falkenhayn  concentrated  his  forces  in  the  valley 
of  the  river  Maros  and,  having  done  so  launched  them  for- 
ward against  the  Roumanians  scattered  out  in  the  moun- 
tains. 

ROADS 

It  must  not  be  assumed  that  mountains  ean  only  be 
crossed  over  roads ;  such  an  assumption  is  a  mistake.  The 
Turks  often  have  been  mistaken  in  the  Balkans. 

The  Japanese  on  repeated  occasions  turned  the  Rus- 
sians out  of  position  in  Manchuria  by  going  over  ridges 
where  no  road  existed. 


314  STRATEGY 

SUPPLY 

The  trouble,  in  mountain  warfare,  is  the  keeping  up 
of  supplies,  particularly  ammunition.  An  army  may  often 
travel  on  half  rations,  but  it  cannot  fight  on  half  ammuni- 
tion. Repeatedly  the  question  of  supply  influenced  the 
movements  of  the  Japanese  in  the  mountainous  country  of 
Manchuria.  The  supply  question  in  the  so-called  Tullahoma 
campaign  in  Tennessee  virtually  dictated  the  strategy.  While 
we  cannot  ignore  the  question  of  supply,  yet  if  we  sur- 
render everything  to  it  we  have  the  case  of  the  "tail  wag- 
ging the  dog." 

A  PROPER  METHOD  OF  DEFENSE 

A  proper  method  of  defense  of  a  mountain  range  would 
be  to  hold  merely  the  passes  by  small  detachments,  re- 
connoitering  with  cavalry  and  aircraft  well  to  the  front, 
while  keeping  the  bulk  of  the  forces  concentrated  and  con- 
cealed back  of  the  mountains  ready  to  fall  upon  the  assail- 
ant as  his  marching  columns  wind  laboriously  out  of  the 
mountain  defiles.  It  is  another  form  of  ambuscade  defen- 
sive. 

DEFENSE  OF  THE  TRANSYLVANIAN  ALPS 

This  is  exactly  the  manner  in  which  von  Falkenhayn 
defended  the  Alps  against  the  Roumanian  invasion  of  Tran- 
sylvania in  1916.  He  left  covering  detachments  to  hold 
all  the  passes  temporarily,  but  to  fall  back  slowly  before 
the  enemy. 

The  Roumanians  pushed  forward  in  long  columns  and 
as  the  heads  of  the  columns  debouched  into  the  valley  they 
occupied  the  towns,  even  while  the  rear  elements  were  still 
marching. 

Von  Falkenhayn,  who  had  concentrated  in  the  valley 
of  the  Maros,  now  moved  swiftly  south  and  attacked  the 
heads  of  these  Roumanian  columns  while  von  Arr  covered 
his  left.  The  result  was  a  hasty  disjointed  deployment  of 
the  Roumanians  and  their  speedy  defeat. 

HOLDING  PASSES  TO  GAIN  TIME  AND  TIRE  ENEMY 
Often  it  becomes  necessary  for  a  numerically  inferior 
force  to  hold  back  the  enemy  to  gain  time  for  the  arrival 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  315 

of  reinforcements  or  for  the  concentration  of  the  scattered 
forces.     Then  the  passes  are  held  themselves. 

SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 

When  Lee  learned  of  the  capture  of  his  Special  Order 
191  and  that  the  Federals  were  advancing,  he  directed  the 
concentration  of  his  army  at  Sharpsburg  and  ordered  the 
cavalry  holding  Turner's,  Fox's  and  Crampton's  Gaps  rein- 
forced and  those  passes  held  long  enough  for  the  concentra- 
tion to  be  completed. 

Meanwhile  McClellan  was  slowly  advancing  on  Turn- 
er's and  Crampton's  Gap.  Longstreet  was  ordered  back  to 
hold  Turner's  Gap  while  Anderson  held  Crampton's  Gap. 

Both  of  the  Federal  advancing  forces,  namely,  Burn- 
side  at  Turner's  and  Fox's  Gap,  and  Franklin  at  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap  were  delayed  until  Harper's  Ferry  had  fallen  and 
Lee  had  concentrated  nearly  all  his  forces. 

Never  in  history  have  mountain  passes  been  of  such 
an  advantage  to  a  defender. 

BRAGG'S  DEFENSE  OF  THE  MOUNTAIN  RANGES  EAST  OF 
THE  TENNESSEE 

After  Rosecrans  had  effected  a  crossing  of  the  Ten- 
nessee River  and  started  over  the  triple  ranges  of  moun- 
tains, he  was  scattered  on  a  front  of  40  miles;  an  un- 
usual opportunity  was  offered  Bragg  to  mass  in  Layf ayette 
Valley,  holding  against  two  of  the  columns,  while  he  anni- 
hilated the  third.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Bragg  did  concen- 
trate, but  he  failed  to  take  the  proper  precautions  toward 
informing  himself  of  Rosecrans'  moves.  With  McCook  at 
Alpine,  Thomas  at  McLemore's  Cove,  and  Crittenden  at 
Ringgold,  none  nearer  the  other  than  20  miles,  Bragg 
actually  did  try  to  crush  one  force  under  Negley  at  Dug's 
Gap,  but  his  subordinates  .failed  him  as  they  repeatedly  did 
during  the  ensuing  campaign.  When  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
maugua  was  fought,  the  Federals  were  concentrated  and 
all  the  advantage  that  Bragg  might  have  gained  from  their 
over-dispersion  had  been  forfeited. 

The  resistance  along  mountain  ranges  at  the  best  is 
much  limited  as  to  time,  for  in  nearly  every  case  the  assail- 


316  STRATEGY 

ant  has  finally  found  a  way  to  turn  the  position  and  the 
defenders  have  been  driven  out. 

Actual  mountain  warfare  is  generally  pictured  as  one's 
imagination  dictates  and  as  it  has  often  been  fought — small 
forces  of  mountain  men  holding  up  vastly  superior  numbers. 

There  is  before  us  as  an  example  the  defense  of  the 
Tyrol  against  Napoleon  I. 

"The  isolated  districts  of  Upper  Albania  have  as- 
serted a  qualified  independence  since  the  days  of  Alexander 
the  Great  on  account  of  their  ability  as  mountain  fighters." 

Skanderberg  furnishes  us  with  the  most  brilliant  ex- 
ample in  mountain  warfare  when  he  spends  a  generation 
in  his  resistance  against  the  armies  of  Mehemet  the  Con- 
queror. 

A  record  of  similar  achievements  is  furnished  by  the 
resistance  of  the  Tscherkasians  in  the  Caucasus  Mountains, 
that  of  the  Montenegrans  in  the  Black  Mountains,  that  of 
the  Spahkians  in  Crete,  and  that  of  the  Carlists  in  the  Bosque 
province.  The  Pomakians  in  the  mountain  valley  of  Tur- 
usch  asserted  their  independence  from  the  Bulgarians  from 
1878  until  1886. 

RIVERS 

Every  river  of  any  importance  is  of  service  in  the 
defense  of  a  country.  For  it  is  not  only  of  use  in  causing 
the  enemy  trouble  in  crossing,  if  the  bridges  are  destroyed ; 
but  it  also  restricts  a  certain  amount  of  his  communications 
with  the  rear;  for  they  are  generally  confined  to  a  few 
crossings,  either  newly  prepared  or  old  ones  made  service- 
able. 

The  direction  of  the  water  courses  determines  their 
influence. 

PARALLEL 

Parallel  to  the  march  of  the  army,  rivers  may  become, 
in  rare  cases,  the  line  of  operations,  but  more  often  the  line 
of  communications. 

They  generally  serve  the  offensive  as  a  support  for  a 
wing. 

They  often  form  a  natural  line  of  invasion  into  coun- 
tries through  which  they  flow.  Such  are  the  Danube  for 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  317 

Austria;  the  Po  for  Italy;  the  Elbe  for  Prussia;  the  Nile 
for  Egypt ;  the  Vardar  for  Macedonia ;  and  the  Oise,  Marne 
and  Seine  for  France. 

PERPENDICULAR 

When  the  watercourse  is  perpendicular  to  an  army's 
line  of  march,  it  becomes  an  obstacle  for  the  assailant  and 
an  aid  for  the  defender. 

The  rivers  Aisne  and  Marne  in  The  World  War  are 
illustrations  of  this  statement. 

The  defense  of  rivers  is  open  to  the  same  temptations 
as  mountain  ranges  in  that  they  entice  the  defender  to 
attempt  to  hold  them  at  all  points  and  thus  become  too 
much  extended. 

In  attempting  to  force  a  crossing,  the  assailant,  if  he 
can  surprise  the  enemy,  has  some  hope  of  success,  other- 
wise not. 

Von  Hindenburg  in  1914,  attempted  to  force  the  cross- 
ing of  the  Neiman  River  by  sheer  weight  of  his  artillery 
but  each  time  was  driven  back  and  finally  had  to  retreat. 

The  Boers  stopped  Methuen  at  the  Modder  River  and 
Buller  at  the  Tugela  when  they  tried  to  cross  by  direct 
attack. 

PROPER  WAY  TO  DEFEND  A  CROSSING 

To  keep  small  detachments  to  watch  the  crossings 
to  learn  the  intentions  of  the  enemy  and  where  his  main 
forces  are  crossing. 

Then  to  assemble  the  main  body  at  some  convenient 
place  in  rear  of  the  line  and  fall  upon  the  enemy  as  he 
is  in  the  act  of  crossing  or,  after  he  has  crossed,  to  strike 
him  when  he  has  the  river  at  his  back. 

In  the  defense  of  the  river,  the  commander  must  de- 
termine how  it  is  to  be  held — whether  as  a  tactical  posi- 
tion or  as  indicated  in  the  previous  paragraphs.  If  the 
enemy  is  to  be  stopped  at  the  river  itself,  then  its  banks 
must  be  strengthened  by  entrenchments,  obstacles  placed 
and  advance  posts  strengthened  and  garrisoned  appropri- 
ately. If  the  near  bank  alone  is  to  be  held,  then  the  bridges, 
if  any  exist,  must  be  prepared  for  destruction  or  destroyed. 


318  STRATEGY 

Larenzac,  commanding  the  5th  French  Army  along  the 
Sambre  River  in  1914,  erred  greatly  in  this  regard.  Ap- 
parently he  had  determined  to  stop  the  Germans  at  the 
Sambre  and  Meuse,  holding  the  angle  formed  by  their 
junction  with  apex  at  Namur. 

Instead  of  throwing  up  entrenchments,  preparing  the 
bridges,  and  garrisoning  his  advance  post  at  Charleroi 
adequately,  he  completely  neglected  this  duty.  As  to  the 
Meuse,  no  entrenchments  were  constructed  north  of  Givet. 
As  a  result  the  garrison  of  Charleroi  was  driven  back  on 
the  river  and  the  bridges  seized.  On  the  Meuse  a  crossing 
was  effected  at  Dinant  at  the  section  of  the  line  not  en- 
trenched. 

The  banks  very  often  offer  opportunities  for  the  direct 
defense  by  tiers  of  fire  delivered  from  trenches.  The  Boers 
had  such  a  position  on  the  Tugela  River. 

But  this  situation  is  exceptional,  for  the  holding  of 
the  river  as  a  tactical  position  is  bad. 

BATTLE  OF  FERE  CHAMPENOISE 

This  battle  illustrates  the  effective  use  of  reserves  in 
throwing  back  an  enemy  after  he  has  crossed  an  obstacle. 

The  movement  of  the  Guard  Division  and  the  Saxons 
around  the  end  of  the  St.  Gond  Swamp  and  their  penetration, 
well  within  the  French  lines,  gave  Foch  his  opportunity,  for 
he  sent  the  42d  Division  post  haste  from  his  left  to  his  right 
rear  where  it  caught  the  Prussians  in  flank  and  drove  them 
back  through  the  gap  while  the  French  were  holding  on 
determinedly  at  other  sections  of  the  line. 

FIRST  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 

The  first  battle  of  Manassas  is  an  illustration  of  a 
river  line  improperly  held.  Beauregard  placed  five  of  his 
seven  and  a  half  brigades  on  the  river  line  itself,  occupying 
it  exactly  as  if  it  were  a  tactical  position.  His  line  was 
seven  miles  long  and  had  a  density  of  1.8  men  per  yard. 

Even  with  this  extreme  extension  he  failed  to  cover 
the  point  at  which  McDowell  crossed,  and  the  passage  of 
the  stream  by  the  latter  was  unopposed. 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  319 

Moreover,  in  occupying  the  line  as  if  it  were  a  posi- 
tion, Beauregard  immobilized  a  large  part  of  his  army. 
The  main  battle  was  fought  principally  by  the  troops  from 
the  Shenandoah — which  on  arrival  at  Manassas  Junction, 
had  been  placed  in  reserve,  assisted  by  two  regiments  of 
Bonham,  ten  companies  of  Cocke,  and  a  half  brigade  of 
Evans'  and  Stuart's  cavalry.  Thirteen  thousand  men  lay 
idle  along  the  creek.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  fords  had  been 
watched  by  small  detachments,  and  the  bulk  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army  held  in  readiness,  say  at  the  road  junction  at 
New  Market,  the  Union  advance  by  the  Warrenton  Pike, 
or  the  Sudley  Springs  Road,  Ball's  or  Mitchel's  Fords,  could 
have  been  opposed  by  the  whole  concentrated  army,  while  an 
advance  by  Union  Mills  could  have  been  taken  in  flank. 
One  of  the  most  serious  administrative  difficulties  Beaure- 
gard met  with  was  in  getting  his  orders  transmitted  and 
their  execution  supervised.  The  greater  his  dispersion,  the 
greater  the  difficulty.  With  his  army  well  in  hand  at  New 
Market  this  embarrassment  would  have  been  diminished  to 
a  marked  degree. 

In  the  second  battle  of  the  Marne,  while  the  main 
German  army  did  not  get  across  the  river  in  force,  yet 
it  was  driven  back  into  the  river  and  almost  exterminated. 

FORESTS 

The  only  advantage  forests  can  be  in  the  nature  of 
obstacles  is  that  they  conceal  movements,  and  in  this  regard 
they  assist  the  assailant  more  than  the  defender,  partic- 
ularly if  a  forest  is  in  front  of  a  defensive  line. 

The  far  edge  of  the  wood  should  be  held  and  succes- 
sive lanes,  swept  by  machine  guns,  cut  through. 

DESERTS 

A  desert  is  of  little  tactical  assistance  other  than 
that  it  affords  no  concealment  for  the  attacker.  In  a  strat- 
egical way  it  is  of  great  assistance  if  it  is  extensive  enough, 
in  that  the  difficulty  of  supply  may  cause  the  assailant  to 
avoid  it.  Railroads  have  facilitated  the  question  of  supply 
to  a  great  extent.  The  tactical  defensive  of  the  desert  is 
from  the  near  side.  The  advent  of  aircraft  has  rendered 


320  STRATEGY 

the  Suez  Canal  absolutely  secure  from  direct  attack  from 
the  east,  for  no  attack  can  be  carried  out  over  the  135  miles 
of  desert  to  the  east. 

ARTIFICIAL  OBSTACLES 

The  artificial  means  of  defense  that  affect  the  opera- 
tions of  armies  and  which  may  be  isolated,  classified,  and 
given  names,  are  fortified  positions,  intrenched  camps  and 
fortresses. 

FORTIFIED  POSITION 

A  fortified  position  is  one,  strong  by  nature,  the 
strength  of  which  has  been  increased  by  artificial  means  and 
which  requires  an  army  for  its  defense. 

Its  purpose  is  to  form  a  point  in  which  final  resistance 
can  be  made  by  a  weaker  against  a  stronger  force. 

ILLUSTRATION  OF  FORTIFIED  POSITIONS 

Danewarth  line  for  the  defense  of  Jutland,  Torres 
Vedras  for  the  defense  of  Lisbon,  Tchataldtchha  lines  for 
the  defense  of  Constantinople,  Nanshan  Hill  for  the  defense 
of  Port  Arthur,  and  the  Bulave  lines  for  the  defense  of  the 
mainland  against  an  attack  via  the  Gallipoli  peninsula. 

The  positions  may  be  also  for  the  purpose  of  strength- 
ening a  portion  of  a  line  in  order  that  it  may  be  held  with 
a  weak  force  and  the  strength  thrown  elsewhere. 

Fortified  positions  are  constructed  on  account  of  a 
feeling  of  weakness  and  are  therefore  primarily  de- 
signed for  a  purely  passive  defense.  Torres  Vedras,  Nan- 
shan Hill  and  Tchataldtchha  furnish  peculiar  examples  of 
artificial  defensive  positions  with  reversed  front,  i.e.,  turned 
toward  the  interior.  But  they  are  very  strong  positions 
which  can  only  be  attacked  f  rontally  and  in  which  the  wings 
of  the  attacker  are  endangered  as  far  as  naval  guns  can 
reach.  Absolute  mastery  of  the  neighboring  seas  is  an  es- 
sential feature. 

ENTRENCHED  CAMPS 

The  old  entrenched  camp  can  be  literally  taken  from 
its  name  as  a  point  to  which  a  force  may  retire  for  camp 
and  be  protected.  It  resembles  a,  fortress  in  that  it  faces 
in  all  directions  and  differs  from  it  in  that  it  requires  an 
army  for  its  defense  and  not  a  garrison. 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  321 

ENTRENCHED  CAMP  AS  SUPPORTING  POINT 

An  entrenched  camp  can  be  used  as  a  supporting  point 
for  one  wing  while  we  maneuver  the  other.  Such  a  camp 
can  be  located  so  as  to  prevent  one  from  being  pushed  away 
from  a  river  while  the  main  body  is  absent.  Dresden, 
held  by  St.  Cyr,  while  Napoleon  was  advancing  on  Blucher 
at  Breslau,  is  a  good  illustration. 

We  should  not  retire  to  an  entrenched  camp  unless 
we  can  count  upon  approaching  reinforcements. 

MODERN  IDEA  OF  AN  ENTRENCHED  CAMP 

The  modern  entrenched  camp  is  a  fortified  location 
like  Verdun  or  Toul,  in  which  there  is  a  fortress  or  a  city 
(enciente)  one  or  both,  but  on  the  outlying  hills  are  a  circle 
of  smaller  forts  that  keep  the  enemy  from  firing  on  the 
main  defense  with  heavy  guns.  These  forts  are  not  a  con- 
tinuous line,  but  are  so  located  as  to  bear  a  tactical  relation 
to  each  other. 

The  position  has  all  the  significance  of  an  entrenched 
camp  as  it  faces  in  all  directions,  requires  an  army  and  is 
a  haven  of  refuge. 

Belfort,  Epinal  and  Langres  are  types  of  entrenched 
camps. 

FORTRESS 

A  fortress  is  more  independent  than  a  camp.  It  is 
more  strongly  constructed  and  cannot  be  taken  generally 
without  specially  prepared  guns.  It  is  held  by  a  garrison 
and  has  its  own  supplies  and  means  of  maintenance,  and 
is  independent  of  a  field  army. 

Forts  and  fortresses  are  generally  built  in  time  of 
peace  at  points  of  great  military  importance.  They  may  be 
located  so  as  to  command  a  harbor,  a  pass,  a  river  and 
the  like.  The  site  may  or  may  not  be  commanding. 

If  provinces  are  situated  at  a  distance  from  the  main 
body  of  a  nation  and  are  without  good  communications 
with  it,  or  if  they  are  so  placed  that  location  of  an  army 
in  them  would  cause  a  separation  of  forces,  then  it  is  a 
good  idea  to  fortify  one  of  the  principal  towns. 

Port  Arthur  and  Sebastopol  are  illustrations. 


322  STRATEGY 

Before  The  World  War,  Turkey  held  Scutari  in  north- 
western Montenegro,  and  Janina  in  northwestern  Greece 
and  was  said  to  hold  the  provinces  in  which  they  were 
located. 

POLITICAL  CONSIDERATIONS 

We  can  readily  see  that  in  such  a  distribution  of  for- 
tresses, political  considerations  outweigh  the  military.  All 
we  want  is  to  hold  in  our  hand  some  security  for  our  de- 
mands at  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

Under  these  circumstances,  a  purely  passive  resistance 
will  suffice. 

Had  Paris  held  out  in  1814,  it  might  have  been  pos- 
sible for  Napoleon  to  have  arranged  a  favorable  peace  for 
himself.  Even  after  Paris  had  fallen,  the  allies  did  not 
withhold  recognition  of  the  King  of  Rome  until  Marmont 
had  surrendered.  After  that,  Napoleon  had  to  accede  to  any 
terms  that  were  offered  to  him.  The  possession  of  Danzig 
and  Konigsberg  did  not  give  the  French  any  right  in  the 
peace  negotiations,  however. 

BARRIER  FORTS 

Barrier  forts  are  located  on  the  frontier  near  the  im- 
portant rail  or  dirt  roads;  in  mountainous  countries,  near 
bridges  over  large  rivers  which  it  is  desired  to  preserve, 
and  on  navigable  rivers  which  might  be  used  by  the  enemy. 

The  important  railroads  and  other  lines  of  transpor- 
tation leading  from  Germany  into  France  were  commanded 
near  the  frontier  by  barrier  forts.  The  passes  leading 
into  Switzerland  are  so  fortified  by  the  Swiss.  Among  the 
first  fortifications  constructed  by  the  Confederates  in  the 
Civil  War  were  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  which  were 
practically  barrier  forts  to  block  the  Cumberland  and  Ten- 
nessee Rivers. 

FORTRESSES  ON  FRONTIER  TO  BE  HELD  AFTER  DEFENDER 
FALLS  BACK 

Sometimes  it  is  well  to  hold  a  fortress  near  the  fron- 
tier in  hopes  that,  if  one  is  forced  to  fall  back,  the  fortress 
may  some  time  be  a  point  of  support  when  reinforcements 
have  been  received  and  the  armies  again  advance. 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  323 

Kars  in  eastern  Caucasia  for  the  Russians,  Danzig, 
Konigsberg  and  Olmutz  for  Napoleon,  and  Verdun  in  The 
World  War  formed  points  of  support. 

The  idea  of  mutual  support  of  fortifications  and  field 
troops  has  led  to  fortresses  being  provided  with  advanced 
works  which  protect  the  space  to  be  occupied  by  the  army. 

FORTRESSES  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  FIELD  ARMY 

"If  the  army  withdraws  before  a  stronger  enemy, 
leaving  a  fortress  in  its  front  like  a  pier  before  a  bridge 
which  is  designed  to  break  the  first  force  of  the  floating 
ice  that  crowds  against  it,  the  enemy  will  invest  the  place 
or  else  be  forced  to  station  a  strong  body  of  troops  in  ob- 
servation before  it." 

As  a  result  he  arrives  before  the  main  forces  of  the 
enemy  weakened  and  his  success  is  questionable. 

General  Heiman's  attack  on  Zevin  on  June  25,  1877, 
was  unsuccessful,  due  to  the  lack  of  troops,  as  a  large  num- 
ber had  been  left  to  invest  the  15,000  Turks  at  Kars. 

The  force  detached  by  Lee  to  invest  Harper's  Ferry 
greatly  weakened  him,  so  much  so,  that  had  the  fort  not 
fallen  and  A.  P.  Hill  arrived  on  the  field  of  Antietam,  Lee 
would  have  been  disastrously  defeated. 

Maubeuge  compelled  the  Germans  to  detach  a  force 
for  its  reduction  which  could  have  been  used  to  better  ad- 
vantage with  the  field  army. 

FIELD  ARMY  EMERGING  FROM  COVER  OF  THE  FORT 

If  the  field  army  makes  a  sortie,  it  has  a  chance  of 
victory  in  that  the  assailant  may  not  know  how  strong  a 
force  is  making  the  effort  and  may  detail  too  weak  a  force 
to  break  it  up. 

FORTRESSES  AS  SUPPORT  FOR  FLANK 

A  fortress  may  also  be  used  as  a  flank  support.  It  is 
not  necessary  for  the  field  army  to  retire  directly  upon  the 
fortress.  With  the  long  range  guns  of  today,  fortresses 
can  cover  ground  some  distance  from  it,  so  that  the  field 
army  is  really  under  its  protection. 


324  STRATEGY 

In  1870,  if  the  French,  instead  of  retiring  on  Metz, 
had  crossed  the  river  between  Pont-a-Mousson  and  No- 
veant,  a  fortress  would  still  have  protected  their  left  wing. 

If  a  fortress  is  located  at  the  junction  of  several  rivers, 
it  may  act  as  a  pivot  of  support  for  a  field  army  encounter- 
ing the  enemy  from  several  directions. 

DELIVERANCE 

The  great  disadvantage  an  army  has  in  attempting 
to  escape  from  a  fortress  is  that  it  must  effect  a  pene- 
tration against  a  prepared  position.  The  enemy  may 
bring  converging  fire  to  bear,  and,  inasmuch  as  the  en- 
emy's assistance  comes  from  his  lines  of  circumvalla- 
tion,  he  will  strike  the  sortie  force  in  the  flank. 

The  attempts  at  self-delivery  at  Fort  Donelson  and 
Vicksburg  are  illustrations. 

POWER  OF  ATTRACTION 

It  is  natural  that  the  proximity  of  a  protecting  for- 
tress must  exert  a  great  power  of  attraction  on  an  army 
in  a  difficult  situation. 

It  is  much  easier  to  lead  back  an  army  behind  its 
walls  and  guns  than  it  is  to  lead  one  forward  away  from 
this  safe  refuge. 

There  are  two  cases  at  least  when  an  army  would  be 
justified  in  falling  back  into  a  fortress.  (1)  To  escape 
annihilation  as  in  the  case  of  Ladysmith,  Kimberly  and 
Maf eking  in  South  Africa.  (2)  When  a  strong  relieving 
army  is  expected.  The  holding  of  Harper's  Ferry  was  not 
an  imprudent  thing  and  would  have  turned  out  all  right 
had  Franklin  shown  even  ordinary  activity. 

THE  ATTACK  ON  ANTWERP 

The  pernicious  power  of  attraction  that  a  fortress  can 
exert  on  a  field  army  is  well  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Ant- 
werp. Joffre  was  extending  his  left  with  a  view  of  con- 
necting up  with  the  Belgian  army  and  with  the  idea  of 
taking  up  a  position  along  the  Scheldt  to  keep  the  Germans 
away  from  the  coast. 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  325 

The  Germans,  becoming  aware  of  Joffre's  plan,  com- 
menced to  bombard  the  outer  forts  on  the  28th  of  Septem- 
ber. 

The  Belgian  military  staff  decided  to  abandon  the  city 
and  join  the  French  either  by  way  of  the  river  Dendre 
or  the  river  Scheldt.  The  retreat  was  to  begin  on  the  2d  of 
October.  The  retreat  had  hardly  begun  when  the  British 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  arrived  at  Antwerp  and  laid  before 
the  Belgian  staff  and  the  council  of  ministers  the  views  of 
his  government.  Antwerp  was  too  rich  a  port  and  too  im- 
portant to  be  given  up. 

He  promised  ample  assistance,  so  encouraged  thereby, 
the  Belgians  determined  to  hold  out  and  thus  lost  three 
valuable  days  during  which  they  could  have  effected  their 
retreat  at  little  risk  and  trifling  cost,  and  established  them- 
selves, in  conjunction  with  the  British  and  French  forces 
that  had  landed  at  Ostend,  on  the  Scheldt. 

By  the  6th,  the  Belgians  became  alarmed  at  the  pro- 
gress of  their  foe  and  disparing  of  the  promised  assistance 
decided  to  continue  the  evacuation  and,  by  the  9th  nearly 
all  the  troops  were  under  way.  Toward  the  end  there 
was  a  good  deal  of  confusion  and  the  rear  guard  came 
very  nearly  being  captured,  whilst  the  garrison  troops, 
including  the  British  marines,  were  unable,  on  account  of 
the  congestion  of  traffic,  to  rejoin  the  main  army.  To 
escape  envelopment,  they  were  obliged  to  enter  Dutch  ter- 
ritory and  as  a  result  about  30,000  were  interned.  Thus 
the  Belgians  had  to  give  up  the  city  anyway  and  lost  a 
great  amount  of  artillery  and  stores  that  ought  have  been 
saved.  When  they  joined  the  allies,  the  Belgian  army  had 
shrunk  from  90,000  to  50,000  men. 

Von  Kluck  hoped  that  Maubeuge  would  exert  an  attrac- 
tive influence  on  Sir  John  French's  army  when  it  fell  back 
from  Mons,  but  the  British  general  was  too  wary  to  fall  into 
the  trap. 

POLITICAL  REASONS 

Many  capitals,  as  already  shown,  may  be  of  great  polit- 
ical advantage  and  so  must  be  held  at  all  odds. 

Constantinople,  Copenhagen,  Lisbon  and  Paris  are  of 
great  importance  politically,  for  in  the  past  their  fall  has 


326  STRATEGY 

been  contemporaneous  with  the  loss  of  a  war.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  fall  of  Moscow,  Vienna,  Belgrade  and  Washington 
have  had  no  political  significance  in  connection  with  the 
ending  of  a  war. 

The  capital  may  be  a  part  of  an  elaborate  defense 
system  and  as  such  should  be  fortified. 

GREAT  DANGER  IN  ATTEMPTING  TO  FORTIFY  A  FRONTIER 

It  will  be  difficult  to  determine  the  point  to  fortify  and 
the  nature  of  the  construction  of  the  fortifications.  It  is 
too  expensive  to  be  done  indiscriminately. 

The  defense  of  the  northern  frontier  of  France  is  an 
interesting  study.  It  is  divided  into  five  sections,  the  line 
of  invasion  through  which  are  blocked  by  forts  d'arret  and 
backed  up  by  fortified  regions. 

On  the  east  front  are  the  two  first-class  fortresses  of 
Verdun  and  Toul  with  the  curtain  between.  Thence  south 
are  the  first-class  fortresses  of  Epinal  and  Belfort  backed 
up  by  fortified  regions. 

The  fortified  region  is  accredited  to  Brailmont.  It  is 
described  by  him  as  follows : 

"A  fortified  region  is  an  area  inclosed  within  a  group 
of  entrenched  camps  so  located  with  reference  to  each  other 
that  an  investing  force  posted  for  the  siege  of  one  would 
be  exposed  to  attack  in  rear  by  forces  operating  from  the 
remaining  entrenched  camps  of  the  group.  This  condition 
is  fulfilled  by  a  group  of  three  or  four  entrenched  camps 
located  at  a  distance  of  about  a  day's  march  from  each  other. 
An  area  is  thus  provided  into  which  an  army,  beaten  in  the 
field,  may  retire  to  reorganize  and  refit.  An  enemy  seeking 
to  engage  such  a  force  would  be  exposed  to  attack  in 
flanks  and  rear,  while  investment  of  the  whole  fortified 
region  would  be  out  of  the  question  on  account  of  its  extent." 

With  the  four  lines  of  invasion  into  France  open  to 
Germany,  namely,  through  the  Lorraine  gateway,  the 
Moselle  trench,  the  Meuse  trench  and  by  way  of  the  Bel- 
gian plains,  France  had  to  rely  mostly  on  her  field  armies. 
.It  was  thought,  even  by  the  Germans,  that  modern  fortifi- 
cations (those  on  the  north  front  by  the  way  were  not  mod- 
ern) could  not  hold  up  a  field  army.  Yet  beginning  with 


SPECIAL  TYPES  OF  WARFARE  327 

Liege,  these  forts  delayed  the  Germans  enough  to  be  a 
decided  contributing  factor  in  their  defeat. 

However,  as  a  general  rule,  it  is  better  to  expend  the 
nation's  money  on  organization  and  on  railroads  that  facil- 
itate active  defense  and  the  assumption  of  the  offensive 
rather  than  on  fortifications,  except  at  most  important 
points. 

In  the  offensive  and  defensive,  the  field  army  comes 
first  and  it  may  win  the  war  without  auxiliary  means  and 
in  spite  of  politicians  and  lack  of  fortifications.  Yet  the 
converse  is  not  true. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

Co-operation  of  the  Army  and  the  IMavy 


APTAIN  MAHAN'S  book  on  the  influence  of  sea  power 
on  history  has  shown,  for  the  first  time,  what  rela- 
tions exist  between  the  mastery  of  the  sea  and  the  mastery 
of  the  world.  Formerly  the  extent  of  this  relation  was 
not  correctly  appreciated. 

Furthermore,  the  importance  which  the  participation 
of  naval  forces  in  the  conduct  of  war  on  land  attains  is 
frequently  underestimated. 

This  in  a  measure  is  due  to  the  fact  that  most  of  the 
great  struggles  in  Europe  of  the  past  centuries  have  been 
too  far  removed  from  the  sea  to  have  the  latter  influence 
them  very  much. 

In  the  Crimean  War,  the  allies  found,  in  their  large 
fleets,  the  only  means  of  being  dangerous  to  Russia. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  England  would  never  have 
attained  the  subjugation  of  the  Boer  Republics  of  South 
Africa  without  the  mastery  of  the  sea.  She  owes  her  vic- 
tory to  her  surprising  performances  in  the  shipping  of 
large  bodies  of  troops  over  the  ocean.  In  this  particular 
the  English  bitterly  deceived  their  opponents. 

In  The  World  War,  had  Germany  been  able  to  master 
the  sea  she  would  have  won  without  a  shadow  of  a  doubt. 

During  the  various  phases  of  development  in  a  war 
the  great  value  of  co-operation  of  a  fleet  may  be  well  shown. 

One  of  the  first  things  the  Japanese  did  in  the  War 
of  1904  was  to  "bottle  up"  the  Russian  fleet  and  get  control 
of  the  China  Sea. 

To  show  how  distressing  may  be  the  influence  of  the 
loss  of  this  control,  we  have  but  to  refer  to  the  raid  of  the 
Vladivostok  squadron.  Although  tactically  defeated  by 
the  destruction  of  the  Japanese  vessels  bringing  over  rail- 
road rolling  stock  for  use  on  the  East  China  Railroad,  the 
fleet  delayed  the  advance  of  the  Japanese  army  for  over  a 
month. 

328 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  329 

In  1894  it  was  impossible  for  the  Japanese  to  advance 
farther  than  the  Yalu  until  after  the  destruction  of  the 
Chinese  fleet. 

And  in  The  World  War,  it  was  not  until  the  German 
grand  fleet  had  been  "bottled  up,"  and  all  auxiliary  craft 
had  been  captured  or  destroyed  that  the  allies  felt  at  all 
sure  as  to  its  ultimate  outcome. 

The  naval  operations  in  the  channel  and  the  North 
Sea  were  inseparably  connected  with  operations  on  land. 
While  we  cannot  state  with  certainty  the  object  of  the  "sally 
forth"  of  the  German  grand  fleet  that  resulted  in  the  battle 
of  Jutland,  yet  it  looks  very  much  like  it  was  an  attempted 
diversion  designed  to  get  the  minds  of  the  German  people 
off  of  the  fiasco  at  Verdun. 

For  the  "sally  forth"  came  almost  immediately  after 
the  French  strokes  at  Douaumont  and  Mort  Homme,  May 
22-28,  1916. 

The  psychological  effect  desired  by  the  great  general 
staff  was  to  create  a  feeling  in  the  minds  of  their  people 
that  there  were  still  several  trump  cards  to  be  played. 

The  German  navy  had  not  justified  itself,  for  its  duty 
had  been  to  clear  the  sea  of  allied  craft,  particularly  Eng- 
lish, and,  in  default  of  that,  at  least  to  make  sea  traffic 
so  precarious  that  the  allies  would  despair  of  oversea  as- 
sistance. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  German  naval  units  were 
scattered  over  the  various  parts  of  the  globe. 

Two  German  cruisers,  the  Goeben  and  the  Breslau, 
made  themselves  conspicuous  in  the  Mediterranean;  the 
Konigsberg  off  the  coast  of  Africa,  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der 
Grosse  in  the  South  Atlantic,  and  the  Emden  in  the  Indian 
Ocean  also  played  a  prominent  part.  All  of  these  vessels 
eventually  were  either  sunk,  captured  or  driven  from  the 
sea.  On  August  28,  1914,  a  portion  of  the  German  fleet 
ventured  out  and  attempted  unsuccessfully  to  lure  Admiral 
Beatty  onto  the  mine  fields  around  Heligoland  and  the  action 
which  took  the  name  of  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  occurred. 
On  January  24,  1915,  a  similar  engagement  took  place  off 
Dogger  Bank.  On  November  1,  1914,  Admiral  von  Spree, 
with  his  Pacific  fleet  from  Kiao-Chau,  engaged  Admiral 
Craddock's  British  fleet  off  the  coast  of  Chile  opposite  Cor- 


330  STRATEGY 

onel,  and  defeated  it,  but  in  turn  was  defeated  himself  on 
December  8th,  off  the  Falklands,  by  the  British  fleet  under 
Admiral  Sturdee. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  narrative  that  the  pres- 
tige of  the  German  navy  must  have  been  low  and  some 
action  had  to  be  taken  to  show  its  effectiveness. 

The  French  were  launching  a  sustained  offensive  at 
Verdun  while  the  British  were  preparing  (to  Germany's 
knowledge)  for  their  "bath  of  blood,"  historically  known 
as  the  "battle  of  the  Somme,"  so  some  diversion  was  nec- 
essary. 

FIRST  ASSISTANCE 

It  may  be  said  that  the  first  great  assistance  a  fleet  can 
give  is  to  clear  the  sea  of  hostile  craft. 

SECOND  GREAT  ASSISTANCE 

The  second  great  assistance  is  to  keep  the  sea  clear, 
or  at  least  reasonably  so.  This  is  done  by  "bottling  up" 
hostile  vessels,  by  patrol  work  and  by  convoy  duty. 

This  latter  duty  was  most  important  in  The  World  War 
and  was  quite  effectively  performed  by  destroyers,  conver- 
ted cruisers  and  U-boat  chasers. 

The  Gallipoli  expedition,  the  transport  of  troops  to  the 
western  front  from  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Canada,  United 
States  and  elsewhere  would  not  have  been  possible  without 
naval  assistance. 

In  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  when  it  was  learned  that 
the  Russians  had  crossed  the  Danube,  Suliman  Pasha's  army 
of  30,000  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Scutari,  Montenegro.  On 
July  16th,  it  embarked  in  20  transports  and  moved  around 
to  the  port  of  Enos  on  the  north  coast  of  the  Aegean  where 
it  arrived  on  the  19th.  From  there  the  army  proceeded  to 
Tirnova  by  rail  and  arrived  on  the  26th.  A  complete  trans- 
fer of  30,000  men  in  ten  days  which  could  not  have  been 
possible  without  the  co-operation  of  the  navy. 

THIRD  GREAT  ASSISTANCE 

A  very  important  and  indispensable  assistance  a  fleet 
can  render  land  forces  is  in  connection  with  advancing 
the  base. 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  331 

In  the  war  between  China  and  Japan  in  1894,  and  the 
war  between  the  Russians  and  Japanese  in  1904-05, 
we  see  how  useful  the  co-operation  of  the  navy  is  in  ad- 
vancing a  base  and  in  attaching  new  communications  if  the 
land  operations  happen  to  be  carried  on  near  the  coast. 

In  1813,  England,  on  account  of  her  absolute  mastery 
of  the  sea,  was  able  to  change  the  base  of  operations  of 
her  army  in  the  field  against  France  from  Lisbon  to  San- 
tander  (north  coast  of  Spain)  in  one  move.  In  the  Italian 
campaign  of  1859,  the  moving  of  a  large  part  of  the 
French  army  from  Marseilles  to  Genoa  brought  to  a  stand- 
still the  offensive  operations  that  Austria  started  against 
Sardinia.  The  development  of  the  railroad  has  greatly  re- 
duced the  importance  of  the  fleets  in  this  respect,  but  has 
not  entirely  removed  it. 

The  command  of  the  sea,  which  permits  the  land  forces 
of  the  power  possessing  it  to  support  themselves  at  every 
point  along  the  coast  that  offers  a  good  harbor,  is  as  val- 
uable to  the  defender  as  it  is  to  the  attacker. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  be  sufficient  to  show  the 
great  importance  that  the  positive  command  of  the  Baltic 
Sea  gave  Germany  in  her  struggle  with  the  allies.  In  the 
Polish  theater,  the  German  armies,  in  case  of  necessity, 
could  fall  back  on  Konigsberg  or  Danzig  instead  of  merely 
in  a  westerly  direction  toward  the  Oder. 

BERNHARDI 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  read  from  Bern- 
hardi  "On  War,"  written  in  1913 :  "If  Germany  should  once 
be  forced  to  conduct  an  offensive  war  against  Russia,  it 
would  be  of  the  utmost  importance  for  her  to  gain  un- 
disputed command  of  the  Baltic.  She  could  then  completely 
paralyze  maritime  traffic  on  the  Russian  coast,  thus  pre- 
venting imports  of  war  material  from  other  states  like 
England  and  France,  by  sea  at  least;  she  would  oblige  the 
adversary  to  use  a  considerable  number  of  troops  for  pro- 
tecting the  coast  and  securing  St.  Petersburg,  which  would 
be  directly  menaced ;  she  could,  lastly,  carry  out  a  very  bold 
offensive  on  land,  if  she  were  able  to  base  herself  partly 
on  the  coast. 


332  STRATEGY 

"If  her  fleet  commanded  the  great  Russian  Baltic  ports 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  permit  men  and  war  material  to 
be  landed  there,  and  to  join  thence  the  field  army,  the 
German  army  would  have  the  chance  of  advancing  along 
the  coast,  enveloping  from  the  north  all  Russian  armies 
operating  in  the  western  provinces  of  the  country,  partly 
interrupting  and  partly  threatening  their  lines  of  commun- 
ications with  St.  Petersburg,  and  pushing  these  armies 
ultimately  in  a  southern  direction. 

"The  fleet  in  such  case  would  enable  the  army  to  make 
its  attack  in  the  decisive  direction,  thus  very  materially  con- 
tributing to  a  decisive  victory. 

"The  fleet  should  therefore  seek  as  soon  as  ever  for  a 
decisive  issue  with  the  Russian  fleet,  to  beat  it,  and  blockade 
its  remnants  in  their  places  of  refuge.  This  success  must 
immediately  be  followed  up  by  blockading  the  Russian  Bal- 
tic coast  and  by  the  capture  of  the  most  important  har- 
bors. 

"The  fleet  would  be  of  similar  importance,  if,  in  a  sep- 
arate war  between  Germany  and  France,  a  German  attack 
was  conducted  through  Belgium. 

"In  this  case,  too,  a  German  offensive  could  act  with 
the  utmost  strategic  freedom  if  the  French  fleet  were  beaten, 
and  the  Germans  commanded  the  sea  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  allow  the  German  land  forces  to  base  themselves  at 
least  on  the  coast." 

FOURTH  GREAT  ASSISTANCE 

The  fourth  great  assistance  that  the  fleet  can  render 
is  in  protecting  the  coast.  Seacoast  defenses  are  not  so 
necessary  if  a  country  has  a  large  fleet  and  controls  the  sea. 

So  long  as  Turkey  was  able  to  control  the  Black  Sea 
and  close  the  Dardanelles,  it  was  a  matter  of  small  con- 
sequence whether  she  fortified  Constantinople  or  not. 

So  long  as  England  controls  by  sea  St.  George  Chan- 
nel, the  North  Sea  and  the  English  Channel,  she  need  not 
worry  about  land  defenses  other  than  against  aircraft. 

But  a  country  must  do  one  of  two  things — it  must 
either  maintain  its  supremacy  at  sea  or  else  fortify  its  coast 
so  that  its  smaller  fleet  will  have  a  place  of  refuge  in  event 
of  the  enemy  descending  upon  it  with  superior  numbers. 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  333 

The  nation  that  does  not  fortify  its  coasts  is  apt  to 
be  confronted  with  the  proposition  of  holding  its  navy  at 
home  in  order  to  prevent  an  enemy's  cruisers  from  blowing 
up  the  unfortified  towns. 

To  defeat  the  enemy,  not  only  on  land  but  on  sea,  we 
must  go  after  his  main  hostile  organization  with  superior 
numbers.  By  so  doing  we  may  have  to  denude  our  coasts 
of  the  necessary  protective  naval  craft. 

The  result  is  that  suddenly  a  few  converted  cruisers 
appear  off  our  coasts  and  bombard  our  defenseless  citizens. 
We  have  a  recent  illustration  of  this  in  England.  A  country 
must  have  fortified  coaling  stations  and  harbors  not  only 
at  home,  but  scattered  all  over  the  world,  in  order  to  form 
havens  of  refuge  for  its  defeated  vessels  unless  it  wants 
its  naval  and  commercial  strength  wiped  from  the  face 
of  the  earth.  The  nation  whose  aggregate  of  war  vessels 
does  not  amount  up  to  a  total  which  can  justify  confidence 
in  their  beating  the  fleets  opposed  to  them  under  all  possible 
contingencies,  in  discussing  the  problems  which  arise  in 
the  art  of  naval  warfare  cannot  ignore  the  position  of  the 
weaker  side. 

To  such  nations,  the  possession  of  maritime  fortresses 
afford  a  guarantee  that  their  navy  will  not  be  wiped  out 
at  the  outset  and  their  shores  be  the  prey  of  any  craft 
with  a  gun  that  may  come  along. 

FIFTH  GREAT  ASSISTANCE 

The  fifth  great  assistance  a  fleet  can  render  to  a  field 
army  is  blockading  the  enemy's  coast  so  as  to  cut  off 
supplies  from  the  outside.  No  nation  depends  solely  upon 
its  own  resources  for  its  supply  of  peace  or  war  materials, 
including  munitions,  food,  clothing,  etc. 

If  the  fleet  can  prevent  their  introduction,  it  indirectly 
will  assist  the  field  forces  to  the  greatest  extent. 

Although  Germany  hesitates  to  admit  it,  yet  the  hos- 
tile blockade  had  as  much  to  do  with  bringing  her  to  her 
knees  as  anything  else. 

Where  two  forces  are  approximately  equal,  victory 
will  finally  fall  to  the  one  that  remains  master  of  the 
sea.  The  latter  exhausts  the  financial  resources  of  the 


334  STRATEGY 

former  by  destroying  his  commerce  and  interrupting  all 
trans-marine  intercourse,  thus  undermining  his  military 
power  also. 

The  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports  had  as  much  to 
do  with  bringing  the  Civil  War  to  a  close  as  anything  else. 

After  the  defeat  of  her  dynastic  armies  in  1870,  France 
never  would  have  been  able  to  organize  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  had  not  the  sea  been  open  for  her  use. 

Had  the  two  military  forces  been  anywhere  near  equal 
in  efficiency,  Germany  would  have  been  defeated. 

The  loss  of  Spain's  colonial  possessions  was  contem- 
poraneous with  the  decline  of  her  navy. 

As  long  as  the  fleet  of  Turkey  controlled  the  Levant, 
she  had  no  trouble  maintaining  her  supremacy,  but  when, 
as  a  result  of  the  War  of  Grecian  Liberation  her  fleet 
was  wiped  out  by  the  combined  fleets  of  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Russia  at  Navarino  Octobsr  20,  1827,  she 
became  easy  prey  to  the  Russians  in  1828-29.  In  the 
Crimean  War,  Turkey  was  about  to  lose  control  of  the  sea, 
and  had  she  done  so,  the  story  of  that  war  would  have 
been  the -same  as  the  previous  one  with  Russia.  However, 
the  intervention  of  Great  Britain  and  France  restored  the 
control  and  the  Russians  were  defeated.  In  1878,  Turkey's 
control  of  the  Aegean  enabled  her  to  throw  troops  from 
Montenegro  and  Albania  to  Thessaly  and,  had  she  in  any 
way  been  prepared  for  the  conflict,  the  outcome  might 
have  been  different.  As  it  was  she  prolonged  the  war 
far  beyond  what  she  could  have  done  had  she  not  con- 
trolled the  sea. 

SIXTH  GREAT  ASSISTANCE 

In  the  tactical  battle,  if  a  flank  rests  on  the  sea,  the 
force  whose  nation  controls  it  has  a  great  advantage.  It 
was  a  most  decided  advantage  to  the  allies  in  Flanders  to 
have  their  left  flank  protected  by  the  fleet.  The  defenses 
of  Lisbon  and  Constantinople  would  be  worthless  without 
control  of  the  sea.  Control  of  the  sea  enabled  the  Japanese 
to  turn  the  left  of  the  Russians  at  Nanshan  Hill. 

At  Alma,  in  the  operations  in  Flanders  on  the  part  of 
the  allies,  and  in  the  final  campaign  in  Italy  in  1918  the 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  335 

control  of  the  sea  rendered  secure  the  flank  of  the  at- 
tacking army. 

Land  forces  also  assist  the  navy  in  their  operations 
against  hostile  fleets,  particularly  when  the  latter  become 
bottled  up  in  a  harbor.  In  the  struggle  between  China 
and  Japan,  the  Chinese  fleet,  worsted  in  the  Bay  of  Korea, 
sought  refuge  in  Wei-hai-wei  and  a  Japanese  army  had 
to  be  landed  on  the  shores  of  Shantung  to  assist  in  the 
destruction.  A  similar  situation  arose  at  Santiago,  in  the 
Spanish-American  War,  1898,  at  Port  Arthur,  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  1904-05,  and  at  Tsing  Tau  in  1914. 

OVERSEA  EXPEDITIONS 

Descents  upon  a  hostile  coast,  if  opposed,  have  a  very 
small  chance  of  success,  particularly  in  modern  times.  It 
is  true  that  the  landing  may  be  made,  but  getting  away 
from  the  coast  is  the  difficulty. 

The  initial  operation  will  be  carried  out  in  some  more 
or  less  open  bay  where  boats  can  be  beached. 

The  feasibility  of  the  operation  depends  greatly  on  the 
weather  and  direction  of  the  wind. 

The  commander  of  the  expedition  has  considerable  lib- 
erty of  action  and  initiative,  and  can  conceal  his  place  of 
true  landing  by  feints  at  other  points. 

Difficulty,  however,  will  arise  first  from  the  fact  that 
it  will  be  almost  impossible  to  keep  his  point  of  landing 
a  secret. 

The  introduction  of  the  modern  means  of  obtaining 
and  transmitting  information  have  greatly  assisted  the  de- 
fender, and  with  modern  transportation  methods,  he  is  able 
to  move  troops  to  the  danger  point  in  time  to  stop  the 
invader.  The  increase  in  the  precision  and  range  of  guns 
is  another  invaluable  assistance. 

The  landing  force  is  at  a  decided  tactical  disadvantage 
in  that  it  is  on  interior  lines  and  is  subjected  to  a  con- 
verging fire  that  can  be  carefully  registered  on  known 
objects  beforehand,  while,  in  return,  its  own  fire  is  di- 
verging and  not  as  accurately  delivered. 


336  STRATEGY 

BASE 

The  establishment  of  the  advance  base  is  a  great  dif- 
ficulty, for  the  point  selected  for  landing  will  be  chosen  on 
account  of  features  that  are  not  at  all  important  in  select- 
ing the  site  for  a  base. 

The  original  expedition  must  be  limited  in  numbers 
and  the  home  base  may  be  at  a  distance,  so  that  it  will 
be  difficult  to  transport  reinforcements  and  supplies  fast 
enough  to  make  up  for  the  consumption  if  the  enemy  is 
active. 

ABOUKIR  BAY 

"One  of  the  most  remarkable  examples  of  a  disem- 
barkation in  modern  times  carried  out  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy  is  furnished  by  Sir  R.  Abercromby's  achievement 
in  Aboukir  Bay.  His  force  consisted  of  some  16,000  men, 
with,  however,  scarcely  any  horses — there  was  practically 
no  cavalry,  and  the  artillery  during  the  subsequent  move 
on  Alexandria  was  hauled  along  by  hand.  The  transports 
were  lying  for  six  days  off  the  coast  before  the  weather 
permitted  boats  to  reach  the  shore.  In  consequence  of  this, 
there  had  been  time  for  a  force  of  2,000  men,  under  Friant, 
to  be  despatched  to  the  bay  by  General  Menou;  that  com- 
mander has  indeed  been  severely  and  probably  not  un- 
justly blamed  for  not  sending  more.  The  French  troops 
were  drawn  up  in  a  semi-circle  on  the  sand  hills  command- 
ing the  beach,  while  their  guns  had  been  placed  in  battery 
on  a  lofty  bluff  that  dominated  its  whole  extent.  The  re- 
sult was  that  the  British  general  was  confronted  with  the 
task  of  not  only  getting  his  men  ashore  but  assailing  a 
strong  position  held  by  veteran  troops. 

"At  9 :00  in  the  morning  of  the  day  of  the  battle,  signal 
was  made  for  the  boats  of  the  fleet,  each  of  them  con- 
taining 50  soldiers,  to  advance  toward  shore.  The  scene 
in  the  bay  at  once  became  one  of  intense  animation.  Under 
the  command  of  Captain  Cochrane,  the  whole  of  the  troop 
boats  made  for  the  shore  formed  up  in  two  lines. 

"Armed  craft  sustained  their  flanks.  Launches  con- 
taining field  artillery,  with  seamen  to  work  the  guns,  ac- 
companied the  boats. 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  337 

"Bomb  vessels  and  sloops  of  war  stood  in  close  to  the 
shore  with  their  broadsides  ready. 

"The  landing  force  consisted  of  about  5,000  men,  no 
more  being  sent  in  the  first  party,  due  to  lack  of  accommo- 
dations. This  brings  out  the  greatest  weakness  of  a  land- 
ing and  that  is  the  fact  that  boat  facilities  will  seldom 
be  sufficient  for  all  the  troops  available  to  land  at  one 
and  the  same  time. 

"No  sooner  had  the  first  boats  come  within  range  of 
Friant's  guns  than  a  heavy  fire  was  opened.  Several  boats 
were  sunk.  The  sailors  pulling  eagerly  at  the  oars,  the 
infantry  huddled  between  the  seats  suffered  appreciable 
losses  during  those  terrible  moments  when  the  boats  were 
traveling  the  zone  of  fire.  The  landing  party  came  on  with 
the  precision  of  the  comic  opera  stage  and  scarcely  had  the 
bows  touched  ground  when  the  men  rushed  ashore.  The 
two  leading  regiments  quickly  deployed  and  rushed  the 
French  cavalry  which  at  one  time  threatened  to  roll  up  the 
first  detachment.  Seeing  the  futility  of  trying  to  hold 
back  this  force,  now  that  it  had  gained  foothold  on  the 
shore,  General  Friant  ordered  a  withdrawal.  This  rather 
brilliant  piece  of  work  could  hardly  be  accomplished  today 
in  the  face  of  the  modern  field  artillery  and  magazine 
rifles. 

"In  the  days  that  this  landing  was  made  muskets  only 
carried  about  100  yards  and  grape  began  to  lose  its  effect 
at  a  range  over  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  The  landing  party 
only  suffered  loss  when  it  was  close  inshore." 

In  modern  times,  as  has  been  stated,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  make  feints  at  landing  at  several  places  in  order  to 
deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  true  point  and  then  to  land 
at  some  point  where  little  or  no  resistance  is  encountered. 
In  1898,  General  Shafter's  army,  destined  to  act  against 
Santiago,  carried  out  its  actual  disembarkation  at  Daiquiri, 
15  miles  east  of  the  harbor  mouth;  but  a  demonstration 
was  made  at  the  same  time  at  Cabanas,  three  miles  west 
of  the  harbor,  where  boats  were  loaded  as  if  intended  to 
put  off  for  shore,  and  every  means  was  taken  to  induce 
the  belief  among  the  Spanish  forces  that  this  was  the 
chosen  landing  place. 


338  STRATEGY 

When  Charles  XII,  in  1700,  was  preparing  a  descent 
upon  the  Island  of  Zealand,  the  military  commander,  Gen- 
eral Stuart;  made  a  secret  reconnaissance  of  the  coast  and 
decided  upon  the  point  at  which  the  landing  was  to  take 
place.  He  then  ostentatiously  examined  several  other  lo- 
calities which  were  obviously  well  adapted  for  purposes  of 
military  disembarkation.  This  induced  the  Danes  to  scat- 
ter their  forces  along  the  shore,  so  that,  when  the  Swedish 
landing  parties  began  to  arrive  in  their  boats,  there  were 
no  Danish  troops  actually  present  on  the  spot  to  meet 
them. 

The  rule  that  descents  upon  the  shores  of  highly  cul- 
tivated and  densely  populated  sections  are  failures  generally 
is  subject  to  the  exception  that  if  the  landing  is  made  con- 
temporaneous with  a  popular  uprising,  the  invader  may 
look  for  sufficient  reinforcements  to  take  advantage  of  his 
hold  on  the  coast.  Otherwise  it  is  a  case  of  "I  came,  I 
saw,  I  went  away." 

Exceptions  occur  when  there  is  an  important  object 
lying  on  the  seacoast,  the  possession  of  which  exercises  a 
considerable  influence  on  the  course  of  the  war. 

The  cases  of  Sebastopol,  in  1854,  and  Port  Arthur  in 
1904,  are  examples  that  naturally  come  to  mind.  The 
presence  of  the  fleet  within  the  harbor,  while  rendering 
it  more  difficult  of  capture,  yet  with  the  capture  of  the 
harbor  and  destruction  of  the  fleet,  the  enemy  was  so 
crippled  that  he  was  about  ready  for  peace.  In  both  cases 
the  Russian  supremacy  was  mortally  crippled  by  the  loss 
of  their  principal  port  and  the  destruction  of  their  fleet, 
without  both  of  which  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  hope 
for  ultimate  victory. 

Political  considerations  may  materially  heighten  the 
importance  of  landing  expeditions,  especially  if  they  are 
directed  toward  an  important  town  or  capital  on  the  sea. 
The  rapid  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz  brought  about  the  over- 
throw of  Huerta;  the  capture  of  Santiago  by  Shafter 
brought  about  the  peace  of  Paris  of  1898. 

Colonial  wars  and  conflicts  with  nations  of  inferior 
military  development  in  distant  parts  of  the  world  are 
the  ordinary  field  of  landing  expeditions.  A  small  force 
of  well  disciplined  and  well  equipped  European  troops 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  339 

making  a  landing  have  been  the  means  of  forcing  some 
smaller  country  to  comply  with  treaty  obligations,  or  to 
settle  political  quarrels.  We  have  several  illustrations  in 
our  own  dealings  with  South  and  Central  American  re- 
publics. The  forts  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-Ho  have  been 
seized  on  two  occasions  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  China 
to  give  the  foreigners  the  treatment  that  their  political 
contracts  provided  for. 

General  Allenby's  control  of  the  sea  made  possible  his 
Philistia-Judea  campaign.  It  afforded  a  good  resting  place 
for  Allenby's  left  flank  and  enabled  him  to  maneuver  with 
his  right  flank  and  change  his  base  as  he  advanced. 

MOVING  THE  ADVANCE  BASE  FORWARD 

Aside  from  the  indirect  support  given  to  an  army  by 
the  navy  controlling  the  sea  and  thereby  rendering  it  pos- 
sible to  get  supplies,  the  navy  may  contribute  directly  to 
the  success  of  the  advance  by  supporting  one  or  both  flanks 
in  case  of  an  advance  along  the  coast. 

Without  the  assistance  of  the  navy,  the  Japanese  would 
not  have  been  able  to  advance,  as  they  did,  to  the  line  of  the 
Yalu. 

The  fleet  supported  the  allied  right  at  the  battle  of 
Alma  to  the  extent  that  the  allies  merely  had  to  pay  atten- 
tion to  their  left  flank.  A  similar  situation  occurred  during 
The  World  War  at  the  battle  of  Vittorio  Veneto.  The  Italian 

JAPANESE  LANDING  IN  MANCHURIA 

The  details  of  this  operation  are  best  illustrated  by  the 
following  quotations : 

"The  victory  of  the  Yalu  had  cleared  the  air,  and  had 
relieved  the  Japanese  Imperial  headquarters  of  much 
anxiety.  East  and  west  had  met  for  the  first  time  under 
equal  conditions  of  armament  and  organization,  and  all  the 
moral  effects  of  success  in  the  first  encounter  was  with 
the  army  of  Japan. 

"General  Kuroki  was  able  to  hold  his  own ;  the  occupa- 
tion of  Korea,  the  first  objective  of  the  campaign,  was 
assured;  and  the  Imperial  headquarters  could  now  turn  its 
attention  toward  Port  Arthur. 


340  STRATEGY 

"The  early  success  of  her  fleet  had  given  Japan  tem- 
porary command  of  the  sea,  and  had  enabled  her  to  land  her 
troops  in  Korea  unmolested,  but  as  long  as  the  Russian 
naval  base  of  Port  Arthur,  and  the  fleet  that  had  taken 
refuge  there,  remained  effective,  there  was  no  permanent 
security  for  the  Japanese  over  the  sea  communications; 
for  the  dockyard  afforded  the  necessary  means  of  repairing 
the  damaged  Russian  ships,  and  the  announcement  of  the 
intended  despatch  of  the  Baltic  fleet  to  eastern  waters  was 
evidently  more  than  a  mere  threat. 

"To  blockade  Port  Arthur,  and,  at  the  same  time,  hold 
off  the  Baltic  fleet,  was  a  task  even  beyond  Togo's  power 
to  perform,  and  the  Russian  fleet  in  the  far  East  must  be 
dealt  with  before  Admiral  Rojestvenski  could  arrive  from 
Europe. 

"The  Japanese  victory  on  the  Yalu  was  the  signal  for 
a  general  movement  of  troops  by  sea  to  the  shores  of  the 
Liao-Tung  Peninsula. 

"While  General  Kuroki  had  been  deploying  his  troops 
of  the  First  Army  upon  the  frontier  of  Korea,  the  Second 
Army  under  General  Baron  Oku,  consisting  of  the  1st,  3d 
and  -4th  Divisions  and  the  1st  Artillery  Brigade,  had  been 
quietly  shipped  from  Japan  to  Chinampo,  where  it  now 
lay  on  board  some  eighty  transports,  whose  moorings  along 
the  Taitong  River  occupied  about  18  miles  of  water. 

"Orders  for  the  mobilization  of  the  Second  Army  had 
been  issued  on  the  6th  of  March,  and  by  the  end  of  that 
month  the  units  assembled  at  the  appointed  ports  of  em- 
barkation, whence,  as  transports  became  available,  they 
sailed  to  the  rendezvous  at  Chinampo  in  groups  of  four 
or  five  ships.  Though  not  actually  under  convoy,  each 
transport  carried  a  naval  officer  and  a  complement  of  sig- 
nalmen, who  communicated  at  fixed  points  with  the  cruisers 
protecting  the  route. 

"The  destination  of  this  force,  which  was  ultimately 
to  form  the  left  wing  of  the  converging  movement  on  Liao- 
Yang,  was  a  point  on  the  coast  line  at  no  great  distance 
from  Port  Arthur,  the  isolation  of  which  fortress  was  the 
immediate  task  assigned  to  General  Oku." 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  341 

LANDING  PLACE 

In  determining  the  exact  locality  of  the  landing  place, 
questions  of  the  nature  and  configuration  of  the  coast  and 
the  facilities  for  safeguarding  the  disembarkation  were 
the  main  factors  involved. 

DESCRIPTION  OF  COAST  LINE 

The  coast  line  between  the  Bay  of  Talien  and  Takusan, 
within  which  zone,  in  accordance  with  the  strategic  plan, 
the  landing  must  be  effected,  is  ill-suited  for  the  purpose, 
the  water  being  very  shoal,  and  the  coast  possessing  no 
sheltered  anchorage  at  a  convenient  distance  from  the  shore. 

Other  considerations  favored  a  disembarkation  in  the 
western,  rather  than  in  the  eastern  section  of  the  coast  line 
chosen,  since  the  foreshore  toward  Ta-Lein-Wan  is  better, 
the  currents  weaker,  and  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  tide  less 
than  in  the  neighborhood  of  Takusan. 

Moreover,  toward  Port  Arthur  there  are  several  groups 
of  islands  suitable  as  points  of  assembly  for  transports, 
and  the  future  movements  of  the  Second  Army  would  be 
considerably  facilitated  by  a  close  approach  to  the  fortress, 
although  the  danger  of  attack  by  sea  would  be  propor- 
tionately greater. 

Everything  pointed  to  a  landing  at  Pi-Tzu-Wo,  whera 
the  Japanese  1st  Division  had  landed  in  1894;  but  that 
place  suffers  from  the  usual  disadvantage  of  the  southern 
coast  of  Manchuria,  for  the  foreshore  shelves  very  grad- 
ually, and  extensive  mud  flats,  nearly  two  miles  wide,  are 
exposed  at  low  water.  For  these  reasons  Pi-Tzu-Wo  itself 
was  rejected,  and  Hou-Tu-Shih,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Ta-Sha-Ho,  where  water  is  deeper,  was  selected. 

This  spot,  chosen  from  the  chart,  had  not  been  recon- 
noitered  in  peacetime,  and  to  have  done  so  after  the  open- 
ing of  hostilities  would  have  attracted  the  attention  of  the 
Russians,  who  had  a  force  only  some  18  miles  distant  at 
Pu-Lan-Tien,  and  another  at  Chin-Chaou,  about  25  miles 
from  Yen-Tai  Bay. 

The  Japanese  general  staff,  however,  was  no  doubt 
aware  from  Admiral  Togo's  report  that  the  Chin-Chaou 
force  was  engaged  in  fortifying  the  Isthmus  of  Nanshan, 
from  which  fact  it  was  reasonable  to  infer  that  any  offen- 


342  STRATEGY 

sive  movement  or  active  defense  from  that  direction  was 
not  contemplated  by  the  Russians.  In  fact  the  nearest 
Russian  force,  from  which  serious  opposition  might  have 
been  forthcoming,  was  100  miles  distant,  at  Ta-Shih-Chiao. 

To  minimize  all  risks  from  the  Russian  fleet,  the  Jap- 
anese fleet  transferred  its  base  from  the  Korean  coast  to  the 
Elliot  Islands,  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  place  of  landing, 
and  a  third  attempt  to  block  the  exit  of  Port  Arthur  was 
made  on  the  night  of  the  2d  and  3d  of  May,  after  which 
Admiral  Togo  was  able  to  report  that  "the  harbor  entrance 
appears  to  have  been  completely  blocked  to  the  passage  of 
cruisers  and  larger  vessels."  Since  destroyers  could  pass 
out,  and  as  the  probability  of  a  torpedo  attack  on  the  trans- 
ports had  been  acknowledged,  further  precautions  were 
necessary  to  reduce  the  danger. 

All  available  destroyers  and  torpedo  boats,  to  the  num- 
ber of  about  60,  were  stationed  off  Port  Arthur,  or  between 
that  fort  and  the  intended  anchorage,  which  was  further 
protected  by  booms,  nets,  dummy  mines,  patrol  boats,  and 
guard  ships  at  anchor,  blocking  the  fairway  between  the 
main  land  and  the  Elliot  Islands,  a  distance  of  nearly 
eight  miles. 

On  the  3d  of  May,  the  first  group  of  16  transports 
sailed  from  the  Taitong  River,  timed  to  arrive  off  Hou-Tu- 
Shih  at  daylight  on  the  4th. 

Two  cruisers  led  the  line,  others  held  position  on  the 
exposed  flank,  and  one  brought  up  the  rear.  The  fleet  was 
delayed  by  boisterous  weather,  and  obliged  to  shelter  under 
the  lee  of  the  Elliot  Islands  from  3:00  PM,  on  the  4th 
until  6:00  AM,  on  the  6th,  when  it  sailed  for  Hou-Tu-Shih, 
where  a  few  Cossacks  were  observed,  but  the  Russians 
offered  no  resistance  either  by  sea  or  by  land.  As  the 
transports  approached  the  coast,  they  were  drawn  up  in 
three  lines,  and  were  taken  to  their  anchorage  close  inshore 
where,  even  if  the  ships  were  sunk,  their  upper  works 
would  remain  above  water. 

THE  LANDING 

At  7 :20  AM,  on  the  5th  of  May,  a  naval  landing  party, 
consisting  of  six  officers  and  about  1,000  men,  who  had  come 
from  Chinampo  in  two  improvised  cruisers,  reached  the 
shore  and  took  up  a  covered  position. 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  343 

On  their  signal,  a  battalion  of  the  3d  Division,  already 
in  the  boats,  pushed  off  from  the  ships,  closely  followed 
by  the  military  landing  staff. 

As  soon  as  the  covering  position  had  been  occupied  by 
the  naval  party  a  flag  was  hoisted,  and  the  boats  at  once 
proceeded  to  the  shore,  the  infantry  replacing  the  sailors 
who  were  then  withdrawn. 

As  more  troops  of  the  3d  Division  reached  the  beach, 
infantry  and  cavalry  were  added  to  the  covering  force, 
which  now  comprised  portions  of  the  two  divisions.  The 
fighting  units  of  the  3d  Division  were  disembarked  by  the 
llth  in  the  evening,  and  those  of  the  1st  Division  by  the 
13th.  On  the  8th  of  May,  General  Oku  and  the  head- 
quarters of  the  2d  Army  landed  and,  on  the  10th,  the  4th 
Division  began  to  disembark,  its  point  of  assembly  being  the 
village  of  Ma-Chai-Tun.  Although  a  strong  south  wind 
was  blowing,  and  the  sea  ran  high,  the  work  of  disem- 
barking was  carried  on  day  and  night,  the  transports  sail- 
ing independently  for  Japan  as  soon  as  they  were  cleared. 

About  3,000  yards  of  shore  was  available.  The  trans- 
ports had  to  be  about  three  miles  off  the  shore.  There 
was  no  shelter  from  the  prevailing  -winds,  while  close  in- 
shore there  were  many  rocks. 

At  high  water  the  troops  landed  at  wharves,  con 
structed  in  the  first  instance  by  the  engineer  battalion  and 
subsequently  by  civilian  carpenters  brought  from  Japan. 
At  low  water  the  lighters  were  grounded  and  the  troops 
waded  ashore,  the  guns  and  wagons  being  run  along  planks 
over  the  sterns  or  sides  of  the  lighters  and  hauled  ashore ; 
the  ammunition  was  carried. 

By  the  13th,  the  three  divisions  with  their  artillery 
and  cavalry  were  all  ashore.  The  1st  Division  held  a  posi- 
tion from  Ma-Chia-Chang  to  the  Li-Lan-Ho  to  Chih-Chia- 
Fang.  The  3d  Division  continued  the  line  to  the  north. 
The  4th  Division  was  in  the  center. 

The  2d  Army  had  taken  the  field  without  either  field 
hospitals,  supply  or  ammunition  columns,  which  were  to 
follow  on  the  next  voyage  of  the  transports  from  the 
Taitong  River.  The  cableship  which  completed  the  ex- 
tention  of  the  cable  from  An-Tung,  thus  establishing  direct 


344  STRATEGY 

telegraphic  communications  with  the  Imperial  headquar- 
ters at  Tokio,  brought  up  the  rear. 

DARDANELLES 

The  expeditionary  force*  with  the  French  contingent, 
consisted  of  the  equivalent  of  three  British  corps.  The 
general  plan  for  landing  was  to  disembark  forces  at  sev- 
eral places  on  the  point  of  the  peninsula  which  would  fight 
their  way  toward  Achi-Baba  while  the  main  force  would 
land  on  the  Gulf  of  Saros  coast  near  Gaba  Tepe  and  en- 
deavor to  seize  the  pass  leading  to  Maidos.  Most  all  of 
the  ridges  and  hills  have  their  apexes  toward  the  Gulf 
of  Saros,  which  was  an  advantage  to  a  force  attacking  from 
the  direction  of  Gaba  Tepe  in  that  the  field  of  fire  from 
these  positions  was  restricted. 

From  the  nature  of  the  peninsula,  the  surprise  fea- 
ture was  eliminated.  This  was  in  no  way  due  to  the  naval 
attacks  of  February  and  March. 

When  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  arrived  at  Tenedos,  on  March 
17th,  he  found  that  the  transports  had  been  improperly 
loaded,  so  they  had  to  put  back  to  Alexandria.  Lemnos 
was  chosen  as  an  advance  base  and  transports  began  to 
arrive  about  the  middle  of  April  in  the  Bay  of  Mudros, 
where  the  men  were  practiced  in  the  tactics  of  debarkation. 

Germany  was  well  aware  of  the  British  intentions, 
even  to  the  extent,  it  is  thought,  of  knowing  the  exact  points 
of  landing. 

Sunday  morning,  the  25th  of  April,  was  the  day  of  the 
first  attack.  At  about  1 :00  o'clock  in  the  morning  the 
transports  arrived,  in  the  mist,  five  miles  off  the  coast.  The 
troops  disembarked  in  small  boats  towed  by  steam  pinnaces. 
Destroyers  towed  the  boats  carrying  the  Australians,  who 
were  to  land  at  Gabe  Tepe. 

As  the  Australians  leaped  into  the  shallow  water  at 
about  5:00  AM,  the  entire  hillside  fairly  blazed  with  fire. 

Farther  south  under  cover  of  fire  from  the  cruisers 
the  landing  was  made  by  the  other  parties  and  the  ridges 
were  seized. 

The  .French  had  landed  at  Kum  Kale  according  to 
orders,  but  the  British  who  had  landed  near  Sedd-el-Eahr 
were  held  to  the  beach. 


CO-OPERATION  OF  ARMY  AND  NAVY  345 

This  battle  of  the  landing  had  been  a  success  in  so 
far  as  getting  ashore  was  concerned,  but  eventually  the 
British  had  to  withdraw  entirely  from  the  peninsula  and 
to  acknowledge  that  the  expedition,  on  the  whole,  had  been 
a  failure. 

The  expedition  undoubtedly  was  a  valuable  diversion 
in  favor  of  the  Suez  and  also  had  a  salutary  effect  on  the 
budding  Mohammedan  uprising.  However,  as  a  descent  it 
was  a  failure,  as  the  expedition  in  its  strict  sense  did  not 
really  leave  the  coast. 

DIVERGENT  AND  CONTINGENT  OR  SUBSIDIARY  DESCENTS 

A  contingent  (or  subsidiary)  descent  is  one  that  con- 
tributes to  the  main  operations  by  holding  superior  forces 
of  the  enemy  at  a  distance  from  the  point  where  the  main 
issue  is  to  be  settled,  or  causes  a  detachment  from  the  hos- 
tile main  army  to  meet  the  descent.  In  other  words,  it 
must  be  a  justified  exception  to  the  second  principle  of 
detachments. 

A  divergent  descent  is  one  in  which  success  or  failure 
has  no  bearing  on  the  ultimate  outcome  of  the  main  issue. 
An  oversea  expedition  falling  within  the  first  named  classi- 
fication is  justifiable,  but  one  falling  within  the  second  one 
is  not. 

The  Gallipoli  expedition  was  of  a  contingent  nature, 
and  only  failed  due  to  bad  tactical  handling.  The  British 
expeditions  to  South  America  while  Napoleon  was  at  war 
on  the  Continent  in  1805-06  were  divergent,  as  they  did  not 
prevent  Napoleon  from  overthrowing  Austria  and  Prussia, 
allies  of  Great  Britain,  when  the  last  named  was  supposed 
to  help. 

CONCLUSION 

The  principles  set  forth  herein  are  general  and  merely 
point  out  the  route.  They  are  the  A  B  C's  of  the  subject, 
but  if  the  main  points  are  understood  the  student  will  be 
benefited  in  the  long  run,  even  if  he  drops  the  subject  after- 
wards. 

In  these  days  when  the  professional  soldier  seems  to 
be  so  much  of  a  "Pariah"  in  the  eyes  of  democracy,  it 
behooves  us  all  to  strive  to  elevate  the  military  profession 


346  STRATEGY 

as  much  as  we  can,  so  that  we,  at  least,  will  have  the  satis- 
faction of  knowing  that  it  is  really  an  art  that  cannot  be 
picked  up  over  night  by  the  pseudo-Napoleons,  who,  confident 
of  their  own  strength  and  in  the  valor  of  their  ignorance, 
maintain  that  a  professional  soldier  is  a  needless  expense. 


A  Brief  Summary  of  Strategical  Principles 


1.  What  is  the  first  principle  of  strategy? 

2.  When  should  a  geographical  point,  not  the  main  hostile 
army,  be  the  objective? 

3.  What  is  the  second  principle  of  strategy? 

4.  Under  what  two  conditions  are  detachments  justifiable? 

5.  What  is  the  difference  between  mobilization  and  con- 
centration ? 

6.  What  is  the  difference  between  the  strategical  offensive 
and  defensive  and  when  should  each  be  adopted? 

7.  Define  strategy. 

8.  Define  tactics. 

9.  What  combinations  bring  about  the  greatest  results 
and  what  the  least? 

10.  In  what  two  cases  is  one  justified  in  combining  the 
strategical  offensive  with  the  tactical  defensive? 

11.  What  is  the  difference  between  an  operation  and  a 
campaign  ? 

12.  What  is  the  von  Moltkean  concentration? 

13.  What  is  the  Napoleonic  concentration? 

14.  Describe  the  following  methods  of  advance: 
•(a)   Parallel  column. 

(b)  Convergent  advance. 

(c)  Divergent  advance. 

15.  When  would  each  one  of  these  forms  of  advance  be 
used? 

16.  What  is  meant  by  the  term  base? 

17.  Under  what  circumstances  is  an  army  justified  in  aban- 
doning its  base? 

18.  What  is  meant  by  lines  of  communication? 

19.  What  is  meant  by  lines  of  operations? 

20.  What  are  the  advantages  of  divergent  lines  of  opera- 
tions ? 

21.  Describe  a  strategical  penetration. 

22.  Describe  a  strategical  attack  of  a  wing. 

23.  Describe  a  strategical  envelopment  and  show  the  dif- 
ference between  it  and  a  strategical  turning  movement. 

347 


348  STRATEGY 

24.  Describe  a  strategical  turning  movement. 

25.  Describe  a  strategic  attack  on  flank  and  rear. 

26.  What  is   meant   by   a   strategic   square   and  mass   of 
maneuver  ? 

27.  Describe  a  tactical  frontal  attack. 

28.  Describe  a  tactical  penetration. 

29.  Describe  the  tactical  successive  attack  and  show  its. 
weakness. 

30.  Describe  a  tactical  envelopment. 

31.  Describe  a  tactical  turning  movement. 

32.  Describe  the  strategical  flank  position. 

33.  Describe  the  strategical  interior  lines. 

34.  Why  are  tactical  interior  lines  of  little  value  ? 

35.  What  is  meant  by  combined  offensive  and  defensive 

operations  ? 

36.  What  is  meant  by  direct  retirement? 

37.  What  is  meant  by  a  convergent  retreat  and  when  would 

it  be  used  ? 

38.  What  is  meant  by  a  divergent  retreat  and  when  would 

it  be  used? 

39.  What  is  meant  by  a  double  divergent  retreat  and  when 

would  it  be  used  ? 

40.  What  are  the  constituent  parts  of  a  plan  of  operations  ? 

41.  What  are  the  characteristics  of  an  ambuscade  defen- 
sive? 

42.  What  is  a  tactical  flank  position  and  wherein  does  it 
differ  from  a  strategical  flank  position? 

43.  How  may  mountain  ranges  be  utilized  by  the  offensive  ? 

44.  How  may  mountain  ranges  be  used  by  the  defensive? 

45.  How  should  they  be  attacked  and  how  defended? 

46.  What  is  the  best  way  of  attacking  a  river  line  ? 

47.  How  should  a  river  line  be  defended  ? 

48.  Describe  a  fortified  area. 

49.  What  is  meant  by  a  fortress  ? 

50.  What  is  meant  by  an  intrenched  camp  ? 

51.  What  is  meant  by  a  fortified  position? 

52.  Show  how  any  of  the  above  three  may  be  used  in  con- 
nection with  a  field  army. 

53.  In  general,  what  is  the  best  way  for  a  field  army  to  co- 
operate in  the  defense  of  any  of  the  foregoing  three? 


SUMMARY  OF  STRATEGICAL. PRINCIPLES  349 

54.  Under  what  conditions  may  the  navy  assist  the  army 
in  the  field? 

55.  What  is  meant  by  an  hostile  descent  ? 

56.  Under  what  conditions  are  the  hostile  descents  generally 
successful  ? 

57.  What  is  the  decisive  strategical  direction? 

58.  What  is  the  decisive  tactical  direction? 

59.  Which  should  be  given  the  preference? 

60.  How  should  a  fort — an  entrenched  camp  or  a  fortified 
position — be  dealt  with  by  an  invading  army? 

61.  How  by  a  field  army  on  the  defensive? 

62.  Describe  the  position   defensive   and   show  where   it 
should  be  used. 

63.  Same  for  retreating  defensive. 

64.  Same  for  step  by  step  defensive. 

65.  Same  for  sortie  defensive. 


350  STRATEGY 

THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
1919-1920 

Map  Problem  No.  1 — PART  V — Strategy 
General   Maps:     Gettysburg- Antietam   and   Virginia   and    Maryland. 

General    Situation: 

A  state  of  war  exists  between  the  United  States  (Blue) 
and  an  oversea  nation  (Red).  The  North  Atlantic,  as 
far  south  as  the  Virginia  capes,  is  controlled  by  the  Red 
fleet.  The  main  Blue  fleet  is  in  the  Pacific. 

The  Reds  have  landed  three  armies  on  the  Jersey 
coast.  These  armies  are  highly  trained,  experienced  troops. 
The  main  Red  army  (Army  of  the  Center)  has  advanced 
as  far  west  as  the  line  of  the  Susquehanna  River  to  the 
north  (off  the  map).  A  Red  army  (Army  of  the  Right) 
has  formed  a  defensive  flank  along  the  line  of  the  Hudson 
River  against  the  Blue  New  England  concentration. 

A  Red  army  (Army  of  the  Left)  is  advancing  south- 
west against  the  Blue  Virginia — Maryland  concentration. 

The  Blue  centers  of  concentration  are  in  western  Mas- 
sachusetts, in  western  Pennsylvania,  and  in  Maryland  and 
Virginia.  Line  of  communication  of  Maryland  and  Vir- 
ginia concentration  is  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley  through 
Cumberland  Gap,  its  base  being  the  states  south  of  the 
Ohio,  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge. 

Special    Situation     (Red): 

Washington  and  Baltimore  are  known  to  be  unfortified 
and  to  have  weak  garrisons.  Carlisle  is  known  to  be  a 
fortified  town,  and  spies  report  that  it  has  a  garrison  of 
infantry  and  artillery  of  about  5,000  militia. 

The  Blue  army  is  known  to  be  made  up  of  a  few 
regular  infantry  brigades  and  a  quickly  mobilized  and 
poorly  trained  citizens'  army. 

Blue  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  have  been  observed 
opposite  Wrightsville  and  Harrisburg  and  to  the  north, 
while  Blue  infantry  has  appeared  in  small  numbers  opposite 
Perryville. 


PROBLEM  351 

The  Reds  have  the  supremacy  of  the  air. 

By  December  20th,  the  Red  Army  of  the  Left  has  ad- 
vanced to  and  is  holding  the  line  of  the  Susquehanna  River 
from  Millersburg  to  Perryville,  exclusive,  awaiting  the 
completion  of  the  strategic  deployment. 

It  is  disposed  east  of  the  Susquehanna  River  as  follows : 

First  Line 

One  cavalry  division  from  Armstrong  Creek  to  opposite 
Duncannon. 

1st  Corps  from  Dauphin,  inclusive,  to  Harrisburg,  exclusive. 

2d  Corps  from  Harrisburg  to  Elizabethtown,  both  inclusive. 

3d  Corps  from  Elizabethtown,  exclusive,  to  Lancaster,  in- 
clusive. 

One  brigade  of  marines  from  navy  at  Perryville.  (Not  a 
part  of  the  Red  Army  of  the  Left.) 

Second  Line 

4th  Corps  in  advance  of  the  Schuykill  River  on  the  line 
Auburn — Reading. 

Line  of  communication  from  the  left  rear  to  Philadelphia. 

Command  post  of  the  army  opens  at  Reading  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  20th. 

On  the  night  of  the  22d,  orders  are  received  from  Red 
general  headquarters  for  the  general  advance,  the  Red 
Army  of  the  Left  to  cross  the  river  and  advance  against 
the  enemy  with  a  view  of  seizing  and  holding  the  states 
of  Maryland  and  Virginia.  D  day  is  to  be  the  24th.  H 
hour  at  5:30  AM. 

On  the  23d,  the  Red  aircraft  has  reported  the  following : 

"Blue  columns  all  arms  observed  this  morning  at  about  10:00 
o'clock  moving,  one  through  Frederick  toward  Taneytown;  one 
through  Thurmont  toward  Gettysburg;  one  heavier  than  the 
others  up  the  Cumberland  Valley  toward  Chambersburg." 

You  are  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Red  Army  of  the 
Left  and,  since  your  arrival  at  Reading,  have  been  work- 
ing with  the  staff  on  an  estimate  of  the  situation.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  23d,  the  army  commander  calls  a  con- 
ference of  his  general  staff. 

NOTES 

The  political  and  economic  conditions  in  the  United 
States  will  be  taken  as  they  are  today. 

The  rail  and  dirt  roads  will  be  taken  to  exist  today 
as  shown  by  the  maps,  with  the  exception  that  there  is  a 


352  STRATEGY 

double  line  of  railroad  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  one  via 
Harper's  Ferry — Front  Royal — Luray — Port  Republic — 
Waynesboro,  and  another  via  Martinsburg — Winchester — 
Strasburg — Harrisburg — Staunton — Lexington,  both  unit- 
ing near  Lexington  and  passing  through  Cumberland  Gap. 

Weather  clear  and  dry. 

Susquehanna  unfordable. 

Potomac  unfordable  south  of  Edward's  Ford. 

Railroads  and  electric  lines  in  operation. 

Organization  of  Blue  forces  as  given  in  Tables  of  Or- 
ganization, G.S.S.,  with  the  usual  number  of  corps  troops. 

Red  corps  numbers  41,000  and  consist  of  two  divi- 
sions, each  of  approximately  15,000  rifles,  600  sabers,  72 
guns  and  with  approximately  the  same  auxiliary  troops, 
including  aircraft,  that  a  United  States  corps  has. 

Red  cavalry  division  consists  of  3,600  sabers  and  12 
guns. 

Required : 

The  recommendation  you  will  submit  to  your  com- 
manding general  at  this  conference  as  to  the  proper  strat- 
egy to  be  followed  in  the  advance,  giving  your  reasons  and 
the  moves,  in  general,  that  should  be  made  in  carrying 
them  out. 

Time  for  solution  not  longer  than  two  hours. 

Special     Situation    2: 

The  Red  aircraft  report  that  the  Blues  in  the  Cum- 
berland Valley  are  apparently  going  into  position  near 
Chambersburg,  but  that  the  other  columns  have  halted ;  that 
the  troops  opposite  Perryville  are  retiring  rapidly  on  Bal- 
timore. Later  reports  indicate  that  there  is  a  general 
retrograde  movement  going  on  among  the  Blue  forces. 

The  last  report  of  the  Red  observation  planes  is  re- 
ceived during  the  night  October  25-26  as  follows: 

"Roads  in  rear  of  the  Blue  forces  in  the  Cumberland 
Valley  are  filled  with  transportation  moving  rapidly  toward 
the  fords  of  the  Potomac  near  Williamsport.  Troops  at 
Chambersburg  are  beginning  to  withdraw  in  that  direction. 


PROBLEM  353 

"Column  on  the  Thurmont — Emmitsburg  road  is  with- 
drawing toward  the  fords  near  Leesburg.  Column  advancing 
through  Frederick  toward  Taneytown  is  retiring  rapidly 
in  the  direction  of  Washington.  Everything  indicates 
a  rapid  withdrawal  to  the  south  of  the  Potomac." 

At  this  time  the  Reds  are  disposed  as  follows: 

The  1st  Corps  is  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  advancing 
southward  with  the  leading  elements  passing  through  Ship- 
pensburg. 

The  cavalry  division  is  covering  its  front  and  right 
flank  and  is  engaged*  with  the  Blue  cavalry  that  is  retiring 
before  it  toward  the  Blue  column  that  has  been  advancing 
north  in  the  Cumberland  Valley. 

The  4th  Corps,  in  support  of  the  1st  Corps,  is  crossing 
at  Harrisburg ;  its  leading  elements  have  advanced  as  far  as 
Dillsburg  Junction. 

The  2d  Corps  that  crossed  at  Harrisburg  is  advancing 
southward  on  Gettysburg  via  the  Dillsburg — York  Springs 
road;  its  leading  elements  have  passed  through  Heidlers- 
burg  and  are  vigorously  pushing  the  Carlisle  garrison 
that  is  retiring  toward  Gettysburg. 

The  3d  Corps  that  crossed  at  Wrightsville  is  advanc- 
ing toward  Hanover  on  the  York — Spring  Grove  road;  its 
elements  have  passed  through  Spring  Grove  and  are  vig- 
orously pushing  back  toward  Littlestown  the  Blue  corps 
cavalry  regiment  in  their  front. 

The  marine  brigade  at  Perryville  has  crossed  the  river 
and  is  holding  Havre  de  Grace. 

Required  : 

As  Red  chief  of  staff,  the  movements  you  recommend 
and  the  strategical  reasons  therefor. 

Time  for  solution,  one  hour. 

You  are  now  the  Blue  chief  of  staff 

Special    Situation     (Blue) : 

The  Blue  southern  army  of  two  corps,  one  of  three 
divisions  and  the  other  of  two  divisions  (two  infantry 
brigades  of  which  are  regular),  quickly  organized  and 


354  STRATEGY 

poorly  trained,  are  advancing  into  Maryland  from  Virginia 
to  defend  the  capital  at  Washington. 

One  corps  advancing  down  the  Shenandoah  Valley  has 
commenced  crossing  the  Potomac  west  of  Harper's  Ferry 
and  the  other  corps,  having  passed  to  the  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  Mountains  via  Manassas  Gap,  is  crossing  the  Potomac 
in  the  vicinity  of  Leesburg. 

The  District  of  Columbia  militia  of  two  infantry  regi- 
ments is  guarding  Washington.  The  Baltimore  garrison, 
consisting  of  a  regiment  of  infantry  (Maryland  state  troops) 
with  a  battery  of  light  artillery,  has  gone  north  to  Havre 
de  Grace  to  observe  the  crossing  at  that  point. 

A  regular  .cavalry  regiment,  with  a  battalion  of  horse 
artillery  from  Fort  Myer,  is  observing  the  crossings  of 
the  river  from  Wrightsville  north,  with  the  bulk  of  the 
force  opposite  Harrisburg. 

October  25th 

The  corps  advancing  up  the  Cumberland  Valley  has 
reached  Chambersburg  with  its  leading  elements  and  has 
started  to  take  up  a  position  across  the  valley  in  that  vi- 
cinity. The  cavalry  regiment  and  battalion  of  horse  ar- 
tillery that  have  been  along  the  Susquehanna  River  delaying 
the  advance  of  the  Reds  are  falling  back  on  this  Blue  col- 
.  umn  with  which  they  are  in  touch. 

Of  the  corps  that  crossed  near  Leesburg,  one  divi- 
sion, covered  by  a  cavalry  regiment  of  corps  troops,  is  ad- 
vancing north  via  the  Thurmont — Emmitsburg  road;  its 
leading  elements  have  just  cleared  Emmitsburg.  The  other 
division  is  advancing  on  Littlestown  via  the  Keymar — Tan- 
eytown  road  covered  by  a  regiment  of  cavalry  from  the 
corps  troops ;  its  leading  element  is  passing  through  Taney- 
town. 

The  right  corps  troops,  less  the  cavalry  regiment  with 
the  right  division,  are  with  the  column  advancing  on  Get- 
tysburg. 

The  Carlisle  garrison  is  retiring  before  the  Red  2d 
Corps  and  is  now  passing  south  through  Center  Mills,  its 
rear  guard  being  vigorously  pressed  by  Reds. 

The  Maryland  troops  at  Havre  de  Grace  have  fallen 
back  toward  Baltimore. 


APPROVED  SOLUTION  355 

The  Blue  army  post  of  command  is  at  Hagerstown. 
At  this  time  the  following  message  is  received  from 
the  Blue  general  headquarters: 

"The  Reds  in  your  tkeater  have  crossed  the  Susquehanna  in 
force.  You  will  withdraw  at  once  to  the  south  of  the  Potomac 
and  defend  the  river  line.  Reinforcements  will  be  sent  you 
in  a  few  days." 

Acting  on  this  message  orders  have  been  issued  for 
the  following  movements,  which  are  put  into  execution  at 
once: 

The  troops  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  to  recross  at 
Williamsport ;  those  near  Emmitsburg  at  the  fords  below 
Point  of  Rocks;  those  passing  through  Taneytown  to  fall 
back  on  Washington,  crossing  the  river  by  the  Washington 
bridges,  where  orders  will  reach  them. 

The  new  Blue  army  command  post  opens  at  Charles- 
town,  to  which  point  you  have  moved  with  the  staff  upon 
closing  at  Hagerstown. 

Required : 

Your  recommendation  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
river  line  will  be  held,  with  the  disposition  of  troops  to 
carry  out  your  recommendations  and  the  strategical  reasons 
therefor. 

Time  for  solution,  one  hour. 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION 

Prepared   by 

COLONEL  WILLIAM  K.  NAYLOB, 
Infantry 

First    Requirement: 

Memorandum  submitted  by  the  chief  of  staff  to  the 
commanding  general  of  the  Red  Army  of  the  Left  at  the  con- 
ference on  the  afternoon  of  December  23d :  "Orders  received 
last  night  from  our  general  headquarters  provide  for  a  gen- 
eral advance  at  5 :30  tomorrow  morning.  The  mission  of  this 
army  is  to  seize  and  hold  the  states  of  Maryland  and  Vir- 
ginia. To  carry  out  this  mission  we  have  no  alternative 
but  to  assume  .the  strategical  and  tactical  offensive.  In 
order  to  succeed  in  this  role  our  movements  must  be  char- 


356  STRATEGY 

acterized  by  secrecy  and  such  rapidity  as  will  perpetrate  a 
surprise  upon  the  enemy.  So  far  our  decision  is  simple, 
but  before  determining  upon  our  particular  movements 
we  must  consider  certain  general  conditions  that  will  in- 
fluence us  as  to  the  details  of  those  movements." 

GEOGRAPHY  OF  THE  THEATER  OF  OPERATIONS 

In  our  immediate  front  is  the  unfordable  Susquehanna 
River,  which  will  have  to  be  crossed,  no  matter  what  our 
plan  thereafter  may  be. 

We  are  so  distributed  that  we  will  be  able  to  effect 
a  crossing  on  a  broad  front  and  probably  will  not  en- 
counter much  opposition  in  so  doing.  Our  line  of  operations 
will  then  lead  us  across  the  state  of  Maryland,  about  75 
miles,  to  the  Potomac  River.  A  glance  at  the  map  will 
show  us  that  the  theater  within  this  state  is  of  two  dis- 
tinctive types,  namely,  parallel  mountain  ranges  in  the 
northwest  separated  by  valleys  traversed  by  good  dirt  and 
rail  roads,  and  open  country  to  the  southeast,  likewise  tra- 
versed by  good  dirt  and  rail  roads,  with  the  interior  flank 
resting  on  Chesapeake  Bay. 

The  mountain  ranges  being  parallel  to  our  line  of  ad- 
vance, will  be  of  as  much  assistance  to  us  as  to  the  enemy, 
since  they  will  enable  us  to  screen  our  movements  and  "to 
debouch  upon  the  hostile  rear  and  flank."  It  is  true  that 
the  country  to  the  southeast  is  more  open,  but  the  moun- 
tains make  it  possible  for  the  enemy  to  take  up  flank  posi- 
tions from  which  his  line  of  departure  will  enable  him  to 
threaten  our  communications.  The  network  of  railroads 
may  greatly  assist  the  enemy  in  effecting  his  concentra- 
tions, at  least  until  we  arrive  on  the  east  and  west  line 
through  Gettysburg.  We  will  be  restricted  in  our  use  of 
these  lines  until  we  have  repaired  the  demolitions  that  the 
enemy  will  surely  carry  out. 

The  next  serious  obstacle  is  the  Potomac  River,  which 
should  be  the  goal  of  our  first  operation. 

The  seizure  of  it  will  enable  us  to  interrupt  the  Bal- 
timore &  Ohio  Railroad,  thereby  effectively  cutting  off 
all  hostile  communication  by  that  agency  .with  the  west, 
and  rendering  Baltimore  and  Washington  untenable. 


APPROVED  SOLUTION  357 

The  Potomac  River  is  unfordable  south  of  Edward's 
Ford,  but  is  crossed  at  Washington  by  one  railroad  and 
three  foot  bridges,  which  of  course  we  may  expect  to  find 
destroyed. 

The  river  north  of  this  ford  is  fordable  at  various 
points,  but  in  those  reaches  forms  a  strategic  salient  with 
apex  to  the  north,  thereby  facilitating  defense. 

Having  crossed  the  river,  we  have  about  200  miles  to 
traverse  before  reaching  the  gaps  of  the  Alleghanies  through 
which  the  hostile  line  of  communications  extends.  The 
theater  of  Virginia  is  of  the  same  general  description  as 
that  of  Maryland,  with  parallel  mountain  ranges  in  the 
northwest  and  flat  but  wooded  country  to  the  southeast. 

The  former  afford  us  this  advantage,  however,  in  that 
there  are  many  gaps  that  would  facilitate  our  debouch- 
ment upon  the  hostile  rear  and  flank  from  the  southeast. 

The  latter,  however,  is  more  difficult  for  operations 
as  it  is  wooded,  particularly  south  of  the  Rappahannock 
River,  and  is  traversed  by  many  lateral  streams  that  are 
formidable  obstacles  in  the  best  of  weather. 

The  distance  to  the  gaps  is  considerable,  but  is  more 
of  a  disadvantage  to  the  enemy  since  his  communications 
are  more  vulnerable;  while  control  of  the  sea  makes  ours 
secure  and  easily  shifted  from  advance  base  to  advance  base 
as  we  progress  south. 

Once  having  evicted  the  enemy  from  Virginia  and 
Maryland,  or  having  eliminated  him,  we  can  assume  the 
strategical  and  tactical  defensive  by  a  redistribution  of 
our  troops  so  as  to  block  the  gaps  from  the  Potomac  River 
south,  and  forming  a  defensive  flank  along  the  Staunton 
and  Roanoke  Rivers  to  the  south.  Inasmuch  as  these  rivers 
flow  west  to  east,  we  would  be  enabled  to  interrupt  the 
remaining  railroads  leading  toward  Richmond,  as  they  ex- 
tend in  a  northerly  direction  from  the  south. 

The  capture  of  the  line  of  the  James  River  opens  up 
to  us  the  port  of  Norfolk,  only  second  to  New  York  City 
in  suitability  as  an  advance  base. 

POLITICAL  AND  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 

The  Blues  have  just  emerged  victorious  from  a  war 
of  great  magnitude  and,  quite  in  keeping  with  historical 


358  STRATEGY 

precedents  in  countries  such  as  the  one  of  the  Blues,  with  no 
well  defined  military  policy,  have  sunk  into  a  certain  amount 
of  inertia  that  logically  comes  from  over-confidence. 

Our  invasion  will  stimulate  renewed  activity,  since  the 
people  are  intensely  loyal  to  their  country  and  its  tradi- 
tions, and  we  may  look  for  gradually  increasing .  strength 
as  the  ex-soldiers,  four  million  in  number,  are  brought 
to  the  colors,  the  war  industries  are  renewed  and  their 
productions  marshalled  for  use.  The  regular  army  exists 
Only  in  name,  but  has  a  nucleus  around  which  a  danger- 
ous organization  may  be  moulded. 

The  Blues  being  intense  Nationalists,  politics  may  be 
eliminated  from  consideration,  as  the  people  may  be  expected 
to  support  their  soldiers  in  a  war  such  as  this  one  without 
regard  to  political  parties  or  affiliations. 

CITIES 

None  of  the  cities  in  our  theater  are  fortified  except 
Carlisle,  and  it  can  be  isolated.  The  political  and  economic 
effect  of  the  fall  of  the  others  will  not  have  any  de- 
cisive influence  upon  the  prosecution  of  the  war  other  than 
to  stimulate  extraordinary  additional  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy. 

THE  ENEMY'S  FORCES  IN  OUR  FRONT 

As  to  hostile  forces  we  will  encounter  and  their  proba- 
ble movements.  -(General  and  special  situations  (Red) 
are  of  common  knowledge  to  the  Reds.) 

Being  quickly  mobilized  and  poorly  trained,  we  may 
not  look  for  any  very  aggressive  action.  The  troops  along  the 
Susquehanna  are  doubtless  observation  groups  quickly 
thrown  forward  to  get  in  touch  with  us  to  supplement  the 
deficient  air  service.  Carlisle  is  held  probably  to  cover 
the  debouchment  from  the  valley  and  to  form  a  support  for 
the  hostile  left  flank  in  event  of  a  line  being  occupied  in 
that  vicinity.  The  three  Blue  columns  that  our  aircraft  re- 
ported earlier  in  the  day  are  doubtless  moving  forward  to 
this  line  to  contest  our  crossing  of  the  river,  or  in  default 
of  that,  to  take  up  a  position  to  protect  their  capital.  At 
this  late  date  they  clearly  cannot  occupy  the  Carlisle  line, 


APPROVED  SOLUTION  359 

so  we  may  expect  to  find  them  on  an  east  and  west  line 
through  Gettysburg.  At  all  events  they  are  widely  sep- 
arated, so  we  may  look  for  a  concentration  in  Cumberland 
Valley  or  in  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg.  We  do  not  know 
the  exact  strength  of  these  three  columns,  but  their  dis- 
persion must  indicate  that  each  one  is  counted  strong 
enough  to  take  care  of  itself  pending  the  arrival  of  assis- 
tance, so  must  be  at  least  a  reinforced  brigade  or  a  divi- 
sion. The  Cumberland  Valley  column  being  stronger,  is 
anything  from  a  large  division  to  a  corps. 

We  well  know  the  superiority  of  our  own  troops  in 
quality  and  leadership,  which  we  must  take  advantage  of  to 
the  utmost.  Our  4th  Corps  is  about  40  miles  to  the  rear 
but  can  quickly  be  brought  forward  by  the  trunk  railroad 
lines  leading  to  Harrisburg.  Each  first  line  corps  has  a 
main  crossing  in  its  front,  which  can  be  supplemented  by 
pontons. 

OBJECTIVES 

In  our  operations  we  have  the  choice  of  two  objec- 
tives— the  Blue  army  or  the  capital.  The  importance  of 
the  fall  of  this  capital  will  not  be  such  as  to  have  a  de- 
cisive effect  upon  the  Blue  army  or  government,  so  we 
must  adhere  to  the  first  principle  of  strategy  and  make 
"the  hostile  main  army  our  objective"  and  continue  to  do 
so  until  it  is  eliminated  or  our  mission  is  accomplished. 

DECISIVE  STRATEGIC  DIRECTION 

With  our  left  resting  on  the  sea,  our  decisive  strategic 
direction  is  by  the  right  flank.  We  cannot  tell  yet  whether 
we  will  turn  the  hostile  left  or  penetrate  between  the 
widely  separated  columns.  A  turning  of  the  hostile  right 
is  open  to  the  objection  that  it  exposes  our  communications 
until  our  advance  base  is  shifted,  restricts  us  to  a  limited 
area  and  forces  us  to  attack  mountains  perpendicular  to 
our  line  of  advance,  where  every  advantage  is  with  the 
defender.  Furthermore,  we  would  virtually  be  driving  the 
enemy  back  along  his  line  of  communications,  for  the  two 
eastern  columns  could,  in  an  emergency,  shift  their  lines 
through  Hagerstown  and  cross  into  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley by  that  route.  In  the  Shenandoah  the  communications 


360  STRATEGY 

are  protected  by  the  Potomac  River,  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the 
Shenandoah  River,  and  consequently  are  secure  until  op- 
erations start  south  of  the  Potomac  River. 

A  turning  of  the  hostile  left  flank  has  more  to  recom- 
mend it,  in  that  it  directly  threatens  the  hostile  commun- 
ications, but  at  the  same  time  gravely  exposes  our  own, 
restricts  us  to  a  mountainous  area,  causes  us  to  make  a 
wide  detour  and  endangers  our  turning  force  to  activity 
in  its  rear  by  partisans  or  detachments  from'  the  Blue 
Western  Pennsylvania  concentration. 

The  penetration  offers  the  greatest  possibilities,  pro- 
vided we  can  anticipate  the  Blue  concentration. 

The  line  of  advance  of  the  Blue  center  column  is  25 
miles  from  that  of  the  Cumberland  Valley  column. 

If  the  Blue  center  and  right  columns  can  be  driven 
away  from  the  Blue  left  column  and  contained,  the  moun- 
tain passes  at  Arendtsville,  Cashtown,  Waynesboro  and  to 
the  south  seized,  the  reserve  thrown  in  around  the  right 
flank  of  the  Blue  left  column  toward  Hagerstown,  that 
force  can  either  be  cut  off  or  taken  in  the  flank  and  routed. 

To  accomplish  this  maneuver  we  must  advance  in 
parallel  columns,  one  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  and  the 
others  to  the  east,  because  they  permit  greater  rapidity,  our 
troops  are  trained  and  our  commanders  are  of  a  type  de- 
pendable in  independent  action.  Our  reserve  corps  must 
move  around  Carlisle  to  the  south,  that  place  being  iso- 
lated by  a  special  detachment,  so  as  to  be  in  a  position  to 
complete  the  rolling  up  of  the  right  of  the  left  Blue  col- 
umn once  the  penetration  is  effected,  or  to  reinforce  our 
troops  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  in  event  of  the  Blues  con- 
centrating in  that  direction.  In  event  of  a  Blue  concen- 
tration in  the  Cumberland  Valley  our  left  columns  can 
move  forward  rapidly  and  strike  the  Blue  center  and  right 
columns  in  flank  and  roll  them  up. 

Therefore  the  penetration  and  movements  last  referred 
to  above  are  the  ones  recommended  by  me. 

The  following  initial  movements  will  be  necessary  to 
carry  them  out: 

1.  Aircraft  to  cross  the  river  at  H  hour,  reconnoitering 
Blue  columns  and  preventing  hostile  observation. 


APPROVED  SOLUTION  361 

2.  Suitable  artillery  to  be  moved  into  position  tonight 
to  cover  all  crossings  and  the  necessary  equipment  for  addi- 
tional bridges  to  be  brought  forward  to  respective  bridge 
sites  at  once. 

3.  Cavalry  divisions  to  cross  at  Marysville  followed  by 
1st  Corps. 

Second  Corps  to  cross  at  Harrisburg. 
Third  Corps  to  cross  at  Marietta  and  Columbia. 
Fourth  Corps  to  be  brought  forward  by  rail  to  Harrisburg, 
and  to  cross   at  that  point  following  the  2d   Corps. 

4.  At  H — 20  minutes,  all  artillery  to  open  fire  on  the 
far  side  of  the  river  in  the  vicinity  of  respective  crossings. 
The  infantry,  covered  by  machine  guns,  to  force  the  cross- 
ings, establishing  bridgeheads  and  then  assisting  in  clear- 
ing up  bridgeheads  in  close  proximity. 

5.  The  cavalry  division,  after  forcing  the  crossings  at 
Marysville,  dismounted,  to  move  promptly  on  Carlisle,  in- 
vesting it  from  the  south  and  sending  detachments  down 
the  Cumberland  Valley  to  reconnoiter. 

6.  Corps  cavalry,  1st  Corps,  to  move  at  once  toward 
Mechanicsburg   assisting   in   uncovering  the  crossings  at 
Harrisburg  and  then,  sweeping  south  through  Mount  Holly 
Springs,  to  join  the  cavalry  division.    The  1st  Corps  to  ad- 
vance in  suitable  formation  down  the  Cumberland  Valley 
toward  Shippensburg.     The  2d  Corps  to  move  south  on 
Gettysburg  via  the  Dillsburg — York  Springs  road,  detach- 
ing an  infantry  brigade,  strongly  reinforced  by  artillery,  to 
relieve  the  cavalry  at  Carlisle  and  to  continue  the  invest- 
ment of  that  place.    The  3d  Corps  to  move  toward  Hanover 
on  the  York — Spring  Grove  road.    Corps  cavalry  to  cover 
the  fronts  of  the  respective  corps.    The  4th  Corps  to  move 
south  toward  Mount  Holly  Springs  to  await  developments. 

Second    Requirement: 

The  movements  recommended  by  the  Red  chief  of  staff 
with  the  reasons  therefor :  "The  situation  is  now  clearing 
up  and  apparently  the  various  Blue  columns  have  become 
aware  of  the  rapid  advance  of  our  forces.  The  evacua- 
tion of  Carlisle  clearly  indicates  the  abandonment  of  any 
hope  of  holding  Maryland  and  protecting  Washington  from 
the  north.  The  fact  that  the  Blues  near  Chambersburg 


362  STRATEGY 

are  going  into  position  indicates  one  of  two  things,  namely : 
they  had  either  started  to  occupy  a  position  and  were 
stopped,  or  have  occupied  it  to  delay  the  advance  of  our 
right  column  to  give  time  for  their  troops  to  recross  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Potomac  River.  The  retreat  of  the  Blue 
right  column  on  Washington  is  either  prompted  by  a  de- 
sire for  a  double  divergent  retreat  with  one  column  crossing 
at  Washington,  or  Washington  has  exerted  the  usual  power 
of  attraction  that  geographical  points,  such  as  important 
cities,  have  for  field  armies.  Our  advance  being  in  parallel 
columns  we  should  have  no  trouble  in  swinging  these  col- 
umns in  the  desired  direction  and  concentrating  on  the 
field  of  battle.  Such  a  concentration  is  proper  since  our 
generals  are  "energetic,  circumspect  and  quite  in  harmony 
with  the  ideas  of  the  commander-in-chief"  and  our  troops 
are  "seasoned  and  of  the  type  that  will  not  be  demor- 
alized by  an  unfavorable  turn  of  affairs."  We  have  ef- 
fected a  strategical  penetration,  partly  due  to  the  manner 
of  our  advance  and  partly  due  to  the  faulty  dispositions 
of  the  Blues  and  their  line  of  withdrawal.  The  interval 
between  the  center  and  right  Blue  columns  and  the  left 
Blue  column  being  about  25  miles,  virtually  divides  the  Blue 
forces  into  two  wings.  These  two  wings  are  now  open  to 
flank  attacks.  The  communications  of  both  are  threatened 
to  a  more  or  less  degree,  and  it  is  now  possible  for  us  to 
surround  or  cut  off  a  part  of  the  left  wing.  By  advancing 
hurriedly  toward  Point  of  Rocks  and  thus  threaten  the  rear 
of  the  center  column,  we  may  cut  it  off  from  the  river, 
while  sending  a  containing  force  after  the  right  Blue  col- 
umn. We  are  in  danger,  of  course,  unless  we  are  extremely 
active,  of  having  our  "wedging  force"  become  imbedded  and 
of  having  the  enemy  mass  troops  against  either  side  of  our 
salient  columns.  It  is  true  that  the  enemy  is  showing  unmis- 
takable signs  of  getting  out  of  Maryland  and,  were  the  cam- 
paign to  be  merely  an  operation  for  the  seizure  of  Maryland, 
we  might  better  let  him  go,  but  our  campaign  is  for  the 
seizure  of  Virginia  as  well  as  Maryland ;  therefore,  we  must 
endeavor  to  eliminate  forthwith  the  main  hostile  army  in 
the  field. 

The   following  movements   should   then   be  promptly 
made: 


APPROVED  SOLUTION  363 

The  cavalry  division  and  the  cavalry  of  the  1st  Corps 
to  swing  around  to  the  west  of  the  Blue  Cumberland  Val- 
ley column  and  endeavor  to  cut  it  off  from  the  crossings  near 
Williamsport.  The  2d  Corps  to  press  the  rear  of  the  center 
Blue  column,  sending  its  cavalry  to  seize  the  passes  through 
the  mountains  to  the  west.  After  passing  Gettysburg,  to 
send  a  pursuing  force  after  the  center  Blue  column,  while 
swinging  the  main  body  of  the  corps  to  the  west  through 
any  passes  open  toward  Hagerstown  to  strike  the  Blue 
Cumberland  Valley  column  in  the  flank.  The  1st  Corps  to 
continue  the  pursuit  of  the  Blue  forces  in  its  front.  The 
4th  Corps  to  move  rapidly  to  the  support  of  the  2d  Corps 
to  complete  the  penetration  and  the  "rolling  up"  of  the  hos- 
tile left  wing.  The  3d  Corps  to  send  a  pursuing  force  after 
the  right  Blue  column  retiring  on  Washington  while  its 
most  mobile  forces  move  rapidly  through  Frederick  toward 
Harper's  Ferry  and  endeavor  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
center  Blue  column.  Close  co-operation  must  be  had  among 
our  various  columns  and  all  must  strike  the  enemy  vigor- 
ously except  those  forces  that  are  continuing  the  direct 
pursuit  of  the  respective  Blue  columns.  These  forces  must, 
however,  make  sufficient  demonstrations  to  hold  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Blues,  but  not  such  as  will  expedite  their  with- 
drawal and  prevent  the  various  turning  columns  from  ac- 
complishing their  missions  to  the  full.  Our  aircraft  to 
bomb  the  Potomac  crossings,  hostile  transportation,  etc. 
A  portion  of  the  cavalry  of  the  3d  Corps  should  be  sent 
across  the  river  at  once  near  Point  of  Rocks  with  orders 
to  move  south  and  destroy  all  the  railroad  lines  entering 
Washington  south  of  the  Potomac  River. 

Third    Requirement: 

The  following  recommendations  were  submitted  by  the 
Blue  chief  of  staff: 

"Our  army,  in  pursuance  to  orders  received  from  general 
headquarters,  is  to  abandon  Maryland  to  the  Reds  and  is  to  hold 
the  line  of  the  Potomac  River,  awaiting  reinforcements  which  are 
to  arrive  in  a  few  days,  and  pending  a  favorable  change  in  the 
situation.  Our  troops  have  succeeded  in  getting  across  the  Poto- 
mac River  without  serious  disaster.  The  river  line  that  we  must 
hold  extends  from  the  mountain  ranges  south  of  Hancock  to  Wash- 
ington, inclusive.  This  line  is  top  extensive  for  us  to  hold  as  a  tac- 
tical position,  even  though  we  might  desire  to  do  so.  In  default  of 
that,  we  can  only  hold  it  as  a  strategical  position  which  will 


364  STRATEGY 

contemplate  suitable  detachments  made  up  principally  of  infantry 
with  machine  guns,  and  light  batteries  of  artillery  located  so  as 
to  cover  the  various  crossings,  while  the  main  forces  are  con- 
centrated in  rear  close  enough  to  be  thrown  forward  to  strike 
any  hostile  columns  while  they  are  astride  the  river,  partially  or 
entirely  across,  and  while  they  are  in  a  restricted  area  without 
sufficient  room  for  deployment.  Under  the  circumstances  this 
method  of  defense  is  in  accord  with  accepted  principles  for 
strategically  defending  a  river  line,  which  provide  for  'small  de- 
tachments to  watch  the  crossings  to  learn  the  intentions  of  the 
enemy  and  where  his  main  forces  are  crossing.'  And  'then 
to  assemble  the  main  body  at  some  convenient  place  in  rear  of 
the  line  and  fall  upon  the  enemy  as  he  is  in  the  act  of  crossing, 
or  after  he  has  crossed,  to  strike  him  when  he  has  the  river  at 
his  back.'  The  river  line  divides  itself  into  two  natural  sectors, 
the  Shenandoah  River  being  the  dividing  line  between  sectors. 

"The  passes  of  the  mountains  to  the  west  should  be  covered 
by  a  mobile  force  to  prevent  incursions  from  that  direction,  while 
those  to  the  east  should  be  held  to  form  a  defensive  flank  and  a 
strategic  flank  position  threatening  any  hostile  movement  south 
in  that  vicinity.  The  main  body  should  be  located  in  the  valley, 
preferably  in  the  triangle  Smithfield,  Charlestown  and  Winches- 
ter, where  there  are  railroad  lines  running  toward  Williamsport 
and  Harper's  Ferry  and  a  lateral  line  connecting  these  two  lines. 
In  addition,  there  are  north  and  south  lines  to  Strassburg  con- 
necting with  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  which  forms  a  junc- 
tion at  Manassas  Junction  with  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Rail- 
road from  Washington.  Likewise,  there  are  suitable  dirt  roads 
for  the  use  of  motor  transportation  extending  north  to  the  Poto- 
mac River  and  across  the  Shenandoah  River  through  the  passes 
of  the  mountains  to  the  east. 

"Our  right  flank  is  protected  by  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains.  It  will  be  impossible  for  an  enemy  to  cross  the 
Potomac  east  of  Nolan's  Ford  and  advance  to  the  south  with  the 
Bull  Run  Mountains  in  our  possession.  The  river  salient  enables 
us  to  strike  the  hostile  columns  in  flank  with  troops  and  gun  fire. 
The  following  movements  are  therefore  recommended: 

"The  regular  cavalry  regiment  and  battalion  of  horse  artil- 
lery to  cover  the  passes  to  the  west. 

"Our  left  corps  to  hold  the  crossings  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
inclusive,  west,  with  one  division  in  reserve  at  Smithfield,  another 
at  Charlestown,  and  a  third  at  Winchester,  and  with  the  neces- 
sary railroad  and  motor  transportation  assembled  in  these  respec- 
tive localities  for  a  quick  movement  of  troops  in  any  direction. 
Our  center  division  to  concentrate  at  Purcellville  guarding  the 
river  from  Harper's  Ferry,  exclusive,  to  Edward's  Ford,  inclusive. 

"The  Carlisle  garrison  to  co-operate  with  this  division. 

"Our  right  division  to  move  on  Washington,  uniting  with 
any  local  troops  at  that  point  to  hold  the  city,  at  the  same  time 
making  plans  for  a  withdrawal,  if  pressed  too  hard,  or  if  the  Reds 
succeed  in  getting  across  the  river  and  in  cutting  off  communica- 
tions with  the  south.  In  the  latter  event,  these  troops  to  retire 
to  the  west  toward  the  Bull  Run  Mountains  and  combine  with 
our  troops  in  that  vicinity.  Close  observation  of  the  river  to  be 
made  by  pur  mobile  troops  and  aircraft  while  the  cavalry  of  our 
right  division  moves  to  the  south  of  the  river  and  covers  the 
right  flank  of  the  troops  holding  the  Bull  Run  Mountains.  In 
this  position  we  will  be  able  to  strike  in  any  direction,  or  to 
withdraw  to  the  south  if  too  strong  a  pressure  comes  before  the 
arrival  of  our  reinforcements. 

"Our  command  post  to  remain  at  Charlestown." 


COMMENTS  ON  SOLUTIONS  365 

GENERAL  COMMENTS  ON  SOLUTIONS  SUBMITTED 

1.  It  was  apparent  from  the  majority  of  solutions  that 
the  members  of  the  class  did  not  clearly  understand  the  ex- 
act form  in  which  a  recommendation  of  the  chief  of  staff 
should  be  presented. 

2.  All  requirements  called  for  moves  "in  general,"  yet 
many  solutions  gave  moves  in  tactical  detail. 

3.  In  some  solutions  there  seemed  to  be  a  disposition 
to  make  the  facts  fit  the  strategical  principles  known  by  the 
solver  and  not  to  make  the  principles  fit  the  conditions  of 
the  problem.    In  none  of  the  problems  was  there  any  great 
amount  of  argument  of  a  strategical  nature  put  forth. 

4.  Few  of  the  solutions  discussed  the  alternative  solu- 
tions to  the  problem,  which  should  always  be  done  at  a  con- 
ference of  the  kind  contemplated. 

5.  Few  solutions  discussed  the  terrain  except  in  the 
most  casual  way  (see  approved  solution) . 

6.  Officers  were  not  careful  about  marking  their  prob- 
lems.   In  one  case  a  problem  bore  the  number  87  when  the 
officer's  number  was  apparently  78. 

7.  Several  of  the  problems  were  very  illegibly  written. 

8.  While  it  was  not  expected  that  officers  would  quote 
verbatim  from  the  text,  yet  in  memoranda  of  this  kind  it 
is  customary  to  quote  in  one's  own  words  what  the  author- 
ities state  in  the  matters  under  consideration. 

9.  Few  solutions  commented  upon  the  fact  that  the 
parallel  mountain  ranges  were  of  as  much  advantage  to 
the  Reds  as  to  the  Blues. 

10.  In  some  solutions  the  terms  right  and  left  were 
used  indiscriminately  and  without  any  regard  to  whether 
they  referred  to  the  military  right  or  left. 

11.  In  many  cases  the  recommendations  were  illogically 
arranged. 

First    Requirement: 

1.  The  general  situation  stated  that  the  Reds  "were 
highly  trained  experienced  troops,"  a  quality  that  should 
contemplate  rapid  and  long  marches,  yet  they  were  held 
down  in  many  cases  to  the  pace  of  inferior  troops.  The 
Germans  in  1914  marched  some  of  their  troops  at  the  rate 


366  STRATEGY 

of  25  miles  a  day  from  August  23  to  September  3  in  getting 
from  the  Sambre  to  south  of  the  Marne,  a  distance,  of  about 
90  miles.  From  the  Susquehanna  to  the  Potomac  River 
the  distance  is  about  75  miles.  During  the  advance  in  1914 
the  Germans  fought  several  battles  and  encountered  strong 
opposition.  In  this  problem  there  was  virtually  none.  In 
this  same  theater  during  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  General 
Imboden  of  the  Confederate  army  moved  a  column  of  am- 
bulances and  farm  wagons,  17  miles  long,  loaded  with 
wounded  from  Gettysburg  to  Williamsport  in  24  hours, 
going  by  way  of  Cashtown.  In  the  same  campaign,  Early 
moved  from  the  vicinity  of  Wrightsville  and  York  to  a 
point  three  miles  east  of  Heidlersburg  on  the  Cashtown 
Road  during  daylight  of  June  30th.  Johnston  moved  from 
near  Carlisle  to  a  point  five  miles  north  of  Chambersburg 
in  the  same  time.  In  the  Antietam  campaign,  Jackson 
moved  from  Frederick  via  Boonesboro  and  Williamsport 
to  the  west  of  Harper's  Ferry,  a  distance  of  60  miles,  in 
three  days. 

2.  The  majority  of  the  class  advanced  in  parallel  col- 
umns with  the  idea  of  effecting  a  strategical  penetration 
which  is  considered  the  best  solution.     (See  approved  solu- 
tion.) 

3.  Many    of   the    officers    who    recommended    parallel 
advances  with  a  strategical  penetration,  when   given   an 
opportunity  to  effect  the  penetration,  failed  to  recommend 
moves  that  would  bring  it  about. 

4.  Many  officers  who  recommended  a  turning  of  the 
Blue  right  flank,  had  they  discussed  it,  would  have  un- 
doubtedly changed  such  a  decision  (see  approved  solution). 

5.  In  some  solutions  Carlisle  was  completely  overlooked. 

6.  A  few  solutions  made  Washington  the  objective. 

Second    Requirement: 

1.  Some  solutions  scattered  the  Red  troops,  even  to 
the  extent  of  sending  a  division  to  Baltimore.      Some  of 
the  same  solutions  had  recommended  under  the  First  Re- 
quirement that  the  hostile  main  army  be  the  objective. 

2.  Many  of  the  solutions  sent  a  corps  after  the  Blue 
division  retreating  on  Washington.    None  of  the  solutions 


COMMENTS  ON  SOLUTIONS  367 

considered  sending  a  mobile  force  across  the  Potomac  River 
to  cut  off  communication  with  Washington  from  the  south. 

3.  Some  of  the  solutions  seemed  to  have  been  influ- 
enced by  the  strategy  of  General  Meade  in  the  Gettysburg 
campaign.    In  that  campaign  politics  dictated  that  the  Con- 
federates evacuate  Northern  soil,  and  when  they  showed 
unmistakable  signs  of  doing  so,  an  attack  would  have  been 
a  gratuitous  blunder.     Such  was  the  case  in  this  problem. 

4.  It  is  true  that  this  campaign  is  susceptible  of  divi- 
sion into  two  operations,  the  first  one  terminating  at  the 
Potomac  line.    But  until  the  Blues  had  arrived  at  that  line 
the  first  operation  was  still  on,  and  every  effort  should 
have  been  made  to  eliminate  them  before  they  got  across 
the  river. 

5.  A  direct   pursuit   is   of   advantage   only   "after   a 
decisive  battle  when  pursuing  the  enemy."     In  this  case 
it  is  not  believed  a  direct  pursuit  without  an  attempt  to 
turn  or  envelop  would  have  been  taking  full  advantage 
of  opportunities. 

Third    Requirement: 

1.  Many  of  the  solutions  made  the  disposition  of  troops 
to  hold  the  river  that  were  decidedly  tactical;  in  other 
words,  the  troops  were  strung  along  the  entire  river  front 
which  was  about  70  miles. 

2.  There  was  virtually  no  discussion  of  the  advan- 
tageous features  of  the  terrain  offered  to  the  Blues. 

3.  Few  of  the  solutions  considered  blocking  up  of  the 
passes  to  the  west. 

4.  Few  of  the  solutions  considered  the  network  of  rail- 
roads and  dirt  roads  in  connection  with  rapid  concentra- 
tions. 

5.  Few  discussed  the  opportunities  offered  by  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains  for  a  flank  position  against  the  advance  of 
the  Reds  in  event  of  their  crossing  near  Washington. 


INDEX 


Page 

ADVANCE  : 

To  the  Tactical  Decision 262 

Convergent 221,  263 

Convergent,  Point  of  Concentration 221 

Divergent    __222 

Divergent,  Campaign  in  Champagne,  1814 222 

Divergent,  Serbs  in  1876 223 

Divergent,  Marengo,   1800   223 

Method   of   218-227 

Parallel    219 

Parallel,   Disadvantages   of   219 

ADVANCE  BASE: 

ADVANCE  POSITION  1 306 

Strategic  Lines  of 218 

ADVANCE   POST    : 306 

Establishment  of 336 

Moving  it  Forward   339 

Value    of    163,175 

ALLIES:    101 

In  Strategical  Defensive 135 

Support  of 132 

AMBUSCADE  DEFENSIVE — Modified  Form  of 309 

ARMY  of  the  Potomac — Bases  of,  Peninsula  Campaign,  1862_178 

ARMY  and  Navy — Co-operation  of 328 

ART  OF  WAR: 

Importance  of .,1-3 

Knowledge   of   1-3 

ASSAILANT  Must  Follow  Defender  Wherever  He  Goes 130 

ASSAULT — Final  Stage  in  Tactical  Offensive 262 

ATTACK  : 

Advancing    258 

Dispositions   for    258 

Fire   259 

Frontal,    Advantages    228 

Frontal,    Disadvantages    : 228 

Frontal,  Advance  in  Parallel  Columns 229 

Frontal,  Campaign  in  Civil  War,  1864 229 

Frontal,  German  Rush  Through  Belgium  and  France 

in    1914   229 

Frontal,  Russo-Japanese  War,   1904-5 :_229 

Frontal,  Saint  Privat 112 

Holding   270 

Pushing  it  Too  Far 142 

Selecting  the  Point  of 110 

Successive 267 

Tactical    Frontal    264 

What  is  Necessary  to  Make  it  Possible 265 

ATTACK  of  a  Wing: 

Strategical   238 

Conditions  That  Must  be  Observed __238 

Strategical,  Ulm,  1805 238 

ATTACK  on  Flank  and  Rear— Strategical 248 

i 


INDEX 

Page 

ATTACK  ON  FLANK: 

Strategical,  Military  Operations  in  Roumania  in  1916-249 
Strategical,  St.  Mihiel  in  1914 249 

ATTACK  on  Rear: 

Strategical    250 

Strategical,  The  Strategic  Square 250 

Strategical,   Mass  Maneuver 251 

BASE: 

Abandoning  of,  Sherman  in  Georgia 184 

Abandoning  of,  Grant  at  Vicksburg 185 

Advance,  Establishment  of 336 

Best   in   Former   Times   171 

Changing  of   177 

Higher  Valuation  of  in  Older  Times 171 

Meaning  of  in  the  Modern  Sense 171 

Military  Road  171 

Modern,  Considerations   Affecting   175 

Navigable  River  171 

Right-angular    ' 176 

Simple  Advancing  of 180 

Temporary  Severance  from 186 

Unexpected  Separation  from 186 

BASES  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Peninsula  Campaign, 
1862   178 

BASE  OF  OPERATIONS 19-22 

170-187 

BESIEGED — Attempts  of,  to  Break  Out 267 

BLUCHER'S  Campaign  in  1813 102 

CAMPAIGN  : 

Alexander  the  Great 172 

Continual  Flow  of  Events 151 

First  Phase  of  Napoleon's  Lower  Elbe 173 

Geographical    Designation    150 

Meaning  of   Word   150 

Napoleon  in  1800 172 

Napoleon    in    1813    173 

Second  Phase  of  Napoleon's  Middle  Elbe 173 

Single 150 

The    First    Encounter    155 

In  Italy  in  1796.     Napoleonic  Type  of  Concentration _ 208 

Of  1805.     Napoleonic  Type  of   Concentration   209 

Of  1806.     Napoleonic  Type  of  Concentration 210 

Of  1813.     Napoleonic  Type  of  Concentration -__214 

Of  1815.     Napoleonic  Type  of  Concentration 211 

Of  1866.     Von  Moltke  Type  of  Concentration 212 

CAVALRY    78 

COAST  LINE — Description  of 341 

COMBINATIONS: 

Illustration  of  the  Various  45 

Of  Strategical  and  Tactical  Offensive 44 

COMMUNICATION  : 

Advantages  of  Dirt  Roads 189 

Change  Wrought  by  Modern  Transportation 195 

Disadvantages   of   the   Sea    194 

Good    ___306 

Guarding  the  Lines  of 99 

Limitation  on  the  Sea 194 

Objection  to  Rivers  as  Means  of I_I___Il93 

ij 


INDEX 

Page 

Preferential   Means  of   194 

Railroads    191 

Routes  by  Water   192 

Safest   Kind   of    189 

Severing  Connection  With,  at  the  Present  Time 201 

COMPULSORY  SERVICE 34 

CONCENTRATION  75 

Advantages  of  Napoleonic  Type 215 

Advantages  of  von  Moltke  Type 216 

Disadvantages  of  Napoleonic  Type 215 

Disadvantages  of  von  Moltke  Type 216 

German,  In   Recent   War   76 

Kind  of  Generals  Necessary  in  von  Moltke  Type 217 

Kind  of  Troops  necessary  in  von  Moltke  Type 217 

Large.     Disadvantages  of   54 

Napoleonic  Type,  Campaign -of  1806 210 

Napoleonic  Type,  Campaign  of  1815 211 

Napoleonic  Type,  Defense  of  France  in  1814 211 

Napoleonic  Type,  Campaign  in  Italy  in  1796 208 

Napoleonic  Type,  Campaign  of  1805 209 

Our  Own   Strategic  Plans  of 162 

Point  of,  Convergent  Advance 221 

Selection  of  point  of 208 

Strategic 206-217 

Two  Classes  of 208 

Von    Moltke   Type   212 

Von  Moltke  Type,  Control  Must  be  Complete 213 

Of   Enemy   162 

To  the  Rear 286 

CONCENTRIC  FIRE.     Value  of  109 

CO-OPERATION  : 

Army  and  Navy 328 

Example  of  What  Happened  at  Magersfontein 257 

CORPS  DEPOT 68 

COUNTER-ATTACK    271 

Simplest  Kind  of 138 

COVER  AND  CONCEALMENT 305 

CROSSING  : 

The  Frontier 25-27 

River,  Proper  Way  to  Defend 317 

DARKNESS 114 

Advantage  of,  in  Tactical  Defensive  Operations 297 

Has  Won  Many  Battles 280 

DECISIVE — Battle    302 

If  Successful  at  One  Point __111 

DEFENDER  : 

Has     Support     of     Inhabitants     and     Administrative 

Depots 126 

Has  Support  of  Entire  People 126 

Making  Use  of  All  Natural  and  Artificial  Features  _125 

DEFENSE: 

Bragg's,  Mountain  Ranges  East  of  the  Tennessee  ___315 

Continual  Flow  of  Events  on _151 

Different  Methods  of IIIIll? 

Proper  Method  of,  in  Mountain  Warfare  _  314 

Of  Ratisbon  122 

Strategical   and   Tactical   __.  I  45 


111 


INDEX 

Page 

Of  France  in  1814.     Napoleonic  Type  of  Concentra- 
tion  211 

Of  Transylvania  Alps.     Mountain  Warfare 314 

DEFENSIVE  : 

Advantages  of 41 

Ambuscade,  Modified  Form  of 309 

Change  From  Offensive,  and  the  Reverse 139-148 

Most   Salient  Points  of   Superiority  of  the   Offensive 

Over    95 

Negative    Purposes    123 

Nobody  Should  Take  it  Deliberately 159 

Plan  of 164 

Position 118 

Retreating    118 

Retreating  and  Step  by  Step 119 

Retreating,   Franco-Prussian   War,  1870   281 

Retreating,   Portugal,   1810   281 

Retreating,  Russo-Turkish  War 282 

Retreating,  Must  Arrive  at  Position  With  Army  Not 

Demoralized   282 

Retreating,  Case  When  Assistance  is  Expected  From 

Allies  283 

Retreating,   Even  if  the   Assailant  is   Successful   His 

Army  May  Grow  Tired  of  War 283 

Retreating,  Previously  Prepared  Positions 283 

Sortie 122 

Tactical    45 

Types  of 41 

Offensive   and    40 

To  Offensive,  Change   From   143 

DEFENSIVE  OPERATIONS: 

Combined    Offensive   and    295 

Artificial    Works    278 

Disease    279 

Exhaustion  of  the   Enemy    279 

Strategical,    Object    of    275 

Strategical,  Serious  Resistance  Not  Always  Necessary  275 

Strategical,    Terrain    277 

Strategical,   Time   and    Space  275 

Strategical,  Weather 278 

Tactical,  Advantage  of  Darkness   297 

Tactical,  Aids   298 

Tactical,  Elements  That  Must  be  Present 308 

Tactical,  Losses  Must  be  Kept  in  Mind  by  Defender  298 

Tactical,  Object  of 297 

Tactical,  Special   Forms  of 307 

DELAYS  : 

On   Part   of   Assailant   123 

Must  Not  be  Too  Costly 280 

DEPARTURE — Line   of   288 

DEPLOYMENT    299 

DESCENTS — Divergent  and  Contingent 345 

DESERTS — Value  of 319 

DETACHMENTS: 

Flank    224 

Formation   and   Forwarding  of   67 

Rule  for  or  Doctrine  of  Economy 54 

DEVASTATION  OF  COUNTRY— To  Delay  the  Enemy 281 


INDEX 

Page 

DIEBITSCH'S  Campaign  in  the  Balkans  _  __103 

DISPOSITIONS: 

Defensive    302 

Of    Troops    302 

DISTANCES  AND  EXERTION   141 

DIVERGENT   Descents   34 

DIVERGENT  LINES  263 

ENDURANCE — Advantage   of   Great   56 

ENEMY: 

Always  Figure  That  He  Will  Do  the  Right  Thing  __161 

Concentration  of —162 

ENTRENCHED  CAMPS: 

As    Supporting   Points    321 

Modern  Idea  of 321 

ENVELOPMENT — Strategical    239 

Bears  Results  on  the  Battlefield 241 

Advantage  of  Double  Base 242 

Dangers  of   Movement   239 

Double   243 

Effect  on  the   Enemy  240 

Effect  of  Superior  Numbers 241 

Forces  a  Battle 241 

Generall  No  Pursuit 242 

Point  of  Culmination 239 

Possible  Toward  the  Close  of  War 243 

Two    Most    Important    Requirements    With    Regards 

to  Troops 242 

ENVELOPMENT — Tactical   268 

EQUIPMENT — United  States  A.rmy  in  Recent  War 81 

ERRORS — Committed  by  Assailant   123 

EXERTION  and  Distances 141 

EXPENSES    132 

EXPOSURE    113 

FATIGUE    113 

FINANCE  AND  WAR «_ 83-91 

Watching  of,  to  Discover  Indications  of  Approaching 

War   85 

FINANCIAL  CONDITIONS — State  of  Prior  to  the  Outbreak  of 

The  World  War 86 

FIRE: 

Attack 259 

Field  of 303 

Interruption    of    113 

FLANKS: 

Both  in  the  Air 305 

Fortresses   as   Support  for   323 

FLANK  POSITIONS: 

Advantages    of    288 

Disadvantages    of    288 

Ignoring  Them 130 

May  be  Taken  Up  as  a  Part  of  an  Offensive  Plan  ___289 

Strategical,  Requisite  of  Good 288 

Tactical  309 

Taking  up,  by  the  Defender 128 

FORESTS  319 

FORTS : 

Barrier    322 

Field  Army  Emerging  From  Cover  of  _  __323 


INDEX 

Page 

FORTRESS: 

Deliverance  from   324 

Political   Considerations   322 

Power  of  Attraction   324 

Power  of  Attraction   That  it  Can   Exert  on  a   Field 

Army 324 

.     Value  of   321 

As  a  Support  for  Flank 323 

Used  in  Connection  With  Field  Army 323 

Frontier  to  be  Held  After  Defender  Falls  Back 322 

GERMAN  ARMY — Mobilization  of 70 

HALTING  PLACE  a  Natural  Obstacle 152 

HOSTILE  Inhabitants  in  Rear 98 

INDIFFERENCE  TO  WAR 127 

INHABITANTS — Effect  upon  Lines  of  Communication 198 

INITIATIVE 43 

INTERIOR  LINES: 

Campaign  in  Champagne,   1814   293 

Chancellorsville   293 

Early's  Resisting  Power 293 

INTERIOR  LINES: 

Elements  That  Contribute  to  the  Success  of  a  Force  on  292 

Roumanians    295 

Sedgwick    294 

Strategical    292 

Wilderness    294 

World  War 292 

INTERVENTION — Armed    100 

INVADER  May  Separate  His  Columns  Thereby  Enabling  the 

Defender  to  Strike  any  One  of  Them  in  Detail 129 

INVASION  of  Hostile  Territory — Moral  Effect  of 96 

Of  Serbia  in  1914.     Austrian,  Example  of  Strategical 

Turning  Movement 244 

JAPANESE  : 

Campaign  in  Manchuria . 104 

Landing  in  Manchuria 339 

JUTLAND— Battle  of 36 

LANDING  in  Manchuria,  Japanese 339 

Of  3d  Japanese  Division  in  Manchuria 342 

LANDING  PLACE — Determining  Locality  of 341 

LEADERS  AND  TROOPS — Kind  of  for  an  Offensive 106 

LIAO  YANG — Operations  at 111 

LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION: 

Base  May  be  off  to  a  Flank 200 

Change    in    129 

Changing  from  One  Line  to  Another 201 

Disadvantages    190 

Egypt    197 

General  Principles  Regarding 188 

Guarding   of    99 

How  the  Change  Should  be  Made 201 

Length    of    198 

Long  Lines  Dangerous 198 

Opening  a  New  Line  by  Taking  up  a  Flank  Position  200 

Petersburg,  Campaign  of  1864-65 189 

Railroads    191 

Routes  by  Water 192 

Safety  of,  Depends  on  How  Well  the  Country  in  Rear 

is    Policed    198 

vi 


INDEX 

Page 

Security  of 198 

Size  of  Trains 199 

Slight  Change  of  Position  Causes  Trouble 200 

Surrendering,  Temporarily  to  Secure  Another 201 

Retreat    188-205 

MAP  PROBLEM   350 

MARCHES  : 

Flank 223 

Flank,  Advantages    224 

Flank,  Disadvantages    224 

Flank,  Necessity  of 225 

Night  226 

Radetsky's  Flank  and  Night,  in  1848 225 

MEETING    ENGAGEMENTS    262 

METHODS  OF  WAGING  WAR 39-48 

MILITARY  HISTORY: 

As  a  Substitute,  The  Study  of 5-14 

Strategy,  The  Study  of 1-5 

MILITARY  ORGANIZATION — Of  the  Present  Day 34 

MOBILIZATION 23-25 

59,64 

French    65 

German,  Plan  of  1870 71 

German,  In  Recent  War,  Failure  to  Complete 75 

In  United  States  in  Recent  War 80 

Of  the  German  Army 70 

MODERN  WAR: 

Distinguishing  Characteristics  of 57 

Special  Nature  of 35 

MORALE — A  Strong  Feature  of  the  Offensive 93 

MOUNTAIN  RANGES — Special  Types  of  Warfare 311 

MOUNTAIN   WARFARE  311 

Bragg's  Defense  of  Mountain  Ranges  East  of  Tennes- 
see  315 

Defense  of  South  Mountain   315 

Defense  of  the  Transylvanian  Alps 314 

Holding  All  the  Passes 313 

Holding  Passes  to  Gain  Time  and  Tire  Enemy 314 

Proper  Method  of  Defense 314 

Roads    313 

Supply 314 

MOVEMENT  OF  PURSUED— Pursuer  Often  Controls 279 

NAVY-ARMY,  Co-operation  of    328 

Map  Problems  Illustrating  Principles  Concerned 350 

OBJECTIVE: 

Limited    263 

Selection   of    50 

OBSTACLES : 

Artificial    320 

Broad  Stream  or  Other 289 

Tactical   Defensive  Operations   303 

OFFENSIVE: 

Change  from  Defensive  to,  and  the  Reverse 139-148 

General  Costliness  of,  in  Men 101 

Kind  of  Leaders  and  Troops  for 106 

Losses  of,  Sometimes  Make  the  Change  Imperative  _141 
Most  Salient  Points  of  Superiority  of,  Over  the  Defen- 
sive     95 

vii 


INDEX 

Page 

Point  at  Which  It  Should  Sue  for  Peace 105 

Some  of  the  Disadvantages  of 97 

Strategical  92-107 

Tactical    44,107-116 

Waning  Power  of , 104 

And    Defensive    _ 40 

OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE: 

First  Important  Point  in  Preparing  the  Plan  of  Opera- 
tions     146 

Operations,   Combined   295 

Joffre  in  1914,  Combined 147 

OFFENSIVE  TO  DEFENSIVE — Change  from,  Proper   Moment 
for    140 

OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS — Tactical : 

Allowing  the  Strategical  Situation  to  Mature 255 

Moltke  at  Sadowa,   in   1866   256 

Right   Time   for   _ 256 

With  Special   Forms  254 

Superiority 254 

OPERATIONS: 

Base  of 19-25 

Dash    in    152 

Distance  Too  Long  in 152 

First  Important  Point  in  Preparing  the  Plan  of 161 

Importance  of  Right  Choice  of  Lines  of 168 

Lines  and  Objects  of   ,-___; 166 

Military    149-169 

Object   of   : 169 

Object  Remains  the  Same 160 

Plan  of  Project  of 153 

Previous  Preparation  Necessary  if  it  is  Not  to  be  In- 
terrupted     152 

Study  of  the  Theater  of 14-18 

OVERSEA  EXPEDITIONS:    •. 355 

Selection  of  a  Base 336 

PENETRATION  : 

Action  in  Event  of,  at  Point  of  Junction  of  Two  Ar- 
mies     236 

Italian,   at  Vittorio-Veneto    237 

Point  of  Union  of  Two  Armies 236 

Time   for    Same   265 

Von  Mackensen's,  in  the  Spring  of  1915 235 

PENETRATION — STRATEGICAL:    230 

Best   Time  for   232 

Campaign   of   Waterloo    234 

Disadvantages   231 

Frederick  the  Great  in  Bohemia 232 

Henry  and  Donelson  232 

Illustrations  of  Bonaparte  in  1796 233 

Political  Interests 233 

PENINSULA  CAMPAIGN   1862.     Bases  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac    i 178 

PLAN— Sensible  Moderation  in 165 

PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS: 

Constituent  Parts _165 

Project  or 18,19 

STRATEGIC    CONCENTRATION — Surprise    206 

viii 


INDEX 

Page 

STRATEGICAL   DEFENSIVE:   45,117-138 

Exhaustion  of  the  Enemy 133 

Inactivity  Has  a  Bad  Effect  Upon  Defenders 135 

Kinds    of    27 

Loss  of  Territory  at  the  Outset 134 

Sickness    135 

Special  Forms  of 288 

Some  of  the  Disadvantages 133 

STRATEGICAL  DIRECTION 252 

STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE: 

Frontal  Attack 228 

Kind  of  Troops  for 158 

Penetration    230 

Special  Forms  of 228 

STRATEGICAL  OFFENSIVE: 45,92-116 

Exceptions   to    47 

When  It  Can  be  Carried  Out  by  Poor  Troops 106 

STRATEGICAL    PRINCIPLES — Application    of    in    Napoleon's 

First  and  Last  Campaigns 3-5 

SUPERIORITY  : 

Most  Salient  Points  of,  Offensive  Over  the  Defensive.  95 
Tactical,  Offensive  Operations   254 

SUPPLY: 

Method  of,  Mountain  Warfare 314 

SURPRISE  : 

An  Ally  of  the  Tactical  Offensive 109 

Element  in  Modern  War 16-17 

Perpetration  of 128 

Strategic  Concentration,  as  a  Means  to  Bring  it  About  208 

TACTICAL  DECISION — Advance  to  262 

TACTICAL    DEFENSIVE    45,136 

TACTICAL   OFFENSIVE:    45 

Importance  of  Good  Troops  in 107 

Possibilities  of  Making  Mistakes  in  Initial  Movement.  115 

Special    Forms   of    264 

Weak  Points   of   113 

TACTICAL  SUPERIORITY — The  Precondition  for  Success 26,27 

TERRAIN  : 

Change  on  Account  of 141 

Tactical  Defensive  Operations . 297 

THEATER  OF  OPERATIONS — Study  of '. 14, 18 

THEATER  OF  WAR 124 

TIME: 

A  Defender's  Friend 124 

Proper  Selection  of  is  a  Matter  of  Judgment 139 

TRAINING — In  the  United  States 81 

TRANSPORTATION  : 

Modern,  Change  Wrought  by,  in  Means  of  Communi- 
cation     195 

Oversea    176 

TROOPS : 

Disposition    of    302 

Kind  of  Leaders  and  Troops  for  an  Offensive 106 

Massing  of,  in  an  Offensive 94 

TURNING  MOVEMENT — Strategical   243 

Austrian  Invasion  of  Serbia  in  1914 244 

Battle  of  the  Aisne  in  1914 245 

Battle   of    Wilderness    247 

ix 


INDEX 

Page 

Battle  with  Reverse  Fronts 248 

Difficult  to  Carry  Out  in  the  Future 244 

Strategic  Fronts  Parallel 245 

Strategical,  Lule  Burgas,  1912 248 

Strategical,  Must  Not  be  Dilatory 248 

TURNING  MOVEMENT — Tactical:   269 

Mountain  Passes.     Battle  of  Motienling 273 

Mountain  Passes.     Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain 274 

Rivers.     Crossing  of  the  Yalu  River  in  1904 271 

TURNING  MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  FUTURE 245 

TURNING  POINT 280 

WAR — An  Almost  Certain  Sign  of 86 

WARS— Cost  of  Since  1776 90 

WAR: 

Definition   of   30 

Indifference    100 

Method  of  Waging   39-48 

Object   of   30 

POSITIVE  NATURE  OF  WAR 30-38 

POSITION  : 

Advance    306 

Fortified    320 

Fortified,   Illustration   of   320 

POST— Advance    306 

PREPARATION 153 

PREPARATION  FOR  WAR 59-81 

PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY 49-58 

PROJECT  OR  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS 18,19 

PRUSSIAN  PLAN  IN  1870 166 

PURSUIT    300 

RAILROADS : 

A  Preferential  Means  of  Communications 194 

An  Advantage  to  the  Defender 125 

Disadvantages  of,  as  a  Means  of  Communications 195 

Lateral    177 

Lines  of   Communication    191 

Russians  in   Manchuria   191 

Sherman   in  Georgia  191 

Single  and  Double  Track  Lines 192 

RECONNAISSANCE    298 

RENCONTRE  OR  MEETING  ENGAGEMENT 262 

RESERVES : 

Calling  Out  of  French  in  1868 66 

Enrollment   in    1868    66 

General   305 

Operation  Attending  the  Calling  in  of  in  1868 67 

RESERVISTS — Incorporation  of,  and  Dispatch  to  their  Regi- 
ments     67 

RETIREMENT — Direct    285 

RETREAT : 

Convergent,  Object  of 285 

Convergent,  In  Case  of  Surprise 286 

Disadvantage  of  an  Eccentric  or  Divergent 203 

Divergent.     Benefit   of    286 

Double  Divergent.     May  Mislead  the  Enemy 287 

Double  Divergent.     Crossing  an  Obstacle 287 

Lines   of   202,289 

Lines  of,  Army  That  is  Not  Defeated __202 


INDEX 

Page 

Line  of,  Blucher  at  Waterloo 202 

Lines  of  Communication 188,205 

Line  of,  Eccentric  or  Divergent 203 

RIVERS  : 

Importance  of,  In  Defense  of  a  Country 316 

Parallel  to  the  March  of  the  Army 316 

Perpendicular  to  an  Army's  Line  of  March 317 

Proper  Way  to  Defend  a  Crossing 317 

ROADS — Mountain   Warfare  313 

ROUTES  BY  WATER:   192 

Elbe    193 

Mississippi    193 

Objection  to  Rivers  as  Means  of  Communication 193 

Rivers    192 

Sea   192 

RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR:   181 

Co-operation  of  the  Army  and  Navy 182 

Second    Army    183 

Third  Army 183 

RUSSO-TURKISH    WAR:    56,103 

Retreating  Defensive 282 

SAINT  PRIVAT— Attack  at 112 

SELECTIVE  SERVICE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 78 

SICKNESS    135 

SIGNAL  COMMUNICATION — Importance  of,  in  Battle 264 

SITUATION  : 

Political    157 

Strategical,  Allowing  it  to  Mature 255 

SOUTH  AFRICAN  WAR 56 

SPANISH  CAMPAIGN  IN  1810 103 

STORES — Supply    64 

STRATEGY : 

First  Principles  of 49-58 

Logical  Definition  of 11-14 

Military  History,  The  Study  of 1-5 

Second  Principle  of J 53 

STRATEGIC  CONCENTRATION: 206-218 

Object  of   __206 

WAR: 

Positive  Nature  of 30-38 

Preparation  for   59-82 

WAR  AND  FINANCE 83-91 

WARFARE  : 

Special  Types  of 311 

WORLD  WAR— Tables  Showing  How  it  Affected  the  Finan- 
ces and  Wealth  of  the  Principal  Belligerents 89 


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